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		<title>Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2024 12:35:07 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab states already face a pivotal moment in shaping their foreign policy. Known for his transactional diplomacy and “America First” approach, Trump is likely to prioritize issues that directly benefit the US economy and enhance its strategic power, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia. For Arab states, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/">Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab states already face a pivotal moment in shaping their foreign policy. Known for his transactional diplomacy and “America First” approach, Trump is likely to prioritize issues that directly benefit the US economy and enhance its strategic power, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia.</p>
<p>For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/01/middleeast/syrian-regime-airstrikes-opposition-forces-intl/index.html">Syria</a>, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.</p>
<p>There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.</p>
<p>First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.</p>
<p>Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/cost-inaction-yemen">continue</a> to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.</p>
<p>This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.</p>
<p>The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/is-russia-helping-the-houthis-in-yemen-if-its-true-it-could-lead-to-a-major-problem-for-shipping/articleshow/115534358.cms?from=mdr">concerns</a> are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/07/russia-houthis-targeting-data-war-western-shipping-gaza/">Russia</a>. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.</p>
<p>The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/">lead</a> in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.</p>
<p>Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.</p>
<p>Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in <a href="https://gulfif.org/irans-concerted-efforts-to-secure-a-foothold-in-sudan/">Sudan</a> and other parts of Africa via different means, including the <a href="https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/evidence-iran-weapons-deliveries">supply</a> of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241122-iran-to-launch-advanced-centrifuges-in-response-to-iaea-censure">progress</a> its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.</p>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.</p>
<p>Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.</p>
<p>Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.</p>
<p>However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/29/china/trump-cabinet-picks-china-response-intl-hnk/index.html">stance</a> toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.</p>
<p>That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/us-uae-discuss-progress-on-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/articleshow/113614959.cms?from=mdr">support</a> of the US. In this respect, despite the <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-challenges-ahead/">challenges</a> facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.</p>
<p>Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.</p>
<p>Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Now-That-Trump-is-Back.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/">Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Israel-Hamas Conflict Has Spread the Fog of War Across the Western World</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-israel-hamas-conflict-has-spread-the-fog-of-war-across-the-western-world/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lora Karch Dulgarian]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2024 13:32:01 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27216</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel began a war responsible for the deaths of many thousands in both Israel and Gaza. The Israeli government and the Hamas controlled Ministry of Health report an estimated 26,000 deaths on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. While debate rages over the conduct of the war, there is [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-israel-hamas-conflict-has-spread-the-fog-of-war-across-the-western-world/">The Israel-Hamas Conflict Has Spread the Fog of War Across the Western World</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel began a war responsible for the deaths of many thousands in both Israel and Gaza. The Israeli government and the Hamas controlled Ministry of Health report an estimated <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-01-15-2024-966bd5a9375e7439dd3de5fc113a7e7d">26,000 deaths</a> on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. While debate rages over the conduct of the war, there is little doubt that Hamas is not an organization supporting personal freedom and peace.</p>
<p>It is important to separate this terrorist organization from the innocent Palestinian population that is dying as sacrificial lambs to Hamas’ ideological goals. Hamas is arguably using the self-made shield of dead and starving Palestinian civilians to gain appeal with Western observers. Civilian casualties, whether child or adult, male or female, devout or secular, are collateral damage in the terrorist organization’s quest to remain hidden and effective in their fight for narrative supremacy.</p>
<p>Yet upon further examination of Hamas’ <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp">covenant,</a> “The Day of Judgment will not come about until [Muslims] fight Jews and kill them.” History has demonstrated that the groups and individuals who choose violent and radical means to achieve ideological goals often disregard the unintended consequences of their ambitions.</p>
<p>It seems that Hamas rejects any long-term peace talks. According to the Hamas covenant, &#8220;So-called peaceful solutions and international conferences are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement&#8230;Those conferences are no more than a means to appoint the infidels as arbitrators in the lands of Islam.” To take it a step further, Hamas believes, “There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. Initiatives, proposals, and international conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.&#8221;</p>
<p>Hamas does not care about the thousands of dead Palestinians, or the families displaced and starving. One must ask, is Hamas an organization supporting Palestinian liberation or a cancer on long-term peace and security in the Palestinian-Israeli question?</p>
