Despite pressure from the Biden administration, the Indian government stuck to its position and, instead, bought Russian oil at discount prices only to refine it and sell it to Europe. The Indians also continued to buy arms from Russia and have sought to rebuild the defense arsenal and civilian scientific sector with Russian technology. Why have the Indians stuck to the Russians despite a warming relationship with the United States? What are the implications of India’s continued relationship with Russia?

The Military Linkage

First and foremost, India sees Russia as the source of weaponry, military technology, and the provider of systems that the West is unwilling to sell. Thus, the Indians leased nuclear submarines from the Russians which proved invaluable in training personnel for India’s own domestically manufactured nuclear boats. Negotiations continue for the lease of another Akula/Nerpa nuclear submarine from Russia although the international sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine have made payments difficult.

Similarly, the Su-30 MKI now forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet (with over 270 aircraft). The Indian government has proposed the purchase of 12 more Sukhois to help replenish India’s declining strength in air combat squadrons. The government officially authorizes 42 squadrons, but the IAF is down to roughly 31 squadrons against a continued two-front threat from Pakistan and China.

Even at the most basic level, after years of trying to indigenize the development and production of an assault rifle, the Indians set up a factory to build the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-203. For a country that has both internal and external security concerns, having a capable assault rifle for both its military and security forces remains a priority.

The more important factor is not just the ability to replenish the military supplies of the country but rather the fact that the Russians are providing the technologies India seeks to become a technologically advanced nation in the production of weaponry.

The India-Russia collaboration has led the country to jointly develop the Brahmos supersonic missile. The next generation of the weapon is supposed to have a hypersonic capability. That would put India in the same league as the United States, Russia, and China in terms of its missile capabilities.

Equally important is the fact that the Indians secured an export order from the Philippines for the Brahmos. Discussions are ongoing to sell the missile to Indonesia. This fulfills a long-term Indian ambition to become an arms exporting nation. While India seeks to sell its indigenously developed Tejas fighter to countries as varied as Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Philippines, it has not met with success. It will also be interesting to see if the United States permits a plane with an American engine to be sold to countries that are potential customers for American aircraft.

Similarly, India’s space program, which has impressive accomplishments like missions to Mars and the Moon, was built on Russian heavy launch engines. Now, the Indians are negotiating for the next generation of cryo-engine from Russia to further their ambitions in space.

On the other hand, there are problems in the mechanics of the relationship that lead, on the Indian side, to a degree of frustration. Spare parts remain a problem, although India has started to use its domestic industry to reverse engineer Russian systems. There are also delays in getting completed systems from the Russians as witnessed by the lengthy delays in acquiring the Gorshkov aircraft carrier because the shipyard could not carry out the retrofit in a timely manner.

The other problem is that post-Ukraine sanctions make it difficult to purchase weaponry from Russia. This is not a problem for heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran, but India sees itself as a part of the international community and a supporter of a rules-based international order. Consequently, New Delhi walks a fine line between purchasing weapons systems while not disregarding international concerns. This complicates the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system from Moscow as India has troubles working out how to make the payment through internationally acceptable rules.

Although the Russians are careful about how India uses the nuclear technology it provides (asking for full-scope safeguards), it does not sanction the Indian use of Russian conventional systems and allows New Delhi to use Russian systems to carry strategic weaponry. Thus, the Su-30 can be used to carry nuclear weapons.

In contrast, all weapon sales from the United States lack guarantees that, in the event of a conflict Washington opposes, weapons are sanction- and embargo-free. This is one of the reasons India preferred the Rafale over the F-16—since the former could be used as a nuclear delivery system. For a country that is far from self-sufficient in weapons production, this is a major factor in deciding arms purchases.

Diplomatically, the Indians are getting closer to the United States. However, New Delhi does not want to antagonize Russia or China, especially because the American relationship, as discussed, comes with its own set of constraints and limitations. Thus, while the Indians see China as an existential threat, they are careful not to cross the point of no return with Beijing by pressing for a full-blown conflict. Similarly, when it comes to the supply of raw materials, Russia remains an important partner.

Even though India’s largest trading partners are China and the United States, the economic link with Russia remains vital to Indian developmental interests. American sanctions on Tehran forced India to wean itself off Iranian oil. The Russian supply of oil has been beneficial to India. Not only did it reduce import costs, but it allowed India to refine the crude and sell it on the international market—particularly to Europe.

