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		<title>NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Oct 2024 12:38:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29001</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is by far the largest contributor to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. According to NATO estimates published in June 2024, the United States will spend $967.7 billion on defense in 2024, roughly 10 times as much as Germany, the second-largest spending country, with $97.7 billion. Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is by far the largest contributor to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. According to NATO estimates published in June 2024, the United States will spend $967.7 billion on defense in 2024, roughly 10 times as much as Germany, the second-largest spending country, with $97.7 billion.</p>
<p>Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 trillion. As Russia grows increasingly assertive, many on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering how NATO member-states will step up and contribute to the continent’s defense.</p>
<p>To withstand a Russian attack, NATO must plan for between 35 and 50 extra brigades of 3,000–7,000 troops each—adding 105,000–350,000 soldiers. Germany must contribute 3–5 extra brigades or 20,000–30,000 combat troops.</p>
<p>Protection from air attacks is a major German and Eastern European vulnerability. Former German Defense Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula van der Leyen recently emphasized the need for Germany, under its new defense plans, to quadruple its air defenses. That includes Patriot missile batteries and shorter-range systems to protect bases, ports, and railway transportation systems.</p>
<p>Should Russia attack NATO, hundreds of thousands of troops, together with tanks, equipment, and ammunitions, will have to make their way to the eastern front through Germany. Preparations for war with Russia indicate that Poland, the Baltics, and other Eastern NATO allies are primary targets, but so is Germany. During the Cold War, Germany had 36 Patriot missile air defense units. The count is down to nine—after donating three to Ukraine. Berlin just ordered four Patriot missile units at a cost of 1.35 billion euros.</p>
<p>The United States spends about 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, but the Congressional Budget Office projects that will fall to 2.5 percent by 2034. NATO member-states recently issued a joint communique that said, “We reaffirm that, in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.”</p>
<p>The Baltic states are adamant about the need for increased defense spending. Tuuli Duneton, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defense Policy, praised the 23 NATO member-states who now meet the 2 percent spending target. She suggested raising the spending goal to 2.5 to 3 percent.</p>
<p>Pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps,” Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūna stated, “We’ll start to talk at least about 2.5 percent as a floor,” pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps.” He added, “When we analyze what the countries need to develop soon, for a decade maybe, it’s not even 2.5 percent. It’s not even 3 percent. It should be more if you want more air defense systems, if you want more long-range strike capabilities.”</p>
<p>NATO plans focus on logistics, troop movement, and cyber defenses in preparation for conflict with Russia. After NATO’s plans for the biggest defense upgrade in three decades were agreed upon last year, now is the moment of truth: the minimum defense requirements to meet these plans were sent to national governments, highlighting significant shortfalls in air defenses, long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistics, and secure digital communications.</p>
<p>Fixing these shortfalls requires billions of euros in investment. By autumn 2025, NATO aims to set binding targets for members to ensure Europe’s defense. Achieving these targets may be difficult due to budgetary constraints and differing views on NATO’s stance towards Russia.</p>
<p>NATO’s effort to navigate a moment of clear and present danger is made more difficult by the Herculean task of rearming. Deep industrial reconstitution and technological evolution are both needed and taking place across all value chains in all defense tech investments, including space, cyber, drones, and the role of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. Despite its current state of political uncertainty, change-adverse politicians and populations must be convinced of the need for refocusing on defense.</p>
<p>Europe must face a <em>Kulturkampf</em> in which Europeans overcome the three decades of cognitive denial about war in Europe. The biggest obstacle to the above efforts is likely to come from populations that are accustomed to generous welfare programs at the expense of defense preparations. Europe cannot tax its way out of its current problem. European taxes are already the highest in the world.</p>
<p>Compelling communication strategies are essential to justify the increased defense budgets. Officials need to emphasize the pan-European necessity for national and regional security. The twin brother of blood and treasure returned from a long hiatus. Making the argument to citizens becomes an even tougher sell if conscription across Europe is required to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to fight.</p>
<p>Asking ordinary citizens in Western or Southern Europe whether they are willing to die for Ukraine or Lithuania or even Poland will likely draw a negative response. Not all European populations seem willing, able, and ready to fight as nation-states united under the concept of pan-European patriotic defense. Those now leading the <em>effort de guerre</em> are found among Poles, Balts, and, in no small part, the newly energized Nordic countries.</p>
<p>In short, if Europe wishes to survive, it must adapt, deter, and defend itself now. Waiting will only add more blood and treasure to the bill that must be paid.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/NATOs-Defense-Math-Doesnt-Add-Up.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-battlefield-nuclear-weapons/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-battlefield-nuclear-weapons/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam Lowther]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Sep 2024 12:05:09 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28959</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States’ and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) continued support for Ukraine’s valiant fight to repel a Russian invasion may, ultimately, depending on the state of the conflict, lead Russia to employ one or a small number of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. A conflict between the United States and China, over Taiwan, could [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-battlefield-nuclear-weapons/">The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States’ and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) continued support for Ukraine’s valiant fight to repel a Russian invasion may, ultimately, depending on the state of the conflict, lead Russia to employ one or a small number of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. A conflict between the United States and China, over Taiwan, could also lead to a similar use of nuclear weapons. There is ample evidence to suggest a growing relevance of what are interchangeably called <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32572/37#:~:text=While%20there%20are%20several%20ways%20to%20distinguish%20between,that%20might%20be%20used%20to%20attack%20troops%20or">non-strategic, tactical, or low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<p>Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.</p>
<p>Russia’s “<a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/escalate-de-escalate">escalate to deescalate</a>” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495930802430098?journalCode=ucst20">win a possible war against a conventional NATO</a> force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a <em>fait accompli </em>using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.</p>
<p>What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are <a href="https://uploads.fas.org/2014/05/Brief2015_NATO-Russia_MIIS_.pdf">not a combat-ready force</a> that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/russia%E2%80%99s-tactical-nuclear-weapon-stockpile-jaw-droppingly-large-197310">maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons</a> that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.</p>
<p>A 2017 <a href="https://info.publicintelligence.net/DIA-RussiaMilitaryPower2017.pdf">Defense Intelligence Agency report</a> went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.</p>
<p>As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-strengths-and-weaknesses-of-russias-military/a-43293017">conventional force</a> sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.</p>
<p>Given Russia’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/625138/EPRS_IDA(2018)625138_EN.pdf">economic and strategic limitations</a>, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-america-needs-more-nukes-5708?nopaging=1">New Look Policy</a> of the Eisenhower administration.</p>
<p>For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/no-tactical-nuclear-weapons-2/">all nuclear weapons are strategic</a> and there is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/19/nuclear-weapons-pentagon-us-military-doctrine">no such thing as a winnable nuclear war</a>, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.</p>
<p>Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.</p>
<p>With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom&#8217;s MI6 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2gz4re394o">revealed</a> that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.</p>
<p>American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.</p>
<p>The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.</p>
<p>Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.</p>
<p>Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.</p>
<p>Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.</p>
<p><em>Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/The-Return-of-Battlfield-Nuclear-Weapons.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-battlefield-nuclear-weapons/">The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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