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		<title>ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 13:16:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29765</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM EAR Report Executive Summary Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025. Quotes of the Week Xi Jinping (China): &#8220;No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.&#8221; U.S. Ambassador [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/">ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM EAR Report</strong> <strong><br />
Executive Summary</strong></p>
<p>Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Xi Jinping (China):</strong> &#8220;No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea):</strong> Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.</li>
<li><strong>DPRK Kim Jong Un:</strong> Committed to implementing the &#8220;toughest&#8221; anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.</li>
<li><strong>Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State):</strong> Highlighted Russia&#8217;s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.</li>
<li><strong>NATO Official:</strong> Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Robert Soofer &amp; Mark Massa on &#8220;The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Shoshana Bryen &amp; Ilan Berman on &#8220;Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Stephen Blank &amp; Mark Schneider on &#8220;Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Hon. Madelyn Creedon &amp; Hon. Frank Miller on &#8220;Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Gordon Chang &amp; Rick Fisher on &#8220;The Chinese Nuclear Threat &amp; Implications for US Security.&#8221;</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Nuclear Derangement Syndrome</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.</li>
<li>The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.</li>
<li>The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The Biden-Trump Arms Race</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Criticism:</strong> The Biden and Trump administrations&#8217; claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.</li>
<li><strong>Reality:</strong> Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.</li>
<li><strong>Key Concern:</strong> Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.</li>
<li><strong>Counterarguments:</strong> Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="color: #000080;"><strong>Download the full report.</strong></span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-week-of-January-3.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/">ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report December 8th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29631</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024 This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024</strong></p>
<p>This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Chelsey Wiley (IISS):</strong> <em>“US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”</em>
<ul>
<li>Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China&#8217;s threats, not shifting blame to the US.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Admiral Tony Radakin (UK):</strong> <em>“The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Palantir CEO:</strong> <em>“Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN):</strong> <em>“Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”</em></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week</strong></p>
<p><strong>&#8220;Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism&#8221; by Christopher Ford (NIPP)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Explores China&#8217;s military expansion and its quest for global influence.</li>
<li>Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.</li>
<li>Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Update</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>FY25 NDAA:</strong> Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.</li>
<li>Key provisions:
<ul>
<li>Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.</li>
<li>Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>New Congressional Members:</strong>
<ul>
<li>78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.</li>
<li>Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>China’s Nuclear Expansion:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.</li>
<li>Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CSIS Wargaming:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.</li>
<li>Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Third Nuclear Age:</strong>
<ul>
<li>UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges</strong>
<ul>
<li>Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.</li>
<li>Marine Corps General Eric Smith: <em>“What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”</em></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Panel 2: Innovation in Defense</strong>
<ul>
<li>Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.</li>
<li>Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Peace Through Strength:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.</li>
