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		<title>Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joseph H. Lyons]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 12:14:57 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 2, 2026 On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual 2025 China Military Power Report to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/reciprocity-in-deterrence-not-just-trade/">Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><em>Published: April 2, 2026</em></p></blockquote>
<p>On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF">2025 China Military Power Report</a> to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, while Russia continues to brandish tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons to shield conventional aggression. Yet U.S. deterrence planning still assumes that sufficiency against one peer will scale to two.</p>
<p>Within the bomber community, personnel are trained to operate and make decisions amid uncertainty. Deterrence cannot rely on idealized scenarios. Washington, however, continues to plan and budget as if deterring one peer at a time is adequate to maintain peace. Since the Nixon administration elevated “strategic sufficiency,” the U.S. has preferred a survivable second-strike posture over matching adversary numbers, even as U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander Adm. Charles Richard <a href="https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/2086752/us-strategic-command-and-us-northern-command-sasc-testimony/">testified in 2020</a>, “We do not seek parity.”</p>
<p>That posture of sufficiency made sense when the U.S. faced one major nuclear superpower at a time. It makes less sense when the U.S. must deter two nuclear peers, potentially in overlapping crises while also accounting for a third in North Korea. The <a href="https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/A/Am/Americas%20Strategic%20Posture/Strategic-Posture-Commission-Report.pdf">2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States</a> warned the nation is “ill-prepared” for a future where China and Russia can coordinate, or opportunistically exploit dual crises.</p>
<p>The issue is not that U.S. modernization appears timid on paper. Instead, it is optimized for a single adversary. A survivable second strike against one major nuclear opponent is not enough as a credible deterrent against two, especially if one adversary believes the other will absorb U.S. attention. Deterrence developed for one enemy breaks down when facing multiple opponents.</p>
<p>Modernization is also colliding with the same budget dysfunction that has battered conventional readiness for years. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats do not just delay programs; they advertise doubt about U.S. resolve. In deterrence, doubt about political will can be just as harmful as uncertainty about capability.</p>
<p>Enter the logic of reciprocity. The White House’s February 2025 memorandum on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/02/reciprocal-trade-and-tariffs/">Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs</a> argues that reciprocal measures are not punishment; they are a way to restore balance when competitors exploit unequal terms. Reciprocity is a framework for fairness, and fairness is what makes commitments believable.</p>
<p>Deterrence needs <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-trade-and-tariff-policy-benefits-americas-nuclear-deterrent/">a similar framework</a>. Strategic fairness demands a posture calibrated to the combined capabilities of the adversaries the U.S. must deter, not an accounting trick that treats them sequentially. <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Dynamic-Parity-Report.pdf">Dynamic Parity</a> offers that calibration: match the aggregate nuclear threat, go no further, and use that ceiling to avoid both arms racing and strategic vulnerability.</p>
<p>Dynamic Parity is “parity without superiority.” It rebuffs a race for numerical dominance, but it also rejects minimalist postures that assume an adversary will politely wait its turn. It restores equilibrium as the foundation of deterrence in a multipolar era.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.stimson.org/2025/gambling-on-armageddon-nuclear-deterrence-threshold-for-nuclear-war/">Skeptics argue</a> that “parity” invites an arms race or abandons arms control. Dynamic Parity does the opposite: it clearly separates what is required from what is excess, with the numerical arsenals determined by the adversary and then matched by America. This establishes a disciplined standard for force planning. That discipline also enhances the U.S. position in future risk-reduction negotiations by making the baseline requirements explicit instead of improvised during a crisis.</p>
<p>Strategy, however, is not self-executing. If Dynamic Parity is the strategic logic, Congress needs a budgeting structure that can deliver it. <a href="https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section2218a&amp;num=0&amp;edition=prelim">The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund</a> provided the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with authorities that support long-lead procurement and multiyear contracting.</p>
<p>Congress should implement that approach throughout the nuclear enterprise via a National Strategic Deterrence Fund. The goal is not to escape oversight; it is to safeguard the core of deterrence from annual budget brinkmanship and start-stop inefficiency. If the fund is protected as non-discretionary spending with multiyear authority, modernization timelines become actual plans rather than mere hopes.</p>
<p>Here is what that would look like in practice:</p>
<ul>
<li>Direct the next Nuclear Posture Review to adopt a concurrency standard and use Dynamic Parity as the force-planning logic.</li>
<li>Create a National Strategic Deterrence Fund with multi-year and long-lead authorities across delivery systems, warheads, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications.</li>
<li>Require annual execution reporting, i.e., schedule, industrial capacity, and funding stability, so Congress can measure delivery and not intent.</li>
</ul>
<p>This is about credibility, not bookkeeping. The State Department’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ISAB-Report-on-Deterrence-in-a-World-of-Nuclear-Multipolarity_Final-Accessible.pdf">International Security Advisory Board</a> warned in 2023 that extended deterrence hinges on the perception of sustained capability and resolve. Allies and adversaries do not parse budget documents; they watch whether the U.S. executes what it promises.</p>
<p>Execution is the signal. Russia’s <a href="https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/">2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence</a> establishes clear redlines for potential nuclear use while deliberately preserving threshold ambiguity. China is building the force structure for <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/parading-chinas-nuclear-arsenal-out-shadows">nuclear coercion alongside conventional power projection</a>. If Washington cannot modernize on schedule and at scale, because budgets lurch from continuing resolution to shutdown threat, adversaries will read that as strategic hesitation, not fiscal noise.</p>
<p>Reciprocity works only when it is enforced. In nuclear deterrence, enforcement means a posture designed for concurrency and a budget mechanism that delivers it. Dynamic Parity provides the standard; a National Strategic Deterrence Fund provides the spine. In a multipolar nuclear world, balance against combined nuclear threats is not a theory, it is the price of credibility.</p>
