Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The use of atomic weapons on Japan by the United States was the culmination of the Manhattan Project’s extraordinary technological achievements. The decision to use these weapons came after US Army and Navy estimates of a protracted invasion of the Japanese home islands (Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaidō) offered casualty ranges from the tens to hundreds of thousands. If the Japanese fought as hard on their own home territory as they fought for Okinawa, for example, there was real concern that the loss of American life would eclipse that seen in Europe.

Additionally, the estimated losses on the Japanese side were five to ten times that of the United States. Japanese tenacity and refusal to surrender in the face of certain defeat was both hated and admired by American troops.

At the time of Germany’s defeat on May 7, 1945, the United States was five weeks into one of the bloodiest fights of the entire war, the battle for Okinawa, which cost more than 50,000 American casualties before the island was taken in late June. Only after the war did it come to light that more than 110,000 Japanese soldiers and 150,000 Okinawan civilians died in the battle. About half of Okinawa’s pre-war population was killed during the battle, sometimes at the hands of Japanese soldiers.

For the military commanders of the war in the Pacific, Okinawa demonstrated a stark example of the Japanese resolve and willingness to fight and die. It should come as no surprise that President Harry Truman, a World War I veteran, understood the difficult decision required to take provocative actions to save American lives. While this was not a war the Americans started; it was a war we had to win—without conditions.

Scholars and non-scholars alike may continue to debate the moral, ethical, and legal justifications of the use of the atomic bomb, but there is little doubt that the men assigned to military units waiting for the invasion to begin were happy to know that the atomic bomb made the loss of their own lives unnecessary. Their families were certainly happy as well. In the articles that often appear on the anniversary of Hiroshima, there is often a lack of understanding of the American lives (and Japanese) that were saved by the use of the atomic bomb.

The Manhattan Project began because the United States feared Nazi Germany would successfully develop the bomb first. With Germany falling to the allies in May 1945, just months before the bomb was ready, it was a logical transition for the target of the A-bomb to shift from Europe to Japan. The weapon, originally designed to counter a German threat, became the best option to quickly end the war in the Pacific.

Often, the articles commemorating the use of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima repeat inaccuracies and leave out important facts. For example, it is common to suggest that the detonation of Little Boy directly caused all of the devastation experienced in Hiroshima. However, approximately 80 percent of the death and devastation in Hiroshima was caused by the fire that began with the detonation and spread far beyond the area directly affected by the bomb. This same level of damage would have been realized with one of Curtis LeMay’s conventional fire-bombing raids because Japanese buildings were in close proximity to one another and made of highly flammable wood and paper. The blast effects of the bomb, while dramatic, were not the leading cause of destruction and loss of life—as is normal with a nuclear detonation.

In retrospect, the American firebombing of Tokyo was far more destructive of life and property than either atomic bomb. Little Boy was detonated at such a high altitude, about 1,400 feet above ground zero, that its damage was limited.

The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a sound military decision that took the best military advice, applied casualty estimates for a future fight to the equation, and reached a sound decision. The atomic bomb did exactly what President Truman and General Marshall desired—end the war as quickly as possible with the least loss of American (and Japanese) life.

The loss of an estimated 150,000 Japanese lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was tragic, but more than justified by the American lives saved. This number, however, in comparison to the estimates of over a million Japanese and American lives that were projected to be lost in an invasion drives a different conclusion and deeper reflection than numbers alone.

The benefit of hindsight to those who challenge the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima often forget that there were real American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines (as well as Japanese military and civilians) who would have died by the hundreds of thousands had the war continued. War is a terrible thing, and, paradoxically, the dramatic use of the atomic bomb, while taken as a single event appears horrific, in contrast to the larger landscape of lives saved demonstrates a justified use that saved lives in the end. Because of this, American warfighters returned home to start lives, get married, raise children, and pursue lives that may very well have ended with a bullet or bomb in Japan.

USAF Col (Ret) Paul Hendrickson, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Reflections on Hiroshima: August 6, 1945 was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Americans, there must be a greater sense of urgency and realization of critical vulnerabilities that can include one or both potential realities. First, consider that a 2024 Chinese attack on Taiwan is feasible. Second, plan for the defense of Taiwan without the benefit of assets in Okinawa and Guam. There is a significant possibility both may prove true.

China has the confidence and believes it can control both conventional and nuclear escalation. China’s “no first-use” policy only exists in name only. China made it very clear, in state-run television, that it would use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Japan. That is, if Japan became involved in the domestic affairs of China during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (which the Chinese Communist Party sees as a domestic affair), then China may strike Japan with nuclear weapons. This would include Okinawa.

China has the capability and will to gain the advantage in the Asia-Pacific and Taiwan relatively quickly. It is said that amateurs think strategy and generals think logistics. If this is true, understanding China’s perspective is instructive.

