Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The newspaper cited U.S. officials, who described the incidents as potential forms of espionage.

Last year, the U.S. Department of Defense, FBI, and other agencies held a review to try to curb the frequency of these breaches, which involved unauthorized entries into US military bases and other federal sites, the newspaper reported.

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Chinese Nationals Posing as Tourists Have Accessed US Military Bases and Other Sensitive Sites: Report was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the case of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it seems China is sending both signals of strength and weakness to foreign audiences. What is the rationale behind these mixed signals?

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) faced some real setbacks this year, such as the August 2023 catastrophic loss of a nuclear submarine. A Type 093 Chinese 107m nuclear submarine hit a chain and anchor trap intended to snare Western vessels lurking off China’s Shandong province, with the entire crew of 55 submariners reportedly suffocated after a failure in the oxygen system. With the PRC expecting any fight with the United States to take the primary form of naval warfare, demonstrations of Chinese naval successes are important.

Then, in November, what some netizens refer to as “Chinese tofu dreg military equipment,” the PLAN’s most advanced 980 hull number Type 071 landing ship, the Longhushan, was seen with multiple fires on deck. Chinese sources claimed that the smoke was simply part of a screening exercise, but the reality is likely very different. Again, the failure gives the impression that the PLAN is not quite ready for the combined naval operations that are certain to take place in a conflict with the United States should China decide to attempt a Taiwan seizure.

To mollify American angst of China’s military buildup, the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs has several articles that explain Chinese action as a result of American aggression and strength. M. Taylor Fravel, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, and Magnus Langset Trøan’s China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion: How US Strategy Is Fueling Beijing’s Growing Arsenal suggests that China’s nuclear buildup is the result of its own perception of weakness. Whether this perspective is accurate is debatable, but it makes the case for Chinese weakness as an explanation for the military buildup. The implication is that the United States can change Chinese military efforts by demonstrating less strength.

Jisi Wang’s America and China Are Not Yet in a Cold War offers advice on how the two countries can avoid a Soviet-American style cold war that is precipitated by American fear of Chinese strength. In his article, Wang, a member of China’s foreign policy establishment, suggests that, in the case of Taiwan, China is capable of taking the country by force if the United States and Taiwan do not begin movement toward unification. The US would fail in any attempts to prevent China from “liberating” Taiwan. Wang’s recommendations for preventing a new cold war all require the United States to weaken its position vis-à-vis the PRC.

Given China’s investment in advanced technologies like hypersonic maneuverable reentry vehicles and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, which represent a significant evolution in its nuclear capabilities and strategy, no such approach to China should ever receive consideration. These developments also suggest a more complex and potentially assertive nuclear posture, moving beyond the traditional confines of minimal deterrence. This shift has major implications for global and regional security architectures, arms control, and the future of strategic stability.

Rather than responding with weakness, the United States should send an unmistakable message to Xi Jinping: the United States is ready and willing to counter Chinese aggression. The simple fact is authoritarian leaders of every stripe respect strength. Despite Xi’s efforts to hide his strength and bide his time, the United States must accelerate its effort to prepare Taiwan and other allies in the region to defend themselves against growing Chinese aggression.

Although the latest issue of Foreign Affairs seems to suggest, through its articles, that Chinese aggression is somehow the fault of the United States and that it is up President Biden and future presidents to take a less assertive path toward China, the fact remains that weakness is provocative. Giving up on Taiwan because China is too strong is not an option. Giving up on American nuclear modernization because China is too weak is also not an option.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, spent two decades in Taiwan and China before returning to the United States as a COVID-19 refugee. He currently lives in Washington, DC, and taught at the University of Nottingham’s School of International Studies in Ningbo, China.

Why Is China Sending Mixed Signals? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This infers the US should ignore the plight of Taiwan’s sovereignty as well as accept the seizing of the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) willful disruption of global peace and stability to further its imperial expansionism directly violates the sovereignty of its neighbors. Readers should not forget that it was only after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was victorious in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 that the communists invaded and occupied Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, East Turkistan, and areas in the southeast that were not historically part of China.

Neither is the history of Taiwan a history of control by Imperial China. The simple fact is that China is an expansionist power that is still hungry for more territory. The United States, however, is not attempting to annex land or sea. The simple fact is that China can ensure the first guardrail by ending its imperial expansion.