<p><em>Joseph H. Lyons is a career bomber aviator and a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, any other U.S. government agency, or Missouri State University.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Reciprocity-in-Deterrence-Not-Just-Trade-1.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="173" height="48" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 173px) 100vw, 173px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/reciprocity-in-deterrence-not-just-trade/">Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Syeda Fizzah Shuja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2025 12:06:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30754</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>War no longer announces itself with the roar of fighter jets or the march of soldiers. It now lurks in the shadows where the front line is undefined. The recent sabotage of Estlink 2 power cables, disruptions to Taiwan’s undersea communication lines, and the increasing presence of unidentified commercial vessels near critical infrastructure are signs [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/">The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>War no longer announces itself with the roar of fighter jets or the march of soldiers. It now lurks in the shadows where the front line is undefined. </strong>The recent sabotage of <strong>Estlink 2 power cables</strong>, disruptions to <strong>Taiwan’s undersea communication lines</strong>, and the increasing presence of <strong>unidentified commercial vessels near critical infrastructure</strong> are <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/beneath-the-surface-the-strategic-implications-of-seabed-warfare">signs</a> <strong>of 5th-generation warfare (5GW). Moreover, a high spike in emerging incidents like Russian hybrid tactics in Europe, artificial intelligence (AI)-powered cyberattacks on maritime infrastructure, and the weaponization of social media for disinformation</strong> suggests the evolving nature of contemporary warfare.</p>
<p><a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/11/25/5th-generation-war-a-war-without-borders-and-its-impact-on-global-security/">5GW</a><strong> includes </strong>information dominance and manipulation, social engineering, economic coercion, cyber sabotage, and hybrid influence operations. It thrives on ambiguity, exploiting vulnerabilities without traditional combat. In 5GW, the lines between war and peace are blurred. No declarations, no clear enemies, just a relentless assault on stability. The goal is not to conquer land or destroy armies, but to cripple a nation’s spirit, economy, and infrastructure from within.</p>
<p>One of the most potent asymmetric tools of 5GW is economic manipulation. <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/11/02/palau-is-under-attack-from-prc/">Palau</a>, a serene archipelago of over <strong>500 islands</strong>, were untouched by war <strong>until 2017.</strong> Palau dared to reject <strong>Beijing’s “One China Policy.”</strong> This move sent shockwaves through its fragile economy in the form of economic strangulation. In a masterstroke of economic coercion, <strong>China’s state-backed tour operators erased Palau from the Web.</strong></p>
<p>Travel agencies stopped selling trips. Online searches yielded no results. <strong>Palau’s tourism industry, which accounted for </strong><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/sep/08/palau-against-china-the-tiny-island-defying-the-worlds-biggest-country">45 percent of gross domestic product</a> (GDP)<strong>, collapsed.</strong> Hotels emptied, airlines shut down, and the once-thriving economy suffocated.</p>
<p>This was not an anomaly, but a pattern<strong>.</strong> In <strong>2016, South Korea agreed to facilitate the American </strong><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-thaad-missile-defence-system">THAAD missile defense system</a><strong>.</strong> China retaliated not with weapons but with <strong>economic muscle.</strong> Mysterious “fire and safety” violations suddenly appeared in South Korean businesses across China. <strong>A </strong><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/augustrick/2017/12/21/how-beijing-played-hardball-with-south-korea-using-the-2018-olympic-ticket-sales/">nine-month ban</a><strong> on Chinese tourism cost Seoul $6.5 billion.</strong> <strong>Retail giants like Lotte crumbled, thousands lost jobs, and yet, no war was declared.</strong></p>
<p>The more interconnected the world economy becomes, <strong>the more vulnerable nations are to economic blackmail.</strong> Even <strong>Venezuela, despite its fiery anti-American rhetoric,</strong> was bound to the US economy. In 2018, despite Washington branding <strong>Nicolás Maduro a dictator</strong> and Caracas calling the US a <strong>“white supremacist regime,”</strong> the two nations still had <strong>$24 billion in trade, </strong>a quarter of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/9/13/venezuelas-crisis-in-numbers">Venezuela’s GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, when Washington imposed <strong>sweeping financial sanctions,</strong> Venezuela’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-tragedy-of-venezuela-1527177202">economy shrunk</a><strong> by 35 percent in a single year.</strong> After all, the United States does not just impose sanctions; <strong>it controls the very financial system that runs the world.</strong> The US dollar is the bloodline of global trade, and those who defy it <strong>find themselves cut off from international markets, unable to access capital or even conduct basic transactions. However, </strong>economic warfare breeds resistance.</p>
<p><strong>Russia and China saw the writing on the wall.</strong> Between 2017 and 2020, <strong>Moscow </strong><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-cuts-holdings-us-bonds-may-end-dollar-payments/29429653.html">slashed its holdings</a><strong> of US Treasury securities from $105 billion to just $3.8 billion</strong> and shifted towards China’s <strong>Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (</strong><a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/why-chinas-cips-matters-and-not-for-the-reasons-you-think">CIPS</a><strong>),</strong> sidestepping American financial hegemony.</p>
<p>The true <strong>commanding heights of global dominance</strong> lie at the intersection of <strong>technology, finance, and unchecked ambition. China is not just selling 5G networks, it is embedding itself into the nervous system of global communication. On the other hand, the US does not just dominate finance, it controls the SWIFT banking system, ensuring economic warfare is just a sanction away. Similarly, corporations do not just innovate, they monopolize, influence, and quietly dictate policy behind closed doors.</strong></p>
<p><em>“Surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.”</em> A battle cry? <strong>Indeed.</strong> Not from a general on the battlefield, but from <strong>Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei</strong>, a company waging a war not just against competitors but against entire nations. Britain’s telecom networks are suspected to have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53329005">Chinese backdoors</a>.</p>
<p>I<strong>nformation is now what oil was in the 1970s, a critical commodity to be controlled.</strong> Today, <strong>data is the new crude</strong>, and the battle to monopolize its flow has already begun. <strong>Quantum computing, AI, and machine learning</strong> are the new oil rigs, and the nations that dominate these technologies will dictate the future. Unlike oil, <strong>information is easily stolen, manipulated, or even weaponized in ways no physical resource ever could. </strong></p>
