To many, the end of the Cold War signaled hope for a more restrained nuclear era. As the rivalry between the US and USSR settled in the early 1990s, the imperative for the two states to expand their nuclear arsenals also decreased. During the same period, global efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation accelerated. In 1991 South Africa became the only country, ever, to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons program before they joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), highlighting what was to be a new nuclear era. There were drawbacks, such as Indian and Pakistani nuclear development and testing in 1998, and North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT and later demonstration of nuclear weapon technology. However, until recently, nuclear threats and coercion have been largely restrained. 

In parallel, civilian nuclear energy has followed a similar trajectory. Although there was initial enthusiasm for a fossil-fuel-free alternative to meet global energy demands, momentum behind nuclear power waned after the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The incident involved a devastating tsunami that shed light on the inherent risks of civil nuclear programs and led governments worldwide to reassess their nuclear energy ambitions. Almost immediately afterward, Germany, accelerated its Energiewende program, shifting the state’s energy infrastructure away from nuclear power and toward renewable wind and solar energy, while Switzerland abandoned its plans to build new reactors. 

Now, the era of restraint appears to be waning. In February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last binding agreement limiting the US and Russia’s nuclear arsenals, expired and brought a formal end to the post-Cold-War arms control regime. That same year, the US signed a landmark civil nuclear agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), giving it a path toward domestic uranium enrichment. While noteworthy on its own, a less discussed aspect of the agreement is what it represents. States are beginning to shift their attitudes toward use of nuclear technologies once again. 

Developments in recent years further support this shift. In 2026, Japan restarted its largest nuclear power station, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, for the first time since the Fukushima accident, while China approved a new five-year plan, aiming to increase its nuclear power capacity from 62.5 gigawatts to 110 gigawatts by 2030. Similarly, India finalized a long-term uranium supply deal with Canada’s Cameco and reached an agreement to expand uranium exports from Australia after years of hesitation over proliferation risks. These developments contrast with the expectations decades ago. Rising energy costs due to increased energy demands, including increased demands for data centers and rapid industrial growth in Asia, have indeed contributed greatly to this renewed interest in nuclear power. 

Energy production holds increased geopolitical dimensions that cannot be ignored. Recent conflicts highlight the downsides of interdependence on fossil fuel resources. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war effected energy prices in response to reduced transportation and risks. States had to confront their import dependence in a volatile geopolitical climate. The need for self-reliance and alternative energy resources became further stressed with the US-Iran conflict, in which oil shipment disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz negatively affected entire state economies. 

Many Middle Eastern governments are now reassessing their reliance on external security guarantees as neighboring conflicts become potential threats and there are concerns about US limitations in protecting allies. These raise doubts about relying solely on US assurances. This may prompt regional powers to pursue independent nuclear deterrents or latent nuclear power production capabilities. 

In this context, the distinction between pursuing civilian and military nuclear programs becomes blurry. Nuclear technology is inherently dual-use. The same centrifuges used to enrich uranium  to 3-5 percent U-235 for civilian reactors can also be used to produce weapons-grade uranium, at around 90 percent U-235. Additionally, spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors can be reprocessed to extract plutonium for weapons. Although reaching weapons-grade enrichment is no easy task, the greatest technical challenge largely lies in developing the initial enrichment infrastructure. 

As a result, states that can acquire domestic enrichment capabilities automatically possess nuclear latency, the ability to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly should a political decision be made. “A key example is India’s 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ which relied on plutonium produced in a Canadian-supplied civilian research reactor. 

Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) exists to prevent civilian-military expansion. However, recent actions have caused concerns about the IAEA becoming politically contentious. In June 2025, the Agency found Iran non-compliant with safeguards but later acknowledged Iran lacked a structured nuclear weapons program. This seeming ambiguity led in part to Israel’s strikes on Iranian facilities, and raised questions about the IAEA’s entanglement with geopolitical interests. In the Middle East, Israel is the region’s only potential nuclear-armed state despite not signing the NPT. This, along with US nuclear rhetoric, suggests that nuclear rules are unclear and that nuclear capability makes strategic autonomy complex.  

The case of Ukraine offers another warning. After surrendering the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR, Ukraine joined the NPT in return for security assurances under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022 have inevitably weakened confidence in such assurances. How this would have played out if Ukraine did have nuclear weapons is unknown, but it does support the argument that external guarantees may ultimately be less reliable than an independent deterrent. 

