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	<title>Topic:psychological impact &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Why the Houthi Threat Persists</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2025 10:59:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Despite months of high-profile naval deployments by the United States and its European allies, Yemen’s Houthi movement launched disruptive attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The majority of attacks only stopped in May, after the United States struck Houthi targets to great effect. This led Houthi leaders to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/">Why the Houthi Threat Persists</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Despite months of high-profile naval deployments by the United States and its European allies, Yemen’s Houthi movement launched disruptive attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The majority of attacks only stopped in May, after the United States struck Houthi targets to great effect. This led Houthi leaders to seek a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/05/06/houthi-ceasefire-trump-yemen-attacks">ceasefire</a>.</p>
<p>The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/israel-launches-airstrikes-targeting-yemen-s-houthi-rebels-and-houthis-launch-missile-at-israel/ar-AA1I56QZ?ocid=BingNewsSerp">Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged</a> cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.</p>
<p>The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/21/houthis-threaten-to-target-us-ships-in-the-red-sea-if-they-participate-in-any-attack-on-ir">announced</a> that they would <a href="https://www.twz.com/news-features/houthis-launch-first-red-sea-attack-on-shipping-since-december">resume</a> attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.</p>
<p>As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.</p>
<p><strong>Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat</strong></p>
<p>At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.</p>
<p>The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.</p>
<p><strong>A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity</strong></p>
<p>Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.</p>
<p>Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.</p>
<p><strong>Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact</strong></p>
<p>The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ryfmgpnege">cost-effective</a> weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.</p>
<p>Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/25/houthi-fighters-down-200m-worth-of-us-drones-in-under-six-weeks">reinforcing</a> the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.</p>
<p>This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.</p>
<p>This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.</p>
<p><strong>Intelligence and Great Power Enablers</strong></p>
<p>What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/26/russia-provides-targeting-support-to-houthi-attacks-on-commercial-shipping/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-china-turned-the-red-sea-into-a-strategic-trap-for-the-us/">China</a>. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.</p>
<p>This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.</p>
<p><strong>The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations</strong></p>
<p>Many military planners agree that land operations are <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-yemen/">required</a> to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.</p>
<p>Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective<strong> </strong>land-sea-air doctrine integration.</p>
<p><strong>Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations</strong></p>
<p>The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.</p>
<p>The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.</p>
<p><strong>Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea</strong></p>
<p>The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.</p>
<p>To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.</p>
<p>A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Why-the-Houthi-Threat-Persists.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/">Why the Houthi Threat Persists</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Air Force&#8217;s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jun 2025 12:14:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30866</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is currently undergoing a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear triad and strategic bomber fleet, with the goal of ensuring a cost-effective and credible deterrent in an increasingly complex global security environment. From new cruise missiles to next-generation bombers and upgraded ICBMs, these programs represent a significant investment in national security. Each faces [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/">The Air Force&#8217;s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is currently undergoing a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear triad and strategic bomber fleet, with the goal of ensuring a cost-effective and credible deterrent in an increasingly complex global security environment. From new cruise missiles to next-generation bombers and upgraded ICBMs, these programs represent a significant investment in national security. Each faces unique challenges and demonstrates varying degrees of success according to a presentation by Lt Gen Andrew Gebara, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, on May 16, 2025, at a National Institute for Deterrence Studies event in Washington, DC.</p>