Second, the article then suggests, “There should be agreement on No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Some argue that a NFU policy is not credible. But if that is the case, it is hard to explain why both the Obama and Biden administrations tried but failed to adopt a NFU or sole purpose policy. Every person of integrity should acknowledge that NFU is relevant and meaningful.”

This argument is laughable. China’s NFU policy is a ploy to deceive American policymakers and dupe nuclear disarmament advocates. During the Cold War, China’s NFU pledge was judged credible because it had a small and unsophisticated nuclear arsenal incapable of engaging in first use. The recent Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2023 Annual Report to Congress describes an increasingly lethal capability that threatens more and more American cities, contrary to American counterforce targeting strategies.

As noted in a recent analysis of the annual report, the PRC sanctioned a video that threatens to employ nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Japan. In that video, the narrator states, “We will use nuclear bombs first. We will use nuclear bombs continuously. We will do this until Japan declares unconditional surrender for the second time.” China’s NFU policy is deliberately ambiguous to deter conventional attacks on its nuclear forces. Moreover, the PRC’s four exceptions to its NFU policy are meant to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” China has deliberately entangled its nuclear and conventional command and control to intentionally increase the risk of nuclear escalation in the early stages of conflict. Finally, the article proclaims the virtues of no first use because an American NFU policy would leave the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies uncovered from America’s nuclear umbrella and more susceptible to Chinese nuclear coercion. 

Third, the article declares, “There should be no cross-domain deterrence.” The US should manage the interplay between non-nuclear capabilities and nuclear deterrence. The article argues that a deterrence policy “stating that nuclear weapons will not be only used to deter nuclear strikes, but also used to deter non-nuclear strategic strikes…significantly lowers the nuclear threshold and drastically increases the risks of nuclear escalation.” Thus, the article argues that the United States and China should prohibit cross-domain deterrence.

With the article also suggesting the United States should adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear policy, the American arsenal would serve one purpose—deterring nuclear attack. Considering that the article suggests the PRC maintains an advantage in strategic cyberattacks, advocacy for a sole purpose policy is little more than an attempt to encourage self-deterrence on the part of the United States. In reality, cross-domain deterrence is key to American security.

The US cannot threaten an in-kind response to a biological attack any more than it can an in-kind cyberattack. Dr. Strangelove suggested that “deterrence is the art of producing, in the mind of the enemy, the fear to attack.” Asymmetric deterrence ensures the United States can deter any attack with the most destructive weapons available. The article advocates for a PRC advantage by removing that fearful threat and thus increasing PRC freedom of action.

Fourth, the article argues that “[t]here should be no unlimited development of missile defense systems. It is undeniable that missile defense has negative impacts upon strategic stability. The bilateral quarrel over missile defense is one of the root causes of US-Russia tensions in the past two decades. An agreement should be reached to limit the development and deployment of missile defense systems in order to assure other nuclear weapon states that their nuclear retaliation capabilities will not be compromised.”

Designed to defend against North Korean attack, American missile defense systems are part of integrated deterrence and are purposed to limit damage and “expand decision-making space for senior leaders.” With the PRC’s breathtaking growth and modernization of its nuclear forces exhibited in the recent construction of over 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile silos and at least 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, China may well be seeking to overwhelm any current or future missile defenses by orders of magnitude.

China is also leading the hypersonic missile arms race, including the coupling of hypersonic weapons with the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) that are potentially nuclear-armed and a destabilizing first-strike capability. Finally, America’s nuclear recapitalization program is already into its second decade and has yet to produce the first new system.

Promulgating PRC propaganda as unbiased perspective may feel good, but it is a red herring. China long ago left the blocks in an arms race that the United States still does not understand it is losing. Not only is China modernizing and expanding its nuclear first-strike capability, but it is also doing so under the guise of deterrence and fear, while the PRC is developing a coercive force meant to ransom American cities in exchange for a Sino-centric Indo-Pacific.