Thus, while recent developments point to a renewed interest in nuclear technologies, whether this shift will ultimately translate into latent or breakout capabilities remains to be seen. What is already clear, however, is the strategic paradox confronting many states. On the one hand, 21st century conflicts have reinforced the value of a nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring long-term security. On the other, the experiences of Iraq and Iran illustrate how even the perception of an emerging nuclear weapons program can trigger military and/or economic responses. In this sense, not possessing a nuclear program may leave a state vulnerable, yet attempting to acquire one may also make it a target for economic sanctions or worse. 

If the international system were genuinely consistent and capable of providing equal security, the incentives for nuclear proliferation would be far weaker. However, as it stands, the system remains unequal and is ultimately shaped by power. Until that changes, nuclear arms will continue to appear to states as insurance against an international order they do not fully trust. The real question, therefore, is whether that order can convince states that they are safer without a nuclear weapons program. 

Sajal Shahid is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad, conducting research on South Asian security. Her work has been published on national and international platforms, including Green Network Asia, The Independent Singapore, Fair Observer, and Modern Diplomacy. She can be reached at cassthinkers@casstt.com. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Return of Nuclear Hedging was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “Atoms for Algorithms” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.

To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, Dr. Yasmina Fina suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “speed and scale” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing nuclear governance to AI governance is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.

In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing verification tool. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large data streams and satellite images to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, Dr. Ian Stewart, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” fissile material, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.

When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of political legitimacy for the safeguards system.

The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “race to adopt” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).

Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new levels of uncertainty. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To support disarmament, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to Mr. Shota Kamishima of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.

This alliance is especially important for the rollout of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “last line of defence”.

“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. Governance policies must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “anomaly detections.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” Nuclear policy decisions must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.

The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful “Atoms for Algorithms” alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus was originally published on Global Security Review.

The first commercial nuclear power plant in the Arab world is now fully operational, with all four units online and providing roughly a quarter of the country’s electricity. In a region traditionally defined by oil wealth, Barakah represents an intentional shift toward a diversified, low-carbon economy aligned with long-term sustainability goals.

The urgency behind this shift stems from rising domestic energy demand, climate commitments, and the need to hedge against volatility in fossil fuel markets. The UAE’s strategy positions nuclear power not as a replacement for hydrocarbons, but as a stabilising foundation within a broader clean-energy system. With global competition intensifying over clean-technology leadership, the UAE’s nuclear program has become a key pillar of national planning, industrial policy, and diplomatic signalling.

Barakah’s completion is notable in a world where many nuclear projects are delayed or cancelled. Built with South Korea’s KEPCO and operated by Nawah Energy Company, the reactors were brought online between 2021 and 2024 on a timeline that compares favourably with international benchmarks.

The program is overseen by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework and publishes transparent safety and inspection assessments. This regulatory credibility underpins both domestic public confidence and international recognition, distinguishing the UAE’s program from states whose nuclear ambitions raise proliferation concerns.

The impact on decarbonisation is already measurable. According to the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Barakah currently avoids around 22.4 million tons of carbon emissions annually, equivalent to removing nearly 4.8 million cars from the road. This mitigation supports the UAE’s net zero by 2050 Strategic Initiative.

This forms part of wider clean-energy planning that includes hydrogen, expanded solar capacity, and carbon-efficient industrial development. Nuclear power provides stable baseload output that complements intermittent renewables and stabilizes the electricity system as demand grows.

The UAE’s nuclear program is also a catalyst for scientific and industrial capabilities. Prior to Barakah’s commissioning, the UAE invested in human capital through institutions such as Khalifa University, which established the Emirates Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) to support reactor safety, radiation science, and advanced materials research. Alongside operator training and regulatory capacity building, these programs expand domestic expertise in high-value sectors that extend beyond power generation. Over time, these skills contribute to cybersecurity, digital instrumentation, robotics for plant inspection, and reactor systems modelling.