<li>Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-December-8th.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Read The Full Report</span></a></h3>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Congressional Haggling Jeopardizes the US Space Force FY 2025 Budget</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/congressional-haggling-jeopardizes-the-us-space-force-fy-2025-budget/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2024 12:16:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28426</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The US Space Force, if judged by inflation-adjusted funding in the fiscal year (FY) 2024 and 2025 budgets, is showing signs of decline. The Biden administration’s FY 2025 request of $29.6 billion, makes up about 3.5 percent of the Department of Defense’s total budget request. Oddly, the FY 2025 request is the first in which [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congressional-haggling-jeopardizes-the-us-space-force-fy-2025-budget/">Congressional Haggling Jeopardizes the US Space Force FY 2025 Budget</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The US Space Force, if judged by inflation-adjusted funding in the fiscal year (FY) 2024 and 2025 budgets, is showing signs of decline. The Biden administration’s FY 2025 request of $29.6 billion, makes up about <a href="https://csps.aerospace.org/papers/fy-2025-defense-space-budget-continued-emphasis-proliferation-under-more-constrained-top">3.5 percent</a> of the Department of Defense’s total budget request. Oddly, the FY 2025 request is the first in which the amount fell from the prior year’s request. By mid-June 2024, the House Appropriations Committee pared back the Space Force budget request by asking for an additional <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/house-appropriators-cut-space-force-budget-more/">$900 million cut</a>.</p>
<p>The FY 2025 budget focuses on simpler satellite networks. Notable decreases occur in launch and classified activities, while increases are found in position, navigation, and timing. The Space Force continues moving towards more distributed, resilient, and cost-effective space capabilities, including GPS satellites and narrowband communications. The intention signaled for space operations is to enhance the Space Force’s ability to adapt and respond to emerging threats. By prioritizing the development of distributed and proliferated satellite networks to ensure resilient space operations, the Space Force places a continued focus on low Earth orbit (LEO). This aligns with defense goals of redundancy and rapid deployment, enhancing space “<a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/saltzman-race-to-build-combat-credibility-space-force/">competitive endurance</a>,” a strategy announced in early 2023 by Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman.”</p>
<p>In General (Ret.) John Raymond’s often <a href="https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3164602/gen-raymond-reflects-on-highlights-of-space-forces-achievements-and-predicts-gr/">quoted words</a>, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Space Force need to “exploit what we have, buy what we can, build what we must.” The DoD will increase the integration of commercial satellite services to reduce costs and accelerate deployment. The belief behind this policy is that to strengthen partnerships with commercial satellite providers is to capitalize on existing technologies and infrastructure, which is largely preferable to government doing it by itself. While it is a politically and operationally challenging process, the budget sequence necessitates more flexible and adaptive budget planning processes within the Space Force and other related agencies. By adopting these practices, the Space Force might better navigate budget constraints and funding adjustment, while advancing its strategic goals in space defense.</p>
<p>Regarding proliferation of smaller commercial assets for the sake of resilience in space, and within the currently prevalent DoD cognitive framework for the Space Force, the link between resilience and deterrence was further validated in April 2023 by John F. Plumb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. In remarks at the Space Foundation’s 38th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Plumb <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3367036/assistant-secretary-of-defense-dr-john-f-plumb-remarks-at-the-space-foundations/">said</a>, “We will do that first and foremost by investing in resilience. We must expect to take punches in space in a near-peer conflict. A resilient architecture means we will be prepared to absorb those blows. With sufficient resilience, we hope to deter an adversary from attacking in the first place, because the value of any such attack will be greatly diminished.”</p>
<p>However, in space as in any other domains, <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-comprehensive-strategy-for-the-space-force-the-good-and-bad/">resilience does not qualify</a> as deterrence. Before events occur on the battlefield, deterrence is first and foremost built not merely based on actual capabilities, but on the ability to clearly communicate to the adversaries what such capabilities will do to them, if used. But deterrence requires a third factor, which is <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/12/01/deterrence_in_space_requirements_for_credibility_651410.html">credibility</a>. And the credibility of passive defensive posturing is where the real problems start.</p>
<p>To prevail over adversaries such as Russia and China, the West requires a genuine understanding of the adversary’s own decision-making process. If the West fails to understand that adversaries fundamentally value space as an offensive domain, the West will fail to protect its space assets—unless the Space Forces build a credible offensive counterforce capability. For active defense of critical Western space and terrestrial infrastructures to be sufficient to ensure credible deterrence, the Space Force must view space systems as a critical infrastructure and not merely a support desk for terrestrial operations.</p>
