The international system is undergoing a profound global power shift characterized by the resurgence of great power competition and a broad diffusion of technical capabilities. This environment is intensifying security competition across all domains. Concurrently, the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) and other disruptive technologies has fundamentally transformed espionage and defense. The traditional landscape of counterintelligence (CI) is obsolete and requires rapid, systemic overhaul to address the increasingly amplified, technologically enabled threats posed by state and non-state actors.

Specifically, the shift to great power technological competition has expanded CI’s mandate from protecting military secrets to securing critical infrastructure, intellectual property (IP), and the integrity of the information domain. The dual-use nature of AI functions as both in support of automated espionage and a critical mechanism for preemptively anticipating and mitigating threats. The failure of the United States to strategically integrate AI into CI methodologies will result in the systemic erosion of national technological and economic advantage.

The Expanded Mandate of Modern Counterintelligence

CI functions to protect a nation’s secrets, personnel, and systems from foreign intelligence entities (FIEs). Yet today, CI must also confront a threat matrix dramatically enlarged in scope, sophistication, and velocity. The current geopolitical climate has necessitated a significant expansion of the traditional CI mission. In the context of great power competition, the most significant threat has shifted from the theft of classified military and diplomatic secrets to the large-scale acquisition of IP, trade secrets, and technological data, as highlighted in the recently released Annual Threat Assessment.

FIEs are aggressively targeting the private sector, academia, and research institutions, the very engines of national innovation through sophisticated economic espionage. Their strategic goal is not merely to obtain information, but to erode a nation’s competitive advantage and accelerate the adversary’s technological timetable, thereby shifting the global balance of power. CI must establish robust protective mechanisms that extend deep into the non-governmental technology and research ecosystem.

The dissolution of a clear distinction between peacetime competition and active conflict has resulted in a continuous state of confrontation known as the ‘gray zone’. This strategic domain is characterized by persistent, non-lethal, yet tactically damaging activities designed to achieve political objectives without triggering traditional military responses. CI must now defend against a spectrum of subtle subversion, including large-scale cyber operations, persistent penetration of networks for reconnaissance and preparatory measures, and covert attempts to manipulate political discourse and decision-making.

The globalization of commerce and technology has created intricate, interconnected supply chains. These networks present significant CI risks, as adversaries seek to compromise the integrity, trustworthiness, and authenticity of products and services. By inserting “backdoors” or creating exploitable “choke points” at various nodes, adversaries establish capabilities for future exploitation. CI efforts are essential to conduct comprehensive due diligence and risk mitigation, securing these complex networks against both hardware and software compromise.

Artificial Intelligence: The Dual-Use Catalyst

AI and emerging technologies are not merely targets of modern espionage; they are simultaneously the most potent tools and the most necessary defenses in the counterintelligence battleground. This dual-use dynamic creates a challenging “AI vs. AI” scenario that demands immediate, radical adaptation. Adversaries are leveraging AI to dramatically enhance the speed, scale, and sophistication of their intelligence operations:

Automated Espionage and Big Data Analysis: AI-powered tools can automate and scale the processing, translation, and analysis of vast, heterogeneous datasets (Big Data), vastly increasing the volume and velocity of intelligence collection from both open-source intelligence and classified sources.

Adaptive Cyberattacks: Machine learning (ML) algorithms enable the development of more elusive and adaptive cyber threats. This includes automated exploitation of vulnerabilities, dynamic creation of polymorphic malware, and rapid penetration of defenses, operating at speeds that effectively outpace traditional, human-centric cybersecurity responses.

Generative AI for Influence: Generative AI can create highly realistic deepfakes (synthetic videos and audio) and synthetic narratives at scale. This facilitates sophisticated disinformation and propaganda campaigns to manipulate public opinion and conduct advanced social engineering, severely compromising the ability of institutions to discern truth from falsehood.

Three interconnected factors fundamentally redefine the scope of CI responsibility: target expansion, the blurring of conflict lines, and supply chain vulnerabilities. To effectively counter these technologically enabled threats, CI must aggressively embrace and integrate these same technologies, transforming them into proactive defensive tools:

Threat Anticipation and Predictive Analysis: AI can process and analyze massive amounts of threat data, identifying subtle, non-obvious patterns, trends, and anomalies. This capability allows CI to transition from merely reacting to threats toward predictive modeling, allowing one to forecast adversary actions before they materialize and enabling preemptive defense.

Enhanced Surveillance and Anomaly Detection: ML algorithms are crucial for the detection of subtle anomalies in network traffic, user behavior, and physical security systems that a human operator would miss. AI-driven monitoring provides real-time, large-scale pattern-of-life analysis that significantly exceeds human cognitive capacity.

