To many, the end of the Cold War signaled hope for a more restrained nuclear era. As the rivalry between the US and USSR settled in the early 1990s, the imperative for the two states to expand their nuclear arsenals also decreased. During the same period, global efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation accelerated. In 1991 South Africa became the only country, ever, to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons program before they joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), highlighting what was to be a new nuclear era. There were drawbacks, such as Indian and Pakistani nuclear development and testing in 1998, and North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT and later demonstration of nuclear weapon technology. However, until recently, nuclear threats and coercion have been largely restrained. 

In parallel, civilian nuclear energy has followed a similar trajectory. Although there was initial enthusiasm for a fossil-fuel-free alternative to meet global energy demands, momentum behind nuclear power waned after the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The incident involved a devastating tsunami that shed light on the inherent risks of civil nuclear programs and led governments worldwide to reassess their nuclear energy ambitions. Almost immediately afterward, Germany, accelerated its Energiewende program, shifting the state’s energy infrastructure away from nuclear power and toward renewable wind and solar energy, while Switzerland abandoned its plans to build new reactors. 

Now, the era of restraint appears to be waning. In February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last binding agreement limiting the US and Russia’s nuclear arsenals, expired and brought a formal end to the post-Cold-War arms control regime. That same year, the US signed a landmark civil nuclear agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), giving it a path toward domestic uranium enrichment. While noteworthy on its own, a less discussed aspect of the agreement is what it represents. States are beginning to shift their attitudes toward use of nuclear technologies once again. 

Developments in recent years further support this shift. In 2026, Japan restarted its largest nuclear power station, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, for the first time since the Fukushima accident, while China approved a new five-year plan, aiming to increase its nuclear power capacity from 62.5 gigawatts to 110 gigawatts by 2030. Similarly, India finalized a long-term uranium supply deal with Canada’s Cameco and reached an agreement to expand uranium exports from Australia after years of hesitation over proliferation risks. These developments contrast with the expectations decades ago. Rising energy costs due to increased energy demands, including increased demands for data centers and rapid industrial growth in Asia, have indeed contributed greatly to this renewed interest in nuclear power. 

Energy production holds increased geopolitical dimensions that cannot be ignored. Recent conflicts highlight the downsides of interdependence on fossil fuel resources. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war effected energy prices in response to reduced transportation and risks. States had to confront their import dependence in a volatile geopolitical climate. The need for self-reliance and alternative energy resources became further stressed with the US-Iran conflict, in which oil shipment disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz negatively affected entire state economies. 

Many Middle Eastern governments are now reassessing their reliance on external security guarantees as neighboring conflicts become potential threats and there are concerns about US limitations in protecting allies. These raise doubts about relying solely on US assurances. This may prompt regional powers to pursue independent nuclear deterrents or latent nuclear power production capabilities. 

In this context, the distinction between pursuing civilian and military nuclear programs becomes blurry. Nuclear technology is inherently dual-use. The same centrifuges used to enrich uranium  to 3-5 percent U-235 for civilian reactors can also be used to produce weapons-grade uranium, at around 90 percent U-235. Additionally, spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors can be reprocessed to extract plutonium for weapons. Although reaching weapons-grade enrichment is no easy task, the greatest technical challenge largely lies in developing the initial enrichment infrastructure. 

As a result, states that can acquire domestic enrichment capabilities automatically possess nuclear latency, the ability to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly should a political decision be made. “A key example is India’s 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ which relied on plutonium produced in a Canadian-supplied civilian research reactor. 

Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) exists to prevent civilian-military expansion. However, recent actions have caused concerns about the IAEA becoming politically contentious. In June 2025, the Agency found Iran non-compliant with safeguards but later acknowledged Iran lacked a structured nuclear weapons program. This seeming ambiguity led in part to Israel’s strikes on Iranian facilities, and raised questions about the IAEA’s entanglement with geopolitical interests. In the Middle East, Israel is the region’s only potential nuclear-armed state despite not signing the NPT. This, along with US nuclear rhetoric, suggests that nuclear rules are unclear and that nuclear capability makes strategic autonomy complex.  

The case of Ukraine offers another warning. After surrendering the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR, Ukraine joined the NPT in return for security assurances under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022 have inevitably weakened confidence in such assurances. How this would have played out if Ukraine did have nuclear weapons is unknown, but it does support the argument that external guarantees may ultimately be less reliable than an independent deterrent. 

