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		<title>Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-an-imminent-israeli-strike-on-iran/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 12:22:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31446</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Multiple converging factors point toward a high probability of a renewed and more expansive Israeli strike against Iran within the coming months, most likely between September and October 7, 2025, with residual probability extending into late November or early December. Israel’s strategic imperatives, Iran’s defensive mobilization, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political calculus reinforce the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-an-imminent-israeli-strike-on-iran/">Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Multiple converging factors point toward a high probability of a renewed and more expansive Israeli strike against Iran within the coming months, most likely between September and October 7, 2025, with residual probability extending into late November or early December. Israel’s strategic imperatives, Iran’s defensive mobilization, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political calculus reinforce the likelihood. This is not a singular scenario but rather the anticipated culmination of a phased campaign, already in motion, designed to disrupt its strategic weapons programs, impose lasting operational disadvantage, and neutralize Iran’s regional military network, including those in Lebanon and Yemen.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Drivers</strong></p>
<p>There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/netanyahu-faces-condemnation-over-plan-for-israel-to-take-full-military-control-of-gaza-13408401">Gaza</a> and its persistent pressure on <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-august-4/">disarming</a> Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable <a href="https://irannewsupdate.com/news/infightings/iran-regimes-leadership-split-over-war-or-negotiations-as-sanctions-threat-looms/">rifts</a> in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.</p>
<p>Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.</p>
<p><strong>Operational Indicators of Preparation</strong></p>
<p>Mossad has already <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/ckglkxl2d25o">intensified</a> intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/26/how-israel-launched-attacks-from-inside-iran-to-sow-chaos-during-the-war">within</a> Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.</p>
<p>Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-to-draw-down-reserve-deployments-by-nearly-a-third-amid-soaring-fatigue/">regeneration</a>, given the apparent contradiction between political <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250802-combat-will-continue-without-rest-in-gaza-unless-hostages-are-freed-says-israel-s-army-chief">calls</a> for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.</p>
<p>At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508054597">formation</a> of a National Defense Council under Ali <a href="https://wanaen.com/appointment-of-ali-larijani-as-secretary-of-irans-supreme-national-security-council/">Larijani</a> and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.</p>
<p><strong>Political Leverage and Timing</strong></p>
<p>US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.</p>
<p>Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77584">coordinating</a> with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.</p>
<p><strong>The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept</strong></p>
<p>Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.</p>
<p>However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/15/hezbollah-refuses-to-hand-over-its-weapons-to-lebanese-government">vowed</a> not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.</p>
<p><strong>International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment</strong></p>
<p>Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.</p>
<p>Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.</p>
<p><strong>Forecast and Likely Outcomes</strong></p>
<p>Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.</p>
<p>If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.</p>
<p>While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israels-davids-sling-air-defense-completes-new-upgrade-mc-080725">David’s</a> Sling, and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/israel-moves-to-significantly-accelerate-acquisition-of-more-arrow-interceptors/">Arrow</a> batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.</p>
<p>Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for </em>Global Security Review<em>.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Forecasting-an-Imminent-Israeli-Strike-on-Iran-Strategic-Drivers-and-Operational-Indicators.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-an-imminent-israeli-strike-on-iran/">Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-silent-shield-how-domestic-strength-sustains-nuclear-power/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-silent-shield-how-domestic-strength-sustains-nuclear-power/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2025 12:11:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31380</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When Americans picture national security, they conjure images of hypersonic missiles, stealth bombers, and aircraft carriers patrolling global hotspots. They measure strength in megatons and defense budgets. Yet, the most critical and increasingly vulnerable pillar of national security may not be found in a silo or a shipyard but in the health of society itself. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-silent-shield-how-domestic-strength-sustains-nuclear-power/">America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Americans picture national security, they conjure images of hypersonic missiles, stealth bombers, and aircraft carriers patrolling global hotspots. They measure strength in megatons and defense budgets. Yet, the most critical and increasingly vulnerable pillar of national security may not be found in a silo or a shipyard but in the health of society itself.</p>
