For NATO to improve its deterrence strategy it must prioritize cybersecurity, enhance space asset resilience, address hypersonic threats, improve missile defense systems, adapt to drone warfare, deter conventional-nuclear integration, monitor China’s nuclear capabilities, and strengthen political unity.

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The Evolving Context for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is some debate, however, as to their continued utility in modern times. They are costly to build, at least $13 billion, require a large complement of personnel, require an escort, and are vulnerable to attack from ballistic missiles and now hypersonic weapons. Disabling an American aircraft carrier would be a priority for enemy nations, as it would be a symbolic victory with great propaganda value for them. An aircraft carrier is simply a very attractive target that, depending upon the analyst, is more or less of an easy target. A missile strike that causes even a listing of a few degrees or propulsion damage can prevent them from being used by air assets.

While on paper supercarriers can carry up to 130 aircraft, they typically have about 70 aircraft of varying types at any given time. Some are under maintenance, some allocated to fleet protection, with the rest able to conduct offensive operations. Using rough math and averaging air wings, at any given time a carrier may have an estimated 15 aircraft in the air for offensive operations. Thus, in a large-scale conflict, it would be best for multiple carriers to work in concert, and for the navy to “surge” personnel and aircraft to deployed carriers.

The most dangerous threat to this strategy is the potential for an adversary, like China, to employ nuclear weapons against a carrier strike group. China, for example, could claim American naval assets are violating its sovereign waters, constituting an invasion, and employ nuclear weapons against the carrier strike group, hundreds of miles from land.

Such a scenario is certainly not a high probability but is a reasonable concern with an uncertain outcome. The ability of fleet defenses to prevent such a strike is uncertain. However, this risk does not negate the utility of carriers, in general. In fact, there may be some utility in building at least two supercarriers with even longer flight decks than the Gerald R. Ford class.

There are two areas where carriers have a possible future: carrying large swarms of long-legged drones and serving as mid-point logistical platforms. Such supercarriers could also host anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile interceptors, changing the boundaries and layers of continental missile defense, as needed.

Ostensibly, a drone-focused carrier can serve as a waystation for land-based drones and even host drone operators. With advancements in remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUV), it would make sense to redesign a new class of assault ships that can launch them. These can also be built cheaper and crewed by fewer personnel, with the goal of having more. In fact, they can be designed to be mostly unmanned and operate within the protection of a carrier strike group.

For supercarriers, their use behind the main lines of combat, between strike groups and mainland bases, has the potential to make them mobile bases for the purposes described above. Should a peer conflict begin in the Indo-Pacific, their use would be between Japan or Australia, and Hawaii, or as an alternative to American bases in the Pacific should China, for example, strike these bases.

The future use of aircraft carriers may be by American allies, whom, if trained, could deploy their own aircraft from American ships. South Korea and Japan, for example, have airfields in the region but, if struck by North Korea or China, may need an alternative hub to refuel and rearm. If land-based aircraft and airfields are at risk, it makes sense to have alternatives.

Contemplating and integrating the capabilities described is certainly well outside the US Navy’s current operational concept. American naval strategy is well established and slow to change, but, if former Indo-PACOM commander Admiral (Ret.) John Aquilino’s “hellscape” concept of a future asymmetric battlefield in the Indo-Pacific were to ever become a reality, rethinking the use of aircraft carriers may become a necessity.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Rethinking Aircraft Carriers was originally published on Global Security Review.

China adopted a policy of no first use upon testing its first nuclear weapon in 1964. From a theoretical perspective, proponents of no first use believe such declarations limit the likelihood of nuclear war. By promising only to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack, intimidation with nuclear weapons is minimal and thus escalation is controllable. This, however, seems to be the opposite direction China is heading.

When the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong, declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, he faced an increasingly difficult environment for his new nation. Amid ongoing tensions, following the Chinese Civil War, Mao faced the Kuomintang (Chinese nationalists) in Taiwan. The KMT still promised a victory over the communists and was aided by the West. In the years that followed, Mao and the CCP leadership watched, what they deemed, bullying from the nuclear weapons states—the US and Soviet Union. Finally, due to a strained relationship with the Soviet Union, China founded the China National Nuclear Corporation in 1956 to build its nuclear weapons program. After fielding a small nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, China largely downplayed the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese foreign policy and never sought an arsenal to rival the US or Soviet Union.

