The election took on a new importance following the breakdown of the once powerful alliance between the Marcos and Duterte political dynasties—after the rapid political decline of the previously popular Duterte family. The Dutertes accused President Marcos of leading a deliberate effort to eliminate his most significant political rivals.

What began as a unified political force that dominated the 2022 elections disintegrated into a bitter rivalry, characterized by personal attacks and an impeachment move against Vice President Sara Duterte. She faces allegations of fund misuse, unexplained wealth accumulation, and even issuing threats against President Marcos, the First Lady, and the House Speaker.

The outcome of the Senate race was crucial, as senators will serve as jurors in the impeachment trial of the vice president. To convict Duterte and permanently bar her from public office, at least 16 of the 24 senators must vote in favor of removal.

The elections, which determined half of the Senate, the entire House of Representatives, and thousands of local officials, revealed a surprisingly even split between Marcos- and Duterte-aligned candidates, defying pre-election polling that predicted a weaker performance from the Duterte faction. The final tally of votes shows that neither Marcos nor Duterte were the big winner in the Senate. Instead, a solid block of both Marcos and Duterte supporters was joined by various reformist candidates who are likely to serve as wild cards in both an impeachment trial and future legislative debates.

Meanwhile, former President Rodrigo Duterte was elected by a massive margin in his bid to reclaim the mayorship of Davao City, despite being detained by the International Criminal Court (ICC). He remained eligible to run because he has not been convicted of any crime. Unexpectedly, the strong showing from the Duterte bloc, combined with the deepening political divide, raises concerns about potential unrest, power consolidation efforts, or gridlock within key institutions even in the intelligence community. As rival factions jostle for influence, the risk of politically motivated violence, destabilizing protests, or coercive maneuvers at both the national and local levels may increase, threatening the country’s governance stability and democratic integrity.

President Marcos publicly distanced himself from the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Duterte. The President denies accusations that he is pursuing a personal vendetta against the Duterte family. Instead, Marcos focused his campaign narrative on the country’s economic progress and his firm stance on defending national sovereignty, highlighting his administration’s opposition to China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. With tensions over Beijing’s regional behavior rising, China is a major political flashpoint in this election cycle.

By downplaying his involvement in the impeachment process, Marcos aims to protect his image as a unifying leader above partisan revenge, possibly to appeal to moderates. This move also helps shift public discourse away from the political feud and refocus it on policy, allowing him to sidestep accusations of using state power to silence rivals.

Marcos’s hardline rhetoric on China serves as a strategic appeal to nationalist sentiment, which grew amid repeated maritime confrontations in the South China Sea. By taking a strong position against Beijing, he seeks to rally public support, differentiate himself from Duterte’s historically China-friendly stance, and secure backing from defense-focused and pro-sovereignty voters.

The spotlight on China in the campaign reflects a broader trend of foreign policy becoming a domestic political issue. This signals a growing alignment between national security concerns and electoral strategy.

Marcos’s tougher China policy also aligns with American interests in the region, potentially strengthening his international legitimacy while further polarizing his rivalry with the Dutertes, who are seen as closer to China.

Conclusion

The convergence of internal political rivalries, external geopolitical interests, and a shifting demographic base marks a potentially volatile era for Philippine democracy where political missteps could quickly escalate into security threats or international incidents. While the Philippines has a civic society and the institutional framework necessary for democratic resilience, political reform, especially an enforceable anti-dynasty law, is essential to revitalize governance.

The results from the Philippine midterm elections illustrate not only the enduring power of political dynasties, but also the rising intensity of intra-elite competition, as both the Marcos and Duterte factions entrench their influence in the Senate. The election’s implications extend beyond politics into questions of institutional credibility, legal accountability, and long-term political stability. How this battle unfolds will shape the Philippines’ democracy in the face of deepening polarization.

The Philippine midterm elections are no longer routine legislative exercises. They are a crucible for deeper structural tensions in the country’s democracy. With institutional legitimacy, political accountability, and regional stability at stake, the results of elections could redefine the Philippines’ democratic trajectory and security outlook in the years to come.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense.

Power Play in the Philippine Midterm Election was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.

During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.

The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.

More Actors Are Getting Involved

The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.

However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.

They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.

This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.

In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.

Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.

The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.

Election Day Was Just the Beginning

Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”

First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”

What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.

In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.

A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.

As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.

It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.

Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science & Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not was originally published on Global Security Review.