The Strait of Hormuz crisis and the continuing crisis in the Bab al-Mandab Strait have shown that narrow maritime passages can and will be used as political weapons in future conflicts. The state actors in Tehran and the non-state actors in Sanaa, however, may not be the only ones that may leverage these choke points in future. For example, Oman’s ports could present an essential part of any land route alternatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that avoid both the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz. However, they have also faced drone attacks in the current war and will likely face political instabilities in future. An alternative that has come into greater focus is the North Sea Route (NSR) or the Arctic route. Surprisingly, recent reductions in Arctic ice levels have increased the feasibility of using the NSR, now potentially facilitating the movement of goods. 

Iran asserts its right to regulate shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Under its 1993 law, innocent passage is subject to prior authorization based on Iran’s national security. The present crisis created by the Iran war has highlighted how the food security of many countries is connected to oil through fertilizer prices, which have witnessed a price surge. Before the war, around 30% of global fertilizers were exported by gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, 20% of global liquified natural gas is used as the feedstock for making fertilizers and much traveled through the Suez Canal before the Houthis disrupted trade. While the rest of the world will face higher food prices, the Gulf countries, which import up to 85% of their food, are still affected. Asian countries like China, India, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore are highly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East and must now find alternatives. In the present crisis, increased imports from the U.S. have provided relief to these countries, but the Cape of Good Hope route, needed for this transport, is time-consuming and increases costs.  

The NSR is also not without its share of complex legal matters. Russia has established laws and codes for regulating passage through NSR. Russia classifies the NSR as its internal waters and does not recognize the international right of innocent passage through it. All ships need prior authorization while foreign warships must notify their intended passage 90 days in advance. Ships may be required to use the services of Russian icebreaker escorts and pilots. Russia justifies its claim under article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Known as the “Arctic Exception,” it applies to all “Ice-covered areas.” It grants coastal states the right to enforce non-discriminatory laws in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to prevent marine pollution in the ice-covered areas. The U.S. and other countries argue that UNCLOS protects innocent passage through territorial seas and hence the Russian law is contrary to the provisions of UNCLOS. 

Unlike the Middle East shipping passages, however, the NSR has been in conflict and has not had any kinetic combat or active armed conflict. The free navigation operations may operate here because the U.S. may be reluctant to indulge in hostilities against and may not be equipped to do so. Simultaneously, there may be U.S. interest in selling its oil to East, Southeast, and South Asia through this route. Russia may also find advantage in developing this route and is seeking partners to develop it. Several countries have already reached agreements with Russia to take advantage of the NSR. 

Russia is already using its Arctic coast seasonally to deliver LNG from its Yamal project to Europe and Asia. With increasing arctic warming and higher investment in icebreakers, this may change to round-the-year operations. The present bonhomie between Putin and Xi Jinping had already led to the October 2025 Harbin agreement to make NSR a strategic Arctic trade corridor. NSR suits China for another reason. It reduces heavy Chinese dependence on transit through the Malacca Strait, where India is developing an island base with potential to choke that passage. 

India is diplomatically very heavily invested in the Middle East and has been seeking a route to Europe through Iran and through IMEC. If India were to shift to oil and gas imports through NSR it could face strong pushback and heavy geopolitical pressure. The shift will come with another risk; the conflict zone in the Middle East will be swapped for the possible U.S.-Russian tensions in the narrow Bering Strait and make India dependent on a Sino-Russian architecture beyond its control. Even so, that scenario may still be a long way off. A positive aspect is India’s long-standing trade and military engagement with Russia that has proved its strength in crises. In December 2025, Russia and India signed an agreement formalizing Indian military access to Russia’s Arctic naval ports. Long-term contracts for oil and gas and equity participation in the Arctic infrastructure and shipping capacity may follow. 

For India and Southeast Asian countries, the year-round availability of the NSR will increase overall energy resilience by creating an alternative route that will dampen price surges during the frequent Middle East crises. It will make it more feasible for these countries to tap into multiple oil and gas sources including Russia and the U.S. and, in addition, provide a faster sea route to Europe. There is also the feasibility of synergy between the energy needs of India, the ship-building capacity of South Korea, and the NSR. While the Arctic route will not be a silver bullet for Asian countries to have risk-free access to oil and gas, the shift of focus from the tropics to the North Pole shall reduce the historic leverage by the Middle East and will help keep prices and access stable even during the recurring Middle East flare-ups. 

R.N. Prasher is a retired member from Indian Administrative Service (IAS). His primary expertise is in geopolitics where he has published in RealClear Defense, Asia Times, and The National Maritime Foundation. He has published the book “Geopolitics: Impact on Energy Transition and Energy Security” and has an upcoming publication “Revisiting the Chinese Screen” The views are the author’s own.