Today, however, that is rapidly changing. Within the varied set of tools that China has used for coercing its neighbors under gray zone tactics, there is one tool it has not yet tried: threatening the use of nuclear weapons—with the exception of threatening Japan. Premier Xi Jinping called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” transforming institutions and norms in ways that will reflect Beijing’s values and priorities. China’s approach to achieving its strategic goals in the region may transition toward the inclusion of nuclear weapons into its framework of political threats, intimidation, and even the use of force to achieve its international goals.

Today, the PRC is fielding new, more mobile, and more accurate nuclear weapons, while simultaneously enhancing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. The PRC completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which cumulatively contain at least 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, with intelligence suggesting those silos are now filled. China’s new strategic plan also includes road-mobile ICBMs that carry at least three multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The US first agreed to eliminate MIRV’d missiles from ICBMs with the signing of the START II treaty despite the agreement’s failure to enter into force. Nations like China and India do not believe themselves to be beholden to the same restrictions, regardless of moral condemnation from the arms control community.

In addition to the growing numbers of China’s coast guard fleet, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is also enhancing and producing more advanced surface ships as these become key components of the PRC’s goal of unmitigated regional expansion. The PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of at least 370 ships and submarines, in addition to over 140 major surface combatants. The new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine will carry third-generation JL-3 ballistic missiles designed with a range of greater than 10,000 kilometers, more than capable of striking the American homeland.

To counter this pacing threat, the US needs to think strategically and long term to compete with China’s decades-long expansionist plans. During the Cold War, NATO was formed to prevent a likely invasion of Europe on its eastern front by the Soviet Union. NATO’s structure of strong defensive and ideological commitments, aided by the assistance of the American nuclear umbrella with a high level of credibility, prevented that catastrophe from happening. A similar approach should be developed in Asia. The case of Taiwan is increasingly vital because a failure to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression may signal the end of American global leadership.

China’s nuclear arsenal, born in 1964 as a small, purely defensive achievement, is now reaching for parity with the United States. The growing power of its nuclear capabilities indicates that PRC leadership intends to update its nuclear policy, moving from a no first use to an active and credible deterrent.

The US should consider at least two strategies to cope with this inevitability: build a stronger political commitment with allies in the Indo-Pacific and continue to counter the Belt and Road Initiative. Regardless of the time it takes for China to declare a new nuclear strategy, preparations within the American government must now begin as if this change has already occurred.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral student at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

China’s Growing Power and the Inevitable End of “No First Use” was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. Foreword and Executive Summary:
   • The ASC program has utilized high-performance computing for nearly three decades to support U.S. nuclear deterrence following the 1992 ban on underground nuclear testing.
   • The integration of AI technologies aims to accelerate problem-solving for national security challenges.
   • The strategy emphasizes combining AI with existing modeling and simulation capabilities to enhance the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program.
2. AI4ND Strategy Objectives:
   • Apply AI methods to nuclear security missions, focusing on design, production, and analysis.
   • Develop ML tools to function with limited data and stringent accuracy requirements.
   • Create scalable and secure data infrastructures to support ML applications.
   • Foster a data-driven workforce by investing in training and developing expertise in AI and ML.
3. Motivations for AI in Nuclear Deterrence:
   • AI can reduce time for material discovery, model development, manufacturing, and maintenance.
   • AI/ML technologies promise to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons lifecycle, including discovery, design optimization, manufacturing, certification, and maintenance.
4. Enabling Capabilities and Investment Areas:
   • Physics-Informed Machine Learning (PIML): Embedding physical constraints in ML models to ensure accuracy and speed in simulations.
   • Limited and Sparse Data Sets: Developing methods to work with limited experimental data and augmenting it with simulations.
   • Verification, Validation, Uncertainty Qualification, and AI Trustworthiness: Ensuring AI models are reliable and explainable, integrating existing verification practices.
   • Data Infrastructure: Investing in performant data storage, federated data environments, and flexible data access interfaces.
   • Machine Learning Architectures and Systems: Developing high-performance ML systems integrated with existing HPC platforms.
5. Workforce, Collaborations, and Partnerships:
   • Establishing partnerships with industry, academia, and other U.S. government agencies to leverage external advancements in AI/ML.
   • Developing international collaborations with similar programs in France, the UK, and Japan.
   • Building a capable workforce through training programs and collaboration with universities.
6. Conclusion:
   • The successful execution of this AI4ND strategy will enhance the ASC program’s ability to meet national security needs, increase efficiency, and attract specialized talent.
   • Collaboration with academia, industry, and other government agencies is crucial to achieving these goals.