<p>From a strategic perspective, Iran is the actor behind the scenes supporting Hamas, which many experts suggest is a subordinate organization in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. A further examination suggests Hamas’ ideological blindness brought the current hell on Gazans. In November 2023, Iran&#8217;s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">reportedly told</a> Hamas leader, Ismail Haniya, “You gave us no warning of your October 7 attack on Israel and we will not enter the war on your behalf.”</p>
<p>Analysts can choose to believe this or not. But Tehran struggles to keep up with <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202312295863">heavy inflation</a>, faces angry and restless <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/23/world/middleeast/iran-execution-protests.html">youth </a>and minority groups, a possible <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/13/blinken-warned-lawmakers-azerbaijan-may-invade-armenia-in-coming-weeks-00121500">invasion by Azerbaijan into Armenia</a>, which would cut <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/armenia/exports/iran">trade </a>and <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-energy">electricity</a><u> imports</u>. This is all while Iran undertakes a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/politics/us-intelligence-iran-nervous-escalating-proxy-attacks/index.html">multifaceted campaign</a> to remove the US from the middle east.</p>
<p>Hezbollah has largely remained out of the Gaza conflict, limiting engagement with Israel to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/1/3/israel-hamas-war-live-hezbollah-vows-revenge-for-israeli-strike-on-beirut">small skirmishes on the Lebanon-Israel border</a>. Hezbollah’s ideological and militaristic zealots do not appear willing to sacrifice their manpower and treasure for a group that is not comprised of co-religionists. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria was not going to join Hamas either because of its never-ending civil war and depleted resources. The Houthis are a different story, but <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/11/2/analysis-houthis-declare-war-on-israel-but-their-real-target-is-elsewhere">as one al- Jazeera columnist wrote</a>, the group’s real goal is permanent deterrence against the Saudis.</p>
<p>Hamas failed to understand that Israel would “<a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israelis-rally-around-flag-wont-save-benjamin-netanyahu-207145">rally around the flag</a>” in an effort to exterminate the organization once and for all. Although Hamas sought to invoke a severe reaction from Israel to generate Gazan casualties, which then generates international support and aid, the Hamas leadership did not expect Israel to pursue a fight to the death.</p>
<p>Globally, Hamas is experiencing significant support in the information war, which can prove equally <a href="https://www.amazon.com/War-140-Characters-Reshaping-Twenty-First/dp/046509614X">important to battles on the ground</a>. While fighting rages in Gaza, the terror group’s strategic ambitions remain unchanged. The confounding reality is that the war is producing distorted Western perceptions of Hamas which are winning sympathy for <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html">Hamas</a> (a <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html">designated</a> terror group since 1997). Uninformed views of Hamas in the West confuse some younger generations, leaving them thinking the extremist group is fighting for freedoms similar to those found in the West.</p>
<p>Sadly, social media algorithms seem to ignore the hostage situation. Hamas took roughly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">240 Israeli hostages</a> during the attacks that killed over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">1,200 people</a>. The hostages were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">taken to underground “tunnels of the resistance”</a>. Recent efforts to negotiate the trade of Hamas prisoners for Israeli hostages has failed. Though many Gazans celebrated in the streets after the October 7 attacks, Gazans recently criticized the harm caused by Israel’s response and are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gazans-are-starting-to-blame-hamas-for-wartime-suffering-066256b0">calling for an end</a> to Hamas’ reign of terror. Tragically, the Israeli response and the refusal of Egypt or any other neighboring nations to accept Palestinian refugees has created a humanitarian crisis that is often viewed from very skewed sources that create echo chambers of disinformation.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://theconversation.com/feedback-loops-and-echo-chambers-how-algorithms-amplify-viewpoints-107935">content amplification</a> may arguably be convincing actors to commit more acts of terror. National law enforcement agencies <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2023/12/14/denmark-germany-arrest-hamas-suspects-planning-attacks_6344720_143.html">report seven arrests made in connection with planned terror attacks related to efforts to support Hamas</a>. Three of them were planning an attack on behalf of Hamas in Denmark and four in Germany and the Netherlands were members of the organization. They were detained due to suspicion of planning attacks against Jewish institutions in Europe.</p>
<p>European countries are notorious for knife attacks related to terror groups. Americans are susceptible to the <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/terrorist-crossed-border-allowed-roam-213710190.html?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAJZbnEfQXq6JAgeSt0DCv913MxHaOUXltbuecnIxaIiJmMXNlbR7km-gHsJtN3UDIEfano1wQdATRhw3NHYR6yI6q6Dywal_1ueQXyVIFJ3dVf5uLT_SdFeha3GcwFnXWD6NYZrWLTaA08CXA0bds5JqPJL0uJ6pdOMfQplsxE1">same danger</a> due to the Biden administration’s open-border policy. A US Customs and Border Protection <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hamas-militants-potentially-crossing-southern-border-us-officials/story?id=104236095">internal intelligence notice</a> warned that “individuals inspired by, or reacting to, the current Israel-Hamas conflict may attempt to travel to or from the Middle East via circuitous transit across the Southwest border.” Hamas’ ideology is indeed a cancer that will spread to the West if left uncontested. Amplified media content indirectly can support Hamas, as the justification and expansion of terrorism is copycatted.</p>
<p>Hamas is far from an Enlightenment-minded organization advocating for personal freedom and the preservation of human life. Americans can help end this war, but only with the defeat of Hamas.</p>
<p><em>Lora Karch Dulgarian is an independent analyst focusing on national security, social, political, and economic issues in the Middle East and Europe. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-israel-hamas-conflict-has-spread-the-fog-of-war-across-the-western-world/">The Israel-Hamas Conflict Has Spread the Fog of War Across the Western World</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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