<p>One of the cornerstones of this modernization is the development of the B-21 <em>Raider</em>, the nation&#8217;s first <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-21-raider?utm_source=bingpaid&amp;utm_medium=search&amp;utm_campaign=air-b21raider&amp;utm_audience=customerhill&amp;utm_content=keywords&amp;utm_format=cpc&amp;code=APPLICANT_SOURCE-3-442&amp;source=APPLICANT_SOURCE-3-442&amp;msclkid=68ef6570ac181f25e1760d403e4be6e9">sixth-generation aircraft </a>and second stealth bomber. Poised to replace the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets, the B-21 embodies the pinnacle of airpower, offering dual-use capabilities and unparalleled lethality. Currently, the B-21 is in its flight test phase, and with multiple aircraft progressing through the assembly line, the B-21 program is largely on schedule and within budget, a testament to its efficient development. Once deployed, this capability will present a significant challenge to potential adversaries and strengthen America&#8217;s capacity to project power and effectively threaten vital enemy targets. Low observable stealth and other on-board technologies can ensure successful penetration and retaliation, placing high-value targets at risk in any cost-imposing deterrence strategy, even against the strongest defenses. This threat, along with the fear instilled by the B-21, will certainly cause any aggressor to reconsider attacking the United States or its allies. While the Air Force is <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/allvin-more-b-21s-may-be-necessary-b-52j-upgrade-goes-awry/">currently funded to buy 100 B-21 bombers</a>, the US Strategic Command commander recently <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/stratcom-chief-b-21s-lrso-strategic-systems/">testified</a> that 145 units are needed “to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security.”</p>
<p>Complementing the B-21 and B-52 is the nuclear-tipped Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Designed to replace the 40-year-old nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently deployed on the B-52, the LRSO is a crucial component of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Impressively, the LRSO program is <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20250507/118208/HHRG-119-AS29-Wstate-GebaraA-20250507.pdf">presently on track</a> regarding schedule and budget, which is a welcome anomaly in major defense acquisitions. Its success is further highlighted by three successful flight tests in 2025 alone, demonstrating its maturity and readiness. The critical question, however, remains: how many LRSO missiles does the nation truly need to maintain a robust deterrent? This calculus involves intricate geopolitical considerations, technological advancements, and the evolving threat landscape. As of 2023, the Air Force plans to procure <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lrso-production-decision-2027/">1,087 missiles</a>, with some 67 to be expended during the development phase.</p>
<p>Across the Atlantic, the NATO nuclear deterrent is undergoing its own transformation, centered on the F-35 fighter jet and the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. All planned units of the B61-12 have been produced, and the F-35 has achieved certification for nuclear operations. While several European allies have already certified their F-35 jets for this crucial mission, others are still awaiting delivery of their aircraft or are in the process of certification. This phased integration underscores the collaborative nature of NATO&#8217;s nuclear sharing arrangements and the ongoing commitment to collective security. The <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/478441/f-35a-lightning-ii/">F-35</a> is a nimble, adaptable, high-performance multirole fighter combining stealth, sensor fusion, and extraordinary situational awareness, enhancing the lethality of NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability.</p>
<p>The venerable senior citizen B-52H Stratofortress, a workhorse of the bomber fleet, is also receiving a suite of vital upgrades. These enhancements include new engines, radar systems, and upgraded nuclear communications systems.  While progress is being made on these upgrades, they are encountering higher costs and longer timelines <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/gao-b-52j-initial-operational-capability-three-year-delay/">than initially projected</a>. Nevertheless, the program is not &#8220;off the rails&#8221; and remains a critical effort to extend this enduring platform&#8217;s operational life and capabilities. When complete, the B-52J will be a more fuel-efficient, <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/lt_gen_gebara_written_posture_statement.pdf">reliable, modern, and better-integrated platform</a> going into the second half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Should the B-52J modernization effort be overly delayed or cancelled, it will likely be replaced with <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/allvin-more-b-21s-may-be-necessary-b-52j-upgrade-goes-awry/">additional B-21</a> bombers.</p>
<p>Finally, the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program represents a monumental undertaking. Beyond merely replacing the now 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, Sentinel involves a complete overhaul of the vast infrastructure spanning five missile fields. Following a Nunn-McCurdy recertification last year, all three stages of the missile, including the post-boost section, have undergone successful testing. The next crucial steps include laying <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/04/01/us-sentinel-icbm-delay/">some 7,000 miles</a> of fiber optic cables across five states to establish robust command and control capabilities for the deployed weapons. A significant cost driver that contributed to the Nunn-McCurdy breach was the <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/05/sentinel-icbm-program-needs-brand-new-silos-air-force-says/405077/">escalating cost of rebuilding</a> the individual launch facilities. General Gebara reminded the audience that with 450 launch facilities (LF), any growth or cost increases in one LF can be multiplied by 450. Therefore, a $1 million increase in the design, construction, or reconditioning of one LF equates to adding half a billion dollars to the program, highlighting the scale and complexity of this vital modernization effort. General Bussiere, commander of the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, <a href="https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3552578/continuing-peace-from-a-position-of-strength-afgsc-commander-outlines-moderniza/">describes the Sentinel ICBM project</a> as “the largest works project ever taken in fifty years [likely] since Eisenhower’s interstate program.”</p>
