However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such an alliance is needed most in the Indo-Pacific region where China is attempting, with some success, to challenge the American-led rules-based international order. Growing American alliances and partnerships beyond current bilateral relationships is the solution.

A more tailored and comprehensive approach involving Australia, Japan, and South Korea should serve as the beginning of an alliance that could expand and counter Chinese efforts in more than just the military realm. Such an alliance could bolster American nuclear deterrence and assurance in the region and directly support regional stability. A need for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is a clear and obtainable objective.

Formalizing a Multilateral Treaty Organization

Creating a regional multilateral treaty-bound organization with Australia, Japan, and South Korea will institutionalize defense cooperation and bolster collective security. This organization could formally facilitate regular interoperability consultations, increase joint coalition exercises, and more effectively coordinate responses to regional threats. By formalizing these relationships, the US and its allies can ensure a cohesive and effective deterrence strategy with more eloquence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Establishing a new treaty organization will be challenging, but the cost-benefit will be worthwhile in the long term. This formality directly supports the diplomatic leg of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model.

Equipping Allies with Nuclear-Capable F-35s

Expanding the sale of nuclear-capable F-35As to Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant advancement in regional coverage of the US nuclear umbrella. These next-generation fighters provide a capable and credible nuclear capability to prepare allies for future conflict, allows increased power projection against potential adversaries, and bolsters the operational compatibility between American forces and allies.

By integrating these aircraft into their respective air forces, allies can contribute to a more dynamic and responsive deterrence posture if a need arises as the geopolitical environment changes. And, if the alliance expands as expected, F-35s can compensate for their range limitations by “island hopping” their way to the fight or allies can build their own aerial refueling capability.

The presence of highly mobile nuclear-capable platforms increases regional solidarity in a strategically tailored way that messages adversaries that aggression will not be tolerated. Given growing Chinese aggression, this is an important task.

Developing Supporting Infrastructure

To maximize the efficacy of these new capabilities, it is crucial to establish a robust infrastructure that supports the deployment and maintenance of nuclear-capable assets for

forward-based power projection. This includes upgrading the host nations’ airfields, maintenance facilities, and command-and-control systems.

Such infrastructure will allow seamless integration of allied forces into joint operations and ensure sustained operational readiness. The host nations will need to take charge of the economic development required to maintain the increase in capability and its continued sustainment in the long term—relieving some of the costs that would otherwise be borne by the American taxpayer.

Increasing SSBN Port Calls and Coalition Heavy Bomber Task Force Exercises

Boosting the frequency of American ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) port calls and conducting more coalition heavy bomber task force exercises will further strengthen the deterrence posture within the region. American SSBN presence provides a method to showcase a strategic, survivable deterrent, while heavy bombers enable power projection. Conducting joint operations further solidifies a multinational force’s allied resolve and compatibility.

Additionally, the United States could showcase the ability to provide a safe haven for the required heavy bomber task forces if the need arises. These activities would demonstrate an increase in enhancing regional security ties and reassuring allies of the continuation of American commitment. The United States could also sell the B1 and B2 bombers it plans to retire to its allies.

Conclusion

Strengthening American nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach that continues to foster positive alliances and partnerships that advance capabilities. Honoring these commitments showcases allied resolve to hold adversaries at risk with well-calculated multilateral decision-making processes and regional cooperation. By equipping Australia, Japan, and South Korea with nuclear-capable F-35As, establishing the necessary infrastructure, formalizing multilateral agreements, and increasing strategic exercises with ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers, the US and its allies can enhance deterrence.

These measures will solidify regional defense cooperation, amplify the efficacy of the nuclear umbrella, and ensure a regional multilateral response to potential nuclear threats, thereby reinforcing the American commitment to maintaining stability and countering China’s growing influence across the region.

William Atkins spent a career in the nuclear enterprise. The views expressed are his own.