<p>The credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, is inextricably linked to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402391003603581">domestic well-being</a>. Economic prosperity, social cohesion, and the trust citizens have in their institutions are all part of that amorphous concept. Adversaries like Russia and China understand that it is in their interest to undermine American societal health; it is time Americans realize the challenge facing the nation.</p>
<p>For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence rested on a <a href="https://sms.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/smj.640">triad of capabilities</a>, credibility, and communication. The United States fielded the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal and communicated credibility effectively. But credibility—the unwavering belief in America’s will to act—is the lynchpin.</p>
<p>This is where the home front becomes the front line. A nation that is prosperous, unified, and optimistic possesses the strategic endurance to maintain its commitments. Societal well-being is not a “soft” issue separate from “hard” power; it is a foundational strategic asset that fuels long-term political resolve.</p>
<p>The mechanisms connecting a healthy society to a credible deterrent are not merely theoretical. They are etched into recent history. Consider the <a href="https://facultyshare.liberty.edu/en/publications/a-position-of-strength-the-reagan-military-buildup-and-the-conven">1980s under President Reagan</a>. An economic resurgence and a renewed sense of national confidence provided the political capital and financial resources for a sweeping modernization of nuclear forces that saw the Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 stealth bomber enter service.</p>
<p>This was not just a military build-up; it was a clear signal to the Soviet Union, born from a nation that had the resources and the will to compete over the long haul. High public trust, buoyed by economic stability, sustained the political commitment for these massive, multi-decade investments.</p>
<p>Contrast this with the period following the 2008 financial crisis. The ensuing economic pain, political polarization, and public discontent led directly to the <a href="https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstreams/396ed8e6-2b97-42ce-bad6-1aab0201ea25/download">Budget Control Act</a> and sequestration, which imposed punishing cuts on the defense budget. Allies and adversaries alike watched as Americans debated whether they could afford to modernize an aging nuclear triad. The signal was one of constraint and introspection, raising quiet questions in foreign capitals about the long-term reliability of America’s security guarantees. A nation struggling with internal economic and social crises inevitably projects an image of distraction and dwindling resolve.</p>
<p>Adversaries did not miss this lesson. They astutely integrated America’s domestic vulnerabilities into their national security strategies. China and Russia are engaged in a <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/clock-tower-security-series/strategic-competition-seminar-series/russia-and-chinas-intelligence-and-information-operations-nexus">relentless campaign of information warfare</a> designed to exacerbate our societal fissures. State-controlled media outlets like CGTN (Chinese) and RT (Russian), amplified by armies of bots and trolls on social media, relentlessly spotlight American inequality, racial tensions, and political gridlock.</p>
<p>Their goal is twofold: erode the confidence of Americans in their own democratic system and persuade the world that the United States is a chaotic, declining power whose deterrence is brittle and promises are hollow. By turning societal metrics into weapons against Americans, adversaries aim to achieve strategic gains without firing a shot.</p>
<p>Of course, the relationship between societal health and defense is not without its complexities. A valid counterargument holds that a society enjoying high well-being might become complacent, preferring to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621671">spend its “peace dividend</a>” on social programs rather than defense. The post–Cold War era saw this exact debate, as calls to shift funding from “guns to butter” grew louder.</p>
<p>This presents a genuine leadership challenge that requires articulating why investments in national security are essential to protecting the very prosperity and stability Americans enjoy. The choice is not always between a new healthcare program and a new submarine. A strong, healthy, and educated populace, free from economic precarity, is the very foundation that allows a nation to project power and afford the tools of its own defense. A robust social safety net and a powerful military are not mutually exclusive—they are mutually reinforcing pillars of a resilient state.</p>
<p>This calculus extends to the nation’s most critical strategic advantage: America’s network of alliances. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48652065">strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</a>, for instance, is not purely a measure of its combined military hardware. It is rooted in a collective commitment to democratic values and the shared societal well-being of its members.</p>
<p>A stable, prosperous, and unified America reassures allies and strengthens collective deterrence. Conversely, an America seen as internally fractured and unreliable invites doubt, weakening the very alliances that magnify American power. When allied societies are confident in American leadership, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168019858047?download=true">collective credibility soars</a>.</p>
<p>Therefore, Americans must rethink national security for the twenty-first century by placing American well-being at the very heart of our strategic imperatives. Bridging the economic divide not only broadens our tax base but also strengthens social cohesion, enabling sustainable defense budgets without overburdening taxpayers. Revitalizing education fuels scientific breakthroughs and cultivates the skilled workforce needed to modernize our nuclear command, control, and delivery systems. Upgrading infrastructure, from critical ports and highways to resilient cybersecurity networks, enhances our logistical agility, accelerates force deployment, and bolsters the credibility of our deterrent. By fostering political unity, we project resolve to allies and adversaries alike, inoculating our society against foreign information warfare and ensuring decisive, coordinated responses in times of crisis.</p>
