Recently, it has become fashionable in news commentary and in political pronouncements by members of Congress, among others, to claim that the United States’ conflict with Iran is a defeat and a debacle. Ironically, sources that criticized the Trump administration for Operation Epic Fury starting on February 28, 2026, are now criticizing the President and his advisors for capitulating to Iran on issues like Iran’s nuclear program, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and funds for Iranian reconstruction. Other critics argue that the regime in Tehran remains in power and that Iranian proxies, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, keep attacking Israel, America’s key ally in the Middle East.

There is no question that this war was started without many of the diplomatic and military precursors seen in past conflicts, such as consulting with major allies, the United Nations (UN), and briefing Congressional leaders beyond those required by the War Powers Act. There was also an ambitious list of political and military goals announced from the start, including hopes that Iran’s internal politics could be stirred into rebellion against the Ayatollahs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other parts of the ruling theocracy. Official objectives included destroying Iran’s missile capabilities and its capacity to produce brand new ones; annihilating its navy; ensuring that the world’s number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon; and ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of its borders. Additionally, Israel sought to weaken or remove Hezbollah in Lebanon, and both the U.S. and Israel intend to further contain other Iranian proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza.

The Memorandum of Understanding reached between the United States and Iran in mid-June expedited shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to provide immediate relief for global trade and, inevitably, generated significant revenue for Iran from its oil sales to China and other buyers. U.S. officials pointed to declining domestic gas prices as a positive sign, which also fostered a more optimistic economic outlook ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. President Trump continued to reassure Americans and others that the upcoming sixty-day negotiation period between Washington and Tehran would prevent Iran from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons. The U.S. claimed that Iranian negotiators had agreed to future inspections of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities by UN atomic inspection experts, though Washington also emphasized the need to include American inspectors. Some Iranian officials denied agreeing to this inspection requirement, but these denials might have been aimed at appeasing hardliners within Tehran’s postwar regime.

Now comes the harder part. Negotiating the end of a war involves more complexity than most observers may realize. This is true even when the stronger power, in military terms, has the capacity to inflict greater damage on the relatively weaker power. Losing powers, not fully defeated, may still retain bargaining chips. The weaker side can influence the transition from midgame to endgame, making it more or less costly for the stronger power, depending on how willing the stronger power is to negotiate and trade concessions rather than simply enforce a diktat.

Regarding Iran, the first aspect of its ongoing ability to stir trouble lies in its close influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen. Israel continues to respond strongly to attacks by Hezbollah, and this back-and-forth creates a distracting layer for the ongoing U.S. negotiations with Iran. A second aspect of Iran’s postwar influence is its capacity to strike regional neighbors that support U.S. military bases or wish to maintain friendly relations with the U.S., including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Third, Iran is already suspected of supporting assassination plots against President Trump or planning other anti-American terrorist activities. Fourth, Iran has used its own narratives about the war with the U.S. to portray its regime as a victim of a bullying superpower, a storyline that appeals to many observers who were already critical of U.S. support for Israel’s war against Hamas following the October 7, 2023, massacre by the latter. Fifth, Iran’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz presents potential opportunities for disruptive actions against merchant ships and U.S. or other naval forces. Lastly, Iran’s ongoing close ties with Russia and China will gradually enhance its postwar military capabilities and economic rebuilding, while also reinforcing the stability of its political regime.

Notwithstanding the preceding cautionary notes against premature American irrational exuberance over Operation Epic Fury, a pessimistic assessment of U.S. military effectiveness, and talk of postwar U.S. political defeat, is unwarranted. Iran’s military capability has been seriously degraded, and major components of its nuclear program are buried under rubble, pushing back the estimated time for weaponization. Several rounds of anti-leadership targeting have scrambled the decision-making process within an already complexified regime structure. It is likely the regime will continue to maintain its powerful grip over the population unless, or until, home-grown opposition becomes much more motivated, better organized, and widespread. Meanwhile, we can assume that U.S. Central Command will maintain vigilant regional overwatch to keep Iran’s mischief within acceptable bounds.

