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		<title>Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/illogic-of-nuclear-disarmament-in-the-contemporary-era/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/illogic-of-nuclear-disarmament-in-the-contemporary-era/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sher Ali Kakar&nbsp;&&nbsp;Atta Ullah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2025 12:44:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31597</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>  Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces. Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/illogic-of-nuclear-disarmament-in-the-contemporary-era/">Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces.</p>
<p>Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.</p>
<p>The latest report by the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/yb25_summary_en.pdf">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)</a> says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?</p>
<p>Signed in July 1968, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/timeline-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty-npt">the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)</a>, is considered the first major step aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament, including the recognized nuclear powers under the treaty. <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/events/2022-08/necessity-meaningful-action-plan-article-vi-npt">Article VI</a> of the NPT emphasizes the pursuit of negotiations in good faith to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and promote general disarmament by nuclear-armed states. Article <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1611187#inline_frontnotes">VI</a> serves as the foundation for global efforts such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).</p>
<p>However, nuclear weapon states under the NPT are not adequately fulfilling their obligations and commitments under Article VI and instead continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. They even provide support to their allies on nuclear matters in clear violation of the treaty. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal and the Nuclear Supplier Group’s waiver to India are cases in point. It is important to note that nuclear weapon states are primarily responsible for progressing disarmament. Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.</p>
<p>The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.</p>
<p>This situation is exacerbated by the fear of cheating among the nuclear-armed countries, “If we disarm, others might not.” Hence any proactive action would leave some at some disadvantage vis-à-vis adversaries.</p>
<p>The latest <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/yb25_summary_en.pdf">SIPRI</a> report suggests that countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines the efforts of arms control and disarmament. The abandonment of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Russia, alongside the failure to develop multilateral treaties on the subject, led to a lack of faith in arms control and disarmament.</p>
<p>In South Asia, India’s prestige-driven global ambitions and expansion of its nuclear arsenal beyond a credible minimum deterrent is complicating security dynamics in the region and beyond. This is further worsened by a purported strategic chain with cascading-downward influence on arms control, nuclear risk reduction, crisis management, confidence-building, and strategic stability in South Asia—induced by extra-regional powers. While offering no cascading upward stimuli for bringing regional stability, there are biases and discriminatory norms governing nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament negotiations at the conference on disarmament (CD).</p>
<p>This suggests not only why nuclear disarmament is not happening, but it also explains skepticism over the future of disarmament. For instance, Ukraine presents a novel case of SBT and questions the negative and positive security assurances/guarantees in conventional as well as nuclear terms. The Ukraine paradox cautions other countries, in a DDS, that their survival rests with nuclear weapons of their own. Even confidence in the nuclear umbrella and assurance by treaty allies is eroding. NPT-member states are yearning for nuclear weapons and pose the greatest danger of proliferation.</p>
<p>Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.</p>
<p>Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape. Countries with advanced technologies and space-based capabilities can still threaten the survival of their enemies.</p>
<p>Emerging technologies are leading to increased conventional imbalances between rivals, which heightens reliance on nuclear weapons for crucial security interests and could, therefore, serve as the ultimate deterrent. Moving toward disarmament requires five actions. First, there is a need for legally binding agreements to address the threats posed by emerging technologies. Second, nuclear powers should not support their allies’ nuclear pursuits. Third, effective multilateral arms control agreements are required. Fourth, it is important to address biases within global frameworks. Finally, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between rivals are needed to resolve long-standing disputes, help prevent arms races, reduce nuclear risks, and build hope for disarmament in the future.</p>
<p><strong><em>Sher Ali Kakar </em></strong><em>is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. <strong>Atta Ullah</strong> is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Illogic-of-Nuclear-Disarmament.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="266" height="74" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 266px) 100vw, 266px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/illogic-of-nuclear-disarmament-in-the-contemporary-era/">Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Usama Khalid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2025 12:05:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30228</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The world is in an uncertain place today and is perhaps experiencing the most uncertainty since World War II. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has faced an active threat of nuclear escalation. Fortunately, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not crossed the nuclear threshold. Still, the threat [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/">How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The world is in an uncertain place today and is perhaps experiencing the most uncertainty since World War II. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has faced an active threat of nuclear escalation. Fortunately, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not crossed the nuclear threshold. Still, the threat cannot be discounted.</p>
<p>Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.</p>
<p>The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.</p>
<p>In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.</p>
<p>The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.</p>
<p>Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.</p>
<p>On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.</p>
<p>Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.</p>
<p>Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.</p>
<p>Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.</p>
<p>The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb">security assurances</a>—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.</p>
<p>At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Erosion-of-Trust.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="Download this article. " width="281" height="78" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 281px) 100vw, 281px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/">How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:23:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30161</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats. Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats. The House and Senate have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="answer_copyable_21811e0e-71c9-41c9-9188-3b92cf83bbe7" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The House and Senate have added $100-150 billion over ten years to defense, focusing on expanding the Navy, strengthening the defense industrial base, and modernizing strategic nuclear forces.</div>
<p>​<br />
SecDef Hegseth seeks an additional $50 billion for top priorities, excluding nuclear deterrence from budget cuts.</p>
<p>The report highlights the importance of concurrent modernization work at the three ICBM bases, which could save billions.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>It also discusses the U.S. Air Force missileers&#8217; critical role in nuclear deterrence, the ethical and psychological aspects of their job, and the challenges of retaining diverse personnel.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The Christian Science Monitor provides an in-depth look at the missileers&#8217; responsibilities and the evolving nuclear landscape.</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Regarding North Korea, USAF General Jason Armagost emphasized that the U.S. can respond overwhelmingly to a North Korean ICBM attack, underscoring the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrence system.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>The report also touches on the potential for arms control negotiations with Russia and China, with President Trump expressing a desire for &#8220;denuclearization.&#8221;</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>However, the feasibility of such agreements remains uncertain, given the geopolitical complexities and the need for the U.S. to maintain a competitive edge in military capabilities.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p><strong>MUST READ: </strong> The most awe-inspiring piece of the report is about  &#8220;RESPONSIBILITY&#8221; from the Christian Science Monitor, dated February 14, 2025, which provides an in-depth look at the lives and duties of U.S. Air Force missileers stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div id="answer_copyable_ba69641a-49fa-483c-9f2d-eeba74404026" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-30165" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png" alt="" width="341" height="228" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png 470w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-300x200.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-360x240.png 360w" sizes="(max-width: 341px) 100vw, 341px" /></p>