<p>The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on June 14, 2024, cleared its version of the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The bill was then headed to the Senate floor. The legislation, which is yet to be released in full, includes compromise language on a long-standing dispute over the <a href="https://spacenews.com/senate-armed-services-committee-advances-2025-defense-policy-bill/">transfer of Air National Guard</a> space units to the active-duty Space Force. That does not mean the political process ends there. In the meantime, the House passed its own version of the NDAA, which includes several social policy amendments, that eliminates paid leave for servicemembers to cross state lines for an abortion, eliminates controversial diversity initiatives, and eliminates taxpayer funding for “gender-affirming care,” which is likely to start another cycle of congressional haggling.</p>
<p>There are professionally constructive developments on the commercial side, though, as the Senate Armed Services Committee includes requirements for reviews of investment policy and performance evaluation. The bill also authorizes DoD to identify poor-performing contractors and require approval for additional contracts. The question remains, though, whether government should still retain an exclusive role in building certain specific space defense capabilities on its own and which ones these should be.</p>
<p>When and how the congressional process concludes, and the end game for the FY 2025 Space Force budget, remain to be seen. It should be extremely clear—no less is at stake than the US and its allies prevailing against common adversaries, for, in, and from space. In short, getting funding priorities right may affect who controls the high ground.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Congressional-Haggling-Jeopardizes-the-U.S.-Space-Force-FY-2025-Budget.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-27949 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Free-Download.png" alt="Download button" width="197" height="84" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congressional-haggling-jeopardizes-the-us-space-force-fy-2025-budget/">Congressional Haggling Jeopardizes the US Space Force FY 2025 Budget</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/do-not-let-terrorism-distract-from-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/do-not-let-terrorism-distract-from-deterrence/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Wasserman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2024 12:00:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[terrorists]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27838</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States was a watershed moment that changed the focus of American national defense. In 2021, Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs released a report estimating international terrorism cost at $8 trillion in resources and over 900,000 lives. Decades of prioritizing terrorism, while neglecting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/do-not-let-terrorism-distract-from-deterrence/">Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States was a watershed moment that changed the focus of American national defense. In 2021, Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs <a href="https://www.brown.edu/news/2021-09-01/costsofwar">released a report</a> estimating international terrorism cost at $8 trillion in resources and over 900,000 lives. Decades of prioritizing terrorism, while neglecting strategic nuclear deterrence, left the US behind its adversaries in great-power competition.</p>
<p>Since 2021, <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-05/nuclear-notebook-russian-nuclear-weapons-2023/">Russia upgraded</a> or modernized approximately 85 percent of its strategic nuclear arsenal. China undertook what then-Commander of United States Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-nuclear-weapons-buildup-strategic-breakout-207774">called</a> “a strategic breakout,” with “explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces.” North Korea went from a fledgling 1980’s nuclear program to possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Iran’s nuclear program goes deeper underground, figuratively and literally, to avoid US threats and complicate US risk assessment.</p>
<p>Little occurred in the US nuclear arsenal during the same two decades. The nuclear enterprise is attempting to modernize each leg, with debatable levels of success. In June 2023, the Biden administration publicly confirmed and accepted American numerical nuclear inferiority for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The administration posits deterrence comes from quality over quantity. But how is a triad that is 30–50 years old qualitatively better than a new Russian arsenal?</p>
<p>The non-strategic nuclear arsenal rose in prominence as the Ukraine war began and Russia began making threats to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states. Production of the B61-13 and life extension of the W80-4 emphasize regional nuclear deterrence and may preempt strategic conflict at a lower level but may arrive too late. Retiring the B83 purportedly transfers the hard and deeply buried target (HDBT) responsibility to the B61-13, <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF#page=33">streamlining</a> the Department of Energy’s sustainment and modernization expenses. The Department of Defense is <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/11/pentagon-launch-new-study-how-get-hard-deeply-buried-targets/379326/">still weighing</a> a 2022 study, evaluating future HDBT targets to demonstrate viability of the non-strategic capability.</p>
