As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “Atoms for Algorithms” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.

To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, Dr. Yasmina Fina suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “speed and scale” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing nuclear governance to AI governance is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.

In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing verification tool. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large data streams and satellite images to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, Dr. Ian Stewart, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” fissile material, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.

When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of political legitimacy for the safeguards system.

The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “race to adopt” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).

Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new levels of uncertainty. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To support disarmament, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to Mr. Shota Kamishima of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.

This alliance is especially important for the rollout of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “last line of defence”.

“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. Governance policies must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “anomaly detections.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” Nuclear policy decisions must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.

The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful “Atoms for Algorithms” alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific increasingly occurs in the grey zone, the space between routine statecraft and open armed conflict. China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran employ a range of coercive tactics designed to alter the strategic environment without triggering a conventional military response. These activities include cyber operations, maritime harassment, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and limited military provocations. Because these actions remain deliberately below the threshold of war, they often exploit the reluctance of states to respond with force. As grey zone competition intensifies, the question confronting policymakers is not only how to deter such activities, but also how to ensure that responses to them are credible. In this context, a nuclear alliance could serve as the ultimate strategic backstop for military responses to persistent grey zone coercion.

Grey zone strategies rely heavily on ambiguity and escalation management. The states that employ these tactics understand that their adversaries—particularly democratic states—are cautious about escalating disputes into major military confrontations. By operating just below the threshold of armed conflict, grey zone actors seek to gradually erode the strategic position of their opponents while avoiding a decisive response. Maritime coercion in disputed waters, persistent airspace incursions, cyber intrusions, and limited military demonstrations all serve this purpose. Over time, these actions can reshape the operational environment, undermine alliances, and weaken the credibility of deterrence.

The difficulty lies in crafting responses that are both proportionate and credible. Conventional military responses to grey zone activities risk escalating a crisis if they are perceived as excessive, yet insufficient responses can embolden further coercion. This dilemma has led analysts to argue that deterrence in the grey zone requires a layered approach that combines political, economic, and military tools. However, even robust conventional responses may prove insufficient if adversaries believe that escalation dominance ultimately rests in their favor. It is in this context that nuclear deterrence retains enduring strategic relevance.

A nuclear alliance would not be designed to deter grey zone activities directly. Nuclear weapons are instruments of last resort intended to deter existential threats and large-scale conventional aggression. Nevertheless, the presence of a credible nuclear backstop fundamentally shapes the broader strategic environment in which grey zone competition occurs. By reinforcing the credibility of allied military responses, nuclear deterrence can prevent grey zone crises from escalating into major wars while simultaneously discouraging adversaries from testing the limits of conventional deterrence.

In practical terms, a nuclear alliance would strengthen escalation management in the Indo-Pacific. If regional states believed that their security rested on a collective nuclear deterrent, they would be better positioned to respond firmly to grey zone provocations. Maritime patrols, cyber countermeasures, and limited military deployments could be undertaken with greater confidence that adversaries would hesitate to escalate beyond the conventional level. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a strategic umbrella under which lower-level military responses can occur without triggering uncontrolled escalation.

The experience of the Cold War offers a useful historical precedent. During that period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization relied on nuclear deterrence to prevent large-scale aggression by the Soviet Union while simultaneously engaging in conventional competition across multiple domains. Although grey zone tactics—including espionage, proxy conflicts, and political interference—were common, the presence of a credible nuclear deterrent helped ensure that such competition did not escalate into direct war between nuclear powers. A similar logic could apply in the Indo-Pacific today.

In the contemporary regional context, a nuclear alliance could involve close coordination among the United States and key Indo-Pacific partners. Such an arrangement would not necessarily require the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, it could mirror existing extended deterrence frameworks in which nuclear-armed states provide security guarantees to non-nuclear allies while maintaining operational control over nuclear forces. Through mechanisms such as joint planning, strategic consultation, and integrated command structures, allied states could strengthen the credibility of collective deterrence without undermining existing non-proliferation commitments.

Importantly, a nuclear backstop would also reinforce political resolve among allied states. Grey zone strategies often aim to exploit divisions within alliances by testing whether partners will respond collectively to incremental coercion. If adversaries perceive hesitation or disunity, they may conclude that the risks of escalation are manageable. A formal nuclear alliance could signal a high level of strategic commitment among participating states, thereby increasing the perceived costs of continued grey zone pressure.

Critics may argue that linking nuclear deterrence to grey zone competition risks lowering the nuclear threshold or introducing unnecessary escalation dynamics. These concerns highlight the importance of clearly defining the role of nuclear weapons within a broader deterrence framework. The objective would not be to threaten nuclear retaliation for minor provocations, but rather to ensure that adversaries understand that attempts to escalate beyond the grey zone could encounter a unified and credible deterrent response. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a stabilizing force that sets clear limits on how far coercion can be pushed.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the central arena of strategic competition, the persistence of grey zone tactics will continue to test existing security arrangements. States that rely solely on conventional responses may find themselves locked in a cycle of incremental coercion that gradually shifts the balance of power. By contrast, a nuclear alliance would provide a strategic foundation that reinforces the credibility of allied military responses across the escalation spectrum.