<p>The first lethal autonomous drone strike in Libya, recorded in <strong>March 2020</strong>, was a grim reminder of what is to come. <strong>A suicide drone, powered by AI, needed no human command—just a target. </strong><a href="https://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/361">Fire and forget</a><strong> was the name of the game. </strong>Imagine the next phase: <strong>terrorist organizations deploying AI-powered swarms, able to strike with precision, invulnerability, and zero risk to human operatives.</strong> They would not negotiate, would not retreat, and would prove hard to stop. <strong> </strong></p>
<p>In a world where biological warfare is outlawed, <strong>the selective control of food, aid, and healthcare has replaced mass destruction with slow, calculated suffocation.</strong> Nations can now <strong>deny access to the very essentials of life</strong> to break their adversaries in a <strong>siege without walls and a war without battlefields. </strong>Over <a href="https://www.wri.org/insights/highest-water-stressed-countries">40 percent</a><strong> of the world’s population</strong> faces water scarcity, and by 2030, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/drought#tab=tab_1">drought</a> could displace <strong>700 million people.</strong> The <strong>Turkish-backed militias that had control over the Alouk water station in Syria</strong> in 2020 was a stark reminder—<strong>when resources are weaponized, suffering becomes policy.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Interestingly, the battle of perception is gaining momentum more than ever. </strong>In an era of <strong>clickbait headlines and disinformation campaigns, lies travel faster than truth. The </strong><a href="https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-twitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-stories-0308">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</a> found that <strong>false news spreads 70 percent faster than real news.</strong> From <strong>the Soviet KGB planting the rumor in the 1980s that the US government created AIDS </strong>to modern <strong>deepfake propaganda,</strong> deception is the new artillery.</p>
<p>Even culture is not immune. <strong>Hollywood exported American ideals, Bollywood spread Indian influence, and K-pop turned South Korea into a global powerhouse. For instance,</strong> the Cold War was not just won by missiles, it was won when a <strong>West German band sang “Wind of Change,” which then became the anthem of the Berlin Wall’s collapse.</strong></p>
<p>If <strong>hunger, water, and financial systems</strong> hare already weaponized, the next battlefield is clear—space and the seabed<strong>.</strong> <strong>Subsea communication cables are responsible for carrying 97 percent of global data traffic and are the arteries of the modern economy. They enable over $10 trillion in financial transactions every single day.</strong> Yet, these vital lifelines remain <strong>shockingly unprotected and are vulnerable to sabotage, espionage, and strategic disruption.</strong> A targeted attack on just a handful of these cables could <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/beneath-the-surface-the-strategic-implications-of-seabed-warfare">cripple stock markets</a><strong>, paralyze banking systems, and sever military command structures—all without a single warship being deployed.</strong></p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <strong>race for space dominance is accelerating.</strong> From <strong>$63.66 billion in 2024 to an estimated $74.4 billion by 2028,</strong> the <a href="https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5735299/military-satellites-market-report#:~:text=It%20will%20grow%20from%20$60.92%20billion%20in,compound%20annual%20growth%20rate%20(CAGR)%20of%204.5%.">global military satellite </a>market is growing, fueled by the realization that <strong>power no longer lies in boots on the ground, but in eyes in the sky.</strong> Satellites provide <strong>precision-strike capabilities, secure communication, and real-time battlefield intelligence.</strong> The <strong>Pentagon warns</strong> that the US is already vulnerable, with <strong>China and Russia developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.</strong></p>
<p>In this realm, one can say that modern states wage wars without battlefields, where the goal is not to destroy but to <strong>subdue</strong>—crippling economies, infiltrating cyber networks, and manipulating narratives <strong>without a single shot fired.</strong> What is never openly begun is rarely officially ended. <strong>In 5th-generation warfare, silence is a weapon, perception is the battlefield, and survival means accepting that war never truly ends.</strong></p>
<p><em>Syeda Fizzah Shuja is a Research Associate at Pakistan Navy War College and an Mphil scholar in Peace and Counter Terrorism. Her work focuses on hybrid warfare and maritime terrorism. She can be contacted at fizzasyed2k@gmail.com.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/The-5GW-Playbook.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="245" height="68" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 245px) 100vw, 245px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/">The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-10-mar/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-10-mar/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2025 12:19:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30318</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The ICBM EAR Week of March 10, 2025, prepared by Peter Huessy, covers various geopolitical and defense-related developments. ​ Key commentary includes statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio praising progress towards peace in Ukraine and Polish President Andrzej Duda urging the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons to Poland. ​ The document highlights the ironclad [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-10-mar/">ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>
<div class="style__markdown___2aU6d">
<p>The ICBM EAR Week of March 10, 2025, prepared by Peter Huessy, covers various geopolitical and defense-related developments. ​ Key commentary includes statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio praising progress towards peace in Ukraine and Polish President Andrzej Duda urging the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons to Poland. ​ The document highlights the ironclad South Korea-U.S. alliance amid North Korea&#8217;s missile tests and ongoing U.S.-ROK Freedom Shield exercises. ​</p>
<p>From the archives, the Team B Report from December 1976 criticizes the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for misunderstanding Soviet strategic objectives by attributing U.S. decision-making behaviors to Soviet leaders. ​ The report emphasizes the political utility of nuclear forces and the need for a complementary war-fighting capability alongside deterrence. ​</p>
<p>Upcoming events include the NIDS/Huessy Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense Seminar Series featuring speakers like David Trachtenberg, Gordon Chang, Rick Fisher, Brad Roberts, Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Maj Gen Stacy Jo Huser, Dr. Jim Howe, Dr. Phillip Karber, and Dr. Uzi Ruben. ​</p>
<p>Administration developments discuss Elon Musk&#8217;s involvement in proposed Pentagon spending cuts, with internal memos suggesting $50 billion in cuts over five years, while a stopgap spending bill proposes a $6 billion defense spending increase. ​ The Pentagon faces challenges in providing lists of potential defense program cuts to lawmakers. ​</p>
<p>Defense budget developments reveal concerns over a yearlong continuing resolution maintaining last year&#8217;s funding levels, potentially costing the Air Force $4-14 billion. ​ Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker advocates for increased defense spending to address threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. ​</p>