Thus, while recent developments point to a renewed interest in nuclear technologies, whether this shift will ultimately translate into latent or breakout capabilities remains to be seen. What is already clear, however, is the strategic paradox confronting many states. On the one hand, 21st century conflicts have reinforced the value of a nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring long-term security. On the other, the experiences of Iraq and Iran illustrate how even the perception of an emerging nuclear weapons program can trigger military and/or economic responses. In this sense, not possessing a nuclear program may leave a state vulnerable, yet attempting to acquire one may also make it a target for economic sanctions or worse. 

If the international system were genuinely consistent and capable of providing equal security, the incentives for nuclear proliferation would be far weaker. However, as it stands, the system remains unequal and is ultimately shaped by power. Until that changes, nuclear arms will continue to appear to states as insurance against an international order they do not fully trust. The real question, therefore, is whether that order can convince states that they are safer without a nuclear weapons program. 

Sajal Shahid is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad, conducting research on South Asian security. Her work has been published on national and international platforms, including Green Network Asia, The Independent Singapore, Fair Observer, and Modern Diplomacy. She can be reached at cassthinkers@casstt.com. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Return of Nuclear Hedging was originally published on Global Security Review.

Contemporary disagreements between the U.S. and its NATO allies have intensified over political, economic, and security issues. Disputes over trade, tariffs, defense spending, and expeditionary support reveal an unhealthy frustration with burden-sharing demands and a strategic recalibration rather than a wholesale fear of U.S. abandonment. Some European leaders’ reactions to U.S. demands for burden-sharing and strategic reciprocity have ranged from performative indignation to explicit efforts to redefine NATO on more European terms and push America out of the alliance. 

The complaint of an underfunded NATO is not new; it is a recurring theme in American strategic discourse. In 2002, President Bush called for NATO reform with new capabilities and interoperability. In 2016, President Obama used the term ‘free riders’ to argue that Europe must take more responsibility. Recently, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz admitted, “We have been free riders in the past, and the Americans guaranteed our freedom and our security.” 

This friction highlights the main operational tension NATO 3.0 seeks to address. At the June 2026 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth described NATO 3.0 as “modeled on NATO 1.0 that won the Cold War, with allies leading Europe’s defense.” He said NATO should be “a hard-edged war-fighting organization.” He also described NATO 2.0 as the post-Cold War effort “no longer focused on defending Europe” but on “climate change and defense austerity.” While some may sneer at these descriptions, they are hard to argue against. NATO 3.0 is likely to be a bold reboot, with European countries leading their defenses while the U.S. shifts focus to the Indo-Pacific and homeland defense, remaining a strategic and nuclear safety net. 

The U.S. is reducing or redeploying its forces to pre-2022 levels and urging a more self-reliant Europe. This does not mean weakening NATO; instead, it aims for a stronger, Europe-focused defense to support NATO’s long-term sustainability. A capable Europe could enhance deterrence and security by lessening its reliance on large-scale U.S. intervention, but European military growth should complement, not replace, American power. 

To resemble NATO 1.0, Hegseth’s NATO 3.0 must understand and embrace the future role of nuclear weapons. The key difference is the size and scope of nuclear arsenals, with fewer weapons overall. While Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal remains more than ten times larger than NATO’s, the aggregate nuclear stockpiles have declined by more than 80 percent since 1992. Smaller arsenals render each remaining weapon more significant and more vulnerable, making allied nuclear forces increasingly valuable instruments of deterrence. NATO 3.0’s success depends on three focus areas. 

First, NATO must abandon the presumption that a smaller nuclear arsenal can effectively deter Russia. Equally flawed is the belief that maintaining fewer weapons automatically signals reduced threat to Moscow. Deterrence credibility does not rest on symbolic restraint; it relies on perceived capability and willingness to impose unacceptable costs. In today’s competitive nuclear environment, NATO needs more—not less—nuclear capability in Europe, to ensure credible deterrence. Smaller arsenals make each weapon’s survivability more critical, increasing the risk of vulnerability, technical failure, or denied retaliation. A strong nuclear posture enhances resilience, confidence, and the capacity to absorb loss whilst ensuring NATO can deter nuclear coercion and attack. 

Expanding NATO’s nuclear capacity involves more than adding American weapons. Macron’s idea of “forward deterrence” seeks to integrate France’s nuclear forces into European security without formal guarantees. While the U.S. shares its arsenal with allies, France would retain sole control over its nuclear weapons, targeting, and use. Macron states France’s core interests may include defending against attacks on European partners that could threaten French sovereignty. Poland, interested in the French offer, also seeks its own nuclear capability. President Nawrocki recently emphasized strengthening Poland’s security “even with nuclear potential.” More nuclear-armed states in the alliance could be necessary to deter Russia and reassure uneasy allies. 