Going forward, the endgame in Iran will test the ability of the United States and Israel to exercise both statesmanship and military power. Politics in the Middle East is as challenging as any. War in the Middle East, from ancient times to today, has been the graveyard of imperial ambitions and the source of frustration for efforts to spread democracy. Reshaping Middle Eastern political alliances for international peace and security requires high-stakes diplomacy, cultural understanding, and a strong dose of diplomatic and strategic realism. In the post–Epic Fury world, we stand on the brink of potentially historic breakthroughs that could lead to lasting regional peace, free from nuclear coercion, or, if they fail, sustain the cycle of theocratically motivated conventional or unconventional warfare.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

The United States Did Not Lose the War Against Iran: The Harder Part is Postwar Peacemaking was originally published on Global Security Review.

The announcement of a mid-June 2026 agreement between the United States and Iran on a framework for resolving the conflict that began on February 28 promised immediate relief for transit through the Strait of Hormuz and raised hopes of unblocking international maritime trade and reducing oil prices. The conflict with Iran, or Operation Epic Fury, has become a defining moment for global security, injecting volatility into an already fragile international system. While the immediate humanitarian and geopolitical consequences are important, the conflict’s deeper, longer‑term implications may be felt most acutely in the realm of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. 

For decades, the global nonproliferation regime, anchored by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements, has sought to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. Yet the conflict in Iran has exposed structural weaknesses in this regime, challenged long-standing assumptions about deterrence and diplomacy, and risked additional proliferation pressures in one of the world’s most strategically sensitive regions. 

Erosion of Trust in Diplomatic Agreements 

Iran’s nuclear program has been at the center of international diplomacy for many years. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated by the P5+1 countries in 2015, demonstrated that sustained negotiation could address nuclear activities through verification, inducements, and incentives. Its unraveling, however, weakened the credibility of diplomatic agreements and signaled to states worldwide that nuclear deals may be vulnerable to political shifts. 

Current and historical animosities over a variety of issues have deepened skepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral agreements in containing proliferation. States observing this conflict may conclude that compliance with agreements is often a matter of perception, and that external actors may still resort to military force if threats are recognized despite formal commitments and diplomatic assurances. Conversely, states considering future negotiations may fear that concessions made today could be rendered meaningless by tomorrow’s geopolitical realignments. This erosion of trust undermines diplomatic tools that have historically underpinned nonproliferation efforts. 

Over three decades and six presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, one fundamental national security principle has remained constant: The United States will not permit Iran to have a nuclear weapon under any circumstances. 

Conversely, the war could hinder efforts to revive or renegotiate agreements with Iran and other nuclear-aspiring nations. Diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, and the political risks of making concessions have risen. Without credible negotiation pathways, countries may increasingly resort to unilateral actions, such as secretly advancing nuclear programs or emphasizing deterrence. Regarding Iran, the ruling elites, worn down by months of anti-regime strikes, are likely to delay denuclearization and other military restrictions. 

Regional Challenges to Nonproliferation 

The Middle East has long been a region of latent nuclear potential. Several states possess advanced civilian nuclear infrastructures, and many have expressed interest in developing fuel‑cycle capabilities. The conflict with Iran has intensified these dynamics by heightening perceptions of vulnerability. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt may interpret the conflict as evidence that regional security guarantees are unreliable. 

As a result, they or others may pursue nuclear hedging strategies by developing civilian programs that shorten the timeline for potential weapons development without overtly violating the NPT. Others  may sign mutual defense pacts with other nuclear-armed states. This hedging behavior could trigger a proliferation cascade, in which each state’s actions prompt others to follow suit. 

If multiple states in the region begin to pursue nuclear latency or weapons capabilities, the Middle East could become the world’s most volatile nuclear arena. Such a development would strain the NPT, challenge IAEA safeguards, and increase the likelihood of miscalculation or escalation. 

Spiking Great‑Power Competition  

The conflict with Iran erupted amid intensifying competition among the United States, China, and Russia for international preeminence. These powers have distinct strategic interests in the Middle East and can use nuclear diplomacy as a tool of influence. Their rivalry and differing interests complicate efforts to build consensus on nonproliferation issues, including the ultimate determination about the status of Iran’s nuclear program. 

