<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:public trust &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/public-trust/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/public-trust/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 15 Dec 2025 14:10:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Dec 2025 13:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[advanced analytics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[advisory councils]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI safety frameworks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI-enabled national preparedness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biosecurity infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bipartisan engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[co-stewardship of national resilience]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[codifying capabilities in law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congress as strategic partner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[continuity across administrations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense planning ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratic oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Department of Energy (DOE) quantum networks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disaster response]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[distributed quantum networking testbed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic competitiveness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[entanglement distribution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[experimental infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[federal guidance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intellectual property protections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international norms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ion-trap quantum computer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mission-driven portfolios]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multi-stakeholder governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multi-year funding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Quantum Initiative (NQI)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national resilience]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Navy quantum RDT&E]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[near-term use cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nontraditional vendors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Other Transaction Authority (OTA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oversight boards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pilot programs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public-private partnerships]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum communications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum communications corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum networking testbeds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum-resilient communications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum-resistant secure transmission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RDT&E portfolio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[responsible technology use]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stable appropriations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statutory roles for key technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic competitiveness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[streamlined oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply-chain monitoring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply-chain security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tech–government alliances]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[threat detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trust in government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[workforce opportunity]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31969</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The tech industry can increase the nation’s trust in government by becoming a reliable and visibly accountable partner for securing America’s technological edge. Specifically, the tech industry can help Congress codify critical capabilities in law and funding provisions that outlast political cycles. Doing so successfully will require long-term relationships with legislators, bipartisan support, and clear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/">Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The tech industry can increase the nation’s trust in government by becoming a reliable and visibly accountable partner for securing America’s technological edge. Specifically, the tech industry can help Congress codify critical capabilities in law and funding provisions that outlast political cycles. Doing so successfully will require long-term relationships with legislators, bipartisan support, and clear safeguards that reassure the public that powerful technologies are used in the best interest of the nation.<a href="https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer">[1</a>]​</p>
<p><strong>Why Trust and Continuity Matter</strong></p>
<p>Recent trust surveys show that public confidence in both government and business has declined, with many people believing institutional leaders are not honest with them. The 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer, for example, highlights a “crisis of grievance,” in which large segments of the population feel left behind and are more inclined to distrust complex policy and technology initiatives.<a href="https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/">[2</a>]​</p>
<p>This erosion of trust is particularly dangerous at a time when artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and advanced biotechnologies are central to economic and military competition. A report submitted to Congress by U.S.–China policy experts emphasizes that both countries now treat these technologies as strategic industries, tying them directly to national power and long-term security.[<u>4]</u>​</p>
<p><strong>Building Durable Relationships with Legislators</strong></p>
<p>For technology companies, increasing national trust starts with treating Congress as a long‑term strategic partner, not simply as an annual budget gatekeeper.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">[4]</a>​</p>
<ul>
<li>Institutionalize bipartisan technology engagement: Firms can create recurring, nonpartisan briefings and workshops with relevant committees to explain how artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, cyber, and bio tools affect national resilience, economic competitiveness, and workforce opportunity. By engaging members and staff from both parties, companies reduce the perception that emerging technologies are aligned with a single political faction.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">[5]</a>​</li>
<li>Lead with ethics, safety, and security: Research on public attitudes toward AI suggests people are more supportive when they see clear safeguards, transparency, and accountability mechanisms within the tech industry. Companies can build trust by proactively presenting their AI safety frameworks, data-protection policies, and supply‑chain security measures, aligning them with federal guidance and international norms on responsible technology use.<a href="https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf">[6]</a>​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Securing Sustained Funding for Critical Technology</strong></p>
<p>Trust is reinforced when technology programs are clearly tied to enduring strategic missions and supported through stable, multi‑year funding rather than fragile pilots.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">[5]</a>​</p>
<ul>
<li>Connect capabilities to mission portfolios: Instead of scattered line items, technology programs can be organized into mission‑driven portfolios—such as quantum‑resilient communications, AI‑enabled national preparedness, or biosecurity infrastructure—that span research, prototyping, and deployment over several years. Multi‑year authorizations and appropriations make it harder for any single administration to abruptly cancel essential capabilities.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf">[4]</a>​</li>