<p>Since 2021, the nuclear enterprise began receiving long-overdue attention, but it will take years to yield results. The enterprise competes for American talent, amongst lucrative technological fields, that it needs for successful reconstruction and for addressing the needs of the triad. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $500 million more <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47869/2">than requested</a> for plutonium pit production reconstitution at Savannah River and Los Alamos National Laboratories.</p>
<p>The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) goal is to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year, between the two facilities, by 2030. Assuming 80 pits per year went into refurbishing 85 percent of deployed nuclear warheads, matching Russia’s accomplishment, that pace would require nearly 16.5 years and almost 20 years for a 100 percent refurbishment. In FY 2024, the NNSA is requesting <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44442/17#:~:text=Congress%20approved%20%2411.1%20billion%20for%20Weapons%20Activities%2C%20within,and%20Veterans%20Affairs%20Appropriations%20Act%2C%202019%20%28P.L.%20115-244%29.">8.6 percent more money</a> than enacted in FY 2023 for the Product Modernization Program to support strategic nuclear weapons modification and life extension.</p>
<p>The Trump administration’s <em>National Security Strategy</em> and <em>National Defense Strategy</em>, refocused on strategic-level concerns, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/r/r46714">reprioritizing strategic power</a> over Russia and China higher than post-9/11 terrorism. The 2018 <em>Nuclear Posture Review</em> (NPR) called for nuclear modernization, as previous NPRs did, but was followed by the financial resources outlined in the <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45816">2019 National Defense Authorization Act</a> required for execution.</p>
<p>There is a nexus between terrorism, nuclear weapons, and immigration. Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and Hamas’ terror campaign against Israel. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon and provides it to any of these groups, the US may be left searching for nuclear fingerprints in the aftermath of a detonation. The <a href="https://www.fairus.org/legislation/biden-immigration-border-policy/illegal-immigration/2023-marks-highest-level-illegal">Federation for American Immigration Reform</a> reported Customs and Border Patrol data showing 3.2 million aliens illegally crossed into the US between October 2022 and October 2023. Among those apprehended, 172 aliens were suspected terrorists. One hundred sixty-nine attempted an illegal entry at the southern border. The notion of an attack on the homeland by terrorists using a smuggled weapon of mass destruction is a credible threat.</p>
<p>Law Enforcement sources assert terrorists can employ nuclear weapons without sophisticated delivery systems on US soil. Former FBI Assistant Director <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ex-fbi-assistant-director-warns-america-vulnerable-islamist-attack-terrorism-1852336#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20is%20currently%20extremely%20vulnerable%20to%20a,never%20seen%20America%20so%20open%20to%20Islamic%20terrorism.">Chris Swecker</a> described the US as extremely vulnerable to a catastrophic terrorist attack. Swecker suggested that the mismanaged southern border is the key source of that vulnerability, concurring with a warning presented in December 2023 by the Department of Homeland Security. Preventing such dangerous exposure belongs at the forefront as policymakers seek to correct three years of negligent border protection. American strategic deterrence once overshadowed immigration, reducing temptation from adversaries abroad.</p>
<p>Nuclear-armed nations and proliferators alike must remember any nuclear attack against the United States from a terrorist organization will result in retaliation against the nation providing the weapon, as codified in the Bush Doctrine found in the 2002 <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/"><em>National Security Strategy</em></a>. While internal politics unnecessarily expose the US, those responsible can project strength by reiterating the consequences of exploiting that vulnerability and reemphasizing nuclear deterrence.</p>
<p>Terrorism and nuclear war are real. The US cannot afford to alternately overlook one in favor of the other. When adversaries see vulnerabilities, it invites aggression. Controlling who and what comes across US borders is essential to keeping Americans safe. Maintaining a modern, reliable, and lethal nuclear deterrent can foundationally dissuade terrorist attacks on US soil.</p>
