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		<title>From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2025 11:54:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30909</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The global nuclear landscape in 2025 is not just unstable—it is accelerating toward unprecedented volatility, testing the very limits of American strategic dominance. New technologies, evolving doctrines, and intensifying rivalries among nuclear-armed states are creating the most unpredictable security environment since the Cold War. The era of passive deterrence is over. As adversaries like China, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/">From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The global nuclear landscape in 2025 is not just unstable—it is accelerating toward unprecedented volatility, testing the very limits of American strategic dominance. New technologies, evolving doctrines, and intensifying rivalries among nuclear-armed states are creating the most unpredictable security environment since the Cold War. The era of passive deterrence is over.</p>
<p>As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.</p>
<p>Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/russia/">2,000 warheads</a>. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.</p>
<p>With nearly <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/NPR-2022.PDF">95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized</a>, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.</p>
<p>China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003322360/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLE'S-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">stockpile surpassed 600</a> and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and <a href="https://www.csis.org/programs/asia-program/asia-program-projects/chinas-military-modernization">hypersonic glide vehicles</a> signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.</p>
<p>North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/north-korea/nuclear/">50 nuclear weapons</a> and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-ties-with-russia-2023-09-13/">Russia</a>, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/latest-iaea-report-on-irans-nuclear-programme-available-to-members">Iran</a> edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.</p>
<p>Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2025/05/07/us-houthi-ceasefire-deal-israel/83489986007/">apparently ended</a> that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.</p>
<p>Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.</p>
<p>Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11917">sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)</a>—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.</p>
<p>Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.</p>
<p>Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-210">nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems</a> is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.</p>
<p>Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50068.htm">theater-range assets</a> can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.</p>
<p>Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/subject/9/date">nonproliferation efforts</a>, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.</p>
<p>Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.</p>
<p>In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.</p>
<p>To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/From-Deterrence-to-Dominance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="245" height="68" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 245px) 100vw, 245px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/">From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Geostrategic Mind of Iran</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geostrategic-mind-of-iran/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geostrategic-mind-of-iran/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed El Doh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Nov 2024 13:05:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29429</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The geographical position and long-standing ambitions for regional influence are long-time influences of Iran’s geostrategic thinking. As a state that controls a critical part of the Strait of Hormuz, a key global oil shipping passage, Iran’s focus is on securing dominance in the Gulf. However, Iran’s aspirations extend far beyond this region. The regime developed [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geostrategic-mind-of-iran/">The Geostrategic Mind of Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The geographical position and long-standing ambitions for regional influence are long-time influences of Iran’s geostrategic thinking. As a state that controls a critical part of the Strait of Hormuz, a key global oil shipping passage, Iran’s focus is on securing dominance in the Gulf. However, Iran’s aspirations extend far beyond this region. The regime developed a broader strategy to assert power across the Middle East, utilizing a complex network of alliances and proxy forces to influence regional dynamics along with a specific focus on the eastern Mediterranean as well as the southern Red Sea.</p>
<p>The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.</p>
<p>The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.</p>
<p>In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.</p>
<p>This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.</p>
<p>Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.</p>
<p>Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.</p>
<p>The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.</p>
<p>This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.</p>
<p>While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.</p>
<p>Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.</p>
<p>However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.</p>
<p>Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.</p>
<p>Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.</p>
<p>The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.</p>
<p>In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f6ffa8c9-229a-4d9a-a54b-52397edac8ab">visited</a> Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.</p>
<p>A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.</p>
<p>In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.</p>
<p>By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.</p>
<p>Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/The-Geostrategic-Mind-of-Iran.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geostrategic-mind-of-iran/">The Geostrategic Mind of Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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