<p>Strategic developments include the U.S. warning Iran against acquiring nuclear weapons, with mixed responses from Iranian leaders. ​ Ukraine agreed to a 30-day cease-fire with Russia under U.S. pressure, restoring American intelligence aid to Ukraine. ​</p>
<p>The document also features a special report on missile defense, emphasizing the need for an integrated, multilayered missile defense architecture to counter threats from adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. ​ The report advocates for expanding U.S. homeland and regional missile defenses, including space-based capabilities. ​</p>
<p>Congressional developments note Senator Jeanne Shaheen&#8217;s decision not to run for reelection in 2026 and the passage of a continuing resolution funding the government through the fiscal year. ​ The document concludes with discussions on nuclear proliferation, highlighting the potential for a new nuclear arms race and the importance of disarmament efforts.</p>
</div>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/The-ICBM-EAR-Week-of-March-10.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="255" height="71" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 255px) 100vw, 255px" /></a></p>
</div>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-10-mar/">ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 13:15:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30092</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 Overview The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis. Key Themes &#38; Highlights Strategic Nuclear Posture &#38; Modernization: U.S. nuclear deterrence [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Overview</strong></p>
<p>The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.</p>
<p><strong>Key Themes &amp; Highlights</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Strategic Nuclear Posture &amp; Modernization:</strong>
<ul>
<li>U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.</li>
<li>The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.</li>
<li>Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Policy &amp; Leadership Insights:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.</li>
<li>House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.</li>
<li>Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Geopolitical Developments &amp; Deterrence Challenges:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.</li>
<li>Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.</li>
<li>The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict &amp; U.S. Policy:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.</li>
<li>Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Congressional &amp; Budgetary Updates:</strong>
<ul>
<li>The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.</li>
<li>Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Emerging Threats &amp; Strategic Risks:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.</li>
<li>Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Download the full report</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-week-of-February-10.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Stone]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2025 13:04:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30080</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, opponents of missile defenses published editorials in several outlets accusing the Trump administration of “conjuring” up an “arms race” that will severely damage “strategic stability by proposing an Iron Dome for America. This view is ill informed at best and severely dangerous at worst. There are several reasons this is true in the great [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/">Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, opponents of missile defenses published editorials in several outlets accusing the Trump administration of “<a href="https://spacenews.com/hubble-bubble-toil-and-trouble-stirring-up-an-arms-race-in-space/">conjuring” up an “arms race” that will severely damage “strategic stability</a> by proposing an Iron Dome for America. This view is ill informed at best and severely dangerous at worst. There are several reasons this is true in the great power competition era we find ourselves in.</p>
<p>First, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/the-iron-dome-for-america/">president’s executive order</a> directing the deployment of an active defense against missile and space-borne attacks is not the starting point for an arms race. The fact of the matter is, the Chinese and Russians started an arms race over a decade ago and recently accelerated it with <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/10/24/china-leading-rapid-expansion-of-nuclear-arsenal-pentagon-says/">their “breakout” in nuclear missiles deployments</a> as well as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-95-russias-nuclear-forces-have-been-modernised-2024-02-23/">expansion and modernization of long-range strike platforms</a> (to include fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.</p>
<p>These expansions in offensive nuclear/space forces were not because America’s space and nuclear forces are too strong, but because they are too weak. The American <a href="https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile">nuclear enterprise is acknowledged to be “atrophied,”</a> and the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/16/us-space-force-needs-more-to-effectively-deter-win-wars/">Space Force is not prepared to address such threats</a> and incapable of addressing the threats posed by adversary space forces.</p>
<p>American vulnerability to homeland attack and, by extension, the nation’s critical space infrastructure, invites these threats. The US is delinquent in its duty to protect citizens by accepting a passive, hostage-style approach and labeling it “strategic stability.”</p>
<p>Second, detractors of homeland missile defense suggest that America is to blame for provoking China and Russia’s build-up. They are more concerned about space-based interceptors creating space debris than the impact of limited or mass attack upon the American homeland.</p>
<p>The US is the leader in advocating for the mitigation of debris generation, while <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/11/29/russia-produces-more-space-debris-than-any-other-country-a30053">China and Russia are the two biggest offenders</a>. To think that these two adversary nations with <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/saltzman-chinas-asat-test-was-pivot-point-in-space-operations/">kinetic ASAT capabilities and the political will to use</a> them, despite debris generation, are only responding to US activity, shows a lack of understanding of these adversaries and their strategy. Lest Americans forget, both China and Russia see the United States as having more to lose from conflict in space than they do.</p>
<p>Third, opponents of Iron Dome for America believe that “real security” does not come from a credible hard power, but from “arms control, diplomacy and shared risk reduction.” While these are noble ideas, the historical record shows that arms control is often one-sided, with Russia cheating on every single arms control agreement it has ever signed and China showing no interest in anything other than American disarmament. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-un-resolution-space-nuclear-weapons-satellites/">UN votes on norms of behavior have not changed the situation one bit</a>. China and Russia regularly exploit <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4443781-history-shows-that-no-ceasefire-or-treaty-with-russia-can-be-trusted/">weakness</a>. Iron Dome America seeks to remove this vulnerability from the equation. As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently stated correctly, “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4068503/hegseth-lauds-us-poland-alliance-reemphasizes-call-for-nato-countries-to-increa/">Diplomacy is important, talk is important, [and] negotiations are important,” Hegseth said. “But, ultimately, beans and bullets and tanks and helicopters and hard power still [matter].”</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Finally, they argue that the system being pursued “won’t work.” This argument fails to understand that the reason American ballistic missile defenses are so limited is mainly due to policy restraints and less about technology. Missile defense technologies, such as those proposed in the Strategic Defense Initiative, were not mature in the 1980s, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3743501/defense-officials-say-continued-investments-in-missile-defense-are-critical-ami/">but four decades later, numerous technologies are more advanced</a>.</p>