<ul>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It highlights their critical role in nuclear deterrence, the gravity of their mission, and the personal and ethical complexities they face.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article follows missileers during their 24-hour shifts, emphasizing their readiness and strict operational protocols.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It also explores the mental burden and moral dilemmas they encounter, particularly in the context of faith.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The piece touches on the historical context of missileers, their continued relevance, and the growing nuclear threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">Additionally, it discusses the challenges of attracting and retaining personnel, especially women and minorities, within this demanding career field.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article underscores the human element of nuclear deterrence, the operational challenges of aging systems, and the evolving nuclear landscape.</li>
</ul>
<p>Overall, the report underscores the need for robust defense investments, the challenges of modernizing nuclear forces, and the geopolitical threats posed by adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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<div></div>
</div>
</div>
<div><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-of-Week-of-2-17^^.Prepared-by-Peter-Huessy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="346" height="96" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 346px) 100vw, 346px" /></a></div>
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<p>​</p>
</div>
</div>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 13:15:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30092</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 Overview The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis. Key Themes &#38; Highlights Strategic Nuclear Posture &#38; Modernization: U.S. nuclear deterrence [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Overview</strong></p>
<p>The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.</p>
<p><strong>Key Themes &amp; Highlights</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Strategic Nuclear Posture &amp; Modernization:</strong>
<ul>
<li>U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.</li>
<li>The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.</li>
<li>Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Policy &amp; Leadership Insights:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.</li>
<li>House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.</li>
<li>Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Geopolitical Developments &amp; Deterrence Challenges:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.</li>
<li>Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.</li>
<li>The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict &amp; U.S. Policy:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.</li>
<li>Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Congressional &amp; Budgetary Updates:</strong>
<ul>
<li>The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.</li>
<li>Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Emerging Threats &amp; Strategic Risks:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.</li>
<li>Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Download the full report</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-week-of-February-10.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Katerina Canyon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jan 2025 12:33:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29731</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The argument for “escalation dominance” as a cornerstone of US deterrence policy, presented in Joe Buff’s recent Global Security Review article, relies on outdated Cold War logic that fails to address the complexities and ethical considerations of today’s global security environment. While the premise of maintaining deterrence is essential, the emphasis on overwhelming military capability [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/">Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The argument for “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg614af.9?seq=10">escalation dominance</a>” as a cornerstone of US deterrence policy, presented in Joe Buff’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/modern-escalation-dominance-is-essential-to-effective-deterrence-and-assurance/">recent <em>Global Security Review </em>article</a>, relies on outdated <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/perspectives-nuclear-deterrence-21st-century-0/nuclear-deterrence-destabilized">Cold War logic</a> that fails to address the complexities and ethical considerations of today’s global security environment. While the premise of maintaining deterrence is essential, the emphasis on overwhelming military capability as a panacea for geopolitical challenges is both dangerous and counterproductive.</p>
<p>Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</a>—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.</p>
<p>President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.</p>
<p>The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.</p>
<p>This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control">Russia</a> and <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/the-china-dilemma/">China</a>, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.</p>
<p>Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/ukraine">Ukraine</a> serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.</p>
<p>The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.</p>
<p>The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.</p>
<p>The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.</p>
<p>Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.</p>
<p>First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.</p>
<p>Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.</p>
<p>Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.</p>
<p>Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.</p>
<p>Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.</p>
<p><em>Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Escalation-Dominance-A-Flawed-Framework-for-Modern-Security-Challenges.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/">Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report December 8th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29631</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024 This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024</strong></p>
<p>This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Chelsey Wiley (IISS):</strong> <em>“US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”</em>
<ul>
<li>Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China&#8217;s threats, not shifting blame to the US.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Admiral Tony Radakin (UK):</strong> <em>“The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Palantir CEO:</strong> <em>“Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN):</strong> <em>“Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”</em></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week</strong></p>
<p><strong>&#8220;Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism&#8221; by Christopher Ford (NIPP)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Explores China&#8217;s military expansion and its quest for global influence.</li>
<li>Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.</li>
<li>Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Update</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>FY25 NDAA:</strong> Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.</li>
<li>Key provisions:
<ul>
<li>Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.</li>
<li>Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>New Congressional Members:</strong>
<ul>
<li>78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.</li>
<li>Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>China’s Nuclear Expansion:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.</li>
<li>Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CSIS Wargaming:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.</li>
<li>Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Third Nuclear Age:</strong>
<ul>
<li>UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges</strong>
<ul>
<li>Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.</li>
<li>Marine Corps General Eric Smith: <em>“What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”</em></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Panel 2: Innovation in Defense</strong>
<ul>
<li>Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.</li>
<li>Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Peace Through Strength:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.</li>
<li>Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-December-8th.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Read The Full Report</span></a></h3>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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