The document emphasizes the transformative potential of AI in ensuring a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent through strategic investments in technology, data infrastructure, and workforce development. Get the report.

Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear Deterrence Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Capabilities Assessment

The possible introduction of SLCM-N to the attack submarine fleet creates an imperative that requires assessing the weapon’s efficiency in enhancing the United States’ ability to both deter an adversary and defeat it, if necessary. From a tactical standpoint, the deployment of SLCM-N offers enhanced flexibility and responsiveness, enabling targeted precision strikes against key adversary assets.

Additionally, the versatility of SLCM-N enables credible deterrence across a spectrum of threats, bolstering the United States’ strategic resilience in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. By utilizing and retrofitting existing or in-process systems, it is possible to make SLCM-N a variable-yield, stealthy, and surgically precise tactical-/battlefield-employable nuclear system. Furthermore, the necessity for a more regionally targeted nuclear weapon capability is necessary, now more than ever, to deter aggression in both EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters and potentially provide greater assurance to partners and allies.

Cost Implications

A key focal point in deliberations surrounding the re-establishment of non-strategic nuclear capabilities is an evaluation of the associated costs—financially and politically. While the deployment of SLCM-N entails large financial investments, its strategic value in offsetting deterrence capabilities warrants consideration. It is important to ensure the cost efficiency of SLCM-N deployment without compromising critical Navy readiness and modernization initiatives. Despite the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review calling for the cancellation of the SLCM-N program, Congress expressed its consternation with that decision by funding the program anyway.

This is key to understanding some of the nuances of shared power within the federal government. Additionally, the geopolitical cost implications must be addressed as well. Adding new capabilities to the American arsenal could drive significant costs for arms control globally. Both near-peer and pacing competitors could see this as an expression of aggression and escalation. This could increase tensions surrounding global arms control and nonproliferation. However, continuing to ignore pacing challenges could potentially threaten arms control and the credibility of ally assurance.

Communication Strategy

Effective communication lies at the heart of strategic decision-making, particularly concerning sensitive topics such as nuclear deterrence. Transparent communication that emphasizes the importance of clarity between military leadership, policymakers, and the public regarding the rationale and implications of reestablishing non-strategic nuclear capabilities is critical. Effective communication also includes proactive engagement with international partners and allies, which is important in fostering cohesion and avoiding misperceptions in a world of continuously evolving threats. Proper messaging to adversaries is equally vital to ensuring the efficacy of adding a new capability to the toolbox. The delicate nature of communication must not be overlooked. American leaders must place this facet of military strategy at the forefront of their minds when addressing not only nuclear but also any decision that is likely to have second- and third-order effects whether intentional or unintentional. Due to the historic nature of American involvement in conflict around the world, the ability to communicate effectively on the world stage is imperative to ensuring the success of this task.

Conclusion

The re-establishment of a non-strategic nuclear capability within the US Navy, bringing SLCM-N to the fleet, represents a nuanced proposition that warrants meticulous scrutiny from a tactical perspective. Keeping an eye on the capability provided, system and modification cost, and a broader communication strategy is essential for informed decision-making when navigating such a complex topic. Nuclear weapon experts Robert Soofer and Walter Slocomb write, “The House and Senate appropriations committees have not provided adequate funding for the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). This is a mistake. The United States needs this capability to deter Russia, China, and North Korea, and to assure its allies.”

SLCM-N enhances deterrence by providing the United States with a flexible and credible deterrent against nuclear-armed adversaries. Fielding an additional nuclear response option also improves allied assurance. A breadth of nuclear capabilities, including sea-launched cruise missiles, gives the American nuclear arsenal the depth required for adversaries that are growing their own capabilities. This aids in ensuring deterrence holds, while reaffirming American commitment to ally security.