Counter-Disinformation and Integrity Checks: CI requires AI-driven tools to effectively identify, analyze, and flag AI-generated propaganda, deepfakes, and synthetic media. Systems designed for content provenance and authenticity verification are essential to safeguard the integrity of the information domain and maintain public trust.

Insider Threat Mitigation: Defensively, AI can monitor internal networks to flag anomalous user behaviors such as unusual data access attempts, large data transfers, or deviations in an employee’s digital pattern-of-life. As such they assist in identifying potential insider threats before significant compromise occurs.

The Strategic Imperative

The shift of global powers and the proliferation of disruptive technologies have thrust counterintelligence into an even more important aspect of national security. The stakes of this technological arms race transcend traditional security concerns, encompassing the integrity of a nation’s innovative ecosystem, its economic competitiveness, and the resilience of its democratic institutions.

CI must rapidly evolve its strategies to prioritize the defense of economic and technological assets, and it must integrate AI as a foundational defensive technology to achieve predictive, scalable threat mitigation. Failure to aggressively master and deploy AI defenses against technologically augmented adversaries risks the systemic erosion of national advantage in a world where technological leadership is increasingly synonymous with global power. The future success of great power competition hinges directly on the adaptive capacity and technological sophistication of CI’s function.

Joshua Thibert is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with over 30 years of comprehensive expertise. His background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and insider risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. The views of the author are his own.

Redefining Espionage: The Unseen War for Technological Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

As of today, ChatGPT-5 Pro is said to have an IQ of 148, as tested officially by Mensa Norway. It is now significantly smarter than most adult humans in the United States (who average 99.7). Grok 4 may be weeks away from becoming even smarter, but the progress at which AI reasoning inches ahead matters little when humans write code for these programs. However, AI has started to write its own code. In tandem, Mark Zuckerberg is building a super team dubbed the “superintelligence AI” lab and he offered a single person, Daniel Francis, $1.25 Billion for a four-year contract (or a $312 million per year salary). Further, Zuckerberg has gone on to poach the top AI talent from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, nearing 24 people in total out of a team of only 44.

Unfortunately, U.S. companies are also allowed to funnel money into Chinese AI companies, in part because it is a less expensive alternative than U.S. developed AI. China, as a near-peer adversary cannot be allowed to reach superintelligence first because whoever wins the AI race to superintelligence will have nearly unlimited computing ability and will be able to launch devastating cyber-attacks with ease.

If there are two teams approaching the finish line in a winner-take-all superintelligence race, then there is also a direct implication for long-term deterrence on global war. Imagine the following scenarios:

SCENARIO 1: The U.S. is ahead in the race to superintelligence, but China works diligently to steal code, launch cyber-attacks, and intimidate U.S. scientists. Eventually, China assassinates critical AI scientists, prompting the U.S. to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against China to stop its attacks. Yet, just before all-out war, China ceases its efforts, having become successful in its bid to cripple the U.S. AI industry so it can reach superintelligence first.

SCENARIO 2: The U.S. is ahead, but China is only barely behind. China uses its innovative AI models to wargame nearly unlimited sequences and calculates what it believes is the perfect attack to prevent the U.S. from reaching superintelligence first. In this scenario, the attacks never ramp up. Instead, it results in a massive, unprovoked first strike that incapacitates the U.S. This might be a nuclear strike or simply an EMP strike that decimates the U.S. power grid. Either way, China wins again.

SCENARIO 3: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress. Public companies continue progressing toward superintelligence, but one or both achieve it in a military or national laboratory behind closed doors. They ponder the best way to use it, leveraging it like the nuclear football in global diplomacy (i.e., setting the briefcase on the floor next to the President). They may have accessed superintelligence but lack confidence in the technology to use it for the near future.

SCENARIO 4: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress, and both achieve superintelligence behind closed doors. Then one day, one of them launches an attack on the other, prompting the other side to launch its own superintelligence response. The two AI agents battle across every sector of society, arm-wrestling for control. Seemingly trivial differences between one model and another let one win in one sector and the other win in another.

This article does not presume that the outcome of a superintelligence race is represented in one of these four scenarios. Rather, it argues that AI will inevitably complicate the landscape of deterrence as it may give confidence of victory in otherwise stable situations. This moment in history is nothing less than the moment when scientists Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein wrote President Roosevelt to warn of the potential use of fission in bombs.

The United States government must think carefully about the current state of AI in the world and what it will mean for deterrence strategy. We need to have a planned response if a superintelligence cyberattack is launched against the U.S. This includes physically isolating our command-and-control systems and planning for surprise attacks, itself planned by another country’s AI technology. Worse yet, military planners need to consider how to detect and respond to multiple grey zone micro-attacks that may be a component of a larger cascading attack.

