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		<title>Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/survival-is-not-victory-how-iran-is-trying-to-outlast-a-militarily-superior-coalition/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 11:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=33168</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: November 3, 2026 The renewed early September exchange of attacks between Iran and the US, including US strikes on three Iranian tankers after missiles targeted American warships, has not changed the conflict’s underlying equation. The US and Israel have inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s leadership, air defenses, naval forces, and military infrastructure. Yet Tehran [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/survival-is-not-victory-how-iran-is-trying-to-outlast-a-militarily-superior-coalition/">Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: November 3, 2026</em></p>
<p>The renewed early September exchange of attacks between Iran and the US, including <a href="https://apnews.com/article/b3650799901c56a6deeca962cbaa4109">US strikes on three Iranian tankers</a> after missiles targeted American warships, has not changed the conflict’s underlying equation. The US and Israel have inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s leadership, air defenses, naval forces, and military infrastructure. Yet Tehran has prevented those operational successes from yielding a stable political settlement. Its regime remains intact, its coercive capabilities have not been eliminated, and the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted.</p>
<p>Tehran has adopted a <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-strategic-logic-of-instability/">strategy</a> designed to avoid a fast and decisive defeat. Iran’s principal objective is no longer to restore a favorable conventional balance. It is to survive, extend the conflict, and increase its opponents’ economic and political costs until Washington accepts a negotiated outcome less ambitious than the one military force was intended to initially deliver.</p>
<p><strong>A Strategy of Political Denial</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s approach rests on a distinction between battlefield performance and political effect. The US and Israel can destroy missile batteries, strike naval facilities, and decapitate command structures. But unless those actions compel Tehran to accept their terms, military success remains politically incomplete.</p>
<p>Iran has therefore treated time as a strategic resource. Every month that the regime survives allows it to argue that the campaign failed to force capitulation. <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-iran-will-prefer-ongoing-conflict/">Prolongation</a> allows Tehran to expose differences among the US, Israel, European governments, and the Gulf states. At the same time, Gulf states also have powerful reasons to prevent their territories and infrastructure from becoming permanent fronts in a US-Iran conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Hormuz as Coercive Leverage</strong></p>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz is the central instrument of this strategy. Before the conflict, approximately twenty million barrels of oil and petroleum products crossed the Strait each day. The <a href="https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz">International Energy Agency</a> estimates that available bypass capacity amounts to only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. Iran therefore does not need to close Hormuz completely to influence international decision-making. It is necessary to maintain sufficient risk to deter shipowners, crews, and insurers. Iran does not possess uncontested control of the Strait. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-strait-hormuz-strike-united-states-6b098da673ac3161a266ee459d5eff44">American forces</a> have cleared mines, attacked coastal launch systems, and facilitated some commercial transits. Recent traffic illustrates the effect. For one late August week, only twenty-four vessels <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-forces-hit-iranian-launchers-preparing-to-fire-in-hormuz-irgc-targets-jordan-in-response/">reportedly</a> passed through Hormuz, compared with roughly 130 per day before the war. Tehran nevertheless retains a potent, still-relevant sea-denial capability through missiles, drones, mines, and the threat of unpredictable attacks.</p>
<p>This leverage, however, is self-eroding. Prolonged disruption damages Iran’s own exports, antagonizes Gulf neighbors and imposes costs on China and other Asian customers whose diplomatic neutrality Tehran crucially needs. It also encourages investment in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-gulf-states-oil-shipping-pipelines-alternatives-graphics/a-78336679">bypass</a> routes, greater international naval coordination, and more aggressive action against Iranian coastal capabilities.</p>
<p><strong>Iran’s Supporting Pillars Are Weakening</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s remaining missiles, drones, and mines still impose operational costs, but stockpile levels and replacement rates will become increasingly important. The question is whether it can sustain enough regime survivability while its economy, oil exports, production sites (including drones and missiles production), and distribution networks (including regional proxies) remain under pressure.</p>
<p>The regional proxy network has also performed below Tehran’s original expectations. Hezbollah in Lebanon has suffered extensive attrition and lost much of its former strategic depth in Syria. Iraqi militias remain divided by local political calculations. The Houthis continue to threaten Red Sea shipping and Saudi-linked interests, but their autonomy means activity in Yemen cannot automatically be converted into coordinated Iranian escalation. The <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/degradation-irans-proxy-model">“axis of resistance”</a> remains dangerous but degraded. It no longer functions as a reliable unified deterrent system unless the Houthis manage to disrupt Bab El Mandeb.</p>
<p>Economic endurance presents a deeper problem. Iran also retains experience in sanctions evasion, informal financial channels, and covert trade. <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/enabling-iran-timeline-chinas-role-during-and-after-operation-epic-fury">China provides an important commercial and technological lifeline</a>, while Russia and China offer varying degrees of diplomatic protection. Yet these relationships are designed to prevent Iran’s total isolation, not to assume the costs of rebuilding its military or rescuing its economy. Sanctions evasion can postpone financial suffocation; it cannot reverse cumulative wartime destruction, lost exports, and declining currency confidence.</p>