First, China will not let Taiwan become the operational center of attention because that is where American attention is focused in wargaming and tabletop exercises (TTX) played in the United States. China, if it acts as expected, will not strike Taiwan, but elsewhere—only later taking Taiwan.

Imagine Taiwan as held between the thumb and finger of the US. Struggle to pry it loose and fail. Cut off the thumb and finger and Taiwan is released. The thumb is American forces on Okinawa and the finger is the US presence on Guam.

Okinawa is home to Kadena Air Base which hosts the 18th Wing, the Air Force’s largest combat air wing. The Kadena’s strategic importance is underscored by its array of advanced fighter aircraft, aerial refueling capabilities, and reconnaissance aircraft. It serves as a critical hub for air operations in the Pacific, offering rapid response capabilities for various regional contingencies. Okinawa is also home to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). The US Navy has several facilities in Okinawa, including White Beach Naval Facility, which supports naval operations in the region.

Guam hosts significant American military assets, including Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base. With Guam and Okinawa out, the US still has assets in Tokyo, the Philippines, Australia, and, further out, is Diego Garcia, and even further away is Hawaii.

To operationally execute a surprise attack on Okinawa and Guam, China could employ a stratagem beginning with a deliberate maritime provocation: a scenario where a less costly Chinese asset, such as a $20 million LY-132 warship, engages provocatively with a more valuable US asset, akin to a $2 billion Aegis destroyer. This mirrors past incidents in the South China Sea involving near-collisions, notably between a Chinese LY132 and the USS Chung-Hoon on June 4, 2023. In such a scenario, the Chinese vessel could aggressively maneuver across the bow of the US destroyer in internationally disputed waters, compelling the US ship to decelerate.

In the event of an actual collision, China could construe this as a hostile action by the US in what it claims as its sovereign territory. Leveraging this pretext for a counterstrike, China’s arsenal includes advanced military capabilities for rapid engagement against Okinawa and Guam. In September 2015, the DF-26 nicknamed the “Guam Killer,” which can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, was publicly revealed. Eight years later, China has added the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, the DF-27 missile, and 094-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), capable of delivering a nuclear strike.

The DF-27, a medium-range ballistic missile, augments China’s offensive reach, particularly in regional conflicts. Its range, speed, and accuracy render it a formidable threat to critical American positions in the Indo-Pacific, including military bases and naval forces. The DF-27 is designed to enhance China’s ability to hold targets at risk beyond the second island chain and possesses a high probability of penetrating American ballistic missile defenses. The newest weapon in the Chinese hypersonic inventory, the DF-27, with its range, speed, and ability to maneuver in flight, is a potent “carrier killer.” Additionally, it can hit targets as far as Hawaii.

Using these capabilities China has the option to hit American forces in the first two island chains fast and furiously.

Some may argue that Japan tried something similar in 1941—only to fail. Then, the United States had industrial capacity to quickly build and overpower Japan. Today, the industrial and labor capacity exists in China, not the US. Most importantly, after years of neglecting American nuclear capabilities while China worked toward perfecting their own, the Chinese now have greater regional nuclear capability than the United States. Retaliating for nuclear strikes on Okinawa and/or Guam would prove pyric because the only option is to strike the Chinese mainland. That would put American cities and populations at risk of annihilation.

Returning to the point of this article, 2024 is a good year to attack American forces in the Indo-Pacific for five reasons. First, the US is distracted by the upcoming presidential election. Second, the US is stretched thin with contingencies in Europe and the Middle East. Third, experts and leaders are myopically looking for a cross-strait conflict, rather than the conflict discussed above. Fourth, the US is busy trying to play catch up and strengthen its integrated deterrence with allies. China has the advantage and would prove unwise to give the United States time to prepare. Fifth, the US has more to lose than China in a nuclear conflict. The risk/reward calculation looks better for China than the US in 2024 and beyond.

Thus, 2024 is a good year for a Chinese attack on American military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It is time Americans wake up to the fact that the threat is already here and not somewhere in the future.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived two decades in Taiwan and China.

Why 2024 Is a Good Year for China to Attack American Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States and its allies need to engage in multi-pronged, asymmetric strategies that exploit the existing geostrategic circumstances. The chessboard of the East and South China Seas includes Japan’s Yaeyama Islands (YI) (Ishigaki, Taketomi, Iriomote, Yonaguni, Hateruma) and the Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoal (TS2). The geography of the YI and the TS2 is central to the strategic equation in the East and South China Seas, particularly in relation to preventing China from taking Taiwan. These locales are not merely dots on a map but multi-dimensional air, land, and maritime pieces on the chessboard or, more aptly, a Go board.

Yonaguni Island is close enough to Taiwan to serve as a forward post for both surveillance and military operations. Yonaguni serves as a forward listening post for activities around the East China Sea and the Miyako Strait, also known as the Kerama Gap. The Second Thomas Shoal, while far removed from the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan and even further from Mainland China, is emblematic of the contested multipolarity of the South China Sea and a source of Chinese aggression toward the Philippines.

