Despite pressure from the Biden administration, the Indian government stuck to its position and, instead, bought Russian oil at discount prices only to refine it and sell it to Europe. The Indians also continued to buy arms from Russia and have sought to rebuild the defense arsenal and civilian scientific sector with Russian technology. Why have the Indians stuck to the Russians despite a warming relationship with the United States? What are the implications of India’s continued relationship with Russia?

The Military Linkage

First and foremost, India sees Russia as the source of weaponry, military technology, and the provider of systems that the West is unwilling to sell. Thus, the Indians leased nuclear submarines from the Russians which proved invaluable in training personnel for India’s own domestically manufactured nuclear boats. Negotiations continue for the lease of another Akula/Nerpa nuclear submarine from Russia although the international sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine have made payments difficult.

Similarly, the Su-30 MKI now forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet (with over 270 aircraft). The Indian government has proposed the purchase of 12 more Sukhois to help replenish India’s declining strength in air combat squadrons. The government officially authorizes 42 squadrons, but the IAF is down to roughly 31 squadrons against a continued two-front threat from Pakistan and China.

Even at the most basic level, after years of trying to indigenize the development and production of an assault rifle, the Indians set up a factory to build the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-203. For a country that has both internal and external security concerns, having a capable assault rifle for both its military and security forces remains a priority.

The more important factor is not just the ability to replenish the military supplies of the country but rather the fact that the Russians are providing the technologies India seeks to become a technologically advanced nation in the production of weaponry.

The India-Russia collaboration has led the country to jointly develop the Brahmos supersonic missile. The next generation of the weapon is supposed to have a hypersonic capability. That would put India in the same league as the United States, Russia, and China in terms of its missile capabilities.

Equally important is the fact that the Indians secured an export order from the Philippines for the Brahmos. Discussions are ongoing to sell the missile to Indonesia. This fulfills a long-term Indian ambition to become an arms exporting nation. While India seeks to sell its indigenously developed Tejas fighter to countries as varied as Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Philippines, it has not met with success. It will also be interesting to see if the United States permits a plane with an American engine to be sold to countries that are potential customers for American aircraft.

Similarly, India’s space program, which has impressive accomplishments like missions to Mars and the Moon, was built on Russian heavy launch engines. Now, the Indians are negotiating for the next generation of cryo-engine from Russia to further their ambitions in space.

On the other hand, there are problems in the mechanics of the relationship that lead, on the Indian side, to a degree of frustration. Spare parts remain a problem, although India has started to use its domestic industry to reverse engineer Russian systems. There are also delays in getting completed systems from the Russians as witnessed by the lengthy delays in acquiring the Gorshkov aircraft carrier because the shipyard could not carry out the retrofit in a timely manner.

The other problem is that post-Ukraine sanctions make it difficult to purchase weaponry from Russia. This is not a problem for heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran, but India sees itself as a part of the international community and a supporter of a rules-based international order. Consequently, New Delhi walks a fine line between purchasing weapons systems while not disregarding international concerns. This complicates the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system from Moscow as India has troubles working out how to make the payment through internationally acceptable rules.

Although the Russians are careful about how India uses the nuclear technology it provides (asking for full-scope safeguards), it does not sanction the Indian use of Russian conventional systems and allows New Delhi to use Russian systems to carry strategic weaponry. Thus, the Su-30 can be used to carry nuclear weapons.

In contrast, all weapon sales from the United States lack guarantees that, in the event of a conflict Washington opposes, weapons are sanction- and embargo-free. This is one of the reasons India preferred the Rafale over the F-16—since the former could be used as a nuclear delivery system. For a country that is far from self-sufficient in weapons production, this is a major factor in deciding arms purchases.

Diplomatically, the Indians are getting closer to the United States. However, New Delhi does not want to antagonize Russia or China, especially because the American relationship, as discussed, comes with its own set of constraints and limitations. Thus, while the Indians see China as an existential threat, they are careful not to cross the point of no return with Beijing by pressing for a full-blown conflict. Similarly, when it comes to the supply of raw materials, Russia remains an important partner.

Even though India’s largest trading partners are China and the United States, the economic link with Russia remains vital to Indian developmental interests. American sanctions on Tehran forced India to wean itself off Iranian oil. The Russian supply of oil has been beneficial to India. Not only did it reduce import costs, but it allowed India to refine the crude and sell it on the international market—particularly to Europe.

