<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:Operation Sindoor &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/operation-sindoor/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/operation-sindoor/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2025 10:39:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sher Ali Kakar&nbsp;&&nbsp;Atta Ullah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 12:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agni-Prime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air defense systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balochistan Think Tank Network]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BUITEMS Quetta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bunker-buster missile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cold Start doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[confidence-building measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional superiority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counterforce capability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[full-spectrum deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Pakistan conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limited war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear posture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear-capable missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Sindoor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rail-based launcher]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[retaliatory capability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security dilemma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic affairs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic signaling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technological development]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31745</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP Singh and Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/world-should-learn-from-india-air-chief-marshal-ap-singh-on-russia-ukraine-conflict-israel-war-494869-2025-09-19">Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP</a> Singh and <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1947463">Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi</a> reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, as evidenced by its ranking as the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf">second-largest</a> importer of military equipment, alongside its huge <a href="https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/IB_Maheen_Sept_24_2024.pdf">investment</a> in indigenization.</p>
<p>India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.</p>
<p>These capabilities are considered key to a state’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">escalation dominance strategy</a>. However, India’s <a href="https://sci-hub.se/https:/link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-15-6961-6">escalation dominance</a> in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.</p>
<p>In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.</p>
<p>Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1944192">Cold Start</a>, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.</p>
<p>On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-significance-north-koreas-rail-mobile-ballistic-missile-launcher">operational capability and survivability</a>, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.</p>
<p>The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.</p>
<p>India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1925251">bunker-buster</a>. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.</p>
<p>These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.</p>
<p>It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/india/modis-address-to-nation-key-statements-made-by-pm-on-pakistan-3536977">military capabilities</a> and technological strides.</p>
<p>On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">Trump</a>’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">tariffs</a> was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.</p>
<p>India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.</p>
<p><em><strong>Sher Ali Kakar </strong></em><em>is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. </em><strong><em>Atta Ullah</em></strong><em> is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Indias-Strategy-of-Escalation-Dominance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Pakistan’s Response to Operation Sindoor</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistans-response-to-operation-sindoor/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistans-response-to-operation-sindoor/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nawal Nawaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:02:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air combat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ceasefire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyclical deterrence failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dassault Aviation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Heron drone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[J-10C]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir dispute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MiG-29]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nur Khan Airbase]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Bunyanum Marsoos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Sindoor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pahalgam terror attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistani Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rafale]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Asia stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Su-30]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31012</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After publicly asserting that the government of Pakistan was involved in the April 21, 2025, Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir, India launched a barrage of missile strikes on nine sites in Pakistan. These sites included Bahawalpur and Muridke in Punjab; Kotli, Bagh, and Muzaffarabad; and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)—in a night attack. Despite India’s [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistans-response-to-operation-sindoor/">Pakistan’s Response to Operation Sindoor</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After publicly asserting that the government of Pakistan was involved in the April 21, 2025, Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir, India launched a barrage of missile strikes on nine sites in Pakistan. These sites included Bahawalpur and Muridke in Punjab; Kotli, Bagh, and Muzaffarabad; and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)—in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/6/india-launches-attacks-on-several-sites-in-pakistan">night attack</a>.</p>