TSgt William Atkins is an instructor at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirtland AFB. The views expressed are his own.

Re-Establishing Non-Strategic Nuclear Capabilities in the United States Navy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Furthermore, the discourse surrounding most disarmament discussions involves the United States leading by example in fulfilling its disarmament commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with the expectation that other nuclear-armed states will emulate this action. However, this is an unrealistic expectation. Expecting other nuclear-armed states to follow the United States in disarmament is like expecting a group of competitive athletes to slow down to match the pace of the slowest runner.

The Perilous Vacuum

The fact is, the American nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of national security strategy. It is designed to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks against the United States and its allies. The credibility of this deterrent is based on the perception that the United States has the capability and the will to use its nuclear weapons, if necessary.

This perception is reinforced by the United States’ strong commitment to its allies and its willingness to defend them against aggression. The mere existence of a nuclear-armed United States serves as a powerful deterrent against potential adversaries, dissuading them from pursuing aggressive actions that could escalate into catastrophic conflicts.

However, the prospect of a world without American nuclear deterrence is a chilling one. The balance of power would shift dramatically, and the risk of conflict and devastation would soar.

If the US followed through on abolitionist desires and disarmed, adversaries would pounce on the opportunity to exercise their expansionist goals and flex their militaristic ambitions. First and foremost, the absence of an American nuclear deterrent would create a dangerous power vacuum, inviting aggression from ambitious states and opportunistic actors.

One example of this is seen in the case of North Korea. Despite facing international sanctions and condemnation, North Korea continues to pursue advancements in its nuclear weapons program. The regime in Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as essential for its survival and a means to deter the United States and South Korea.

If the United States no longer possessed a credible nuclear deterrent, North Korea might feel emboldened to take aggressive action such as direct military aggression against South Korea. This would lead to all-out war on the Korean Peninsula.

The presence of an American nuclear deterrent helps to prevent such a scenario by making it clear to North Korea that any aggressive actions will be met with a swift and overwhelming response. Without this deterrent, rogue states like North Korea could be more inclined to pursue their expansionist agendas, leading to increased tensions and the potential for conflict in regions of strategic importance.

The Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo

Furthermore, the absence of an American nuclear deterrent erodes the credibility of the nuclear taboo, the unwritten norm that nuclear weapons should not be employed. The fear of nuclear retaliation by the United States has long served as a potent force in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. Without this fear, the threshold for nuclear use is lower, increasing the likelihood of nuclear warfare and the unimaginable human suffering it would entail.

States such as Russia would no longer fight wars of attrition on its borders with lesser military powers, such as Ukraine, if a taboo against nuclear first use disappears. Russia could force capitulation through the use of nuclear coercion and/or employment. This is a worst-case scenario and likely a primary reason why the US is hard pressed to ignore Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and preserve its nuclear deterrent into the foreseeable future—despite abolitionist ambitions.

Moreover, a world without American nuclear deterrence will likely see the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states. Absent an American deterrent, countries that feel threatened by their neighbors, no longer protected under by an American nuclear umbrella, may seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

This proliferation would further destabilize the international system, increasing the risk of nuclear conflict and the catastrophic consequences that would follow. That is unless Kenneth Waltz was right and that a world with more nuclear weapons is a safer world.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the prospect of a world without an American nuclear deterrent is a daunting one, where the balance of power shifts dramatically to authoritarians, and the risk of conflict and devastation escalate. Thus, it is essential for the United States to maintain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent.

To accomplish this, the US must craft convincing narratives regarding the capability, intent, and credibility of its nuclear arsenal. Despite abolitionist ambitions, the continued presence of an American nuclear deterrent remains vital in deterring aggression, preventing conflict, and preserving stability in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own

The Perilous Void: Imagining a World without U.S. Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Central to the concept of inhibition is the idea that the US is willing to go to great lengths to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even at the expense of strained diplomatic relations or the imposition of sanctions. This commitment was evident in American interactions with both adversaries and allies, as seen in its efforts to dissuade countries like Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. Inhibition failed in the latter case and may soon fail in the former, but the lack of proliferation by American allies are cases of success.