In the short to medium term, the oil supply chain from Russia cannot be disrupted since India has few alternatives. This is of importance because Middle East oil becoming more expensive due to production cutbacks.

Lastly, a negative factor shapes the desire to keep open ties with Russia. New Delhi worries that if Moscow and Beijing get too close, it narrows India’s maneuvering space in the international system.

In a post-Ukraine war world, Moscow will likely give up its aspiration of being considered a western power and, instead, is highlighting its identity as a Eurasian nation with close ties to China. A Russia that sides with China against India would be New Delhi’s worst nightmare. This problem is compounded if Washington takes an even-handed approach to an India-China confrontation as Trump did, when, in 2020, he offered to mediate after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in fisticuffs along the border. Thus, India will continue the relationship with Russia until guaranteed military and economic alternatives are provided to India by the West.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this article are his own. He can be reached at agupta1856@gmail.com.

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It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link was originally published on Global Security Review.

There are two ways to achieve the regime’s objectives. First, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold and turn the tables on the United States, Israel, and the Sunni Arab states. Second, Iran can continue engaging in conflict and terrorism via proxies.

This approach took shape with the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which drove the US out of Lebanon. The United States and Israel’s current conflict with Iranian proxies is at best a strategic distraction that cost the lives of American troops and drains Israel of resources. Houthis militias not only disrupt 15–25 percent of global shipping, but they are also a vector for testing increasingly lethal weapons and tactics.

When recently fighting Islamist militias in Idlib, Syria, Iranian forces demonstrated the brand new Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). This puts Israel within range, making the Iranian threat to “raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” even more explicit.

While the West is distracted by the persistence of proxy attacks, Iran’s laser-sharp focus on nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continues to deliver results. As of early 2024, Iran is capable of Uranium enrichment above the 80 percent threshold, while it keeps growing its stockpile of Uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran might not have yet mastered Uranium-metal machining and the implosion trigger, but it eventually will, albeit with a little bit of help from the enemies of the United States. It is not a question of if but when will Iran field a nuclear weapon.

Iran has long developed the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It took nearly three decades for Europe to acknowledge that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were a growing threat. Western inability to deploy coercive nonproliferation tools that effectively compel Iran to cease and desist with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs demonstrates that efforts to deter Iran are an epic failure. It is in that context that Iran’s space launch vehicle programs provide a pathway toward longer-range ballistic missile systems, something not fundamentally different from North Korea’s approach.

The current American bombing campaign in retaliation for the attack on American troops in Jordan, while targeting proxies, does not change Iran’s tactical or strategic objectives. It is not a stretch to anticipate that Iran may consider a theater nuclear paradigm. For this to be adopted, Russian tutelage of Iran as to the utility of its nuclear doctrine is needed.

There remain several issues to consider. These include warhead miniaturization, mating with a Shahab 3 missile, and missile guidance, which require assistance from Russia, China, or North Korea. North Korea spent the past decade working on these very issues and is likely to share its knowledge for a price.

China relies heavily on Iran and Iran-controlled Iraq for its oil imports. Iran’s export of crude oil recently reached a 5-year high with China as the top buyer. Sanctions simply do not work. In addition to the expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Global South’s emerging alternative payment systems, which bypasses dollar-based control infrastructures, illegal weapons/technology proliferation continues unabated. While it is concerning that components used in Iranian missiles are reported to have made their way from the United States to Iran via China, the obvious question is what export-control designated items should never have made it out of the United States in the first place.

By staging a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and accelerating the expansion of the BRICS to countries that are primarily oil and gas suppliers, China is further consolidating its energy security and its appeal as an alternative to the Western-led world order. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Royal Highness Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, maintains bridges with Iran while performing diplomatic damage control such as in Lebanon. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia will ultimately turn its back on the West. But by keeping its options open, Saudi Arabia’s smart diplomacy does not lose sight of its own strategic goals—leveraging any weight China already carries around the Middle East and globally.

