The relationship between the federal government and American universities is tense and often misunderstood. The gap between the purposes and priorities of government, on one side, and the missions and functions of universities, on the other, is alarming.

Historically, the United States has relied on its colleges and universities for several things critical to national defense. First, higher education produces a more educated work force for a globally competitive marketplace. Second, advanced learning fills federal, state, and local government positions that citizens rely on for necessary services. Third, the military and civilian defense establishments require leaders who understand the science and engineering behind modern weapons. Future defense and national security leaders must also understand the American military experience and the relationship between the armed forces and society.

The current and prospective international system is one that poses a wide variety of threats to world peace and international order. U.S. armed forces will be tasked for deterrence and war fighting missions across the entire spectrum of conflict,  from nuclear weapons spread and the possibility of war in space, to the nuances of urban terrorism and counterinsurgency. Officers who rise to senior command will need the perspective of innovators and adaptors, sometimes improvising in combat when exigent conditions override old rules of engagement.

As technology advances and the geostrategic environment grows more complicated, the United States will need a stronger educational establishment to compete with China and other rising powers. Nowhere in Europe or among major Asian military powers is national education under such crossfire as it is in the United States today. How did we get here, and what is to be done?

A primary cause of the war against American education is the perception among politicians, activists, and journalists that higher education has been colonized by radicals who hate America, misrepresent its history, and aim to produce dissidents who attack traditional culture and values, including patriotism and military service. This narrative has spread through misleading political campaigns, indifferent media coverage, and, unfortunately, some missteps by educators themselves.

At the center of this narrative is conflict between the Trump administration and Ivy League universities where demonstrations included violence and charges of antisemitism. Coverage of episodes at Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia has emphasized the behavior of a small percentage of students, sometimes supported by nonstudents and outside money, and overlooked the far larger share of students and faculty who avoid political violence and intimidation.

Admittedly, some leaders in higher education were slow to confront agitators who crossed the line between permissible speech and harassment. On July 24, 2025, Columbia University announced a settlement with the Trump administration: $220 million in fines in exchange for an end to attacks on Columbia’s federally funded research program. Some commentators and observers saw a dangerous precedent; others preferred Harvard’s decision to litigate. Acting Columbia President Claire Shipman argued the agreement was needed to prevent further disruption, and possible destruction, of the broader research enterprise. Whatever the outcome, we are far from the day President John F. Kennedy, at Yale’s 1962 commencement, joked that he enjoyed the best of both worlds: a Harvard education and a Yale degree.

Attacks on higher education also suggest that students, faculty, and administrators are elitists out of touch with Middle America. In fact, most students that attend public institutions come from middle class families, and do not learn their basic values from professors. Values are learned years before college through family and other primary groups. Professors rarely convert diehard conservatives into liberals, or vice versa. Radicals who break the law and violate campus codes are seldom motivated by instructors and more often they are encouraged and funded by activists who move from campus to campus. For example, antisemitism at some universities has been fueled by provocateurs exploiting student concern for non-terrorist Palestinians in Gaza while mischaracterizing Israel’s response to the October 7, 2023, attacks.

Administrators can also be faulted for negligence in defending First Amendment rights and for suppressing speech on spurious grounds. Unlike high school students, most college students are legal adults. They have the right to use confrontational rhetoric and provocative discourse protected by the First Amendment, however infuriating it may be. Too many universities have come to see themselves as providers of reassurance and guarantors of good feeling, backing that impulse with coercive training and sanctions against so-called offensive remarks inside and outside the classroom. The result is an atmosphere in which conversation is reduced to clichés and the celebration of the obvious instead of the clash of ideas from which great minds are molded.

It is an irony that more cut-and-thrust classroom testing of ideas can be found in some U.S. military war colleges and service academies than in many civilian institutions. Even there, however, trends toward government micro-management of curricula and textbook selection are troubling. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia since the February 2022 invasion is lesson to be learned in this debate: Ukraine turned a failed coup de main into a war of attrition through determination, drones, better intelligence, and a faster OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) than Russia.

Going forward, educators, politicians, warriors and voters will have to decide: do we want rigorous and results-oriented learning experiences for our future generations of leaders, or, instead, do we prefer ritualized feelgood rites of passage that will produce generations of intellectual bobbleheads majoring in conspicuous consumption?