<p>The birth of the United States Air Force coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age and the rapid escalation of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence quickly became a central and defining mission, profoundly shaping USAF structure, development, and doctrine throughout the Cold War and beyond. In today’s complex era of great power competition, the USAF is, as it should be, deeply committed to modernizing and revitalizing its nuclear deterrent. While programs like the LRSO and B-21 demonstrate impressive progress, others, such as the B-52 upgrades and Sentinel ICBM, face inherent challenges. These efforts, though costly and complex, are essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrent in a dynamic global environment, ensuring national security for decades to come. This must be America’s number one priority!</p>
<p>As the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley once <a href="https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AG19491021.2.40">affirmed</a>, as a believer in humanity, he deplored the use of the atomic bomb; however, as a soldier, he respected it. The United States should be prepared to utilize the full psychological and military impact of the bomb to prevent a war and, if attacked, to win the war. He was right in October 1949, and his sentiment remains valid today; the Air Force must ensure that its segment of the strategic nuclear triad is prepared to deter war well into the century.</p>
<p><em>Col. Curtis McGiffin </em>(US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National <em>Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/The-Air-Forces-Nuclear-Deterrent-Modernization-in-Progress.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/">The Air Force&#8217;s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 12:09:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[energy sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[force protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intelligence failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[internal dissent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international standing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logistical shortcomings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national interests. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychological impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sabotage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain disruptions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tactical miscalculations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerabilities]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30811</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s military doctrine, honed through decades of sparse experience and adapted in the post-Soviet era, emphasizes the projection of power and the defense of its vast territory. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed a critical weakness: a systemic inability to implement effective force protection measures, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for Russia’s critical infrastructure, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/">Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s military doctrine, honed through decades of sparse experience and adapted in the post-Soviet era, emphasizes the projection of power and the defense of its vast territory. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed a critical weakness: a systemic inability to implement effective force protection measures, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for Russia’s critical infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. This failure stems from a complex interplay of factors, ranging from tactical miscalculations and logistical shortcomings to a potential underestimation of the adversary’s capabilities and a possible overconfidence in Russia’s own defensive capabilities.</p>
<p>Force protection, in its broadest sense, encompasses all measures taken to safeguard personnel, equipment, and facilities from hostile actions. For the military, this includes battlefield tactics, intelligence gathering, logistics security, and the establishment of robust defensive perimeters. For critical infrastructure, it involves physical security, cybersecurity, and contingency planning to mitigate the impact of attacks. Russia’s struggles in both areas are glaringly apparent.</p>
<p>On the battlefield, Russian forces repeatedly demonstrated a lack of effective force protection. From the initial botched attempts to seize Kyiv to the protracted and costly battles in eastern Ukraine, Russian units suffered heavy casualties. This was often due to a combination of poor tactical decisions, inadequate reconnaissance, and a failure to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Ambushes, artillery strikes, and drone attacks took a heavy toll, revealing vulnerabilities in their supply lines and a lack of situational awareness. This inability to protect its forces has not only hampered Russia’s military objectives but also had a cascading effect on the security of its critical infrastructure.</p>
<p>The vulnerability of Russia’s infrastructure, particularly its energy sector, is a direct consequence of these force protection failures. Oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, and processing facilities, often located in remote areas, require robust security to prevent sabotage or attack. However, the demands of the war in Ukraine stretched Russia’s military resources thin, leaving critical infrastructure exposed.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russian territory, including energy facilities, demonstrates this vulnerability. These attacks not only disrupt energy production and supply but also have a significant psychological impact, undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and vital assets.</p>