<li>Use innovation tools that protect both government and industry: Policy analyses highlight the value of mechanisms like Other Transaction Authority and structured public‑private partnerships to bring nontraditional vendors into national security and infrastructure work more quickly. By pairing these tools with clearer intellectual property protections and streamlined oversight, legislators can encourage top-tier tech firms to stay engaged in sensitive missions over the long term.<a href="https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4">[8]</a>​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Embedding Technology in Law, Not Just Budgets</strong></p>
<p>To prevent critical technologies from being swapped out with each political shift, their roles must be written into statute and tied to democratic oversight.<a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/">[9]</a>​</p>
<ul>
<li>Statutory roles for key technologies: Laws governing defense planning, critical infrastructure, and economic security should explicitly call for the use of AI, secure digital infrastructure, and advanced analytics in defined mission areas, such as threat detection, disaster response, and supply‑chain monitoring. Once these roles are codified, dismantling them requires visible legislative action rather than quiet executive changes.<a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/">[9]</a>​</li>
<li>Multi-stakeholder governance in legislation: Legislated advisory councils and oversight boards that include government, industry, academia, and civil society should supervise high-impact technologies and publish regular reports. This structure signals that powerful tools are subject to ongoing, pluralistic scrutiny rather than being controlled solely by political appointees or corporate executives.<a href="https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf">[10]</a>​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Quantum Networking Testbed Infrastructure</strong></p>
<p>The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put forth by Congress each year does not typically use a single, generic phrase like “quantum networking testbeds” in isolation; instead, it authorizes and directs specific programs and experiments that collectively constitute quantum networking testbed infrastructure. Several provisions and related authoritative documents are especially relevant to the future of quantum technology growth.</p>
<p>A Senate Armed Services Committee fact sheet on the fiscal year 2024 NDAA highlights language that “authorizes increased funding for a distributed quantum networking testbed” and the development of a next-generation ion‑trap quantum computer at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). While the fact sheet summarizes rather than reproduces the statutory text, it makes clear that Congress explicitly authorized a distributed quantum networking testbed as part of the defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&amp;E) portfolio.<a href="https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/">[12]</a>​</p>
<p>Within the fiscal year 2025 NDAA, Congress, “authorizes funding to create a ‘quantum communications corridor’ as part of Navy research, development, test, and evaluation.” This is an explicit description of support for a testbed or network to advance quantum communication research so the Navy and the Department of Defense (DoD) can securely transmit information resistant to quantum computer decryption.<a href="https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa">[15]</a>​</p>
<p>Other recent NDAA cycles also include broader direction that reinforces these testbed authorizations, such as requirements for DoD to establish pilot programs for promising quantum computing capabilities and to identify near‑term use cases that can be fielded within two years. These provisions do not always use the word “testbed” in the operative clause, but they direct the department to stand up experimental infrastructure and pilots that, in practice, operate as quantum networking and computing testbeds for defense applications.<a href="https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/">[16]</a>​</p>
<p>In parallel, the National Quantum Initiative framework and associated Department of Energy (DOE) efforts describe quantum networking testbeds as shared infrastructure for entanglement distribution and quantum communications, and Congressional action has repeatedly referenced these federal testbeds and network efforts as part of the broader quantum information science ecosystem that the DoD can leverage.<a href="https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf">[13]</a>​</p>
<p>Ensuring key technologies not only protect the nation but are also provided with substantial investment and economic promise is a necessity for companies to further their developmental efforts. Demonstrating that quantum technologies are viable for multiple applications—within internal defense and external partnerships—is one possible solution as tech companies become increasingly concerned with the long-term payoff of their test bed programs. For now, defense authorization bills appear to be the most forward leaning avenue supported by government, but the long-term stability of this method has yet to be validated.</p>
<p><strong>How This Approach Builds Public Trust</strong></p>
<p>When the tech industry engages both parties and chambers in Congress, supports multi-year statutory programs, and accepts meaningful oversight, it demonstrates that emerging technologies are being developed within a framework of law, ethics, and long-term national interest. In such a system, citizens can see that AI, quantum computing, and other advanced capabilities are not partisan experiments or purely profit-driven ventures, but part of a durable national strategy subject to democratic control.<a href="https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance">[2]</a>​</p>
<p>The tech sector can both strengthen U.S. strategic competitiveness and contribute tangibly to rebuilding public trust in government by positioning itself as a co-steward of national resilience, helping design governance mechanisms, committing to transparency, and working with legislators to hard‑wire critical technologies into law and funding.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf">[5]</a>​</p>
<p>Sources:</p>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer">https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer</a></li>
<li><a href="https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/">https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance">https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf">https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3&#8211;U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf">https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/chapter/executive-summary">https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/chapter/executive-summary</a></li>
<li><a href="https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4">https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/">https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf">https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/audio-articles/restoring-faith-in-leadership-in-the-age-of-grievance/">https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/audio-articles/restoring-faith-in-leadership-in-the-age-of-grievance/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/">https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf">https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NQI-Annual-Report-FY2025.pdf">https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NQI-Annual-Report-FY2025.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa">https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/">https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/</a></li>