This knowledge base has spillover effects in multiple fields. In nuclear medicine, investments in radiopharmaceutical production and imaging facilities have strengthened diagnostic and therapeutic services, enabling the UAE to become a regional hub for advanced cancer treatment. In agriculture, the application of nuclear techniques such as the sterile insect technique (SIT) has supported integrated pest management, reducing chemical pesticide use and improving food security. In industry, nuclear-powered low-carbon aluminium production demonstrates how nuclear energy can decarbonize energy-intensive exports, positioning the UAE competitively as global markets introduce carbon border adjustment mechanisms.

However, several longer-term challenges require sustained policy focus. First, the UAE’s nonproliferation model, which commits to no enrichment and no reprocessing, enhances international trust but requires resilient fuel-cycle logistics. Ensuring diversified fuel suppliers and clearly articulated strategies for spent-fuel management will be essential over the fleet’s 60- to 80-year operational life.

Second, as more renewable energy is integrated into the grid, nuclear power plants will need to operate flexibly to maintain system stability. This will require advanced forecasting, large-scale storage solutions, and coordinated dispatch strategies.

A third challenge is ensuring that the nuclear workforce remains locally grounded and resilient. While Emiratization in the sector has advanced, retaining specialised talent requires clear career progression pathways, applied research opportunities, and continued collaboration with global operators, research laboratories, and regulatory bodies. Sustaining this talent pipeline is vital not only for Barakah’s long-term success but also for future reactor projects or advanced nuclear applications.

These considerations are particularly important as the UAE explores a potential second nuclear plant, which has been signalled in government discussions and energy planning reports. A second site could reinforce fleet-level operations, enhance outage scheduling, expand industrial applications, and deepen domestic supply-chain maturity. If pursued, the contracting and technology-selection process will become a significant geopolitical signal in the Gulf energy landscape, particularly as other states in the region show growing interest in nuclear power.

The UAE is now uniquely positioned to shape the trajectory of civil nuclear development in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Establishing a GCC Nuclear Regulation and Safety Forum, anchored in FANR’s experience, could enable shared emergency preparedness frameworks, cybersecurity standards, and safety culture norms. Similarly, coordinating research networks in radiopharmaceutical production, nuclear-enabled agriculture, and advanced reactor technologies could support regional industrial integration. These collaborative frameworks would not only enhance security and performance standards but also reduce duplication of effort among neighboring states.

Looking ahead, discussions around small modular reactors (SMR) and microreactors are expanding globally. These technologies offer potential applications for district cooling, desalination, and off-grid industrial clusters. For the UAE, SMRs could complement rather than replace large-scale reactors. Any adoption pathway must be grounded in demonstrated vendor maturity, regulatory readiness, supply-chain localization, and long-term cost predictability. The UAE’s existing regulatory and operational foundation gives it a comparative advantage in evaluating such options pragmatically rather than rhetorically.

The UAE’s experience demonstrates that new nuclear programmes can be delivered on time, integrated into a national climate strategy, and used to catalyse broader scientific and economic development. The challenge now is to advance from successful construction to strategic expansion, ensuring fuel-cycle resilience, embedding research translation, supporting workforce depth, and strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms. If these next steps are taken with the same planning discipline that characterised the first phase, the UAE will not only retain its role as the GCC’s leader in civil nuclear power but also provide a model for how emerging economies can balance energy security with strategic ambition in a decarbonizing world.

Tahir Azad, PhD, is a Research Scholar in the Department of Politics at the University of Reading. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Energy Security and Strategic Ambition: Evaluating the UAE’s Nuclear Journey was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this electrifying episode, the NIDS crew pull back the curtain on one of the most game-changing technologies in national defense: micro nuclear reactors.

From powering remote bases and forward-deployed operations to fortifying homeland energy resilience, these compact energy giants could rewrite the playbook for military logistics, deterrence strategy, and even climate goals.

Tune in as they dive into:

• The breakthrough tech behind micro reactors
• How nuclear energy ensures mission continuity in contested environments
• The balance between sustainability and survivability
• Why energy security is national security

This is more than a conversation, we are all realizing it’s a strategic wake-up call for anyone in defense, energy policy, or the fight to future-proof our force.

Listen now — and find out how micro reactors could power the next era of deterrence.

#EnergyResilience #MicroReactors #NationalSecurity #NuclearInnovation #Deterrence #MilitaryEnergy #DefenseStrategy #EnergyDominance #ThinkDeterrence #ClimateAndSecurity

131 Micro Reactors: Reliable Energy and National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.