We are amid our generation’s Manhattan Project moment. The 2023 Oppenheimer movie culminates in the detonation of the 1945 Trinity test. Perhaps if the United States plans well, in 80 years, we may all be able to enjoy a movie about Zuckerberg forming his superintelligence lab.

Rob Kittinger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The AI Revolution’s Outsized Impact on Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Featuring insights from Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther, the discussion examines the myths perpetuated by Hollywood, the historical context of deterrence policy, and why accurate understanding matters for national security.

Participants gain a deeper appreciation of: * The evolution of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy since the Cold War * Misconceptions in movies like Oppenheimer and Dynamite * The critical role deterrence plays in preventing large-scale conflict This event is part of NIDS’ ongoing mission to advance peace and stability through education, research, and dialogue on strategic deterrence.

Hollywood vs. Reality: Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Dynamite and Oppenheimer-Huessy Seminar was originally published on Global Security Review.

For advocates of renewed nuclear weapons testing, stop packing for the journey to the Nevada National Security Sites (NNSS). No mushroom cloud or subterranean detonation is soon to take place. Anti-nuclear protestors should also stay home.

The truth is less exciting. No real changes will happen “immediately” that “light up the sky and shake the ground.” This is not to say that the announcement had no effect. In fact, the statement was indeed monumental and incredibly significant.

Contrary to public perception, the US has never ceased testing its nuclear weapon systems. What has changed since the 1992 self-imposed moratorium on high-yield explosive testing is the nature of those tests.

Before 1992, the US conducted 1,054 nuclear weapon test explosions. The country detonated 839 of those warheads underground, mostly at the then-named Nevada Test Site, where the last halted test, Icecap, still stands as a memorial to the explosive testing days.

Several scientists involved in Icecap acknowledge that, owing to the extensive preparations undertaken, such as instrumentation, computational simulation, analysis, and test rigging, the most significant insights were gained from the limited number of unsuccessful tests. In other words, there is still great confidence in the performance and reliability of the American nuclear arsenal. It is this kind of “testing” to which President Trump’s declaration is likely referring.

Since 1992, testing has been through proxy systems that simulate a nuclear explosion’s unique energy output and then uses the results to validate physics models on advanced computer systems, known as physics-based modeling. This approach provides a way to validate the physics and predict the performance of a nuclear explosion under conditions that were never known in an underground test.

Scientists continuously conduct these tests, improving and refining them as added details are learned. They often report that scientists know much more now than possible from explosive testing.

Despite the president’s directive that testing “will begin immediately,” experts agree that resuming full-scale nuclear explosive testing is a complex and time-consuming endeavor. According to the Arms Control Association, it would take at least 36 months to prepare the Nevada Test Site for contained underground detonations.

This includes environmental assessments, infrastructure upgrades, and political approvals. This does not mean that explosive testing is impossible, but it represents a clear change in policy and a national effort to move nuclear weapons to the forefront of national strategy through an active nuclear explosive testing program.

The phrase “on an equal basis” is particularly provocative. It implies that nations like Russia and China may already be conducting nuclear explosive tests or at least advancing their capabilities in ways that challenge the spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Either of these should sound alarms and rightly must elicit a response.

The president has chosen precisely the response as outlined in the National Institute for Deterrence Studies’ (NIDS) Dynamic Parity report, where a response matches the activities of adversaries, giving them the option to continue expanding their nuclear capabilities, knowing how America will respond, or cease and return to the table to negotiate for a more stable relationship.

The announcement of an “immediate” resumption of (explosive) testing is monumental because of its effect on deterrence. In his international policy book, The Necessity of Choice, Henry Kissinger writes that deterrence is the (mathematical) product of will and capability. Few would question that the US has a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems that can cause incredible damage and harm. However, there is growing criticism and concern that the US lacks resolve to deploy its nuclear weapons even if an existential crisis arises.

Without clear signals of resolve, adversaries may doubt American willingness to act, weakening deterrence. This declaration supports that resolve without making a direct threat to any adversary. It simply puts them on notice.

Whether President Trump’s message leads to actual detonations or remains symbolic, it marks a turning point in American nuclear policy. It also aligns with the Dynamic Parity framework advocated by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther, which calls for symmetrical deterrence and strategic clarity.

President Trump is demonstrating resolve, assuring allies, and highlighting American commitment to nuclear deterrence. The path forward should prioritize modernization, transparency, and diplomacy—not a return to the destructive rituals of past decades.

James C. Petrosky, PhD, is the President and Co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor Emeritus of the Air Force Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are the authors own. 

“Resumption of Nuclear Testing”—Not So Fast! was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chris McInnes is Executive Director at the Air Power Institute. He is an air power and national security expert with 25 years of experience in the military, government, and industry and is also a frequent commentator and speaker at defence seminars here in Australia.

Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Australian Air Power and Deterrence with Chris McInnes was originally published on Global Security Review.

That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.

India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI

India’s governance model integrates civilian oversight with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its National Strategy for AI mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.

The Evaluating Trustworthy AI (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.

India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular red-team exercises involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.

Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation

US-India collaboration on AI verification can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The iCET fact sheet outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.

The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the Quad framework, pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.

Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control

A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The UNIDIR report calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.

The UN General Assembly has established an Independent AI Scientific Panel and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.

Regional Applications and Future Prospects

India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include joint research on AI safety, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.

Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of Mach 8 and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.

By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science & Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces.

Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.

The latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?

Signed in July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered the first major step aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament, including the recognized nuclear powers under the treaty. Article VI of the NPT emphasizes the pursuit of negotiations in good faith to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and promote general disarmament by nuclear-armed states. Article VI serves as the foundation for global efforts such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

However, nuclear weapon states under the NPT are not adequately fulfilling their obligations and commitments under Article VI and instead continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. They even provide support to their allies on nuclear matters in clear violation of the treaty. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal and the Nuclear Supplier Group’s waiver to India are cases in point. It is important to note that nuclear weapon states are primarily responsible for progressing disarmament. Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.

The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.

This situation is exacerbated by the fear of cheating among the nuclear-armed countries, “If we disarm, others might not.” Hence any proactive action would leave some at some disadvantage vis-à-vis adversaries.

The latest SIPRI report suggests that countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines the efforts of arms control and disarmament. The abandonment of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Russia, alongside the failure to develop multilateral treaties on the subject, led to a lack of faith in arms control and disarmament.

In South Asia, India’s prestige-driven global ambitions and expansion of its nuclear arsenal beyond a credible minimum deterrent is complicating security dynamics in the region and beyond. This is further worsened by a purported strategic chain with cascading-downward influence on arms control, nuclear risk reduction, crisis management, confidence-building, and strategic stability in South Asia—induced by extra-regional powers. While offering no cascading upward stimuli for bringing regional stability, there are biases and discriminatory norms governing nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament negotiations at the conference on disarmament (CD).

This suggests not only why nuclear disarmament is not happening, but it also explains skepticism over the future of disarmament. For instance, Ukraine presents a novel case of SBT and questions the negative and positive security assurances/guarantees in conventional as well as nuclear terms. The Ukraine paradox cautions other countries, in a DDS, that their survival rests with nuclear weapons of their own. Even confidence in the nuclear umbrella and assurance by treaty allies is eroding. NPT-member states are yearning for nuclear weapons and pose the greatest danger of proliferation.

Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.

Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape. Countries with advanced technologies and space-based capabilities can still threaten the survival of their enemies.

Emerging technologies are leading to increased conventional imbalances between rivals, which heightens reliance on nuclear weapons for crucial security interests and could, therefore, serve as the ultimate deterrent. Moving toward disarmament requires five actions. First, there is a need for legally binding agreements to address the threats posed by emerging technologies. Second, nuclear powers should not support their allies’ nuclear pursuits. Third, effective multilateral arms control agreements are required. Fourth, it is important to address biases within global frameworks. Finally, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between rivals are needed to resolve long-standing disputes, help prevent arms races, reduce nuclear risks, and build hope for disarmament in the future.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

Meanwhile, the US Department of Defense (DoD) appears to be doing the opposite. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) recently axed its Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate, a move many analysts view as strategic self-sabotage.

This directorate, responsible for overseeing more than $340 million in AI and digital integrations in fiscal year 2024, represented a critical nexus linking battlefield innovations with institutional infrastructure. Its elimination, justified under “efficiency” mandates, alarmed defense observers who fear it fractures continuity, erases institutional memory, and sends a dangerous signal to adversaries willing to exploit perceived American weakness.

The Strategic Misstep

The CDAO was formed in 2022 by fusing key functions from the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service, Chief Data Office, and Advana analytics, aiming to unify policy, technology, and digital services. Embedded within CDAO, the CTO led cross-functional teams in AI, cyber, logistics, and command-and-control systems, ensuring that new technologies remained interoperable and aligned with warfighter requirements.

Abruptly dismantling this directorate not only removes a pivotal vision and coordination role but also creates a void with no clear replacement. The result is fragmented efforts, lost synergy across mission areas, and a battlefield advantage handed to adversaries.

Expertise Lost, Momentum Undermined

Leadership and expertise take years, even decades, to develop. Figures like Bill Streilein, former CTO of CDAO and veteran of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, carried institutional memory and high standards into Pentagon AI programs. But when top-tier professionals are sidelined under the label of “streamlining,” they often leave and seldom return.