Great‑power divisions have already weakened the effectiveness of institutions such as the UN Security Council. When major powers cannot agree on enforcement measures, sanctions, or diplomatic strategies, the credibility of the nonproliferation regime suffers. The war has amplified these divisions, making coordinated responses more difficult. As great‑power competition intensifies and long‑standing norms, such as the taboo against nuclear proliferation, may weaken. States may perceive that geopolitical alignment matters more than compliance, reducing the incentive to adhere to international rules. 

Risks to the Nonproliferation Regime’s Tool Kit 

War creates conditions that undermine the ability of the IAEA and other bodies to monitor nuclear activities. Inspectors may lose access to facilities, satellite imagery may be obscured by conflict, and supply chains for nuclear materials may become harder to track. Conflict zones are fertile ground for illicit networks seeking nuclear materials. 

In some cases, the breakdown of state authority increases the risk that sensitive technologies or materials could be diverted, stolen, or sold on the black market. Sanctions on regimes depend on stable political conditions and international cooperation. During local or regional wars, enforcement becomes more difficult, and states may prioritize military objectives over compliance with international obligations. 

Opportunities for Post-Conflict Innovation 

In contrast to the above, major conflicts have sometimes encouraged breakthroughs in arms control. The Cuban Missile Crisis led to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Cold War produced the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and other reduction treaties. The war in Iran may similarly prompt a reassessment of existing frameworks. The conflict could motivate states to explore new regional security architectures, such as a Middle East nuclear‑weapons‑free zone, or enhanced transparency measures. 

Although politically challenging, such initiatives could reduce pressures to proliferate. In addition, emerging technologies, such as remote sensing, AI‑assisted monitoring, and blockchain‑based tracking of nuclear materials, could strengthen verification regimes. Post–Epic Fury consultations may accelerate investment in these tools as states seek more resilient oversight mechanisms. 

Conclusion: Future Pathways 

The war in Iran has brought the global nonproliferation regime to a crossroads. One path leads toward fragmentation: weakened norms, regional arms races, and diminished trust in diplomacy. The other path, albeit politically challenging, offers the possibility of progress with new agreements, modernized verification tools, and renewed commitment to cooperative security. Which path the international community ultimately follows will depend on states’ willingness to learn from the conflict and recognize that nuclear stability cannot be taken for granted. If the wider postwar Middle Eastern political alignments sought by the Trump administration comes to pass, including a lasting rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the nonproliferation regime may be a beneficiary from reduced regional political toxicity and increased regional military cooperation. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

The Iran War and Nuclear Weapons: Paths Forward or Backward? was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.

French “Forwardism”

In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France’s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.

Trump’s Frustrations

The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the U.S. should leave the alliance despite being prohibited by Congress from unilaterally doing so.

There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.

European and U.S. Support for Ukraine

Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. continues to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a $71.4 billion FY27 plan for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.

It is doubtful that France’s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s available inventory. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.

U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO

This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.

France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to increase the number of French nuclear weapons. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.

Conclusion

A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are “condemned to succeed” together.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way was originally published on Global Security Review.

The label of the “first AI war” obscures the reality that Operation EPIC FURY is still a conflict in which human judgment remains central to targeting. Artificial intelligence (AI) has not replaced human operators, but it has redefined how human judgment functions. The contemporary battlefield is now shaped by rate of fire, targeting accuracy, AI-enhanced cognition, and the real transformation that machine learning has introduced into modern warfare. 

One of the most persistent misunderstandings about AI-assisted targeting is the claim that humans have somehow been removed from the loop, decisions are made solely on AI recommendations, or strikes are approved in seconds without meaningful review. The human factor has not disappeared. Humans remain indispensable to targeting. What has evolved is not the elimination of human involvement, but the rapid synthesis of intelligence with target acquisition. That distinction matters because many assume there is little or no review before a strike is done. However, no systems make decisions independently. They supplement human decision-making by sorting and ranking information to generate recommended outcomes that must still meet rigid criteria. Analysts verify intelligence, legal teams conduct reviews, commanders make the final decision, and human beings remain responsible for the outcome. 

