The first commercial nuclear power plant in the Arab world is now fully operational, with all four units online and providing roughly a quarter of the country’s electricity. In a region traditionally defined by oil wealth, Barakah represents an intentional shift toward a diversified, low-carbon economy aligned with long-term sustainability goals.

The urgency behind this shift stems from rising domestic energy demand, climate commitments, and the need to hedge against volatility in fossil fuel markets. The UAE’s strategy positions nuclear power not as a replacement for hydrocarbons, but as a stabilising foundation within a broader clean-energy system. With global competition intensifying over clean-technology leadership, the UAE’s nuclear program has become a key pillar of national planning, industrial policy, and diplomatic signalling.

Barakah’s completion is notable in a world where many nuclear projects are delayed or cancelled. Built with South Korea’s KEPCO and operated by Nawah Energy Company, the reactors were brought online between 2021 and 2024 on a timeline that compares favourably with international benchmarks.

The program is overseen by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework and publishes transparent safety and inspection assessments. This regulatory credibility underpins both domestic public confidence and international recognition, distinguishing the UAE’s program from states whose nuclear ambitions raise proliferation concerns.

The impact on decarbonisation is already measurable. According to the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Barakah currently avoids around 22.4 million tons of carbon emissions annually, equivalent to removing nearly 4.8 million cars from the road. This mitigation supports the UAE’s net zero by 2050 Strategic Initiative.

This forms part of wider clean-energy planning that includes hydrogen, expanded solar capacity, and carbon-efficient industrial development. Nuclear power provides stable baseload output that complements intermittent renewables and stabilizes the electricity system as demand grows.

The UAE’s nuclear program is also a catalyst for scientific and industrial capabilities. Prior to Barakah’s commissioning, the UAE invested in human capital through institutions such as Khalifa University, which established the Emirates Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) to support reactor safety, radiation science, and advanced materials research. Alongside operator training and regulatory capacity building, these programs expand domestic expertise in high-value sectors that extend beyond power generation. Over time, these skills contribute to cybersecurity, digital instrumentation, robotics for plant inspection, and reactor systems modelling.

This knowledge base has spillover effects in multiple fields. In nuclear medicine, investments in radiopharmaceutical production and imaging facilities have strengthened diagnostic and therapeutic services, enabling the UAE to become a regional hub for advanced cancer treatment. In agriculture, the application of nuclear techniques such as the sterile insect technique (SIT) has supported integrated pest management, reducing chemical pesticide use and improving food security. In industry, nuclear-powered low-carbon aluminium production demonstrates how nuclear energy can decarbonize energy-intensive exports, positioning the UAE competitively as global markets introduce carbon border adjustment mechanisms.

However, several longer-term challenges require sustained policy focus. First, the UAE’s nonproliferation model, which commits to no enrichment and no reprocessing, enhances international trust but requires resilient fuel-cycle logistics. Ensuring diversified fuel suppliers and clearly articulated strategies for spent-fuel management will be essential over the fleet’s 60- to 80-year operational life.

Second, as more renewable energy is integrated into the grid, nuclear power plants will need to operate flexibly to maintain system stability. This will require advanced forecasting, large-scale storage solutions, and coordinated dispatch strategies.

A third challenge is ensuring that the nuclear workforce remains locally grounded and resilient. While Emiratization in the sector has advanced, retaining specialised talent requires clear career progression pathways, applied research opportunities, and continued collaboration with global operators, research laboratories, and regulatory bodies. Sustaining this talent pipeline is vital not only for Barakah’s long-term success but also for future reactor projects or advanced nuclear applications.

These considerations are particularly important as the UAE explores a potential second nuclear plant, which has been signalled in government discussions and energy planning reports. A second site could reinforce fleet-level operations, enhance outage scheduling, expand industrial applications, and deepen domestic supply-chain maturity. If pursued, the contracting and technology-selection process will become a significant geopolitical signal in the Gulf energy landscape, particularly as other states in the region show growing interest in nuclear power.

The UAE is now uniquely positioned to shape the trajectory of civil nuclear development in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Establishing a GCC Nuclear Regulation and Safety Forum, anchored in FANR’s experience, could enable shared emergency preparedness frameworks, cybersecurity standards, and safety culture norms. Similarly, coordinating research networks in radiopharmaceutical production, nuclear-enabled agriculture, and advanced reactor technologies could support regional industrial integration. These collaborative frameworks would not only enhance security and performance standards but also reduce duplication of effort among neighboring states.

Looking ahead, discussions around small modular reactors (SMR) and microreactors are expanding globally. These technologies offer potential applications for district cooling, desalination, and off-grid industrial clusters. For the UAE, SMRs could complement rather than replace large-scale reactors. Any adoption pathway must be grounded in demonstrated vendor maturity, regulatory readiness, supply-chain localization, and long-term cost predictability. The UAE’s existing regulatory and operational foundation gives it a comparative advantage in evaluating such options pragmatically rather than rhetorically.

The UAE’s experience demonstrates that new nuclear programmes can be delivered on time, integrated into a national climate strategy, and used to catalyse broader scientific and economic development. The challenge now is to advance from successful construction to strategic expansion, ensuring fuel-cycle resilience, embedding research translation, supporting workforce depth, and strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms. If these next steps are taken with the same planning discipline that characterised the first phase, the UAE will not only retain its role as the GCC’s leader in civil nuclear power but also provide a model for how emerging economies can balance energy security with strategic ambition in a decarbonizing world.

Tahir Azad, PhD, is a Research Scholar in the Department of Politics at the University of Reading. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Energy Security and Strategic Ambition: Evaluating the UAE’s Nuclear Journey was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this electrifying episode, the NIDS crew pull back the curtain on one of the most game-changing technologies in national defense: micro nuclear reactors.

From powering remote bases and forward-deployed operations to fortifying homeland energy resilience, these compact energy giants could rewrite the playbook for military logistics, deterrence strategy, and even climate goals.

Tune in as they dive into:

• The breakthrough tech behind micro reactors
• How nuclear energy ensures mission continuity in contested environments
• The balance between sustainability and survivability
• Why energy security is national security

This is more than a conversation, we are all realizing it’s a strategic wake-up call for anyone in defense, energy policy, or the fight to future-proof our force.

Listen now — and find out how micro reactors could power the next era of deterrence.

#EnergyResilience #MicroReactors #NationalSecurity #NuclearInnovation #Deterrence #MilitaryEnergy #DefenseStrategy #EnergyDominance #ThinkDeterrence #ClimateAndSecurity

131 Micro Reactors: Reliable Energy and National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.