<p>Several factors contribute to Russia’s struggles with force protection and the resulting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Firstly, the sheer size of Russia and the length of its borders make it incredibly challenging to secure all potential targets. This geographical challenge is compounded by the fact that many critical infrastructure sites are dispersed and remote, making them difficult to defend effectively. Secondly, there are indications of potential intelligence failures. Russia may have underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and its ability to conduct effective counter-offensives, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of preparedness for attacks on its own territory. Thirdly, logistical issues plague the Russian military. Supply-chain disruptions, shortages of essential equipment, and a lack of well-trained personnel have all contributed to the erosion of force protection capabilities.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the potential for internal dissent and sabotage cannot be discounted. The war in Ukraine fuels anti-government sentiment in Russia, and there is a risk that individuals or groups opposed to the regime may seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to express their discontent. Such internal threats further complicate the task of ensuring the security of these facilities.</p>
<p>The implications of Russia’s failure to implement effective force protection are far-reaching. The disruption of energy supplies can have a devastating impact on the Russian economy, leading to shortages, price increases, and social unrest. Moreover, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure can undermine Russia’s international standing and its ability to project power. The perception of weakness can embolden adversaries and erode alliances, further isolating Russia on the world stage.</p>
<p>Russia’s ongoing struggles with force protection in the context of the Ukraine conflict have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. These vulnerabilities stem from a combination of tactical miscalculations, logistical shortcomings, intelligence failures, and the inherent challenges of securing a vast and geographically dispersed territory. The consequences of these failures are significant, with the potential to destabilize the Russian economy, undermine public confidence, and weaken Russia’s international standing. As the conflict continues, Russia will need to address these shortcomings if it hopes to protect its critical infrastructure and safeguard its national interests. The ability to learn from these failures and adapt its security strategies will be crucial for Russia’s long-term stability and its ability to project power in the region and beyond.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a><em> and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Russias-Vulnerable-Underbelly_-The-Failure-of-Force-Protection-and-its-Impact-on-Critical-Infrastructure.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="187" height="52" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 187px) 100vw, 187px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/">Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Oct 2024 12:15:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anti-access/area denial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asymmetric tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collateral damage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cruise missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyberattacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decentralized tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense budgets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategies. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-value equipment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hybrid Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hypersonic technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific region]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range weapon systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[low-observable technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military doctrines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military personnel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[persian gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision-guided munitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychological impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rapid deployment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reconnaissance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Standoff warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[targeting data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[targeting technologies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29176</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Standoff warfare has emerged as a pivotal approach in modern warfare. By keeping forces beyond the reach of adversaries and utilizing long-range offensive capabilities, nations aim to maintain a tactical advantage while minimizing risk to personnel and equipment. This article delves into the pros and cons of standoff warfare and examines its potential as a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/">Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Standoff warfare has emerged as a pivotal approach in modern warfare. By keeping forces beyond the reach of adversaries and utilizing long-range offensive capabilities, nations aim to maintain a tactical advantage while minimizing risk to personnel and equipment. This article delves into the pros and cons of standoff warfare and examines its potential as a preferred strategy against formidable adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare is characterized by the use of long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, to engage targets from a safe distance. This approach leverages advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting technologies to identify and strike enemy assets without direct engagement.</p>
<p><strong>Advantages of Standoff Warfare</strong></p>
<p>One of the primary advantages of standoff warfare is the significant reduction in the risk to military personnel. By operating from a distance, forces are less exposed to direct enemy fire and ambushes, leading to fewer casualties and increased morale. By keeping forces out of the immediate reach of the enemy, standoff warfare helps preserve valuable military assets. This approach ensures that high-value equipment and personnel are available for prolonged engagements and future conflicts.</p>