Critics often point to ambiguity in strategic-level U.S. directives. The Department of War Directive 3000.09 attempted to regulate certain AI-enabled systems, though the technology at the time was far less sophisticated than it is today. Military doctrine undermines the myth of autonomous targeting as well. The Army’s FM 3-60 frames targeting as an iterative command process and states that commanders remain the final approval authority for targeting activities and acceptable levels of risk. Machines may assist with detection, but they do not inherit command responsibility. The result is that humans remain in the loop because targeting is still a command process, not an autonomous one. Military doctrine frames targeting as a cycle of deciding, detecting, delivering, and assessing, but commanders retain authority over acceptable risks. AI can compress and organize the data, but it cannot make strategic or moral judgments. 

AI models remain central to identity-based targeting and advanced decision support. Open-source reporting indicates that sophisticated models, such as Anthropic’s Claude, integrated into systems such as Palantir designed Maven Smart System, have enabled rapid conversion of vast amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), signals intelligence, and behavioral data into target packages. 

Human productivity has also increased. Tasks that once required weeks and a large staff can now be completed in minutes with fewer personnel. However, speed and efficiency do not mean AI independence. It does not change what Clausewitz described as the “grammar of war.”  

The most consequential shift in conflict today is the compression of time within the targeting cycle and its integration into intelligence. In the past, high-value or high-payoff targets were often missed because manual processes relied heavily on human operators and overwhelming amounts of ISR data. Past conflicts reflected these limitations. During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi mobile Scud launchers exploited delays by firing and relocating before U.S. forces could strike them. Kinetic precision still frequently exceeds intelligence fidelity. A munition could hit its coordinates perfectly while the underlying intelligence remained flawed. The use of intelligence to target enemy combatants predates modern technology. AI did not invent decapitation strategies; it made them more data-driven and less dependent on purely human intelligence sources. The Information Age once overwhelmed operators with data. AI now provides a way to navigate that environment. This is why cyber intelligence and persistent access are essential to modern targeting. Pattern-of-life targeting relies on multiple streams of surveillance and behavioral data. AI’s greatest strength is its ability to combine these streams on a scale that would overwhelm most military units. Yet the central question remains unresolved by algorithms alone: should the target be neutralized? That decision is legal, moral, political, and strategic. 

A clear example of AI-integrated intelligence limits came on the first day of the 2026 Iran War, when a U.S. missile struck an elementary school in Minab, Hormozgan province, killing civilians, including children, in one of the war’s deadliest civilian incidents. The incident underscored a basic truth: AI-enabled targeting is only as dependable as its data. Here, the system likely relied on outdated intelligence that missed the school’s proximity to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps compound.  

AI was not the likely source of failure. More likely, flawed intelligence and the fog of war were to blame. Human operators still validated the strike with satellite imagery and intelligence reviews, even though the target was effectively co-located with the school.  

The episode showed both the limits of AI models and the need for human review. Systems like Maven Smart System’s Target Workbench sort, correlate, and reveal intelligence, but humans still approve of final actions. AI can aid target validation, but legal review and command authorization remain essential. 

CONCLUSION 

The effectiveness of any algorithm depends entirely on the intelligence architecture and data supporting it. AI does not create certainty; it produces probability. If the underlying data is manipulated, incomplete, stale, or inaccurate, the output will reflect those flaws. The greater danger is not the removal of the human in the loop, but the compression of human judgment into groupthink. AI-generated recommendations can create an aura of probabilistic certainty that encourages agreement instead of scrutiny. Human operators may still make the final call, but the risk is that they increasingly validate model logic rather than independently challenge it. 

Humans remain in the loop today, but intelligence is now sorted at machine speed while generative systems provide recommendations to reviewers within the targeting cycle. Doctrine should evolve to ensure that human judgment takes precedence over AI-generated recommendations. The defining feature of this so-called first AI war is therefore not the replacement of human agency, but the intensification of human responsibility to judge, restrain, and decide at machine speed. 

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is an information operations officer working with artificial intelligence, and a PhD researcher at King’s College London. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the US Government. 

Why the “First AI War” is Still a Human Struggle was originally published on Global Security Review.

Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron indicated on April 2nd that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that NATO was a “paper tiger”; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”

The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth describes as “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.” But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.

An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.

To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.

Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trumping NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.