In January 2024, a Qaem 100 rocket from the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, for the first time, launched a Soraya satellite to an altitude of 750 kilometers. Not long after this first success, a Simorgh (Phoenix) rocket launched 3 small satellites into orbit.  Iran’s missile program, under the guise of a space program, demonstrated significant breakthroughs just as Iran is on the brink of reaching its technical goals for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. As the West contemplates failed deterrence policies, the United States and other western nations must contemplate how much longer they can continue to fail without having to pay a price for their eroding regional and global leadership.

Iranian effort to reassert itself to regional hegemony after a long period of mediocrity will not go unchallenged by the Saudis (Sunni Arab) or Turks (Sunni Turkish). American preeminence in the region kept old animosity at bay but may not for much longer. We will all be worse off for it.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Iran’s Quest for Middle East Hegemony was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington policy and political circles, the former President’s comments are met with both shock and disdain. The familiar tropes about the indispensability of the Western alliance and the civilizational connection with Europe are trotted out to defend NATO. In the Pentagon, there is even an optimistic belief that Europe is the security partner of future expeditionary missions around the world.

While Trump may talk like a shock jock, what he says about NATO and Europe hold true. Unless some tough love is imposed on the Europeans, American taxpayers will foot Europe’s security bill indefinitely. What Europe needs to understand is that America is changing, and with it Europe’s free pass is getting rescinded.

The Demographic Transition

One reason the Trans-Atlantic political and military alliance will change is the demographic transition in both the United States and Europe. In the US, by about 2045, citizens not of European extraction become a slim majority. Surveys of the next generation show that the affinity for Europe and with traditional American foreign policy imperatives is shrinking. The younger generation’s position on the Palestine-Israel conflict is a case in point. Latinos, Asians, and black Americans do not have emotional ties to Europe. They are, therefore, less inclined to tolerate and support the subsidizing of European defense efforts.

Instead, much like Trump, they will call on Europe to pay its bills. Europe, however, cannot pay those bills since it is an aging society with a large welfare state. As Table 1 shows, major European societies are rapidly aging. Not only that, but their median age is also going to rise to the extent that they will have a hard time fielding women and men of a fighting age.

 Table 1

Source:  Data retrieved from UN Population Revision 2019. (These numbers do not account for the recent population transfer from Ukraine to Russia or to the millions of Ukrainian refugees now in other parts of Europe who are unlikely to return.)

These numbers paint a bleak future. The nations listed above have the largest and most capable armed forces among NATO. In short, they all have greying populations and, by 2030, except for Turkey, will have a median age that is greater than 40. Italy, for example, is in serious demographic trouble with a median age of 50.8. Spain and Greece also have a median age of nearly 50. Worse, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are all going to see a major decline in their populations. The priority of these countries is focused on meeting the social needs of their populations—something which is very expensive and can only come at the cost of reduced defense expenditure.

The other big problem for the Europeans is finding people who are willing to join the armed forces. After the Cold War, most European countries eliminated conscription. Reintroducing it would be political suicide for even the most conservative politician. Thus, while German Prime Minister Olof Schulz has committed 100 billion euros to defense modernization, he cannot realistically bring about force expansion without bringing back conscription. Further, 100 billion euros are not primarily going to buy more weapons but, instead, refurbish and modernize the existing force, much of which is mothballed.

The fact that the European nations lack manpower and the fact that rebuilding the forces will be expensive leads to the modest size of the militaries of the major NATO countries (as shown in Table 2). The question then arises, how many troops and weapons can these nations realistically field in modern combat? The answer is very few as these countries are likely to be casualty averse given their shrinking and aging demographics.

Table 2: Cuts in Force Levels of Major European Nations

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, and 2023 editions.

The Two Percent Myth

The other myth that Europe must stop hyping is that of how these countries are going to reach 2 percent of GDP in their defense spending. A remilitarization of Europe would require the Germans to cross the 2 percent threshold, but, by the end of 2022, the German government was admitting that it is unlikely to raise defense expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.

Table 3: NATO Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 2023

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

            The news is not all bad. Those NATO member-states who most fear Russia, or, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, are spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, except for the United Kingdom, the further geographically from Russia a NATO member-state gets, the less the country spends on defense.