This pattern has already occurred. The Defense Digital Service (DDS), once lauded as the Pentagon’s “SWAT team of nerds,” lost almost all of its members by May 2025, prompting its demise. Nearly every DDS member, citing bureaucratic pressure from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), chose to depart rather than conform.

These departures are not benign transfers. They represent the scattering of core innovators and connectors whose insight and trust networks are irreplaceable. Without them, emerging AI systems risk becoming siloed projects rather than battlefield-enabling capabilities.

DOGE: Efficiency or Engineered Evisceration?

DOGE, instituted by a presidential executive order in January 2025, is authorized to slash perceived inefficiencies across federal agencies—often through AI-enhanced, automated assessments. Under the leadership of figures tied to Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, DOGE has repurposed its mandate to aggressively target leadership and innovation roles across the board—including in national defense.

DOGE has justified cuts using its proprietary AI systems to flag and eliminate “inefficient” programs, often without human oversight or contextual nuance. The CTO’s directorate was among its most high-profile targets, methodically identified and removed, despite its mission-critical nature.

To make matters worse, DOGE is reportedly comfortable with these decisions. One Pentagon official described it as a “theater of dominance,” not just cost-cutting, but deliberate erasure of institutional anchors to obfuscate the depth and breadth of the sacrifice.

The High-Stakes Fallout

Adversaries feast on the narrative that the US champions AI yet purges its own tech leadership overnight. “America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare,” such narratives go. These optics weaken American deterrence, erode allied confidence, and provide cover for Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang to reframe the battlefield narrative.

Domestic consequences are equally grim. The consistent removal of flagship tech roles projects a clear message to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) professionals; serve, and risk being discarded. That weakness is a recruitment boon for adversaries, national lab contractors, and tech-armed autocracies solving tomorrow’s warfare puzzles.

Real efficiencies lie not in gutting leadership but in fortifying it. Per the National Security Commission on AI, prioritizing disciplined recruitment and retention of technical talent, including a Digital Corps and AI fellowships, is key to American competitiveness. Instead, we witness the dismantling of precisely those anchor roles meant to shepherd AI innovation into combat-relevant systems.

The DOGE-Driven Dismantling of Tech Leadership

The concepts herein are alarming and reflect an institutional unraveling that directly undermines America’s global security posture and strategic deterrence in five critical ways. First, the elimination of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate from the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) strips away a core pillar of the Pentagon’s ability to adapt emerging technologies for battlefield advantage. This directorate was not redundant bureaucracy; it was the crucible in which ideas from national labs, industry, and warfighters were harmonized into operational capability.

By abruptly dismantling this team, the Department of Defense has extinguished a pipeline of institutional memory and strategic insight at the precise moment when rapid, informed, and integrated decision-making is needed. This brain drain parallels a historical pattern of self-sabotage and leaves adversaries uncontested in the tech talent race.

Second, the removal of high-level AI leadership is a propaganda gift to revisionist powers like China and Russia. These states are watching America voluntarily decapitate its own strategic leadership, an act they can now frame as proof of American decline. This strengthens their strategic messaging in influence campaigns aimed at allies, neutral states, and even American citizens.

“America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare” is not just a phrase, it is a weaponized narrative that demoralizes partners and emboldens adversaries to challenge American dominance in contested domains like cyberspace, space, and AI warfare.

Third, strategic deterrence hinges on credible capability and the perception of cohesion. DOGE’s algorithmic-driven targeting of leadership roles without contextual assessment introduces chaos into the acquisition and integration life cycle of military AI systems. Instead of creating synergistic effects across logistics, cyber, and command and control, the US risks building a fractured, siloed ecosystem that fails in joint operations.

By removing the very leaders who prevent stove piping, the US sabotages its ability to develop and field interoperable, scalable, and warfighter-ready AI tools. This systemic breakdown makes deterrence brittle, vulnerable to being cracked in future high-end conflicts.

Fourth, the US has struggled to compete with the private sector for AI and cybersecurity talent. By signaling that even elite government technologists are disposable under the guise of “efficiency,” this policy drives future talent away from public service. Those who might have joined a modern “Digital Corps” will instead seek stability and respect elsewhere, perhaps even abroad.

Strategic deterrence depends not only on weapons but on technologists who know how to deploy them. Gutting these roles ensures that tomorrow’s innovations will not make it past the lab, let alone onto the battlefield.

Fifth, DOGE’s use of automated assessments to eliminate “inefficiencies” without human oversight is a grotesque parody of reform. Its reliance on cold, context-blind algorithms to purge critical roles mimics adversary models of techno-authoritarianism, not democratic accountability. If allowed to continue, this will hollow out innovation across government agencies and military branches.