Ultimately, understanding grey zone actors and the tactics they employ is essential for effective deterrence. Yet deterrence also requires credible escalation management and the assurance that adversaries cannot exploit the space between peace and war indefinitely. In the Indo-Pacific, a carefully structured nuclear alliance could provide the strategic backstop necessary to ensure that responses to grey zone coercion remain both credible and effective while preventing escalation into catastrophic conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 3: A Nuclear Alliance as the Ultimate Backstop to Grey Zone Coercion was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, modernization efforts are underway among all nuclear weapons states (NWS), who must acknowledge how their nuclear-based actions and rhetoric impacts global security through incentivizing proliferation for non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). Moreover, the world must not forget the effects of actual nuclear use or the potential for catastrophic escalation to follow. Hiroshima and Nagasaki may represent victory achieved by nuclear use to some, but there is no direct analogy to the present day.

On the Horizon?

The potential for nuclear war began in August 1949, when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb. After the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), bilateral and multilateral treaties focused on nuclear arms control. Such efforts served a vital role then, as they do today, for strategic stability and mutual security.

The cornerstones of nuclear arms control include 2011’s New START, plus the original nuclear agreement, and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Russia suspended participation in New START in August 2022, ultimately exacerbating tensions amidst the war in Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats are also increasing nuclear tensions. While the NPT remains active with 191 signatory states, its intention to prevent the further spread of nuclear proliferation is threatened by increasingly aggressive nuclear rhetoric surrounding nuclear strikes and first use. Such concerns stem from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as its, China’s, and North Korea’s vertical proliferation.

Japan is one of many states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons and is experiencing increasing incentives to do so. The cost-benefit analysis of nuclear proliferation is a frequent focus amongst theorists, with the commonality being credible existential threat(s) to a state. Japan experiences this regionally from China and North Korea and more broadly from Russia. Though the United States provides a nuclear umbrella to its Pacific allies, which it continuously reaffirms, discussion in South Korea and Japan suggests growing support for independent nuclear arsenals. This adds to the concern that Japan, for example, might develop its own nuclear weapons.

The Japanese Perspective

Even with existential threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries, most Japanese citizens are opposed to nuclear proliferation and nuclear use. According to public opinion polls, 75 percent of Japanese citizens support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). They believe so strongly in the nuclear taboo that 58 percent denounce nuclear use, even in retaliation to a nuclear attack.

This sentiment is strong in no small part because of their very direct experience through Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Survivors of the Hiroshima bombing—alongside Nagasaki—advocate for peace. They see warfare and the employment of nuclear weapons as unavoidably devastating to civil society. Survivor Toshiko Tanaka advocates for peace through nuclear disarmament, arguing that the world must remain consciously aware of nuclear war’s aftermath. The city of Hiroshima also holds annual commemorations on the bombing’s anniversary—along with housing museums and memorials intended to be a stark reminder of the consequences of war.

“The Only Winning Move is [Still] Not to Play”

Japanese surrender in 1945 stemmed from several factors that cannot be replicated in the age of multiple nuclear-armed states. Imperial Japan started the war in the Pacific with invasions of China and other Asian nations before eventually launching a surprise attack on the United States. By the time Japan surrendered, it took the emperor imposing his will on a military that sought to fight to the bitter end. For some of the military leadership, the physical effects of the atomic bombs were comparable to the firebombing long underway.

Today, however, nuclear weapons are far larger and more numerous, making the effects far greater for any society that may experience nuclear employment. Thus, avoiding highly destructive conventional wars with the potential for uncontrolled nuclear escalation is important.

The threat posed by nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states may be much higher than previously believed. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Ukraine are worrisome. Expanding Chinese and North Korean nuclear arsenals and Iran’s likely nuclear breakout are also worrisome. Moreover, some US political thinking combines with its ballistic missile defenses to lean into isolationist tendencies that stress extended deterrence credibility.

Any nuclear use is likely to receive strong condemnation from the international community. The consequences of international condemnation and the uncertain consequences for use may be enough to prevent the employment of nuclear weapons, but there is no guarantee. Whether limited or large scale, the use of nuclear weapons will likely end efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, including 79 years of historical precedent prioritizing diplomacy, reduction, and verification. This would be a world that neither NWS nor NNWS should wish to see. And to its survivors, remembering the Hiroshima of 1945 serves as a stark reminder of the cost of nuclear employment.

Deterring the use of nuclear weapons must remain a priority for the United States. The optimism for disarmament that won former President Barack Obama the Nobel Prize in 2009 has mostly eroded, and nuclear-armed adversaries show little interest in resuming talks much less action. Therefore, the United States must accomplish its nonproliferation objectives through the strength found in its nuclear modernization and commitments to allied defense.

Amanda Hart is a recent graduate from Virginia Tech, currently working in the field of C-WMD planning and support. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Proliferation Motivations and Modern Japan: Lessons Since Hiroshima was originally published on Global Security Review.