<p>The defining contest of this century will not be waged on traditional battlefields but in a struggle of systems: our free, prosperous, and cohesive society versus an authoritarian model of centralized control. To secure our peace, we must fortify America’s Silent Shield at home. The credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and, by extension, our global leadership, will always mirror the resilience and unity of the nation it protects.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Americas-Silent-Shield_How-Domestic-Strength-Sustains-Nuclear-Power.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="259" height="72" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-silent-shield-how-domestic-strength-sustains-nuclear-power/">America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 12:07:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[security risks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic interests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tartus naval facility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Western influence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30236</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The fall of the Assad regime has marked a watershed moment in the Syrian armed conflict, fundamentally ushering in a new phase of military and political uncertainty. This development intensified regional and international competition for influence in Syria, with profound implications for the country’s stability and the broader Middle East. Critical factors are already shaping [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/">Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fall of the Assad regime has marked a watershed moment in the Syrian armed conflict, fundamentally ushering in a new phase of military and political uncertainty. This development intensified regional and international competition for influence in Syria, with profound implications for the country’s stability and the broader Middle East. Critical factors are already shaping Syria’s future in the post-Assad era.</p>
<p>The collapse of the regime created a tremendous power vacuum, with various actors vying for control over Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape along with the main aim of shaping the country’s trajectory. Iran remains deeply entrenched in Syria through its network of allied militias and its strategic interests in the region. Tehran’s ability to sustain its presence and influence will depend on its capacity to mobilize resources and navigate mounting international and regional opposition.</p>
<p>In a post-Assad context, Iran may seek to carve out autonomous zones of influence, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as southern Syria and the corridor connecting Damascus to Lebanon. However, with the Assad regime no longer in power, the United States and Israel are likely to intensify their efforts to prevent Iran from filling the power vacuum. This could include targeted military actions, support for opposition groups, and diplomatic pressure on Iran and its allies. These countermeasures will play a very important role in shaping the balance of power in Syria and limiting Tehran’s ability to consolidate its position.</p>
<p>In the same vein, ISIS is likely to re-emerge again in the Syrian scene, which has already prompted US Central Command forces to <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3989696/us-central-command-conducts-dozens-of-airstrikes-to-eliminate-isis-camps-in-cen/">conduct</a> a series of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria. The existing fragmentation among opposition forces over the past years is likely to continue and despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the absence of a centralized authority has exacerbated divisions among Syria’s opposition groups, including factions with divergent political and ideological agendas.</p>
<p>External support for these groups will be a decisive factor in determining whether they can coalesce into a viable political and military force or remain fragmented, thereby prolonging instability. In this respect, the role of international and regional powers in supporting different opposition groups in Syria will be detrimental about how the tense situation in Syria unfolds.</p>
<p>Regional actors including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Gulf Arab states are poised to play a more prominent role in Syria’s post-Assad future. Turkey has already expanded its influence in northern Syria, while Gulf states may seek to assert their presence by supporting moderate factions. However, Turkish involvement is more complicated, given that Turkey aims to take control of influencing Syria. The ongoing armed conflict between Turkish forces and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-kurds.html">Kurdish</a> controlled Syrian cities in the North is likely to intensify.</p>
<p>In this regard, it is worth noting that Kurdish forces in Syria were originally <a href="https://apnews.com/article/syria-war-assad-kurds-rebels-turkey-us-2b4af609c4dcf853ac6d7a22d3dccf5d">supported</a> by the US and considered one of the main local allies in the fight against ISIS. The interplay among these powers will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory and the broader regional order.</p>
<p>Russia’s evolving strategy for Syria is still worthy of consideration. Russia’s role in Syria has become more precarious following the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow already faces many challenges of recalibrating its strategy to safeguard its regional interests, which include maintaining access to its naval bases in the Mediterranean, countering Western influence, and preserving its role as an influential actor in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s ability to adapt to the new reality will determine its long-term relevance in Syria. Despite speculations that Russia is likely to negotiate maintaining naval bases with the controlling opposition force led by Al-Jolani, it can be also assumed that Turkey will be the main negotiator with Russia with regard to allowing Russian forces access to Syrian soil.</p>