<p>Also, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-spacex-lowered-costs-and-reduced-barriers-to-space-112586">The high cost of launch, for example, is drastically lower today than it was four decades ago because of efforts of companies like SpaceX</a>. This single company demonstrated the capacity to launch hundreds of satellites a year, if not thousands in the <a href="https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/spacexs-big-year-heres-every-new-record-and-feat-elon-musks-space-company-achieved-in-2024">same number of launches it took thirty years for the Space Shuttle to fly</a>.</p>
<p>Today, the idea of having “space-based interceptors” does not mean the United States must place missiles or laser cannons in space. There are many ways to pursue this effort in ways that were not conceivable when Ronald Reagan envisioned a space-based missile defense. Agencies like the Missile Defense Agency and Space Development Agency are pursuing numerous defensive layers as mentioned in the President’s Executive Order. All will collectively aid the system in protecting the homeland from boost to terminal phases of flight.</p>
<p>Iron Dome for America may not stop every missile launched at the United States, but fielding some measure of defense is better than simply ignoring the problem and hoping that good will prevail. History shows that idealism is all too often a key factor in the onset of war. Nuclear war is one Americans cannot afford to lose and should never be satisfied with leaving to chance.</p>
<p>Iron Dome for America is not just an idea, it is a requirement. The nation must get it right in order to ensure a more safe and secure home for Americans and the world.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Pentagon. The views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect those of his employer or the United States government. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Iron-Dome-America-is-Not-the-Threat-to-Peace-Chinese-and-Russian-Nuclear-and-Space-Force-Build-Up-Is.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="320" height="89" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 320px) 100vw, 320px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/">Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Fincher]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2025 13:14:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30044</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Secretary Hegseth, It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/">Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Secretary Hegseth,</p>
<p>It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard it can be for some once they leave the service. That same research will also help you to eliminate the politicization that left the military hurting for recruits.</p>
<p>This understanding and experience will be helpful in correcting the course of the Department of Defense. Prioritizing warfighting capabilities and lethality over supporting the mission creep of bureaucracy is critical but antithetical to everything that is Washington, DC. The Pentagon was focused on budgets and bureaucratic infighting long before you arrived. The five-sided puzzle palace will fight back and has a long institutional memory.</p>
<p>Just remember, of <a href="https://www.fedsmith.com/2024/10/25/federal-employees-and-2024-political-donations/">all services and the department</a> itself, only the US Air Force Airmen gave more money to Republicans than Democrats. There is at least one ray of hope.</p>
<p>For decades the military has had its combat forces slashed, bases closed or consolidated, and weapon systems and platforms reduced or retired—all while the Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, and Russians expanded their military capabilities and plotted the destruction of the international order Americans built. While the war on terror was lost by the very people who hate the fact that you are Secretary of Defense, you have an opportunity to right the ship before it is too late.</p>
<p>No doubt, you will receive more input on what you should do than you can possibly digest. Let me offer a quick list.</p>
<p>First, a sovereign state, by definition, controls its borders. That is a military function. Help President Trump secure the border. There is no such thing as acceptable illegal immigration.</p>
<p>Second, adopt the Weinberger Doctrine as your overriding strategy for the use of military force. You will never go wrong if you do.</p>
<p>Third, the military may be the best socialist system in the world, but it is time to overhaul the personnel system and bring it into the twenty-first century. The military is unique, but do not let that be an excuse.</p>
<p>Fourth, modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal must be your top spending priority. A bigger Army, conventional Navy, or conventional Air Force will not deter China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia; only a robust strategic and theater nuclear arsenal can achieve that objective.</p>
<p>Fifth, service members, particularly junior enlisted, have lived in <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/photos-us-military-bases-show-mold-mice-roaches-brown-water-rcna168368">toxic base housing</a> for far too long. This problem should not make this list, but after two decades it has yet to be solved.</p>
<p>Sixth, remove the cancerous social and political activism that inundates the military. Nothing harms unity more than pitting servicemembers against one another because of their race, gender, or some other contrived distinction. Based on your initial actions, your efforts are already moving ahead.</p>
<p>Seventh, there is simply too much duplication across the services and within the services. Ensuring command opportunities should not lead to the creation of unneeded commands. The services are too small to be inefficient.</p>
<p>Eighth, <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/reforms-needed-reduce-delays-and-costs-us-shipbuilding">expand the number of combatant</a> ships, missile defense systems, and the combat air force. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force has the capability to wage a sustained campaign against a peer. Not only does the nation lack the delivery platforms, but it will go Winchester in a matter of days. Thus, every kind of weapon is also needed.</p>
<p>Ninth, take the time to reset the baseline and see what the military really needs to defeat the Axis of Autocracy. Is it <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/drone-swarms-new-threat-us-bases/">drone swarms</a>, <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/donald-trumps-iron-dome/">missile technology</a>, robots? Whatever the answer may be, it is unlikely exactly what we already have.</p>