Efficiency is not the enemy, misapplied efficiency is. Strategic deterrence requires smart investments, not cost-cutting theater that sacrifices our warfighting edge on the altar of political optics.

Strategic Self-Sabotage Must Be Reversed

This is not merely streamlining, it is full-blown surrender. The dismantling of the CDAO’s CTO directorate and the broader DOGE initiative represents an engineered unraveling of the very leadership needed to project U.S. strategic deterrence in the AI era. Leadership is the vector through which technology becomes capability. Remove it, and you hand your adversaries not only the advantage, but the narrative.

Unless reversed, these concepts and actions will echo through wargames, deterrence failures, and battlefield losses. The US must stop cannibalizing its competitive edge and re-center its national security strategy on strengthening, not sidelining, its AI leadership.

Conclusion

Leadership is not just overhead on the funding spreadsheet; these leaders are our ammunition in the fight for global AI dominance. Removing them during a strategic inflection point is not reform, it is a self-made vulnerability, and as the US disables its own leadership of advanced technologies, it is dismantling future readiness.

The nation must insist on accountability. Cost-cutting means nothing if it costs the technological coherence to compete in tomorrow’s battles. In the strategic competition unfolding now, leadership is the weapon, and ceding it is surrender. This page out of the DOGE handbook should be shredded and burned. Remember, Iranian nuclear scientists were not dismantled by their own regime, they were destroyed by US and Israeli bombs.

Greg Sharpe is Marketing Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is retired from the US Air Force. The views expressed are his own.

The Quiet Dismantling of America’s AI Warfighting Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this electrifying episode, the NIDS crew pull back the curtain on one of the most game-changing technologies in national defense: micro nuclear reactors.

From powering remote bases and forward-deployed operations to fortifying homeland energy resilience, these compact energy giants could rewrite the playbook for military logistics, deterrence strategy, and even climate goals.

Tune in as they dive into:

• The breakthrough tech behind micro reactors
• How nuclear energy ensures mission continuity in contested environments
• The balance between sustainability and survivability
• Why energy security is national security

This is more than a conversation, we are all realizing it’s a strategic wake-up call for anyone in defense, energy policy, or the fight to future-proof our force.

Listen now — and find out how micro reactors could power the next era of deterrence.

#EnergyResilience #MicroReactors #NationalSecurity #NuclearInnovation #Deterrence #MilitaryEnergy #DefenseStrategy #EnergyDominance #ThinkDeterrence #ClimateAndSecurity

131 Micro Reactors: Reliable Energy and National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Engineering & Intelligence Combined
What began in 2009 with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s monitoring of Iran’s Fordow site evolved into a cutting-edge capability. The 30,000‑lb GBU‑57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) was precisely engineered—tested hundreds of times and customized in fuse timing and impact parameters—to penetrate deeply buried facilities

Strategic Collaboration & Planning
This achievement isn’t just about hardware. It reflects 15 years of close collaboration between military planners, intelligence analysts, and industry leaders—including Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and the Air Force’s Quick Reaction Capability program

Execution with Precision
On June 22, B‑2 stealth bombers launched Operation “Midnight Hammer,” striking Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites with surgical accuracy. The MOP penetrated as planned—leaving minimal surface signatures while delivering deep destruction

What This Means for National Security
This operation showcases how sustained investment in R&D, intelligence integration, and interagency coordination can yield mission-defining capabilities. It exemplifies the strategic patience and partnership necessary for complex, high-stakes operations.

Key Takeaways for Defense & Tech Leaders:

1. Vision Meets Execution – Long-term defense projects require a clear vision, persistent funding, and cross-disciplinary alignment.
2. Testing & Validation – MOP’s success was no accident—it was the result of rigorous modeling, simulation, and live testing.
3. Partnership Power – Defense agencies, military services, and industry must collaborate seamlessly over years to deploy such capabilities.
4. Strategic Deterrence – Precision technologies like the MOP expand strategic options, offering alternatives to broader or more escalatory responses.

As our world grows more complex, this operation demonstrates that when foresight, perseverance, and technological excellence coalesce, they can deliver decisive outcomes.

Let’s discuss: How can lessons from this mission inform future innovation in defense tech and strategic deterrence?

15 Years in the Making: U.S. Precision Strike on Iran’s Fortified Nuclear Site  was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a rare and refreshingly direct conversation, a senior international defense partner outlines why the growing tensions between India and China are raising alarms far beyond the region.

Why it matters:

• Strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific hinge on stability between these two nuclear powers.
• Border disputes aren’t just bilateral—they ripple across regional defense planning.
• Allies are preparing for scenarios where diplomatic friction could escalate into something far more dangerous.