<p><em>Dan Wasserman was both a missile operations and maintenance officer in the United States Air Force. He remains active in the field. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Do-Not-Let-Terrorism-Distract-from-Deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/do-not-let-terrorism-distract-from-deterrence/">Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/congress-must-demand-stronger-leadership-from-osd-space-policy/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/congress-must-demand-stronger-leadership-from-osd-space-policy/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Garretson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2024 13:21:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27210</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In 2019, Congress created the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD Space Policy) to elevate space within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provide strong civilian oversight within the Department of Defense (DoD) as part of the reorganization that included a new service and combatant command for space. While [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congress-must-demand-stronger-leadership-from-osd-space-policy/">Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2019, Congress created the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD Space Policy) to elevate space within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provide strong civilian oversight within the Department of Defense (DoD) as part of the reorganization that included a new service and combatant command for space. While the expectations of many in government and the private sector assumed that this new position would lead to stronger leadership in space for OSD, the reality is disappointing. The office is underwhelming in its core responsibility—to advance American spacepower through thought leadership in strategy and policy.</p>
<p>Rather than an aggressive push in space strategy, policy, and guidance for the DoD’s emergent roles and missions in such things as <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/11-2022-NSTC-National-Cislunar-ST-Strategy.pdf">cislunar operations</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/04-2022-ISAM-National-Strategy-Final.pdf">in-space manufacturing</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/NATIONAL-LEO-RD-STRATEGY-033123.pdf">low earth orbit operations</a> (LEO), <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/National-Space-Weather-Strategy-and-Action-Plan-2019.pdf">space weather</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/09-2022-Interagency-Roadmap-to-Support-Space-Related-STEM-Education-and-Workforce.pdf">science, technology, engineering, and math skills</a>, planetary defense, and support for deep space exploration and development; the only substantive document produced by the office was an <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/310010p.PDF">updated directive for the Department of Defense on space policy</a>. While this usefully collects and repeats a number of high-level policies, it falls short as it fails to codify the most important policies and taskings material for strategic, great power competition, which were released by the two previous administrations.</p>
<p>Reading the updated directive gives the impression that the DoD is not subject to any of the space-specific national strategies and appears to indicate that the <em>National Strategy for Space,</em> as developed in 2018, is defunct. The <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/310010p.PDF">DoD’s space policy</a> completely ignores the nation’s legal and policy direction to economically develop space and continue to lead the free world in this vital domain.</p>
<p>Worse, the absence of forward-leaning enabling policy leads to hesitation on the part of key players in government and industry that increase uncertainty and reduce synergies within the interagency, and their allies and partners.</p>
<p>Some apologists for the lack of thought leadership from ASD Space Policy argue that the office is held hostage by an administration whose National Space Council is overly focused on a norms-based approach and is overly passive about developing the key material capabilities needed to address America’s ever-diminishing advantage in strategic competition in the space domain. While the Biden administration kept the Artemis program, and released a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/11-2022-NSTC-National-Cislunar-ST-Strategy.pdf">cislunar science and technology strategy</a>, they were overly tolerant of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-delays-planned-return-of-astronauts-to-moon-until-2026-/7432974.html">NASA’s delays</a>, <a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-inspector-general-faults-agency-on-sls-booster-and-engine-overruns/#:~:text=The%20OIG%20reported%20that%20the,era%20hardware%20for%20the%20SLS.">budget overruns</a>, and failure to meet the <a href="https://csps.aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/NSpC%20New%20Era%20for%20Space%2023Jul20.pdf">intent</a> of <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-reinvigorating-americas-human-space-exploration-program/">SPD-1</a>—to facilitate a permanent and <a href="https://youtu.be/11Fso5GWe1o?si=v-WLoB-89BJ-6Ji4&amp;t=854">industrial base</a> on the moon. While the administration kept the Space Force, it allowed both ASD Space Policy and the Space Force to operate for nearly four years without a future operating concept or strategy for strategic competition in the space domain.</p>
<p>To address this flagging advantage in space, and the lackluster focus of ASD Space Policy and the administration, Congress must play a stronger role to ensure that the strategy, guidance and resources are committed to ensure American leadership in space through the following actions:</p>
<p>First, Congress needs to ensure the <a href="https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Space-Policy/">ASD Space Policy</a> is not distracted from their intended duties. When Congress elevated the position, in concert with the establishment of the Space Force, Congress envisioned a dedicated shop which would enable concentrated and singularly space focused, civilian oversight and rapid yes/no decisions in support of the Space Force and overarching national security space requirements. This would enable more agile evolution and employment of the force—in some ways analogous to ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC).</p>