<p><strong>Three Paths Over the Next Three to Six Months</strong></p>
<p>The first option is a managed but deteriorating stalemate. Iran will preserve enough missile and maritime capacity to keep Hormuz contested, while the US alternates between limited strikes, mine-clearing, sanctions, and enforcement of its blockade. Negotiations will periodically resume without resolving the nuclear issue, maritime access, and sanctions relief. Iran will remain capable of resistance but progressively less capable of setting the terms of the conflict.</p>
<p>A second, plausible option is a coerced interim bargain. Mounting economic damage, Gulf pressure and concerns about military readiness could lead Washington to accept a phased arrangement involving verified commercial passage through Hormuz, limits on Iranian maritime activity and partial sanctions relief. It would be an armistice managing the confrontation rather than resolving it.</p>
<p>Lastly, is an accelerated Iranian breakdown accompanied by wider escalation. Serious fractures within the security elite, an inability to finance the coercive apparatus or a rapid decline in missile-launch capacity could convince Tehran that time is no longer on its side. Rather than surrender, the regime might expand attacks against neighboring states, undersea cables, shipping, or American regional facilities to force immediate intervention by outside powers. Iranian weakness could therefore make the conflict more dangerous before it makes Iran more conciliatory.</p>
<p>The indicators to watch are commercial traffic and insurance premiums in Hormuz, Iran’s missile and drone launch rate, evidence of renewed minelaying, Chinese purchases and technological transfers, cohesion within the Revolutionary Guard, and whether Gulf governments move from advocating restraint to supporting sustained maritime enforcement.</p>
<p>Iran has demonstrated that a regional actor can temporarily deny a superpower an inexpensive political victory. But denial is not victory, and endurance is not recovery. Unless Tehran converts disruption into a negotiated settlement, the same strategy that preserved the regime during the conflict’s first six months will surely consume the economic, diplomatic, and military foundations required to survive the next phase.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.</em><em> The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Survival-Is-Not-Victory-How-Iran-Is-Trying-to-Outlast-a-Militarily-Superior-Coalition.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32906 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/@-Download-Button-2026.png" alt="" width="250" height="80" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/survival-is-not-victory-how-iran-is-trying-to-outlast-a-militarily-superior-coalition/">Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed El Doh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 12:29:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32698</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 18, 2026 (Originally written in April 2026) The failure of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/">The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 18, 2026 (Originally written in April 2026)</em></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/12/jd-vance-says-no-deal-us-iran-pakistan-talks-islamabad">failure</a> of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive pressure, military signaling, and elevated risk of miscalculation. This risk is driven by the threat Iran continues to pose to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and by its remaining ballistic capabilities, which allow it to erratically target neighboring Arab states and regional U.S. allies.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the announcement of a U.S.-led maritime <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/us-blockade-iran-threatens-gulf-shutdown-ceasefire-on-brink-despite-trumps-war-nearly-over-claim-1.500508304">blockade</a> over Iranian ports fundamentally alters the operational and strategic landscape aimed at confining the Iranian threat. The main question now is no longer whether tensions will rise, they already have, but whether the current trajectory leads toward controlled escalation, negotiated recalibration, or systemic full-scale conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Structural Drivers of Escalation</strong></p>
<p>At the core of the U.S.-Iran negotiations lies a set of structural but irreconcilable objectives. The U.S. continues to frame its demands around three pillars: curtailment of Iran’s nuclear development program, limitations on ballistic missile capabilities development, and the rollback of Iran’s regional proxy networks. Iran, on the opposite side, views these elements as essential to regime survival and sovereign deterrence. Accordingly, this is not a negotiation gap; it is a strategic contradiction.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear posture has evolved from a bargaining chip into a core pillar of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) and the regime’s survival. Any perceived concession risks undermining internal legitimacy and external deterrence credibility. Accordingly, ongoing diplomatic negotiations are performative rather than transformative, thus aimed at managing escalation rather than resolving underlying disputes. Additionally, the U.S. decision to impose a maritime blockade represents a calibrated escalation designed to exert economic and psychological pressure without the need to immediately resort back to kinetic operations. However, the strategic implications are profound.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy relies mainly on maritime oil exports. A blockade directly targets this vulnerability, threatening <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAXGoXDQ19Q">revenue</a> streams, which then impacts the domestic stability, in addition to regional influence operations funded through such revenues. From Tehran’s perspective, failure to respond would signal weakness not only to the U.S. but also to its network of non-state groups across the region. This creates a classic escalation dilemma for Iran. On one hand, not responding risks strategic erosion of the IRGC and the current regime’s image. On the other hand, the response risks triggering military confrontation, which Iran cannot withstand. In such conditions, even any Iranian action such as harassment of commercial shipping, or proxy attacks carry a high probability of escalation.</p>