This isn’t just a warning—it’s a call for greater alignment, deterrence, cooperation, and strategic foresight across like-minded nations.

If you’re in security policy, defense strategy, or Indo-Pacific affairs, this is essential viewing.

#IndoPacific #IndiaChina #StrategicAlliances #Deterrence #DefenseDiplomacy #GlobalSecurityReview #ThinkDeterrence #NationalSecurity #AlliedStrategy #Geopolitics

Watch the interview: https://youtu.be/2m-uj8G0RkA

Irregular Warfare: An Indian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, ranging from early warning radar sites to critical military installations. They did not provoke the feared nuclear response. Instead, these operations exposed a new threat calculus where persistence, precision, and the power of perception are paramount.

Recent analyses suggest that such drone operations contributed to shifting risk assessments within adversary states, where even a 10 percent to 15 percent error in perception could lead to miscalculation. American nuclear strategists now contend with an urgent need to rethink deterrence as the boundary between conventional and nuclear erodes.

Spectral Shifts: Rethinking Strategic Assumptions

For decades, American nuclear strategy hinged on the assumption that any conventional attack on nuclear command and control assets would inevitably trigger a nuclear counter-response. Data from Cold War–era exercises and subsequent real-world incidents reinforced this mindset among defense planners. Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on sensitive Russian assets, including radar installations integral to Russia’s early warning systems, force a reconsideration of long-held assumptions.

The Kremlin’s response is notably restrained, treating these incursions as manageable costs rather than triggers for nuclear escalation. This strategic restraint, observed in multiple public and classified communications from Moscow, signals that deterrence may now rely less on the brute force of nuclear capability and more on the sophistication of targeting and intent. The takeaway for modern policymakers is that deterrence must now incorporate a broader array of factors, including technology-driven precision and the adversary’s threshold for escalation.

Phantom Impact: Redefining Strategy Beyond Nuclear Might

The era when the primary measure of strategic impact was synonymous with nuclear firepower is ending. Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost, high-precision drones demonstrates that small platforms can disrupt traditional security calculations. Recent reports from defense think tanks estimate that the unit cost of drone operations is less than 1 percent of what a conventional fighter aircraft mission might cost, yet their operational impact in terms of intelligence and tactical disruption is comparable in key areas.

These drones infiltrate deep into adversary territory and strike high-value military and economic assets once presumed invulnerable. Such operational dynamics challenge the long-standing monopoly of nuclear-armed states over credible homeland threats. American planners must now recalibrate their threat models to integrate non-nuclear options, recognizing that the future of strategic impact is both more economical and more technologically complex than ever before.

Haunted Homelands: The Crumbling Illusion of Sanctuary

During the Cold War, vast distances, natural barriers, and the geographic isolation provided by oceans created the comforting illusion that major powers could enjoy an impenetrable sanctuary. Today, that illusion is crumbling. Ukraine’s drone operations are a vivid demonstration that even regions thought to be well-protected can be penetrated. Attacks targeting Russia’s early warning networks, critical oil infrastructure, and military bases reveal that no area can rest on its laurels.

American infrastructure, ranging from energy grids to communication systems and early warning radars, face elevated risks in an age of highly agile autonomous systems. Consider that the global market for unmanned aerial vehicles is projected to reach nearly $50 billion by 2030. Considering this, there is an immediate imperative to overhaul homeland defense strategies. Rapid response protocols, increased situational awareness, and investment in counter-drone technologies are no longer optional. They are emerging as essential components of modern deterrence.

Phantom Signals: How Optics and Intent Drive Escalation

One of the most remarkable aspects of Ukraine’s campaign is its ability to secure tactical advantages without spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. The success of these drone strikes lies in their careful timing, precision, and measured execution. Ukrainian forces consistently space out operations and meticulously choose targets that convey national resolve without risking mass casualties. This dual messaging, delivering a tangible operational effect while sending a clear political signal, underscores a critical evolution in deterrence thinking.

Today, the optics and perceived intent behind an action can be as decisive as the physical impact. One analysis points out that misinterpretations of strategic intent now pose as much risk of inadvertent escalation as traditional force-on-force scenarios. For the United States, this means that developing clear, well-articulated signaling frameworks is crucial. Such frameworks must enable policymakers and military leaders to assert credible force while avoiding actions that might be misread as provocative by adversaries. In a world where every action is scrutinized and the margins for error are thinning, clarity in communication becomes a cornerstone of modern deterrence.

Ghosts in the Arsenal: Integrating Drones into Deterrence

Drones are transcending their traditional role on the battlefield and are emerging as indispensable strategic assets. Modern unmanned systems serve multiple roles, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to direct precision strikes against key targets. Their integration is revolutionizing how military operations are conducted without risking human life. Moreover, these systems have the added benefit of being less politically charged than manned strike platforms. However, their growing prominence also introduces the potential for miscalculation.