If the United States wants to retain its geopolitical influence and continue to assure regional allies, it must avoid any compromise with the Chinese, like that offered in the article discussed. Instead, it is time for the United States to embark on a comprehensive nuclear arms build-up that accounts for the risks posed by an aggressive and hostile China. To do anything less is a concession to Chinese imperialism and an admission that the United States is no longer a “shining city upon a hill,” the beacon of liberty President Reagan once suggested this country is to the rest of the world.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President of Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and host of Nuclecast. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service. Both authors co-host the weekly podcast The Nuclear View. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Red China’s Concerns About Nuclear Escalation Are a Red Herring was originally published on Global Security Review.

The report, which is an annual requirement mandated by Section 1202 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, provides an authoritative assessment of military and security developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 2023 report’s findings speak to the consistent failure of Western idealism and a failure to acknowledge the oncoming threat of China.

The report is replete with alarming “takeaways” and disquieting gaps in known information about the PRC’s capabilities and current plans. The word “probably” was used 102 times within the report, indicating a nascent level of awareness so low that analysts could do little more than venture guesses or futile estimates for Congress.

Additionally, missing from this report is an acknowledgment that the PRC is likely seeking to “acquire a first-strike capability.” While garnering a first-strike capability does not always mean an intent to “go first,” for a country with a stated “no first use” policy, this nuclear arsenal expansion is distressing. By not acknowledging this perceived PRC goal, the report mutes the clarion call this report should evoke.

While this annual report has plenty to cheer and jeer, below are ten points from the report that should alarm Congress, the Biden administration, and the American people.

First, as of May 2023, the DoD estimates that the PRC has at least 500 operational nuclear warheads (p. 104). This is a significant increase from the DoD’s 2020 estimate, which placed China’s stockpile in the low 200s—with an expectation of doubling by 2030 (p. 111). This is juxtaposed by a 2012 estimate in which retired Russian generals asserted that China had enough fissile material for 3,600 nuclear warheads, with 1,600–1,800 nuclear weapons in the stockpile.

Second, the report suggests, “The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos.” This may be the first public announcement that “some” of the completed ICBM silos are now loaded with potentially both DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs (p. 107).

Former USSTRATCOM commander Admiral (Ret.) Charles Richard and his predecessor General (Ret.) John Hyten have both noted that the DF-41 carries up to ten warheads. When combined with the scores of road-mobile ICBMs in China’s nuclear arsenal, the number of land-based ICBM launchers exceeds the number of American land-based nuclear missiles.

During the summer of 2021, open-source researchers using commercial imagery discovered, documented, and tracked the construction of new ICBM missile silos at Yumen, Hami, and Yulin. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies first identified the construction of an estimated 119 silos at the Yumen site. US Strategic Command tweeted a link to a New York Times story about the Hami discovery, a poor substitute for the requisite and timely official statement a revelation of this magnitude demanded.

Third, the PRC has approximately 350 ICBMs that can all reach the United States (p. 106). In addition to the DF-31 and DF-41, the PRC is also deploying the new DF-5C, a silo-based ICBM with a multi-megaton-class nuclear warhead (p. 107). A January 31, 2017, Bill Gertz article reported that a flight test of the DF-5C missile carrying ten warheads was conducted, which indicated the PRC “is increasing the number of warheads in its arsenal.”

Generally, megaton warheads are designed as a counter-value capability for destroying American cities. The PRC likely considers DF-5Cs as an asymmetrical advantage designed to hold American cities hostage and ransom their safety in exchange for abandoning Taiwan during forced unification.

Fourth, the newly constructed network of silo-based ICBMs is likely to operate under China’s emerging “Early Warning Counterstrike” posture. This launch-on-warning (LoW) operating concept enables a rapid counter-nuclear strike before an adversary’s first strike destroys the Chinese arsenal. The LoW concept of operations has long been vilified by American strategists as destabilizing and fraught with risk of accidental launch.

Fifth, the PRC officially established its own nuclear triad. The vintage H-6N bomber features a modified fuselage to allow an external nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) (p. 63). According to the report, the nuclear-capable ALBM “appears to be armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle,” thus indicating the ALBM is likely capable of conducting nuclear precision strikes (p. 108). This capability and the report’s assessment indicates China is developing a nuclear warfighting approach, not just maintaining deterrence.

Sixth, the PRC may be developing a conventionally armed ICBM. If fielded, such capability would allow the PRC to threaten conventional ballistic missile strikes against the continental United States (p. 66). The report notes that conventionally armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability, which is one reason why the United States Air Force abandoned the concept.