<p>Finally, get very good at telling the American people why it is more important to spend tax dollars on the military than the entitlements they know and love. This is perhaps your biggest task. In 2024, the federal government took in $4.4 trillion and spent $4.6 trillion on entitlement programs alone. That is unsustainable. The federal government was never meant to take care of the health, retirement, and education of Americans. It was specifically tasked to defend the nation.</p>
<p>You have a big job ahead of you. Good luck. Americans want nothing more than your success. The safety of the country depends on it.</p>
<p><em>Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Congratulations-Secretary-Hegseth.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/">Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Future of US-Pakistan Relations</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Haseeb Riaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 12:55:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29892</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>President Donald Trump’s return to the White House may or may not prove auspicious for Pakistan. Trump’s victory will certainly have wide-ranging ramifications for the geopolitical chessboard because of existing challenges to international order. It could potentially transform the fabric of international cooperation. No region will remain untouched. South Asia will be no exception. Most [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/">The Future of US-Pakistan Relations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President Donald Trump’s return to the White House may or may not prove auspicious for Pakistan. Trump’s victory will certainly have wide-ranging ramifications for the geopolitical chessboard because of existing challenges to international order. It could potentially transform the fabric of international cooperation. No region will remain untouched.<br />
South Asia will be no exception. Most South Asian nations are betting their hopes on greater American engagement in the region despite Donald Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and foreign and security policy.</p>
<p>President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.</p>
<p>Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.</p>
<p>America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.</p>
<p>There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.</p>
<p>President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.</p>
<p>An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.</p>
<p>This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.</p>
<p>American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.<br />
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.<br />
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.</p>
<p>Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.<br />
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.</p>
<p>These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.<br />
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Future-of-Pak-US-Relations-under-Trump-2.0.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/">The Future of US-Pakistan Relations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report December 8th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29631</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024 This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024</strong></p>
<p>This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Chelsey Wiley (IISS):</strong> <em>“US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”</em>
<ul>
<li>Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China&#8217;s threats, not shifting blame to the US.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Admiral Tony Radakin (UK):</strong> <em>“The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Palantir CEO:</strong> <em>“Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN):</strong> <em>“Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”</em></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week</strong></p>
<p><strong>&#8220;Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism&#8221; by Christopher Ford (NIPP)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Explores China&#8217;s military expansion and its quest for global influence.</li>
<li>Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.</li>
<li>Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Update</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>FY25 NDAA:</strong> Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.</li>
<li>Key provisions:
<ul>
<li>Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.</li>
<li>Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>New Congressional Members:</strong>
<ul>
<li>78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.</li>
<li>Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>China’s Nuclear Expansion:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.</li>
<li>Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CSIS Wargaming:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.</li>
<li>Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Third Nuclear Age:</strong>
<ul>
<li>UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges</strong>
<ul>
<li>Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.</li>
<li>Marine Corps General Eric Smith: <em>“What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”</em></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Panel 2: Innovation in Defense</strong>
<ul>
<li>Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.</li>
<li>Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Peace Through Strength:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.</li>
<li>Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-December-8th.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Read The Full Report</span></a></h3>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2024 11:54:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Low-yield nuclear warheads]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Unpredictability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28862</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the November presidential election approaches, the prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency raises important questions about the future of American nuclear deterrence. Trump’s first term was marked by a significant focus on nuclear weapons modernization and a distinct approach to nuclear deterrence that contrasted sharply with his predecessor. Understanding what nuclear deterrence could [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/">What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the November presidential election approaches, the prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency raises important questions about the future of American nuclear deterrence. Trump’s first term was marked by a <a href="https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/future-of-warfare/under-trump-the-nuclear-weapons-industry-has-boomed/">significant focus on nuclear weapons modernization</a> and a distinct approach to nuclear deterrence that contrasted sharply with his predecessor. Understanding what nuclear deterrence could look like under another Trump administration requires a closer examination of his past statements, policies, and actions, as well as the perspectives of his closest national security advisors.<br />
<strong><br />
Trump’s Views on Nuclear Weapons: Modernization and Importance</strong></p>
<p>Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/trump-interview-nuclear-weapons/index.html">said</a>, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.</p>
<p>Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF">2018 <em>Nuclear Posture Review</em> (NPR)</a>, which highlighted the need to revitalize the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">nuclear triad</a>—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.</p>
