In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

On paper, India looks like a good candidate. It is a nuclear weapons power. It has a large army that in recent years confronted China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the disputed border between the two countries. It shares democratic values with the United States as well as the objective of a free and open Indo-Pacific. There are several problems, however, on both sides that will prevent this partnership from achieving its objectives.

Militarily, the United States, Japan, and Australia have the same technology and weaponry making interoperability easy between the three countries. India, on the other hand, presents an obstacle since its weaponry is largely of Russian origin and its technology is a generation behind that of the other three Quad members. This means that the Quad is actually a 3+1, because in a real conflict it would be difficult for the four countries to successfully coordinate their efforts.

Politically, while the US, Japan, and Australia share values and are strong alliance partners, India has significantly divergent views from Washington on Russia and the Ukraine invasion, its position on nonproliferation issues, and because of its unwillingness to be in an open alliance against China.

Technologically, while India wants the latest technologies for its armed services, and would like to build these weapons systems domestically, it does not have the financial resources to pay for these systems or, arguably, the ability to absorb the latest technologies. The Indian government prioritizes butter over guns and has kept defense expenditure below 2 percent of gross domestic product to pay for social welfare programs. (And unlike the United States, the Indian defense budget includes the pensions paid to retired servicemen.)

These financial constraints led to India cutting its order for the Rafale fighter from 126 to 36 aircraft and to the government delaying acquisitions like a new conventional submarine, a new aircraft carrier, and additional fighter jets. Fully modernizing the Indian armed forces requires selling weapons at subsidized rates to the Indians—something the United States will not, and cannot, do, since this would up-end the United States’ arms-transfer policies that have been in place for decades.

Additionally, the Indian government has a policy of techno-nationalism which requires that new weapons systems be built in India. The problem with this approach is that such production is marked by delays and quality-control issues. The Indian Air Force’s long and troubled procurement history of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is testimony to these failures.  Not only is production marred by delays, but the procurement of weapons from foreign companies moves at a glacial pace and can take decades. It took twenty years for India to buy the Hawk Trainer and fifteen to purchase the Rafale. More recently, the Indian Navy has put out a tender for a new conventional submarine but the takers are few since the Navy’s requirements

are considered impractical by major suppliers and some have dropped out of the competition for supplying the new submarine.

The other problem for India, of course, is the cost of weapons systems and here the United States can be of little help to New Delhi because the latter would need high-quality arms at subsidized rates—something that the US has not done in significant numbers since the Cold War. Further, some of India’s most pressing needs—like a conventional submarine—cannot be met by the US which decades ago gave up producing those subs.

Despite these problems, if given proper assistance, Indian capabilities can be improved to the extent where the country’s armed forces can pose a greater challenge to China and in doing so complicate the threat calculus of the People’s Liberation Army in the Indo-Pacific. As of now the Chinese have two divisions in Xin Jiang which are heavy units with armor and over 10,000 soldiers in each of them. In Tibet, the Chinese have four brigades with 4,000 soldiers each and 10–12 regiments with 2,000 soldiers in each unit.

The units in Tibet face the India border, and as of now, there is no major Chinese build-up of forces in the region. Instead the Chinese are modernizing their air defenses and infrastructure to allow for the rapid movement of troops and materiel into the area. Facing an Indian Army that has better weaponry, and more effective intelligence assets, would force the PLA to divert more resources, especially manpower, to the border and tie down those forces.

Better weaponry does not necessarily mean better aircraft and submarines, it requires building up the fundamentals of the armed forces which is cheaper to do and leads to combat effectiveness. Thus, the Indian Army still does not have a decent assault rifle since the factory that is supposed to produce Russian AK-203s is still not fully functional and the Army was forced to import 73,000 Sig Sauer rifles from the United States. The Indian Army also operates largely without night-vision equipment and is only now beginning to acquire drones at the tactical level for its units. Given that it has engaged in skirmishes with the PLA, the Indians need to be in a better position to handle such localized conflicts.

The other area where the United States and India can cooperate is in developing a set of affordable drones for surveillance and carrying out tactical strike operations. The Indian Army is buying off-the-shelf First Person View (FPV) drones in sufficient numbers and, eventually, the three services will acquire 31 Reaper drones, although these are both expensive and, given the vast ocean, mountain, and desert territories of India, too few to make a substantial difference to Indian combat capabilities. What the country needs is an affordable Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone to back up the FPV drones and provide a redundancy in drone capabilities. There are several medium-sized American companies that can collaborate with the Indians to build such drones thereby fulfilling the Indian desire to manufacture in India but also allowing for the procurement of affordable systems for the military.

The other key area where the US can help the Indians is by providing intelligence on Chinese positioning and basing along the border. This was done in 2022 because of an intelligence-sharing agreement that gave the Indians the location of Chinese forces, which allowed the Indians to successfully engage and deter the Chinese. Such agreements should expand to significantly enhance Indian capabilities along the border since New Delhi lacks the space-based assets to comprehensively monitor its border.

While the India-US military relationship may not prove as successful as those with NATO or Israel, it can develop to give the Indians a better ability to defend their interests along the disputed India-China border. That is good for America’s interest in containing China in the Indo-Pacific.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa, Canada. The views in this article are personal. He can be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

The Flawed US-India Military Relationship was originally published on Global Security Review.