Table 4: NATO Nations Spending Two Percent of GDP on Defense

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

With only a third of NATO member-states contributing 2 percent of GDP, it begs the question to what end? Estonia, for example, has a population is 1.3 million. Is 2 percent of Estonia’s small GDP a meaningful contribution to the Continent’s collective defense? Latvia, similarly, has 1.9 million citizens. Lithuania has 2.79 million citizens. In practical terms, this means that for credible militarization the rich and populous states of Europe need to reach a similar level of defense expenditures.

Most NATO nations intend to raise their defense expenditure to 2 percent by 2026. Italy and Spain expect to reach it by 2028 and 2029, respectively. This is, however, a medium-term projection which does not consider the state of the economy. Neither does it explain where funding will come from. The social democracies of Europe are unlikely to agree to a transfer of resources from social welfare programs to defense expenditures. In fact, with rapidly aging populations the cost of elderly care will grow.

The other alternative, raising taxes, is unpopular in European societies, which already carry a heavy individual tax burden. Further, in some countries, notably Britain, the prevailing mood is to cut taxes, making it unfeasible to ask the citizenry to agree to a tax increase to fund defense expenditures. The question arises, therefore, where will the money come from to pay for new weapons, the development of a defense infrastructure, and the intake of more troops to boost larger military formations?

A European Nuclear Deterrent

 One way out is for Europe to field a Euro-centric nuclear umbrella. Talk is already ongoing as some suggest the French nuclear force transform into one requiring joint authority to permit employment. The British nuclear force, since 1962, has been committed to the protection of NATO members.

One way to achieve this integration painlessly would be to state which missions fell under the purview of the French or British nuclear authority and which would be covered by the joint command. Thus, a French decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response to a 9/11-style terror attack, for example, would be the country’s sovereign right while a Russian assault would fall under the category of a jointly authorized strike. NATO member states would contribute to the cost of maintaining and fielding the force—perhaps increasing its size and capability.

One can also speculate on whether other NATO states may decide to cross the nuclear Rubicon given the changed security environment on the continent. Sweden and Poland would certainly fall into this category given their fears of Russian expansionism. If this happens, it is well within the scope of nonproliferation laws since countries are allowed to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if their core security interests are threatened (The problem for the US, however, is how to prevent non-Western states from taking a similar step).

While this may compensate for the inability to field adequate forces it would certainly meet with considerable opposition from the peace groups in Europe and the general population which is wary of nuclearization.   Which then brings the issue back to the need for conventional militarization.

Fielding capable militaries that can defend Europe and project power in alliance with the United States requires NATO member-states to make hard choices about spending and compulsory military service. For the reasons cited above that is unlikely. For the United States, therefore, the best course of action is to redefine its commitment to Europe and let the continent make the diplomatic and political compromises needed to bring about regional stability.

For those in the Pentagon who think Europe is a partner to help maintain global security, it is time to look for new security alliances. The evidence is clear. Europe has neither the funds nor the manpower to be a partner of the United States.

Amit Gupta was on the faculty of the USAF Air War College and is now a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this piece are his. He may be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Is Trump Right About Europe? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In nuclear deterrence, where the stakes are high and the consequences of failure are catastrophic, narratives play a crucial role in shaping strategy and influencing outcomes. Narratives surrounding nuclear weapons have profound effects on perceptions of credibility, intentions, and, ultimately, shaping the behavior of states. Understanding the role of narratives in nuclear deterrence is essential for policymakers and strategists seeking to navigate the complexities of nuclear politics.

Role of Narratives in Shaping Perceptions of Credibility

Narratives are important in nuclear deterrence strategy in shaping perceptions of credibility. The credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrent is essential for its effectiveness in deterring potential adversaries. States that possess clear escalation dominance and nuclear superiority will hold an advantage in perceptions of resolve and strength. However, credibility is exclusively tied to a state’s willingness to use the bomb.

In the United States, the president is responsible for influencing the perceptions of his adversaries through crafting a compelling narrative that will properly induce fear into his enemy. Narratives that emphasize a state’s willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons can enhance its deterrence posture, dissuading others from taking aggressive actions. The only other way to enhance credibility beyond strategic narratives is to employ nuclear weapons in some capacity. Such acts are unpalatable for moral and ethical reasons, which leaves crafting convincing narratives as the preferred means of influencing an adversary.

Influencing Perceptions of Intentions

Narratives also influence perceptions of intentions. States often use narratives to signal their intentions and clarify their strategic objectives. For example, a state may adopt a narrative of minimum deterrence, emphasizing its nuclear arsenal’s defensive nature and its commitment to avoiding nuclear conflict. China is the prime example.