<p><strong>Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty-glance">Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty</a>, citing <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832/38#:~:text=This%20report%20stated%20that%20the,to%205%2C500%20km%2C%20or%20to">Russian violations</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/29/trump-china-new-start-nuclear-arms-pact-expiration/">signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes</a> such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.</p>
<p>Under Trump<a href="https://fas.org/publication/w76-2deployed/">, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead</a>, which was deployed on <em>Ohio</em>-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/sentinel/rising-to-the-occasion-northrop-grumman-and-the-sentinel-gbsd-program">Sentinel </a>ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.</p>
<p>However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1708/09/nday.01.html">fire and fury</a>” rhetoric toward North Korea and his <a href="https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/948355557022420992?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E948355557022420992%7Ctwgr%5E8f3c7c895f959526a3e4adcaae7b41e23ea14eba%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2018%2F01%2F02%2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-north-korea-nuclear%2Findex.html">famous twitter threat</a> that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger &amp; more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.</p>
<p>While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/19/trump-national-security-candidates-00153381">contest for top national security positions</a>, with figures like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/us/politics/grenell-trump-cabinet.html">Richard Grenell</a> and <a href="https://themarathoninitiative.org/elbridge-colby/">Elbridge Colby</a> emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for <a href="https://www.descifrandolaguerra.es/elbridge-colby-former-pentagon-advisor-the-united-states-is-not-ready-for-a-high-intensity-war-with-china/">focusing military efforts on countering China</a>, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.</p>
<p>The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.</p>
<p><strong>What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?</strong></p>
<p>If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the <em>Columbia</em>-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.</p>
<p>A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.</p>
<p>At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.</p>
<p>Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. </em><em>Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/What-Nuclear-Deterrence-Might-Look-Like-Under-a-Second-Trump-Presidency.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28497 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/">What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/reflections-on-americas-cold-warrior/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[James McCue]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jul 2024 12:28:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28466</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>America’s Cold Warrior is a biography of Paul Nitze’s professional life. For those not deeply steeped in this man’s career, he was a “stalwart of the arms control community” and continuously involved in US foreign policy from the beginning of the Cold War until his death in 2004—beginning with the Truman administration and ending five [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/reflections-on-americas-cold-warrior/">Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>America’s Cold Warrior</em> is a biography of Paul Nitze’s professional life. For those not deeply steeped in this man’s career, he was a “stalwart of the arms control community” and continuously involved in US foreign policy from the beginning of the Cold War until his death in 2004—beginning with the Truman administration and ending five decades later.</p>
<p>The book is fast-paced and covers Nitze’s career in and around government in just 268 pages. James Graham Wilson, an historian at the US State Department, draws on voluminous archived notes of White House meetings and State Department documents to build his description of Nitze’s influence. This allowed the author to clearly and confidently identify what and how Nitze’s ideas were injected into treaties and American policy. Wilson also does not shy away from criticizing Nitze’s policy or personal shortcomings where warranted. This makes for a complete yet consumable treatment of Paul Nitze’s work.</p>
<p>Whether working in the Department of State or Defense, where Nitze served, aspiring national security professionals should be reading this book. Following Paul Nitze’s career path might be impossible today, but tracing it offers many useful insights.</p>
<p>Nitze made a personal fortune investing during the volatile years of the market crash and depression. He married into political connections and with his comfort secured, could have lived a life of leisure, but chose a life “in the arena” instead. Nitze first applied his exceptional analytical skills to a pressing national security issue—assessing the value of strategic bombing in World War II. It was here, with the US Strategic Bombing Survey, that the Nitze way came to prominence. As Wilson tells it, this “way” is to find the facts, use them to craft executable plans for securing American “predominance,” and then fight aggressively but patiently to get that plan implemented.</p>
<p>The Bombing Survey demonstrated that strategic bombing did not achieve the goals its advocates claimed, earning Nitze no friends in the Pentagon. His analytical accuracy, candor in presentation, and independence of thought earned him the respect of President Truman, Eisenhower, and most presidents that followed.</p>
<p>Paul Nitze has a particular policy related to nuclear weapons. His influence did not depend on his holding a position in government but transcended political partisanship. He saw himself as a “man of action” who fused his mathematical mind with the social sciences and balanced theory with his practical experiences to provide realistic policy. Wilson’s Nitze changed his views rarely and did not shy away from bullying when the tactic appeared useful.</p>
<p>Nitze’s laser focus on America first policies put the country on the path for peace through strength well before those were popular slogans. His loyalty to national interest over personal gain was showcased in a scathing op-ed he helped write that attempted to scuttle the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, once he came to see it as counter-productive to defense.</p>
<p>United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68) was Paul Nitze’s first, and perhaps most important policy document. Wilson dedicates a chapter to this product, but it permeates the entire book. Wilson shows how this document was so much more than simply a plan to deal with Soviet nuclear weapons. It was close in impact to Kennan’s Long Telegram. While sensitive to the value of public debate on defense policy, Wilson demonstrates that Paul Nitze was self-conscious about publishing. However, Wilson credits Nitze with an impressive writing feat in NSC-68, functionally creating the first national security strategy. This document certainly echoes across the decades from its initial presentation to Truman in 1950 well past the Cold War.</p>
<p>Later in his career, Nitze led President Ronald Reagan’s negotiation team for the anti-ballistic missile and intermediate nuclear forces treaties. Nitze consistently pushed for a strong US nuclear posture to enable effective negotiations. This is reflected in deterrence theory today in books like Matt Kroenig’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Logic-American-Nuclear-Strategy-Superiority/dp/0190849185"><em>The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters</em></a>.</p>