<p>Modern long-range weapons are highly accurate, allowing for precision strikes on strategic targets. This capability enhances operational efficiency by focusing on high-value targets and minimizing collateral damage, which is crucial in maintaining public support and adhering to international laws of warfare.</p>
<p>The ability to strike from a distance can have a significant psychological impact on the enemy. The constant threat of unexpected precision attack can demoralize opposing forces and disrupt their operational planning and execution.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows for rapid deployment and response to emerging threats. With assets positioned at a safe distance, commanders can quickly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and execute strikes without the need for extensive mobilization.</p>
<p><strong>Disadvantages of Standoff Warfare</strong></p>
<p>Standoff warfare relies heavily on advanced technologies for surveillance, targeting, and weapon delivery. This dependence can be a vulnerability if these systems are disrupted by electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or other countermeasures.</p>
<p>The development, procurement, and maintenance of long-range weapon systems and associated technologies are expensive. The financial burden of sustaining a standoff warfare capability can strain defense budgets and divert resources from other critical areas.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare is most effective against concentrated, high-value targets. When facing adversaries employing dispersed, decentralized tactics, the efficiency of long-range strikes diminishes, necessitating alternative approaches.</p>
<p>Accurate intelligence and targeting data are crucial for successful standoff operations. The reliance on real-time, high-fidelity information can be a limitation if there are gaps in intelligence or if adversaries employ deception and concealment strategies.</p>
<p>The use of long-range strikes can be perceived as highly provocative and potentially escalatory in a conflict. Adversaries may respond with retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of escalation that can spiral out of control.</p>
<p><strong>China</strong></p>
<p>China’s military modernization and expansion pose a significant challenge to American and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and naval assets, necessitates a robust standoff strategy.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to engage Chinese assets from a distance, mitigating the risk posed by China’s A2/AD systems. The ability to strike from afar can disrupt Chinese operations, degrade critical infrastructure, and maintain freedom of navigation in contested areas.</p>
<p>China’s advancements in electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and counter-space operations could undermine the effectiveness of standoff warfare. Additionally, the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region presents logistical challenges for sustaining long-range operations.</p>
<p><strong>Russia</strong></p>
<p>Russia’s military doctrine emphasizes hybrid warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tactics. Its integrated air defense systems, long-range missile capabilities, and electronic warfare proficiency make it a formidable adversary.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare enables NATO forces to counter Russian aggression by targeting key military installations, command-and-control centers, and logistical hubs from a safe distance. Precision strikes can degrade Russia’s offensive capabilities and hinder its operational tempo.</p>
<p>Russia’s integrated air defenses and advanced electronic warfare capabilities pose significant challenges to standoff operations. The risk of miscalculation and escalation is also high, given the proximity of NATO forces to Russian borders and the potential for rapid conflict escalation.</p>
<p><strong>Iran</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s strategic posture relies on asymmetric tactics, including the use of proxy forces, ballistic missiles, and naval assets in the Persian Gulf. Its ability to disrupt critical waterways and target regional adversaries necessitates a nuanced approach.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to target Iranian missile launch sites, naval assets, and command structures with minimal risk to their forces. This approach can help deter Iranian aggression and protect vital shipping lanes in the region.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of underground facilities, mobile missile launchers, and dispersed assets presents challenges for effective targeting. Additionally, the potential for retaliatory actions against regional allies and American interests necessitates careful consideration of the broader geopolitical implications.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Standoff warfare continues to offer significant advantages in terms of force protection, precision, and operational flexibility. However, its effectiveness is contingent on technological superiority, accurate intelligence, and the ability to adapt to evolving threats. Against adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, standoff warfare provides a valuable tool for countering their respective military capabilities. Nonetheless, it must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses the unique challenges posed by each adversary and mitigates the risks of escalation and technological vulnerabilities. As hypersonic, low-observable, and other advancing technologies continue to develop, they will force the need for rapid evolutions of military doctrines which will need to consider the role of standoff warfare as a critical component of modern defense strategies.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a><em> with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Striking-from-Afar-The-Strategic-Edge-of-Stand-Off-Warfare.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/">Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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