“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

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Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.

The article’s opening line sets the articles tone, “The world is entering a dangerous nuclear arms race unlike anything since the first atomic bomb, but it does not have to end in catastrophe.” The problem with this assertion is twofold.

First, the one example of nuclear arms racing we saw, which took place between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was likely responsible for the fact that the two great power never fought World War III. Rather than sparking conflict, the arms race deterred it.

Second, what is happening today is in no way comparable to the Cold War arms race, which saw global nuclear arms climb to a total of 63,632 fielded weapons in 1985. According to the Washington Post, the Russians field 1,588 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 1,912 tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese number is less well known but the Department of Defense’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023) estimates the People’s Liberation Army fields about 500 nuclear weapons and will field about 1,500 by 2035. The same Washington Post article suggests the United States fields 1,644 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 200 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—with no plans for growing the size of the American arsenal.

This about a 90 percent reduction in the number of fielded nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States removed more than 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe between 1991 and 1993.

This means that the number of deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the three major powers sits at about 5,050 weapons. If you include the arsenals of India, Pakistan, North Korea, France, and the United Kingdom, the number rises to about 6,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons.

It is hard to compare what is taking place today with what occurred during the Cold War. For an arms race to take place, there must be participants. The Biden administration has made it very clear; the United States will not increase the size of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. Russia has the capacity to expand its arsenal rapidly. China is doing just that. The United States is sitting in the stands and watching its adversaries.

The editorial board then laments the lack of arms control agreements to prevent adversaries, the Chinese in particular, from growing the size of arsenal. If the editorial board shares the view of many within the arms control community, then they too incorrectly assume that all arms control agreements are inherently good and stabilizing. In reality, arms control agreements are only good when they advance the United States’ national interest, which is not synonymous with their very existence.

When you take into account Russian violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Opens Skies, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and likely violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the at all costs desire for arms control with Russia is too often a bad deal for the United States that sees the nation constrain its military capability while the Russian buy time to overcome military weakness.

In short, arms control for arms control sake is neither an inherent American interest, nor is it inherently stabilizing.

The editorial board also places great hope in recent meetings between the United States and China in which arms control was discussed. What the editorial board’s article fails to reveal is that the November talks were an utter failure in which the Chinese made it clear that no arms control agreement is possible.

Finally, there is a mistaken and unsubstantiated belief that more nuclear weapons is inherently destabilizing. This idea is not born out by the historical record. A careful reading of Cold War history makes it clear that the large Soviet and American nuclear arsenals of the era caused leaders in both the United States and Soviet Union to exercise great caution, avoid provocative actions, and demonstrate restraint in the face of uncertainty.

It is not strength that is provocative but weakness. If the United States seeks to ensure nuclear weapons are never used, it should meet the threat head on and follow the recommendations of the bi-partisan Strategic Posture Commission Report. Authoritarians respect strength. It is time the United States shifts from blind optimism to just that.

Adam Lowther is the Vice President for Research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Curtis McGiffin in the Vice President for Education and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t was originally published on Global Security Review.