The geography of these places interlocks with larger strategic aims, especially vis-a-vis Taiwan. If the US chooses to defend Taiwan it will need to see these islands and shoals incorporated into its defense strategy. If the US chooses not to defend Taiwan against China, it will need to see these areas incorporated into its defense strategy for the sake of a Japan and Philippines that now face a Communist China that has taken control of Taiwan.

The Yaeyama Islands, part of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, are located 200 kilometers from Taiwan. This proximity serves as a critical buffer zone in the event of Chinese military activity aimed at Taiwan. It provides a forward-basing opportunity for surveillance, rapid deployment, and potentially disruptive activities against Chinese assets moving toward Taiwan.

The undisputed Japanese sovereignty over the Yaeyama Islands (excluding Senkaku) offers a unique opportunity. The Japanese, and by extension their allies, have unequivocal authority to militarize the islands without violating international norms.

The same is true of the Philippine islands of Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait. These islands would prove to be especially critical in the event of a Chinese conquest of Taiwan.

Along with the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade stationed on Yonaguni Island, a defense network aligning the islands appears to be taking shape. Looking to future military configurations, the US Marine Corps’ restructuring to establish marine littoral regiments points to a rapid adaptability aimed at responding to China’s growing presence. Such forces are particularly effective in island-hopping campaigns, enabling the US to project power in a more flexible and responsive manner.

The expanded regiment, previously the 12th Marine Regiment, was agreed upon by the United States and Japan following the 2023 US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in January, according to the US Naval Institute, and is expected to be formed by 2025. Recently the III Marine Expeditionary Force’s commander, Lt. Gen. James Bierman Jr., visited Ishigaki, an island 160 miles east of Taiwan during the Resolute Dragon exercises.

The US, Japan, and the Philippines might consider more subtle and incremental actions. Deploying civilian fleets for research or fisheries, augmented by American and Philippine coast guard vessels, is a mechanism to assert a de facto presence without triggering a full-scale military response. By embracing the Chinese strategy of incrementalism, these nations can turn the tables without risking immediate reprisals or violating international law. Furthermore, the Philippines already established a legal precedent through its 2016 victory at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s Permanent Court of Arbitration.

A presence at TS2 sends a strong signal to China about the range and mobility of American and allied forces. This geographic stretching of the theatre can dilute Chinese focus and assets.  Recently, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels rammed Philippine Coast Guard and resupply ships carrying supplies to troops stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre. Considering the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Representative Mike Gallagher was emphatic that American support would include assisting the Philippines in establishing a more secure and permanent foothold in the TS2. If, for the sake of argument, Taiwan was part of China, the PRC is already encroaching on the space of two American allies—Japan and the Philippines.

Preventing further Chinese intrusion and hardening the outer islands and shoals of the Philippines and Japan can form a potential encirclement that limits the operational freedom of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in a Taiwan scenario. This Go strategy forces the PLAN into a multi-front conflict, complicating naval strategy. Exploiting these advantages requires an overlapping understanding of both the physical and symbolic dimensions of geography, intertwined with the complexities of military strategy, international law, and multi-dimensional warfare.

On November 9, in a Foreign Policy and the Quincy Institute jointly sponsored panel, Zack Cooper and Lyle J. Goldstein addressed the strategic value of the Senkaku Islands, which is just north of the Yaeyama Islands and the TS2. According to Goldstein, the US is not “going to defend shoals (TS2) or islands with goats (the Senkaku Islands).” He added, the need to “draw reasonable lines and do things that are affordable” is “a more realistic approach and that is consistent with realism and restraint.”

Cooper expressed concern about giving up TS2 or the Senkaku islands. He argued that conceding defeat on either front will cause American allies to ask, “You know, our alliance is backed by nuclear deterrence. What’s the red line on the nuclear deterrence?” By giving up on TS2 and the Senkaku Islands he said, “I worry that is what walks us into a very serious strategic crisis.” He added, “If we’re very sure that we can fight and defend Japan and the Philippines then why can’t we also protect Taiwan in the same way?”

Barely visible shoals and islands with goats will not retain their bucolic simplicity if the Chinese take control of them. In due time they will become fortified threats at the doorsteps of America’s allies. If the United States refuses to fight, it is a reasonable expectation that China will continue its aggression and claim historical ownership of Okinawa as well.

Absent a strong military response, an expansionist China may desire to limit Japan to the home islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido. Chinese aggression toward the Philippines could see the country lose its islands north of Luzon. This may seem farfetched, but so, too, is believing that Chinese expansion is satiated with the Scarborough shoals and islands with nothing more than goats.

US Maneuvering in the Yaeyama Islands and the Second Thomas Shoal to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.