The Pragmatic Approach of Inhibition

Historically, the United States was always willing to engage with other nuclear powers, even adversaries such as the Soviet Union, to advance shared inhibition goals. The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty discussed by both the United States and Soviet Union before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was understood as an inhibition tool. As Marc Trachtenberg notes,

A test ban, the Soviets would be told, would mean that “there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp.” The Russians, for their part, would prevent allies from building nuclear forces. And these commitments would be linked: the United States would “take responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated.”

This pragmatic approach, characterized by a mix of cooperation and competition, highlights the adaptability of the inhibition strategy in the face of evolving geopolitical dynamics. Ultimately, the US is willing to work with either friend or foe, to pressure, coerce, and threaten nascent nuclear states, to include both allies and adversaries, to keep them non-nuclear.

The Role of Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Extended nuclear deterrence, a key component of American grand strategy, refers to the United States’ commitment to defend its allies with nuclear weapons, if necessary. This commitment serves as a crucial aspect of the security assurances provided by the US to its allies under the nuclear umbrella, reinforcing the broader framework of alliances that underpin global security. However, the credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence is under scrutiny, particularly in light of doubts about the United States’ willingness to prioritize the defense of its allies over its own interests.

The United States’ willingness to trade Los Angeles for Seoul, for example, raises concerns about the reliability of American security assurances and the potential impact on its inhibition efforts. Such doubts not only affect the perception of American commitment to its allies but also raise concerns about the effectiveness of extended deterrence in supporting the broader strategy of inhibition. As such, ensuring the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence is crucial for maintaining global stability and preventing nuclear proliferation.

Reevaluating Kenneth Waltz’s Proposition

Kenneth Waltz’s proposition that more nuclear states can lead to a safer world raises profound questions about the nature of nuclear deterrence and international security. In a world where South Korea is concerned about American security commitments, they may consider proliferating nuclear weapons to ensure they have a credible deterrent against North Korea. They may come to the belief that more is better and develop their own nuclear arsenal in hopes of obtaining more security. However, the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the risks associated with additional nuclear-armed states suggests that Waltz’s argument may not hold true. The proliferation of nuclear weapons introduces uncertainties and escalatory risks that could destabilize regions and increase the risk of nuclear conflict rather than decrease the risk.

A scenario in which South Korea acquires nuclear weapons could potentially strengthen North Korea’s resolve to consider early nuclear weapons use in conflict, compensating for weaknesses in its conventional military capability. This is precisely the kind of hypothetical situation that prompted the United States to adopt a policy of extended deterrence alongside the grand strategy of inhibition. There is a concern that when the US (or any nuclear state) faces an adversary lacking parity in escalation capabilities, that adversary might resort to early nuclear weapons use to compensate for strategic shortcomings. However, testing an American response to nuclear attack is a risky endeavor fraught with the possibility of further escalation.

Sustaining the Strategy of Inhibition

Instead of advocating for a proliferation-friendly approach, it is imperative for the United States and the international community to continue their efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation. This includes diplomatic engagement, economic incentives, and, when necessary, coercive measures to dissuade states from acquiring nuclear weapons. The risks of nuclear proliferation far outweigh any potential benefits, and concerted efforts to prevent it remain essential for global security and stability.

Despite these challenges, the sustainability of the inhibition strategy remains feasible. The key lies in reaffirming American commitment to its allies and maintaining a credible deterrence posture. This requires not only a clear and consistent articulation of American security guarantees but also investments in conventional military capabilities and diplomatic efforts to address the underlying security concerns of allies. The US must continue to craft convincing strategic narratives regarding its commitment to allied security via maintaining escalation dominance, nuclear superiority, and narrative control.

Furthermore, the US can leverage its alliances and partnerships to reinforce norms against nuclear proliferation. By working closely with its allies and engaging with potential nuclear aspirants through dialogue and diplomacy, the US can continue to promote the goals of inhibition while ensuring the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrence.

Conclusion: Upholding the Principles of Inhibition

The United States’ grand strategy of inhibition is a linchpin of American foreign policy and is rooted in the belief that preventing nuclear proliferation is crucial for global security. While recent debates on the credibility of American extended deterrence raise valid concerns, the strategy of inhibition remains not only relevant but imperative in today’s world.