<p>Another key driver for the escalation is the pre-positioned military capabilities. Unlike previous crises, the current environment is characterized by pre-positioned military assets and operational readiness on both sides. U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in the Middle East are already <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/15/us-sending-10000-more-troops-to-middle-east-despite-iran-ceasefire">configured</a> for rapid response operations, while Iran’s IRGC maintains asymmetric capabilities are carefully tailored for maritime disruption, drone attacks, ballistic missile launches, and regional proxy warfare.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Spillover Risks</strong></p>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical geographic variable in this confrontational equation given that one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Iran has long signaled its capability and strategic <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/16/military-advisor-to-iran-s-supreme-leader-threatens-to-sink-us-ships-in-the-strait-of-hormuz_6752475_4.html">intent</a> to disrupt traffic through asymmetric means, including naval mines, drones, and anti-ship missiles. While full closure remains unlikely due to the overwhelming U.S. response it would provoke, disruption has already been taking place via targeted attacks on passing vessels, which is more than enough to deter commercial liners. Even limited interference could generate outsized economic and political effects, particularly for energy-dependent economies. All that said, the Houthis in Yemen remain on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/">standby</a> mode to disrupt the maritime flow via resumption of attacks on vessels passing via Bab-el Mandeb to and from the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Iran’s strategic depth lies not in conventional military parity but in its network of regional proxies. Groups aligned with Tehran, including those in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, provide Iran with operational flexibility. Given Israel’s successful campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah as well as the Iran-backed Iraqi militias preoccupied with the deterrence posed by the U.S. forces, the <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/">Houthis</a> in Yemen remain the final card for Tehran. Intensified maritime threats from Houthi forces in the Red Sea are likely to <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/04/14/amid-focus-on-strait-of-hormuz-experts-sound-warning-on-yemens-houthis-and-red-sea/">reemerge</a> at any moment. This allows Iran to impose costs on U.S. and allied interests without triggering immediate large-scale retaliation. However, the cumulative effect of a multi-chokepoint pressure strategy could compel a broader and internationally supported response.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Calculus: War vs. Controlled Escalation</strong></p>
<p>Some believe that neither the U.S. nor Iran appears to seek full-scale war given that the costs (military, economic, and political) would be immense and unpredictable. For the U.S., a major conflict with Iran would disrupt global energy markets, divert resources from strategic competition with China, and risk regional destabilization affecting key allies in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). For Iran, a continuation of a direct war would expose critical infrastructure to sustained strikes and threaten regime survivability.</p>
<p>The most probable scenario over the next 2–3 weeks is a phase of controlled escalation characterized by maritime harassment incidents in the Gulf, limited proxy attacks, and intensified rhetoric and signaling. This scenario allows both sides to demonstrate resolve while avoiding irreversible steps toward war. However, it is susceptible to disruption by unforeseen incidents at any moment.</p>
<p>An increasingly possible scenario would be one that involves targeted military actions, such as U.S. strikes on IRGC assets or critical infrastructure vs. Iranian retaliatory indiscriminate strikes on U.S. regional allies. Such exchanges would likely be calibrated to avoid full-scale war but could easily escalate if casualties or strategic assets are impacted.</p>
<p>Lastly, a less likely but still possible scenario is the return to productive negotiations, driven by economic pressures including oil market volatility, as well as diplomatic intervention by third parties, including the Gulf states, China, or European actors.</p>
<p>The highest-impact and most consequential scenarios involve a rapid escalation into full-scale conflict, potentially triggered by Iran’s full refusal to give up on its nuclear program or ballistic missile development program. Other triggers for a full-scale conflict would include any major incident in the Strait of Hormuz, high-casualty attacks on U.S. forces, or a direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military assets. Such a conflict would likely expand beyond bilateral engagement, drawing in regional actors and severely disrupting global economic systems.</p>
<p><strong>Key Indicators to Watch</strong></p>
<p>Several indicators are going to be crucial in assessing the trajectory of the ongoing conflict. This includes maritime activity where increased Iranian harassment of shipping continues to take place. Proxy operations are also a critical indicator where the frequency and intensity of proxy attacks, and the Red Sea specifically start to rise. Finally, force posture changes remain one of the key indicators, as they are mostly based on advanced intelligence assessments, which are not available to the public or markets. That said, deployment of additional U.S. and allied assets to the region remains the clearest indicator of how the situation will move forward and provides early signs of shifts from controlled escalation to broader conflict.</p>
<p>For defense strategists, the imperative is clear: preparing for escalation, planning for contingencies across multiple theaters, and achieving consensus that in the current environment, the most dangerous outcomes are not those that are intended but those unintended.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management &#8211; France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/">The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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