Second, NATO 3.0 must focus its nuclear deterrent on active escalation management and theater warfighting. During the NATO 1.0 era, Cold War doctrines like “Massive Retaliation” relied on the threat of overwhelming nuclear strikes in response to acts of aggression rather than protracted war. Later doctrines such as “Assured Destruction,” which largely focused on direct US-USSR deterrence, and “Flexible Response,” which tested allies’ willingness to fight a third conventional war on the Continent, demanded a significant and costly increase in Europe’s conventional forces. 

NATO 3.0 requires a keen focus on European-centric escalation management. Since adversaries see low-yield theater nuclear weapons as usable coercive tools in an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, NATO must have an abundant, diverse, and flexible nuclear arsenal. Maintaining credible low- and high-yield options and non-nuclear systems allows NATO 3.0 to match any rung on the escalation ladder, thereby reinforcing crisis stability. 

Third, NATO 3.0 must emphasize both forward based and strategic U.S. nuclear forces for extended deterrence, which is crucial for alliance security. NATO 1.0’s success depended on America’s nuclear umbrella, with ample modern forces and deployments reassuring allies, deterring enemies, and preserving the alliance. NATO remains a nuclear alliance. However, complacency and reliance on aging U.S. arsenals during NATO 2.0 led to budget cuts, reduced force postures, and misaligned goals.  

Going forward, NATO 3.0 will require greater nuclear capability to deter effectively. The American nuclear umbrella deters nuclear coercion against U.S. allies by providing a credible strategic deterrent that France and the UK cannot single-handedly offer against an assertive Russia with the largest, most diverse nuclear stockpile in the world. British and French arsenals are combined eight times smaller than Russia’s, leaving NATO countries like Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states more vulnerable to Russian intimidation or invasion. If NATO and the U.S. are driven apart, the remaining alliance states will need to rapidly grow their nuclear forces. However, a strong American nuclear arsenal, supported by credible, mutual commitments, remains crucial to binding the alliance, reassuring partners, deterring enemies, and preserving strategic stability. 

Rather than signaling the end of the transatlantic alliance, NATO 3.0 would mark a new phase, one that adapts to an aggressive, revanchist Russia and a shifting global power balance. NATO 3.0 may be one in which the United States remains Europe’s principal strategic partner and nuclear guarantor, while Europe assumes far greater responsibility for its own conventional defense. This reflects strategic growth, not alliance end. Despite $40 trillion in debt, the U.S. remains the only great power capable of countering China and North Korea, threats not contained in Article 6 of NATO’s charter. Expecting allies to bear a greater share of defense responsibilities is sound policy and demonstrates empowered trust within NATO. 

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service, is the co-editor of the book “Learning to Love the Bomb,” and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization. 

NATO 3.0 and the Nuclear Arsenal It Requires was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR – Week of February 24, 2025

Deterrence at a Crossroads: A Call for Strength and Resolve

America is pivotal in nuclear modernization, strategic deterrence, and global security. As threats from Russia and China escalate, U.S. defense policy must adapt—or risk catastrophic consequences.

Key Strategic Insights

Nuclear Deterrence Imperative – The Minuteman III test launch underscores the critical need for modernization. General Tom Bussiere warns: “We must recapitalize our nuclear forces while maintaining the old—an unprecedented challenge.”

The Russian Threat – Moscow’s aggression is reinforced by information warfare and nuclear coercion. Sergei Shoigu states: “We must undermine the political, economic, and social system of the West.” The impending New START Treaty expiration (2026) raises concerns of a Russian nuclear breakout.

China’s Strategic Decline – $168 billion in foreign direct investment fled China in 2024. Its aggressive military expansion—the largest since WWII—coupled with its alliance with Russia, isolates Beijing internationally.

Global Realignment & Defense Priorities –
Britain increases defense spending (2.5% GDP by 2027).
South Korea considers nuclear options in response to North Korea.
The U.S. must act decisively to maintain strategic dominance.

The Cost of Hesitation

From Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament to past Western miscalculations on Russia, history warns against underestimating adversaries. De-escalation as a default strategy has failed.

The Air Force Association calls for a $45 billion annual increase in USAF and Space Force funding. As Stephen Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense nominee, bluntly states:

“If we do not plug our capability gaps, we will lose to China.”

Call to Action: Strength Through Deterrence

Fully modernize the U.S. nuclear triad
Accelerate next-generation air and missile defense
Fund a credible and flexible deterrent

Deterrence is not optional—it is the foundation of peace. America must lead with strength, invest in security, and ensure our adversaries understand that aggression will never be left unanswered.

The future is watching. We must be ready.

ICBM EAR Week of Feb 24th was originally published on Global Security Review.