The risks posed by nuclear proliferation far outweigh any perceived benefits, making it essential for the US and the international community to continue their efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation. By reaffirming its commitment to allies, maintaining credible deterrence, and engaging diplomatically with potential proliferators, the US can uphold the principles of inhibition and mitigate the risks associated with nuclear proliferation. In doing so, the US will not only safeguard its own security but also contribute to a safer and more stable world.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Challenges: Inhibition and Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington policy and political circles, the former President’s comments are met with both shock and disdain. The familiar tropes about the indispensability of the Western alliance and the civilizational connection with Europe are trotted out to defend NATO. In the Pentagon, there is even an optimistic belief that Europe is the security partner of future expeditionary missions around the world.

While Trump may talk like a shock jock, what he says about NATO and Europe hold true. Unless some tough love is imposed on the Europeans, American taxpayers will foot Europe’s security bill indefinitely. What Europe needs to understand is that America is changing, and with it Europe’s free pass is getting rescinded.

The Demographic Transition

One reason the Trans-Atlantic political and military alliance will change is the demographic transition in both the United States and Europe. In the US, by about 2045, citizens not of European extraction become a slim majority. Surveys of the next generation show that the affinity for Europe and with traditional American foreign policy imperatives is shrinking. The younger generation’s position on the Palestine-Israel conflict is a case in point. Latinos, Asians, and black Americans do not have emotional ties to Europe. They are, therefore, less inclined to tolerate and support the subsidizing of European defense efforts.

Instead, much like Trump, they will call on Europe to pay its bills. Europe, however, cannot pay those bills since it is an aging society with a large welfare state. As Table 1 shows, major European societies are rapidly aging. Not only that, but their median age is also going to rise to the extent that they will have a hard time fielding women and men of a fighting age.

 Table 1

Source:  Data retrieved from UN Population Revision 2019. (These numbers do not account for the recent population transfer from Ukraine to Russia or to the millions of Ukrainian refugees now in other parts of Europe who are unlikely to return.)

These numbers paint a bleak future. The nations listed above have the largest and most capable armed forces among NATO. In short, they all have greying populations and, by 2030, except for Turkey, will have a median age that is greater than 40. Italy, for example, is in serious demographic trouble with a median age of 50.8. Spain and Greece also have a median age of nearly 50. Worse, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are all going to see a major decline in their populations. The priority of these countries is focused on meeting the social needs of their populations—something which is very expensive and can only come at the cost of reduced defense expenditure.

The other big problem for the Europeans is finding people who are willing to join the armed forces. After the Cold War, most European countries eliminated conscription. Reintroducing it would be political suicide for even the most conservative politician. Thus, while German Prime Minister Olof Schulz has committed 100 billion euros to defense modernization, he cannot realistically bring about force expansion without bringing back conscription. Further, 100 billion euros are not primarily going to buy more weapons but, instead, refurbish and modernize the existing force, much of which is mothballed.

The fact that the European nations lack manpower and the fact that rebuilding the forces will be expensive leads to the modest size of the militaries of the major NATO countries (as shown in Table 2). The question then arises, how many troops and weapons can these nations realistically field in modern combat? The answer is very few as these countries are likely to be casualty averse given their shrinking and aging demographics.

Table 2: Cuts in Force Levels of Major European Nations

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, and 2023 editions.

The Two Percent Myth

The other myth that Europe must stop hyping is that of how these countries are going to reach 2 percent of GDP in their defense spending. A remilitarization of Europe would require the Germans to cross the 2 percent threshold, but, by the end of 2022, the German government was admitting that it is unlikely to raise defense expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.

Table 3: NATO Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 2023

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

            The news is not all bad. Those NATO member-states who most fear Russia, or, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, are spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, except for the United Kingdom, the further geographically from Russia a NATO member-state gets, the less the country spends on defense.

Table 4: NATO Nations Spending Two Percent of GDP on Defense

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

With only a third of NATO member-states contributing 2 percent of GDP, it begs the question to what end? Estonia, for example, has a population is 1.3 million. Is 2 percent of Estonia’s small GDP a meaningful contribution to the Continent’s collective defense? Latvia, similarly, has 1.9 million citizens. Lithuania has 2.79 million citizens. In practical terms, this means that for credible militarization the rich and populous states of Europe need to reach a similar level of defense expenditures.