<p>Rather, the administration convoluted the new office <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3561602/asd-space-policy-keynote-address-for-brookings-panel-on-2023-dod-countering-wea/">with other strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence</a>, including cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This should be reversed and should provide the dedicated strategy/policy focus space requires for the US to compete and win against adversaries in space.</p>
<p>Second, task ASD Space Policy, in partnership with OSD Net Assessment to provide Congress with a bigger-picture net assessment and strategy for great-power competition in space. In the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf">2021 NDAA Section 1614</a>, Congress asked the National Space Council to do a comprehensive net assessment and to produce a comprehensive strategy to compete with China. The National Space Council proved uninterested in the task.</p>
<p>Congress should re-assign this primarily security-focused study to ASD Space Policy as lead. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who historically pushed for the creation of both the ASD Space Policy and the Space Force, should ensure that their fiscal needs reach Congress in a timely manner, and not compromise the long-term effectiveness of ASD Space Policy by exacerbating perceptions of the office’s tardiness and non-responsiveness.</p>
<p>Third, Congress should direct ASD Space Policy to update the Defense Space strategy. <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/lost-space-why-america-needs-new-defense-strategy-168001">It was argued at the time</a> of release that the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF">2020 <em>Defense Space Strategy</em></a> was <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/lost-space-why-america-needs-new-defense-strategy-168001">already out of date</a>. Since 2020 a diversity of higher-level policies has established major components of a broader national grand strategy in space. New joint doctrine better articulates the DoD’s role in <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/13WAYsbN5fyF-guDZH94UwDwoR1XWwQQx/view">strategic competition</a>; the <em>Defense Space Strategy</em> has not aged well. Congress should therefore ask for a new <em>Defense Space Strategy</em> that acknowledges the nation’s grand strategy in the domain. In particular, the nation’s civil and commercial ambitions in cislunar space must be included, with provisions for enabling policy to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force—to support and protect those equities.</p>
<p>Fourth, accompanying this broad defense space strategy should be a specific DoD cislunar strategy. Just as the DoD has an <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF">Arctic strategy</a>, which articulates the manifold ways in which the department supports primarily civil and commercial actors in the Arctic, A <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf">whole-of-nation strategy</a> is needed for space. ASD Space Policy should be directed to author a DoD cislunar strategy which articulates how DoD postures, invests, and operates to support broader national goals.</p>
<p>Finally, Congress should also ask ASD Space Policy to update the <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/310010p.PDF">DoD directive on space policy</a> and the DoD <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/510001p.pdf">directive on functions of the Department of Defense</a>, with the specified tasks in <a href="https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section9081&amp;num=0&amp;edition=prelim">Title 10</a>, the Unified Command Plan, <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/National-Space-Policy.pdf"><em>National Space Policy</em></a>, national <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/11-2022-NSTC-National-Cislunar-ST-Strategy.pdf">cislunar</a> strategy, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/04-2022-ISAM-National-Strategy-Final.pdf"><em>In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy</em></a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/NATIONAL-LEO-RD-STRATEGY-033123.pdf">LEO</a> strategy, and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/2023-NSTC-National-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action-Plan-for-Near-Earth-Object-Hazards-and-Planetary-Defense.pdf">planetary defense</a> strategy. These White House documents detail US Space Command, US Air Force, and US Space Force responsibilities to protect and defend commerce, develop technologies of strategic interest, and develop capabilities for homeland defense against asteroids and comets. Just as NASA provides implementing guidance for the national planetary defense strategy, ASD Space Policy should provide implementing guidance for each of those mentioned above.</p>
<p>In short, Congress must ensure that ASD Space Policy is not a stumbling block to America’s grand strategic ambitions in space. Toward that end, Congress should give that office some much needed homework.</p>
<p><em>Peter Garretson is Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/We-Need-Stronger-Leadership-from-OSD-Space-Policy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congress-must-demand-stronger-leadership-from-osd-space-policy/">Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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