Seventh, the PRC is likely developing advanced nuclear delivery capabilities like the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). A FOBS-HGV was tested on July 27, 2021—orbiting the earth before reentering the atmosphere to strike a target (pp. 67, 111). Chinese FOBS weaponizes outer space because it potentially places nuclear warheads into low-earth orbit prior to de-orbiting them onto their targets with the goal of evading missile defenses.

The risk to America from a realized Chinese FOBS-HGV is conspicuous. The system’s extreme range allows it to circumnavigate the planet placing any target on the face of the earth at risk, potentially from any direction. This greatly complicates an early warning system’s ability to detect, track, and target it for intercept. Moreover, once separated from the FOBS, HGVs would be very maneuverable and travel at least five times the speed of sound, “effectively reducing the defender’s warning and response time as well as understanding of the ultimate destination of the attack.” From a Western perspective, there is little deterrent value from a FOBS-HGV system other than to coerce adversary compliance amid a crisis or function as a first-strike pre-emptive attack.

Eighth, despite the PRC’s “No First Use” policy, China’s nuclear strategy likely includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack. As one senior People’s Liberation Army Colonel told this author on a trip to China, threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or command and control systems will likely elicit a nuclear response.

A recent assessment of China’s Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance noted the omission of any “No First Use” policy while expressing other detailed positions on nuclear weapons could indicate a departure from China’s almost 60-year commitment. In 2021, the PRC sanctioned a video threat in which the narrator said,  “We will use nuclear bombs first. We will use nuclear bombs continuously. We will do this until Japan declares unconditional surrender for the second time.” It appears the PRC’s “No First Use” policy remains in name only and exists only to deceive Western policymakers and nuclear disarmament advocates.

Ninth, China deploys two land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), which can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads that can “hot swap”  between launching the nuclear and conventional warhead variants. The purported flexibility, precision, and range of these IRBMs suggest that they are well suited to limited nuclear use against American military targets in the Pacific.

And tenth, the PRC’s continued research on toxins and pharmaceutical-based agents has both military and civilian applications, which raises concerns about its compliance with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. The United States is unable to confirm if the PRC has fulfilled its obligations under either Convention (p. 114). The probability of chemical or biological weapon employment against American forces remains a real threat.

Since the United States does not possess an in-kind chemical or biological capability with which to respond to such escalatory attacks and thus must either deter or respond with conventional or nuclear weapons, China may view its capabilities as an asymmetric advantage. Adversaries who are signatories to such treaties but are unwilling to adhere to their protocols cannot be trusted to adhere to nuclear weapons treaties or risk reduction measures.

Conclusion

The DoD’s inability to provide a confident and consistent description of China’s increasing nuclear threat for public consumption raises questions of intentional underestimation. For the Department of Defense to construct and implement a coherent strategy to counter the Chinese nuclear threat, it must first understand the adversary’s capabilities and capacities. Next, it must accurately communicate the magnitude of the threat to the American people and their congressional representatives to ensure proper support and resourcing. Then it must be prepared to “hold at risk” the newly added PRC nuclear targets without uncovering other strategic targets in other parts of the world. This may well demand additional American capability, something the Biden administration has already repudiated without sufficient explanation.

The PRC views the development of its “asymmetric countermeasures,” primarily nuclear weapons, as a “trump card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan (p. 181). With breathtaking speed, the Chinese are fervently and consistently building the capability and capacity needed to ensure their “freedom of movement.”

If deterring a nuclear attack by the United States was its goal, the PRC would not have spent such time and treasure expanding a nuclear force that was already successfully deterring the United States. Rather, its nuclear force is expanding rapidly to prevent America and its allies from intervening in any aggression toward Taiwan or in the South China Sea. Simply said, China seeks to restore a hierarchical international order where the Chinese Communist Party sits atop the rest of the world and American influence is severely reduced or even eliminated.

The time has come to be honest with the American people about the true nuclear threat from China. We must replace “probability” with certainty and then act realistically to defend American interests with a more aggressive deterrence posture.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Adam Lowther, PhD is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service in the nuclear enterprise. Both authors co-host the popular weekly podcast “The Nuclear View” found at https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed was originally published on Global Security Review.