The inverse strategy to a narrative of minimum deterrence would be a narrative of maximum deterrence. In this approach, Russia, for example, emphasizes the offensive capabilities of its nuclear arsenal and its readiness to employ nuclear weapons in a wide range of scenarios. This narrative seeks to maximize the perceived threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Unlike the minimum deterrence narrative, which emphasizes restraint and a defensive posture, the maximum deterrence narrative emphasizes assertiveness and a willingness to escalate to achieve strategic objectives. Such narratives can help reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing clarity about a state’s nuclear policy.

Shaping Perceptions of Capabilities

Narratives also play a crucial role in shaping perceptions of capabilities. States often use narratives to convey information about their nuclear arsenal’s size, sophistication, and survivability. These narratives can influence how other states perceive the balance of power and make strategic calculations. For example, a state that portrays its nuclear arsenal as modern and reliable may be seen as more credible and capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Additionally, the concept of secure second strike is fundamental. This capability refers to a state’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a devastating counterattack after absorbing a first strike. Second-strike retaliatory arsenals, which encompass a variety of delivery systems such as submarines, land-based missiles, and strategic bombers, are critical components.

Narratives surrounding second-strike retaliatory arsenals are designed to convey specific messages about a state’s nuclear capabilities. By highlighting the sophistication and survivability of their arsenals, states seek to deter potential adversaries by signaling that any attack would result in a devastating response.

Limitations of Narratives

Narratives in nuclear deterrence strategy are powerful tools, but they also have inherent limitations. One major limitation is the potential for misinterpretation or manipulation. Different states may interpret the same narrative in different ways, leading to misunderstandings and increased tensions. Moreover, narratives can be undermined by actions that contradict the message being conveyed. When China emphasizes its commitment to peaceful coexistence but then takes provocative actions, such as conducting aggressive military exercises near Taiwan, the credibility of its narrative is eroded. This is known as the credibility-action gap, where actions speak louder than words, undermining the narrative’s intended message.

When leaders openly talk about a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, expressing a moral revulsion to using them even in extreme circumstances, it can inadvertently weaken the state’s deterrent posture. Adversaries may perceive this as a lack of resolve, believing that the state would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons even if its survival was at stake.

Importance of Narrative Control

In the context of nuclear deterrence, narrative control is not just a strategic advantage but a fundamental necessity. It is through narrative control that states can shape perceptions, manage crisis situations, and ultimately enhance their deterrence posture. This is important for four reasons.

First, narrative control allows states to shape how their nuclear capabilities are perceived by others. By crafting a narrative that emphasizes their resolve, states can deter potential adversaries by conveying a clear and credible message. This perception can influence how other states make strategic calculations and may deter them from taking aggressive actions.

Second, during a crisis, narrative control can be crucial in de-escalating tensions and preventing misunderstandings. A carefully crafted narrative can provide clarity about a state’s intentions and actions, helping to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to escalation. By shaping the narrative surrounding a nuclear incident, states can help manage crisis situations and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.

Third, narrative control is essential for enhancing the credibility of deterrent threats. A state that successfully controls the narrative can convey a clear and credible message about its willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. This can enhance the credibility of its deterrent threats, making them more effective in deterring aggression.

Fourth, narrative control can help reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. By shaping perceptions, managing crisis situations, and enhancing credibility, states can deter potential adversaries and maintain peace and stability in the nuclear age.

Conclusion

With China and Russia growing increasingly assertive in the pursuit of their interests, nuclear deterrence is once again growing in its importance to the United States. The narratives surrounding nuclear weapons are pivotal in shaping perceptions of credibility, intentions, and capabilities. Crafting convincing narratives is thus crucial for President Biden and future presidents. As a free nation, the United States has never quite mastered the art of narrative creation because it can often seem antithetical to American values. It may seem too much like propaganda.

However, the time has come to reconsider this view. For the United States to effectively deter not only China and Russia, but also North Korea and a nascent nuclear Iran, an effective narrative is an important tool in the toolkit. This is particularly true as the American nuclear arsenal declines relative to those of China and Russia.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World was originally published on Global Security Review.