Bolstering Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the freshly liberated Micronesia islands were turned into a United Nations trust territory administered by the United States from 1947 to 1994—Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). In 1951, the US Department of the Interior took over management of the trust and transferred its headquarters from Honolulu to Guam and then Saipan. The TTPI divided Micronesia into six districts: the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, Marianas, Yap, and Palau. In the 1970s and 1980s, the districts started to vote to end the relationship, which led the United Nations to dissolve the Trust Territory in 1990. Palau was the last to exit, voting to end its trustee status in 1994.

Currently, the former Trust Territory is comprised of four self-governing districts. On one hand is the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, which is an American commonwealth whose residents are US citizens. On the other hand are the three island-states known as the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. These three island-states funding frameworks are referred to as the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the United States. These compacts provide for full self-government except for defense. These island economies, based on tourism and fisheries, are barely self-sustaining and will outsource their defense to the United States in return for economic support and other social benefits.

The Biden administration previously pledged $6–7 billion in economic aid over the next two decades. Congressional haggling, however, is delaying adoption of the economic assistance. The Marshall Islands also held up the process by asking for more funding in relation to the legacy of US nuclear testing in the Pacific. This issue is now resolved, with the Marshall Islands recently signing a 20-year agreement on October 16, 2023, for $2.3 billion. All three COFA members have signed and need congressional ratification.

The current 45-day continuing resolution recently passed by Congress does not fund the Biden administration’s COFA agreements. The situation is particularly dire for Palau due to its continuous support to Taiwan. The island-state has already lost the entire Chinese tourism market, with tourism revenue declining nearly 40 percent. In 2021, Finance Ministry records show that Palau ran a deficit of at least $37 million on a total budget of less than $150 million. In contrast, the island-state expected to receive $90 million from an extension of its compact for 2024. Since the agreement is not yet approved by Congress, Palau survives entirely on debt.

This cost is a drop in the bucket and a way to purchase American security on the cheap. Supporting COFA to deny Beijing access to the 5.6 million square kilometers of the Pacific Ocean controlled by these islands is well worth the investment. Indefinitely delaying COFA funding will kill the United States’ open-ended permission to build several military facilities in the island-states’ territory.

It is important to keep in mind that the United States already has a military base in the Marshall Islands, where, on Kwajalein Atoll, the Department of Defense tracks long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles test-fired from California. It is also where missile defense interceptors launched from Alaska are tracked.

More recently, at a base in Palau, the United States started the installation of an over-the-horizon radar system and is increasing military exercises over the island itself. Thus, pulling the rug from under the island’s leadership increases anxiety among the local population and casts a large shadow of doubt over the sincerity of American commitment. Congress needs to consider that, in the presence of an increasingly assertive China in the Pacific, security guarantees come as a package that also involves the modernization of these islands and outfitting their economies with digital and space-domain transition assets.

The Palau Cable 2 (PC2), for example, will connect Palau with Echo, a submarine optical cable linking Southeast Asia and the United States. The $30 million PC2 is funded by Australia, Japan, and the US under the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific. When it comes to the island’s broader infrastructure, digital transformation is not scheduled to take place.

The Maldives, a small island nation similar to Palau, already has its own Maldives Space Research Organization. Palau cannot financially afford a program that would leverage earth observation and enhance the island’s economic sustainability and situational awareness. Security guarantees should include not only technology transfers and facilities investment, but also education and training, enabling economic transformation and mitigating Palau’s youth brain drain.

Meanwhile, in the southern half of the Pacific, China has concluded a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, including a policing pact. Local populations understand that China is “eager to help” their Pacific Island states. Both of these agreements are counter to American interests. Rather than deterring China, current congressional dysfunctionality is an invitation for China to take over.

The facts are simple. American dithering is putting the nation’s ability to effectively operate in and secure the vastness of the Pacific at risk. There is perhaps no more cost-effective way to advance Pacific security than for Congress to fund the Compacts of Free Association and related activities.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries and is based 80 percent of the time in the Pacific Basin.

Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.