<p>Advocacy for high defense budgets did not restrict Nitze from calling for complete nuclear disarmament later in life. He believed that the 1991 Gulf War showed that this could be achieved because of the strategic effects of precision-guided weapons and what the Biden administration calls integrated deterrence.</p>
<p>Some of today’s up and coming defense policy and strategy practitioners may have a hard time relating to Paul Nitze’s privileged upbringing or his self-made independent wealth. Wilson’s assertion that it is unlikely that anyone today could move back and forth across the political aisle like Nitze did is probably true. But there are many useful nuggets of Nitze wisdom and experience in this book that are useful for new and well-practiced policymakers. Wilson’s Nitze is a persistent yet practical advisor at the nexus of defense and diplomacy whose work covered most of the last century but whose impact will likely reach into the next. Paul Nitze’s professional life is worth your time and this book is a great introduction to his work.</p>
<p><em>James McCue is a retired USAF aviator and nuclear security professional. He is an expert on nuclear strategy and national defense policy. He is a fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Associate Editor for </em>Global Security Review<em>. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/reflections-on-americas-cold-warrior/">Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Space Guard Opponents Seek Unraveling of Constitution’s National Defense Framework</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-guard-opponents-seek-unraveling-of-constitutions-national-defense-framework/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Stone]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2024 12:19:10 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27826</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Since the establishment of the United States Space Force in 2019, many in the federal defense establishment have aggressively fought to prevent the establishment of the Space National Guard. The reasons are numerous. In 2020 there was a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report that claimed a Space National Guard component would be enormously expensive and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-guard-opponents-seek-unraveling-of-constitutions-national-defense-framework/">Space Guard Opponents Seek Unraveling of Constitution’s National Defense Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since the establishment of the United States Space Force in 2019, many in the federal defense establishment have aggressively fought to prevent the establishment of the Space National Guard. The reasons are numerous. In 2020 there was a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report that claimed a Space National Guard component would be enormously expensive and add bureaucracy. The required personnel and infrastructure already exist and nearly 70 percent of Space Force warfighting capacity is already part of the Air National Guard. Official Air Force and National Guard budget numbers refute the CBO’s position.</p>
<p>Then it was argued that spacepower is solely a federal mission and the states have no role or requirement for space forces. The federal system of checks and balances purposefully divides power between the active and reserve component controlled by the president and the national guard controlled by governors.</p>
<p>While many Americans may remember from high school civics or college government class the Constitution’s separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government and the states, the Constitution also deals with a separation of military power. It was not in the founding father’s plan for all military power to be vested in the hands of the capitol and the president. It was intended to be distributed between the states and in partnership with the federal government.</p>
<p>If the federal bureaucracy’s push for centralization of American military spacepower is successful, it will set a dangerous precedent that ultimately leads to the consolidation of all national guard forces of the states (Army and Air Force) into the single component service model with the rest of the service branches. This, according to sources, was discussed as part of the plan. If it works for the Space Force, it will work for the rest of the services. Therefore, the states who created the federal government are at risk of losing even more power of self-defense to the federal leviathan than intended by the founding fathers and current law.</p>
<p>The active component has long sought to exercise day-to-day control over National Guard units that are not under Title 10 federal orders. Day-to-day, National Guard units answer to their governors and the adjutant general, who is appointed by the governor. As such, a working relationship between state military departments and the federal department of defense is a required check upon federal overreach.</p>
<p>This is frustrating to federal commanders, but as the <em>Federalist Papers </em>denote, this was part of the plan. James Madison stated in <em>Federalist</em> 46 that “the federal and state governments, are…[to] resist and frustrate the measures of each other.” The military and militia (now National Guard) were intended to be a security for the rights of civilians and a check against a large federal force from the “oppression of the several states.”</p>
<p>In fact, it was thought that the federal force should be smaller than the aggregated strength of state military forces as a means of defense from an overreaching federal force. The border situation is one example of where state control of armed forces as a means to fill a void left open by the federal government is so important. Hamilton agreed but thought that the states could also be overpowering if not checked by a federal force answerable to the president. So, a compromise was decided that a federal force combined with the checks of the states would be the best option in the constitutional system.</p>
<p>If military space forces are denied the states, who, despite the messaging of some in Washington, DC, that are actively leveraging space systems for state roles and functions, will challenge the idea circulating in the Pentagon and Biden administration that it is necessary to convert all military services to a federal-only single component of part-time and full-time forces? This is a move that is contrary to the Constitution’s purposeful efforts to create a system of checks and balances.</p>
<p>If successful, the single component concept will neuter the states’ abilities to check and be engaged in their policy of state self-defense and the broader national security debates of our time. The single component service model must be opposed, and the Space National Guard should join the established components of the Army and Air Force to ensure that the separation of military power between the states and the federal governments continue to provide the security we need as a country in this ever-growing time of geopolitical and astropolitical strife.</p>
<p><em>Christopher Stone is a Senior Fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Stone is a former U.S. Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for space policy. The opinions expressed in this commentary are his ow</em><em>n and do not necessarily reflect those of Core-CSI nor the Defense Department.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-guard-opponents-seek-unraveling-of-constitutions-national-defense-framework/">Space Guard Opponents Seek Unraveling of Constitution’s National Defense Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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