The North Sea Route as an Alternative to the Hormuz-Red Sea Conundrum was originally published on Global Security Review.

West Africa has experienced an increasing number of national security challenges over the past two decades. Violent extremism, political instability, transnational organized crime, and maritime insecurity have created complex threats that undermine governance, economic development, and regional stability. According to the United Nations Africa Renewal, instability in the Sahel has become one of the most pressing security concerns on the African continent, with escalating violence and growing humanitarian consequences. Countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have faced persistent security crises that require coordinated responses at both national and regional levels; issues that the world should be paying attention to.

One of the most serious security challenges in the region is the rise of violent extremist organizations operating in the Sahel. Groups affiliated with global jihadist movements have expanded their activities across national borders, transforming local conflicts into regional security threats. The Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria is a prominent example. Since its emergence in the early 2000s, Boko Haram has conducted numerous attacks targeting civilians, government institutions, and security forces. The conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people. The insurgency has destabilized large parts of the Lake Chad Basin and continues to pose a significant threat to regional stability.

The spread of extremist violence is not limited to Nigeria. Countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso have experienced rapid increases in militant attacks over the past decade. Armed groups have exploited weak state presence in rural areas, limited economic opportunities, and political grievances among marginalized communities. In many cases, extremist organizations present themselves as alternative authorities capable of providing protection and financial support to local populations. Militant organizations in the Sahel increasingly operate across national borders, making regional coordination essential for effective counterterrorism responses.

Political instability has further complicated the security environment in West Africa. In recent years, several countries in the region have experienced military coups, including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These political disruptions often occur in contexts where governments struggle to address security threats and economic challenges. Military interventions in politics can weaken democratic institutions and create governance gaps that extremist groups may exploit. Governance failures and security crises have contributed significantly to the resurgence of military coups in parts of Africa.

Another important dimension of insecurity in West Africa involves organized transnational crime. Criminal networks operating across the region engage in activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. West Africa has become a major transit hub for cocaine shipments traveling from Latin America to European markets. Weak border controls and limited law enforcement capacity make it difficult for governments to combat these illicit networks effectively. Organized criminal networks in the region frequently intersect with extremist groups, enabling the trafficking of weapons and illicit commodities across borders.

Maritime insecurity also represents a growing challenge for coastal states in West Africa. The Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime regions in the world due to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Criminal groups often target oil tankers and commercial vessels, stealing valuable cargo, and disrupting international shipping routes. These activities have significant economic consequences for regional trade and energy production. The International Maritime Organization has identified the Gulf of Guinea as a major global hotspot for maritime piracy and maritime crime.

Several structural factors contribute to the persistence of security threats in West Africa. Elevated levels of poverty and youth unemployment create conditions that extremist groups and criminal networks can exploit for recruitment. Many young people lack access to education and stable employment opportunities, making them vulnerable to financial incentives offered by militant organizations. The United Nations Development Program highlights how socio-economic marginalization and limited state services contribute to instability in fragile regions.

Climate change has also intensified competition over natural resources in the Sahel region. Desertification and declining rainfall have reduced agricultural productivity, leading to conflicts between farming and pastoralist communities. These local disputes can escalate into broader security challenges when armed groups become involved. The World Bank has emphasized that environmental pressures and climate variability are increasingly linked to conflict dynamics in the Sahel.

Addressing national security threats in West Africa requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military responses with governance reforms and socio-economic development. Governments must strengthen democratic institutions and improve transparency to build public trust and reduce political instability. Effective governance is essential for preventing the conditions that allow extremist groups to expand their influence.

Regional cooperation is also critical for managing transnational threats. Organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States play a key role in coordinating peacekeeping missions and promoting political stability. Joint military operations and intelligence-sharing initiatives can improve the ability of governments to respond to cross-border insurgencies.

Economic development programs should be prioritized in regions most affected by insecurity. Investments in education, infrastructure, and job creation can help address the underlying socio-economic drivers of violence. Providing young people with economic opportunities reduces the likelihood that they will join extremist groups or criminal networks.

West Africa’s security challenges are complex and interconnected. However, through stronger governance, regional cooperation, and sustainable economic development, governments and regional organizations can significantly improve the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the region.

Huseini Kamara is a researcher with academic interests in national security, terrorism studies, and regional security dynamics in West Africa. His previous publication examined the role of artificial intelligence in ECG interpretation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Rising Security Threats in West Africa and Regional Responses was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.