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

The Halls of Ivy and National Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Role of Dark Money in Adversarial Interference

Dark money refers to funds used to influence political outcomes where the source of the money is not disclosed. This form of funding is particularly sly because it operates within the loopholes of campaign finance laws, exploiting the lack of transparency in the system to advance agendas that may run counter to American interests.

Adversaries, keenly aware of the limitations of direct military confrontation with the US and its allies, turned to these covert tactics to achieve their objectives. By funneling funds through 501(c)(4) organizations, which are classified as “social welfare” groups and are not required to disclose their donors, adversaries evade scrutiny and manipulate American policy and public opinion.

One of the most concerning aspects of this tactic is its potential to influence American elections. Peter Schweikert’s scenario, presented in a recent congressional hearing, underscores this danger. If an adversary were to donate to a 501(c)(4), which then redirected those funds to a Super PAC supporting candidates sympathetic to their agenda, they could effectively buy influence and shape American policy in ways that may not align with the country’s interests.

Implications for National Security

The implications of adversarial interference through dark money are significant, affecting both the credibility of its deterrence posture and the integrity of its political system. By manipulating public perception and policy discourse, adversaries seek to undermine the credibility of deterrence, a cornerstone of national security strategy. If successful, such efforts could weaken the resolve of the US and its allies, creating a perception of vulnerability that could embolden aggressive actions by adversarial states and non-state actors. This, in turn, could lead to increased tensions and ultimately destabilize the global security environment.

Moreover, the use of dark money undermines the integrity of the American political system, which is built on principles of transparency and accountability. By circumventing disclosure requirements and influencing policy decisions behind the scenes, adversaries erode trust in democratic institutions and raise doubts about the fairness of the political process. This erosion of trust not only weakens the United States’ ability to counter adversarial threats but also undermines its standing as a global leader in democracy and governance. It sets a dangerous precedent that could be exploited by other actors seeking to undermine democratic norms and institutions worldwide.

Furthermore, the use of dark money in American politics could have ripple effects beyond its borders. As a global leader, the US sets an example for other countries in terms of democratic governance and transparency. If the integrity of the political system is compromised, it could embolden authoritarian regimes and other adversaries to disregard democratic norms and institutions, further destabilizing the international order.

Countermeasures and Recommendations

To counter adversarial interference through dark money, several measures should be considered. First and foremost, greater transparency is needed. Regulations should be strengthened to ensure that all sources of funding for advocacy groups, including 501(c)(4) organizations, are disclosed. This would provide greater visibility into the flow of dark money and help identify and mitigate foreign influence.

Additionally, efforts should be made to enhance public awareness of this issue. First and foremost, there must be a concerted effort to enhance public awareness and education on deterrence policy. By providing accurate and accessible information, the government can counter misinformation and ensure that the public understands the necessity of maintaining a credible deterrent.

Furthermore, it is crucial for the US to engage with its allies and partners to collectively address the challenges posed by adversarial narrative control. By presenting a unified front and sharing best practices, the international community can better defend against attempts to undermine deterrence policy and stability.

Ultimately, protecting the integrity of the domestic narrative is essential for safeguarding US interests and maintaining global stability. By taking proactive steps to counter adversarial interference, US officials and deterrence experts can ensure that the public remains well informed and supportive of efforts to modernize our nuclear capabilities.

Conclusion

The use of dark money as a tool for adversarial interference poses a significant threat to national security and the integrity of the political system. Adversaries, recognizing the limitations of direct military confrontation, are increasingly turning to covert tactics to undermine deterrence. By manipulating public perception and policy discourse through funding channels like 501(c)(4) organizations, adversaries seek to weaken the credibility of American deterrence and erode trust in democratic institutions.

The implications of this interference are far-reaching. If successful, adversaries could undermine the resolve of the US and its allies, emboldening aggressive actions and destabilizing the global security environment. Moreover, the use of dark money undermines the principles of transparency and accountability that are essential to a functioning democracy. This raises doubts about the fairness of the political process and weakens the United States’ standing as a global leader in democracy and governance.

To counter this threat, greater transparency in campaign finance laws is needed, along with enhanced public awareness and international cooperation. By taking decisive action to expose and counter adversarial interference through dark money, the US can protect its deterrence posture, safeguard its democratic institutions, and uphold its leadership role in the global community.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is a NIDS Senior Fellow and a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Securing Deterrence: Exposing and Countering Adversary Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.