<p>Despite India’s conventional superiority, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) shot down <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/5/8/india-pakistan-live-heavy-shelling-along-line-of-control-dividing-kashmir">five Indian fighter jets, including its three French Rafales, one Russian MiG-29 and one Su-30, and a Heron surveillance drone.</a> The interception and neutralization of the drone, and the shooting down of the fighters about 17 miles from the line of control (LOC), highlighted the Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF) expeditious response to Indian missile strikes.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eurasiantimes.com/f-16-vs-rafale-pakistan-threatens-india-with-fighting-falcons-does-us-origin-jet-stand-a-change-against-iafs-french-fighters/">Rafale</a>, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter jet, which is capable of performing interdiction and aerial reconnaissance, is one of the reasons for India’s muscle flexing in the region. Although the Rafale is not a stealth aircraft, it does have a smaller radar cross section. The Rafale was also touted as a game-changer for the Indian Air Force (IAF), boosting the country’s technological edge over its regional adversaries especially Pakistan.</p>
<p>However, the successful <a href="https://trt.global/world/article/809a9cd9c7e9">shoot down</a> revealed New Delhi’s low operational efficacy and false perception of Indian air superiority. The MiG-29, a twin-engine fighter jet designed for air combat, was also believed to be shot down. With features like advanced avionics and radar systems, the loss of such aircraft was unexpected.</p>
<p>Likewise, the downing of India’s primary frontline fighter, the Russian SU-30, which is known for its maneuverability, indicates weaknesses in Indian operational tactics and a clear vulnerability to Pakistani air defense forces. Contrary to common belief, the PAF historically outperforms the IAF aerial engagements. The excellence of PAF was first made evident when it <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/1296078/understanding-pafs-winning-strategy-part-i/">defeated the IAF</a> on the ground and in the air during the first full-scale war with India (<a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/1296078/understanding-pafs-winning-strategy-part-i/">1965</a>). In 2019, the IAF conducted airstrikes in Balakot in response to the Pulwama incident, accusing Pakistan of involvement in the terrorist attack. The following day, the PAF retaliated with an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47412884">airstrike in the Rajouri sector</a> of Jammu, downing an Indian MIG-21 and capturing Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman in the process.</p>
<p>In the latest example of conflict between the two countries, Pakistan responded with its best fighters, the Chinese-made J-10C, which is a multirole fighter and was unproven in combat until these events. With the shoot down of Rafale fighter jets, shares of Dassault Aviation declined by <a href="https://en.bd-pratidin.com/economy/2025/05/07/36440">6 percent</a>. The PAF response to Indian airstrikes displays its enhanced air combat capabilities.</p>
<p>According to the Indian Ministry of Defense, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/6/india-launches-attacks-on-several-sites-in-pakistan">Operation Sindoor</a> was India’s effort to punish the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack. However, Pakistan, which has denied any involvement in Pahalgam, deemed these strikes “unprovoked.” Beginning on May 6, 2025, Indian officials undertook <a href="https://www.ndtvprofit.com/trending/civil-defence-mock-drills-india-live-updates-pakistan-war-tensions-mumbai-delhi-bengaluru">drills and exercises</a> in preparation for their attack. This “show of strength” was designed to send a clear message to the international community that India can employ conventional force under a nuclear shadow. However, the reluctance of the international community to get involved in the dispute served as a concern for the Trump administration, which ultimately aided in ending military clashes.</p>
<p>On May 9, 2025, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/5/9/live-india-pakistan-tensions-surge-as-both-sides-trade-attack-claims">India fired air-to-surface</a> missiles at three air bases in Rawalpindi, Chakwal, and Shorkot, as well as Rahim Yar Khan airport, normalizing escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Pakistan deemed these missile strikes an “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/reduced-rubble-india-strikes-alleged-headquarters-militant-groups-pakistans-2025-05-07/">act of war</a>,”  authorizing the military to take corresponding military action against India.</p>
<p>In response, Pakistan launched <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/5/9/live-india-pakistan-tensions-surge-as-both-sides-trade-attack-claims">Operation Bunyanum Marsoos</a> after four days of Indian strikes. These strikes targeted wide swaths of Indian territory, including military bases in Udhampur, Pathankot, Drangyari, Nagrota, Adampur, and Buj Air Base. As the escalation veered from the disputed state of Kashmir towards the brink of nuclear escalation, the United States, shifting from its previous stance of non-interference, brokered a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/5/9/live-india-pakistan-tensions-surge-as-both-sides-trade-attack-claims">ceasefire</a> between Pakistan and India.</p>
<p>Vice President JD Vance initially <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2544711/indian-attack-on-nur-khan-base-prompted-us-intervention-nyt">remarked</a> on May 8, 2025, that the latest escalation between Pakistan and India is not the United States’ business. The situation changed after Indian missile strikes hit Pakistan’s Nur Khan Airbase in Rawalpindi, fearing potential nuclear escalation. Nur Khan serves as a key transport and refueling <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2544711/indian-attack-on-nur-khan-base-prompted-us-intervention-nyt">hub for the PAF</a>, lying just kilometers from the strategic plans division, which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>Before the situation expanded into widespread conflict, the United States announced an immediate ceasefire between the two states, offering assistance for resolving the Kashmir issue. The efforts of President Trump, an advocate of peace, led to the 2025 ceasefire and are a notable diplomatic achievement for the US. However, the success of this ceasefire rests upon a fragile equilibrium. In absence of institutions and channels of communication for resolution of key disputes between Pakistan and India, peace and stability of South Asia will remain uncertain. Without addressing structural issues like the dispute over Kashmir, the region will remain locked in cyclical deterrence failures, with the future of peace less likely than escalation.</p>
<p><em>Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Pakistans-Response-to-Operation-Sindoor.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistans-response-to-operation-sindoor/">Pakistan’s Response to Operation Sindoor</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistans-response-to-operation-sindoor/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