In the short to medium term, the oil supply chain from Russia cannot be disrupted since India has few alternatives. This is of importance because Middle East oil becoming more expensive due to production cutbacks.

Lastly, a negative factor shapes the desire to keep open ties with Russia. New Delhi worries that if Moscow and Beijing get too close, it narrows India’s maneuvering space in the international system.

In a post-Ukraine war world, Moscow will likely give up its aspiration of being considered a western power and, instead, is highlighting its identity as a Eurasian nation with close ties to China. A Russia that sides with China against India would be New Delhi’s worst nightmare. This problem is compounded if Washington takes an even-handed approach to an India-China confrontation as Trump did, when, in 2020, he offered to mediate after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in fisticuffs along the border. Thus, India will continue the relationship with Russia until guaranteed military and economic alternatives are provided to India by the West.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this article are his own. He can be reached at agupta1856@gmail.com.

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It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two issues are at play today. First, a direct military confrontation between the United States and China appears inevitable, despite the economic entanglement that was intended to prevent it. Second, two nations that are so closely tied economically have rarely waged war, leaving such conflict’s second and third order effects unknown. Should the United States follow Reagan’s approach and challenge China’s economic rise, there may be a path to avoiding conflict. Oil may be a good place to begin such an effort because China is so highly dependent on oil imports.

President Reagan began by initiating a change in US oil price policy that commenced what National Security Council official Roger Robinson called a policy of “economic warfare” against the Soviet Union. One of Reagan’s first moves was to decontrol the price of oil. This lowered the price of oil and markedly decreased the earnings of the Soviet government, which relied heavily on oil and gas sales to generate foreign currency reserves.

A second move was to encourage the expansion of American oil and gas production over the long-term—driving down prices. In 1984, President Reagan persuaded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to markedly increase oil production by seven million barrels a day, again seriously reducing Moscow’s export earnings. As an importer of oil, driving prices down would help, not hurt, the Chinese economy. Thus, the United States would need to put Chinese oil imports at risk and more expensive.

China is growing its ability to project military power astride key maritime choke points which see the transit of 60 percent of global oil production—58.9 million barrels of oil per day. This includes four choke points where China is seeking a military presence. These include: the Straits of Hormuz (with the help of Iran); the Straits of Malacca (through military construction in the South China Sea); Bab el-Mandeb (with Iranian/Houthi help); and the Suez Canal.

While China fears an oil cut-off during a military conflict, it appears China is seeking to turn the tables on the United States. As part of China’s belt and roads initiative, overland routes for petroleum export are under construction, with a specific design to prevent American interference.

Given the stakes, the United States must act with urgency and circumspection as it looks for ways to economically disentangle from China—a country which clearly seeks to supplant American global influence. As the Chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger warned in a recent “Xi’s Pearl Harbor”  broadcast, many American institutions may not be up to the challenge. Employing oil as a deterrent force is no simple task.

If China were to achieve a stranglehold on oil tanker transportation, America’s NATO allies stand to suffer most. Michael Klein and Robert Zubrin point out that it is no coincidence that each recession since 1975 began with sharp spikes in oil prices.

Currently, the United States is the largest oil producer in the world despite the Biden administration’s efforts to constrain oil production. Should administration’s change or President Biden change his position on hydrocarbons, the United States could, in a time of crisis, ramp up production to counter Chinese efforts to constrain oil flows.

There is real value in the United States securing the sea-lanes and thwarting Chinese plans to build overseas bases at key the key geographic points mentioned above. One of China’s weaknesses is that it uses economics in a purely coercive way that seem attractive at first, but always carry heavy burden on the back end. States participating in the Belt and Road Initiative are now coming to regret their decision. Buyer’s regret is a key tool the United States can use to thwart Chinese expansionist efforts.

Maintaining a sufficiently sized and capable US Navy that can patrol sea lanes remains a core capability and coercive tool of American diplomacy. The sight of American warships in foreign ports, rather than Chinese warships, speaks volumes to those countries considering which superpower to support. This is proving particularly true in the Middle East as oil rich nations are reconsidering their cooperation with the United States.

In a future strategic environment where China attempts to use oil as a coercive tool, the United States must be prepared to push back or prevent such a set of circumstances from ever materializing. The time is now for American policymakers to contemplate the role oil can play in economic warfare with China. Xi Jinping is certainly thinking about it.

Peter Huessy is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Economic Deterrence: Chinese Style was originally published on Global Security Review.