Most NATO nations intend to raise their defense expenditure to 2 percent by 2026. Italy and Spain expect to reach it by 2028 and 2029, respectively. This is, however, a medium-term projection which does not consider the state of the economy. Neither does it explain where funding will come from. The social democracies of Europe are unlikely to agree to a transfer of resources from social welfare programs to defense expenditures. In fact, with rapidly aging populations the cost of elderly care will grow.

The other alternative, raising taxes, is unpopular in European societies, which already carry a heavy individual tax burden. Further, in some countries, notably Britain, the prevailing mood is to cut taxes, making it unfeasible to ask the citizenry to agree to a tax increase to fund defense expenditures. The question arises, therefore, where will the money come from to pay for new weapons, the development of a defense infrastructure, and the intake of more troops to boost larger military formations?

A European Nuclear Deterrent

 One way out is for Europe to field a Euro-centric nuclear umbrella. Talk is already ongoing as some suggest the French nuclear force transform into one requiring joint authority to permit employment. The British nuclear force, since 1962, has been committed to the protection of NATO members.

One way to achieve this integration painlessly would be to state which missions fell under the purview of the French or British nuclear authority and which would be covered by the joint command. Thus, a French decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response to a 9/11-style terror attack, for example, would be the country’s sovereign right while a Russian assault would fall under the category of a jointly authorized strike. NATO member states would contribute to the cost of maintaining and fielding the force—perhaps increasing its size and capability.

One can also speculate on whether other NATO states may decide to cross the nuclear Rubicon given the changed security environment on the continent. Sweden and Poland would certainly fall into this category given their fears of Russian expansionism. If this happens, it is well within the scope of nonproliferation laws since countries are allowed to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if their core security interests are threatened (The problem for the US, however, is how to prevent non-Western states from taking a similar step).

While this may compensate for the inability to field adequate forces it would certainly meet with considerable opposition from the peace groups in Europe and the general population which is wary of nuclearization.   Which then brings the issue back to the need for conventional militarization.

Fielding capable militaries that can defend Europe and project power in alliance with the United States requires NATO member-states to make hard choices about spending and compulsory military service. For the reasons cited above that is unlikely. For the United States, therefore, the best course of action is to redefine its commitment to Europe and let the continent make the diplomatic and political compromises needed to bring about regional stability.

For those in the Pentagon who think Europe is a partner to help maintain global security, it is time to look for new security alliances. The evidence is clear. Europe has neither the funds nor the manpower to be a partner of the United States.

Amit Gupta was on the faculty of the USAF Air War College and is now a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this piece are his. He may be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Is Trump Right About Europe? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In nuclear deterrence, where the stakes are high and the consequences of failure are catastrophic, narratives play a crucial role in shaping strategy and influencing outcomes. Narratives surrounding nuclear weapons have profound effects on perceptions of credibility, intentions, and, ultimately, shaping the behavior of states. Understanding the role of narratives in nuclear deterrence is essential for policymakers and strategists seeking to navigate the complexities of nuclear politics.

Role of Narratives in Shaping Perceptions of Credibility

Narratives are important in nuclear deterrence strategy in shaping perceptions of credibility. The credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrent is essential for its effectiveness in deterring potential adversaries. States that possess clear escalation dominance and nuclear superiority will hold an advantage in perceptions of resolve and strength. However, credibility is exclusively tied to a state’s willingness to use the bomb.

In the United States, the president is responsible for influencing the perceptions of his adversaries through crafting a compelling narrative that will properly induce fear into his enemy. Narratives that emphasize a state’s willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons can enhance its deterrence posture, dissuading others from taking aggressive actions. The only other way to enhance credibility beyond strategic narratives is to employ nuclear weapons in some capacity. Such acts are unpalatable for moral and ethical reasons, which leaves crafting convincing narratives as the preferred means of influencing an adversary.

Influencing Perceptions of Intentions

Narratives also influence perceptions of intentions. States often use narratives to signal their intentions and clarify their strategic objectives. For example, a state may adopt a narrative of minimum deterrence, emphasizing its nuclear arsenal’s defensive nature and its commitment to avoiding nuclear conflict. China is the prime example.