</ol>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Beyond-the-Next-Administration-Building-Enduring-TechGovernment-Alliances-for-National-Power.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="256" height="71" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 256px) 100vw, 256px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/">Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Justin Miller]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 13:15:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2020 ban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024 return]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American buyer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ByteDance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electoral politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign influence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political pawn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political rhetoric]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pragmatic governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public good]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security threat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TikTok]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30150</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In modern politics, decisions often seem driven more by narrow interests than by a genuine concern for the public good. A prime example of this is the evolving stance on TikTok in American political discourse. In 2020, President Donald Trump led a campaign to ban TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/">TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In modern politics, decisions often seem driven more by narrow interests than by a genuine concern for the public good. A prime example of this is the evolving stance on TikTok in American political discourse.</p>
<p>In 2020, President Donald Trump led a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/08/06/900019185/trump-signs-executive-order-that-will-effectively-ban-use-of-tiktok-in-the-u-s">campaign to ban</a> TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership and compromise of private data by the Chinese government. Four years later, Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/tiktok-goes-dark-us-users-trump-says-save-tiktok-2025-01-19/">delayed the removal</a> of TikTok from the American market as he looks to find an American buyer for the popular app. This apparent reversal raises the question, is this change motivated by legitimate considerations or political advantage?</p>
<p><strong>The 2020 Ban: National Security or Politics?</strong></p>
<p>During his first term, President Trump pushed to ban TikTok. This effort was framed as a national security measure. Concerns were raised that the app’s parent company, ByteDance, was sharing user data with the Chinese government, posing a threat to American citizens and government operations.</p>
<p>While these concerns were legitimate, critics argued the move was also a political maneuver. It allowed Trump to position himself as tough on China, appealing to his base and broader nationalistic sentiments during an election year. Few analysts considered that both can be true. Politics, particularly those surrounding a beloved video app, were too divisive.</p>
<p><strong>2024: The Return of TikTok?</strong></p>
<p>Fast forward to 2024, and the reported pivot to support TikTok’s return appears incongruous. The core issues cited in 2020—national security and data privacy—have not fundamentally changed. In fact, Americans better understand what it means to have sensitive personal data captured and potentially used for nefarious purposes by an adversary state. Highly contentious congressional testimony by the leaders of social media companies in 2024 only shined a further spotlight on how such firms do not work for the good of users.</p>
<p>Why then would President Trump seek to save the platform? One possible explanation is the platform’s immense popularity, particularly among younger demographics—a voting bloc Trump struggled to capture. Saving TikTok from the US Supreme Court’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/scotus/395462/supreme-court-tik-tok-garland-first-amendment-china">ruling</a> and ensuring its sale to an American firm could signal an attempt to appeal to these voters, making the move less about the app’s merits and more about electoral politics.</p>
<p><strong>Is It about the Public Good?</strong></p>
<p>President Trump’s changing perspective on TikTok may reveal a broader trend in modern politics—the prioritization of optics over substance. Leaders often take contradictory stances to align with prevailing public opinion or to cater to specific constituencies. In the case of TikTok, the narrative seems less about resolving genuine concerns and more about capitalizing on its cultural ubiquity. If national security was a pressing concern in 2020, the question remains why it would be any less urgent today.</p>
<p>Ironically, users fleeing from TikTok prior to its designated cutoff date did not flock to American social media platforms as some might expect, but other Chinese platforms similar to TikTok. It seems Americans are angrier and more concerned that Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat are manipulating them than anything the Chinese Communist Party may do. Whether this is the wisest choice is yet to be determined.</p>
<p><strong>Political Rhetoric or Pragmatism?</strong></p>
<p>Ultimately, the fluctuating stance on TikTok underscores the blurred line between political rhetoric and pragmatic governance. Decisions on complex issues like technology and national security require consistency and transparency, yet they are often reduced to tools for political gain. This is a bipartisan issue that was not invented by President Trump. It has a long tradition dating back to the early days of the Republic. In fact, it is endemic to democratic systems.</p>
<p>Whether Trump’s recent position reflects a genuine change of heart or strategic posturing, it highlights the broader issue of political inconsistency. Leaders across the political spectrum often adjust their positions based on electoral strategy rather than principle, yet accountability for these shifts is rare. For example, former Vice President Kamala Harris initially endorsed “Medicare for All” during the 2020 Democrat primary, only to later soften her stance to appeal to moderate voters. These shifts demonstrate how political beliefs are easily adjusted to maximize votes. Whether on healthcare, national security, or technology policy, such reversals can erode public trust if not clearly explained to the electorate.</p>
<p>The ultimate resolution of TikTok’s future will depend on whether the app is sold to an American firm, as President Trump has stipulated, or whether it continues operating without a sale. Given the heightened concerns over data security and foreign influence, a lack of clarity on this issue could further weaken public confidence. While political reversals are common, abrupt shifts without clear explanations can make leadership appear inconsistent or opportunistic. Greater transparency from President Trump regarding his rationale would not only provide insight into the decision-making process but could also help mitigate skepticism about his motivations. At a time when trust in government is already fragile, reinforcing accountability and open communication is critical to maintaining public confidence.</p>
<p>The TikTok saga serves as a reminder that political decisions, especially those framed as national security concerns, are often entangled with strategic interests. In an era where public trust in government is fragile, transparency and consistency are essential. Without them, shifting narratives risk further eroding confidence in leadership—not just on TikTok, but on the larger issues that shape democracy itself.</p>
<p>Offering further explanation into President Trump’s plan and thinking would give the American people a better understanding of the variables under consideration and could potentially assuage some of the speculation into his motivation. Democracies require open communication between the citizenry and their representatives. TikTok is an example of just that.</p>
<p><em>Justin Miller is Associate Professor of Practice in the School of Cyber Studies at the </em><a href="https://cybersecurityonline.utulsa.edu/"><em>University of Tulsa</em></a><em>.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/TikTok_-Security-Threat-or-Political-Pawn_-Regardless-America-deserves-better.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="367" height="102" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 367px) 100vw, 367px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/">TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