<p>Overall, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Russia, which had invested heavily in propping up the Syrian government as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy over the past decade. Accordingly, Moscow now faces a host of strategic challenges.</p>
<p>With the Assad regime gone, Russia has lost a key partner that provided it with a foothold in the Middle East. This development undermines Moscow’s ability to project power in the region and challenges its status as a dominant player in the Syrian conflict. Russia must now contend with the risk of its influence being marginalized by other actors, including Turkey, and the US.</p>
<p>Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim and its naval facility in Tartus are critical to its military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime has exposed these facilities to heightened security risks, including potential attacks by opposition forces or Islamist groups. Protecting these assets will require significant resources and a re-evaluation of Russia’s military posture in Syria, which can be challenging for Russia given its existing war with Ukraine.</p>
<p>The collapse of the Assad regime diminished Russia’s ability to dictate the terms of international engagement in Syria. Without a stable Syrian government to anchor its strategy, Moscow will struggle to assert its influence in negotiations over Syria’s future. This loss of leverage could weaken Russia’s position not only in Syria but also in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.</p>
<p><strong>Scenarios for Syria’s Post-Assad Future</strong></p>
<p>The fall of the Assad regime presents a range of possible outcomes, each with distinct implications for regional and international actors. These scenarios may include the following.</p>
<p><strong>Continued Fragmentation</strong></p>
<p>The most likely short-term scenario is the persistence of fragmentation, with various factions and militias controlling different parts of the country. This will lead to prolonged instability and create opportunities for external actors to widen their influence.</p>
<p>For Russia, this scenario presents both challenges and opportunities, as it seeks to secure its interests while navigating a highly complex landscape. The same applies to Turkey. Turkey is, however, well-positioned to expand its influence, particularly in northern Syria, where it already established a significant military presence. This scenario could lead to increased friction with Russia, as Ankara’s ambitions conflict with Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria. Furthermore, armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish controlled areas, which are supported by the US, are likely to escalate.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the situation in Syria represents a new challenge to the Trump administration regarding its Middle East engagement policy. On one hand, President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-17/trump-sees-turkey-as-key-player-shaping-syria-s-future-after-assad-s-fall">indicated</a> that Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future. On the other hand, the US already <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9">fears</a> that the ongoing military build-up by Turkey, along the Syrian border, signals that Turkey is preparing for a large-scale invasion to areas held by the American-backed Syrian Kurds.</p>
<p><strong>Iranian Consolidation</strong></p>
<p>Despite the recent Israeli strikes on Iran and its proxies in the region, including Lebanon and Syria, Iran may still seek to fill the power vacuum by strengthening its alliances with local militias, establishing a dominant presence in key areas. Such a scenario would be of a key concern for other regional and international powers and lead to increased military confrontations.</p>
<p>For decades, Syria was under the influence of Iran. Syrian ground routes were among the main routes of supply of armaments by Iran to Hezbollah. Regardless of Iran’s current weak state, Iran is unlikely to give up on its influence in Syria. However, it is very likely that Iran-back militias will continue to take a central role in countering any stabilization endeavours in Syria.</p>
<p><strong>Emergence of a New Central Authority VS Escalation of Proxy Conflicts</strong></p>
<p>While very unlikely in the short term, the emergence of a new central authority that can unify the country would fundamentally reshape Syria’s future. Such an outcome will depend on significant international support and political compromise.</p>
<p>On the other hand, and more likely, the power vacuum in Syria will increase the likelihood of Syria becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts among regional and international powers. Regardless of the opposition forces’ success in overthrowing the Assad regime, still many member of these opposition forces emerged from extremist groups, which prompted Israel to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/10/world/syria-news-assad-rebels">strike</a> most of Syria’s military assets following the country’s take over by Al-Jolani.</p>
<p>The rise of ISIS bases in Syria also presents an imminent threat to the region, prompting US CENTCOM to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4005902/centcom-strikes-isis-new-carrier-group-enters-region/">conduct</a> precision airstrikes targeting ISIS camps and operatives in the region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder stated that the US military presence and primary focus remains on &#8220;supporting the defeat of ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.&#8221;</p>
<p>The post-Assad era in Syria is defined by uncertainty, with a host of internal and external factors shaping the country’s trajectory. For Russia and Iran, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major strategic challenge, forcing it to rethink its approach and adapt to a rapidly changing landscape in Syria and the Middle East.</p>
<p>As regional and global actors vie for influence in Syria, the country’s fate will remain a key barometer of broader geopolitical trends. The decisions made by international actors in the coming months and years will not only shape Syria’s future but also redefine the balance of power in the region.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/">Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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