The inverse strategy to a narrative of minimum deterrence would be a narrative of maximum deterrence. In this approach, Russia, for example, emphasizes the offensive capabilities of its nuclear arsenal and its readiness to employ nuclear weapons in a wide range of scenarios. This narrative seeks to maximize the perceived threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Unlike the minimum deterrence narrative, which emphasizes restraint and a defensive posture, the maximum deterrence narrative emphasizes assertiveness and a willingness to escalate to achieve strategic objectives. Such narratives can help reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing clarity about a state’s nuclear policy.

Shaping Perceptions of Capabilities

Narratives also play a crucial role in shaping perceptions of capabilities. States often use narratives to convey information about their nuclear arsenal’s size, sophistication, and survivability. These narratives can influence how other states perceive the balance of power and make strategic calculations. For example, a state that portrays its nuclear arsenal as modern and reliable may be seen as more credible and capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Additionally, the concept of secure second strike is fundamental. This capability refers to a state’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a devastating counterattack after absorbing a first strike. Second-strike retaliatory arsenals, which encompass a variety of delivery systems such as submarines, land-based missiles, and strategic bombers, are critical components.

Narratives surrounding second-strike retaliatory arsenals are designed to convey specific messages about a state’s nuclear capabilities. By highlighting the sophistication and survivability of their arsenals, states seek to deter potential adversaries by signaling that any attack would result in a devastating response.

Limitations of Narratives

Narratives in nuclear deterrence strategy are powerful tools, but they also have inherent limitations. One major limitation is the potential for misinterpretation or manipulation. Different states may interpret the same narrative in different ways, leading to misunderstandings and increased tensions. Moreover, narratives can be undermined by actions that contradict the message being conveyed. When China emphasizes its commitment to peaceful coexistence but then takes provocative actions, such as conducting aggressive military exercises near Taiwan, the credibility of its narrative is eroded. This is known as the credibility-action gap, where actions speak louder than words, undermining the narrative’s intended message.

When leaders openly talk about a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, expressing a moral revulsion to using them even in extreme circumstances, it can inadvertently weaken the state’s deterrent posture. Adversaries may perceive this as a lack of resolve, believing that the state would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons even if its survival was at stake.

Importance of Narrative Control

In the context of nuclear deterrence, narrative control is not just a strategic advantage but a fundamental necessity. It is through narrative control that states can shape perceptions, manage crisis situations, and ultimately enhance their deterrence posture. This is important for four reasons.

First, narrative control allows states to shape how their nuclear capabilities are perceived by others. By crafting a narrative that emphasizes their resolve, states can deter potential adversaries by conveying a clear and credible message. This perception can influence how other states make strategic calculations and may deter them from taking aggressive actions.

Second, during a crisis, narrative control can be crucial in de-escalating tensions and preventing misunderstandings. A carefully crafted narrative can provide clarity about a state’s intentions and actions, helping to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to escalation. By shaping the narrative surrounding a nuclear incident, states can help manage crisis situations and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.

Third, narrative control is essential for enhancing the credibility of deterrent threats. A state that successfully controls the narrative can convey a clear and credible message about its willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. This can enhance the credibility of its deterrent threats, making them more effective in deterring aggression.

Fourth, narrative control can help reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. By shaping perceptions, managing crisis situations, and enhancing credibility, states can deter potential adversaries and maintain peace and stability in the nuclear age.

Conclusion

With China and Russia growing increasingly assertive in the pursuit of their interests, nuclear deterrence is once again growing in its importance to the United States. The narratives surrounding nuclear weapons are pivotal in shaping perceptions of credibility, intentions, and capabilities. Crafting convincing narratives is thus crucial for President Biden and future presidents. As a free nation, the United States has never quite mastered the art of narrative creation because it can often seem antithetical to American values. It may seem too much like propaganda.

However, the time has come to reconsider this view. For the United States to effectively deter not only China and Russia, but also North Korea and a nascent nuclear Iran, an effective narrative is an important tool in the toolkit. This is particularly true as the American nuclear arsenal declines relative to those of China and Russia.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World was originally published on Global Security Review.