With investments in drone technology doubling over the past decade in many leading militaries, the United States must swiftly incorporate these assets into its overarching deterrence framework. This requires the formulation of robust policies that define the operational limits and acceptable contexts for drone employment, comprehensive training programs for commanders in escalation management, and public messaging that reinforces strategic resolve without escalating tensions. The rapid pace of technological adoption means that the window for effective integration is short, and strategic agility is paramount.

Phantoms of the Future: Recasting Deterrence in the Drone Age

Retaining U.S. strategic credibility in the coming decades will demand an evolution beyond a deterrence model solely anchored in nuclear might. Although nuclear forces remain critical, they are no longer the exclusive instruments that shape adversary behavior in today’s multidomain conflicts. The future of deterrence depends on a seamless strategy where nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are coherently integrated. This entails developing a comprehensive national doctrine for drone utilization that explicitly defines clear thresholds for action, acceptable target sets, and robust escalation-management protocols. In parallel, efforts must focus on modernizing homeland defenses to counter the threat of long-range, autonomous drone attacks, especially in sectors such as space-based assets, energy, and telecommunications. Data from defense budget analyses show that if every NATO member met the 2 percent gross domestic product defense spending target, the alliance’s budget would increase by over $100 billion annually. Such investments, along with analogous U.S. initiatives to enhance technological resilience, are crucial if deterrence is to remain credible and effective in this new operational environment.

Final Haunting: Embracing the Ghostly Evolution of Deterrence

“Ghosts in the Skies” is not just a metaphor; it encapsulates the profound transformation underway in modern deterrence. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone technology is forcefully redefining the conventional wisdom that has long informed global security policy. This paradigm shift challenges entrenched assumptions and demands a rapid evolution of U.S. military strategy. In an era of hybrid threats and rapid technological change, our global security environment is more complex and interdependent than ever before. The future of deterrence will rely on the capacity to adapt swiftly, integrate non-linear threat responses, and build flexible defense systems that are as agile as the adversaries they are designed to deter. The message for policymakers is clear: embrace this ghostly evolution now, for in the emerging multidomain battlefield every misstep carries the risk of destabilizing not only regional security but also global order.

The transformation in deterrence prompted by Ukraine’s drone operations is a stark reminder that innovation in warfare can render old paradigms obsolete. As nations invest in cost-effective, high-precision autonomous systems, the calculus of deterrence will continue to shift, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink both doctrine and defense spending. In this new era, where even the faintest ghost can upend strategic balance, the ability to adapt and respond with agility will be the true measure of national security.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

One of the cornerstones of this modernization is the development of the B-21 Raider, the nation’s first sixth-generation aircraft and second stealth bomber. Poised to replace the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets, the B-21 embodies the pinnacle of airpower, offering dual-use capabilities and unparalleled lethality. Currently, the B-21 is in its flight test phase, and with multiple aircraft progressing through the assembly line, the B-21 program is largely on schedule and within budget, a testament to its efficient development. Once deployed, this capability will present a significant challenge to potential adversaries and strengthen America’s capacity to project power and effectively threaten vital enemy targets. Low observable stealth and other on-board technologies can ensure successful penetration and retaliation, placing high-value targets at risk in any cost-imposing deterrence strategy, even against the strongest defenses. This threat, along with the fear instilled by the B-21, will certainly cause any aggressor to reconsider attacking the United States or its allies. While the Air Force is currently funded to buy 100 B-21 bombers, the US Strategic Command commander recently testified that 145 units are needed “to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security.”

Complementing the B-21 and B-52 is the nuclear-tipped Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Designed to replace the 40-year-old nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently deployed on the B-52, the LRSO is a crucial component of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Impressively, the LRSO program is presently on track regarding schedule and budget, which is a welcome anomaly in major defense acquisitions. Its success is further highlighted by three successful flight tests in 2025 alone, demonstrating its maturity and readiness. The critical question, however, remains: how many LRSO missiles does the nation truly need to maintain a robust deterrent? This calculus involves intricate geopolitical considerations, technological advancements, and the evolving threat landscape. As of 2023, the Air Force plans to procure 1,087 missiles, with some 67 to be expended during the development phase.

Across the Atlantic, the NATO nuclear deterrent is undergoing its own transformation, centered on the F-35 fighter jet and the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. All planned units of the B61-12 have been produced, and the F-35 has achieved certification for nuclear operations. While several European allies have already certified their F-35 jets for this crucial mission, others are still awaiting delivery of their aircraft or are in the process of certification. This phased integration underscores the collaborative nature of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the ongoing commitment to collective security. The F-35 is a nimble, adaptable, high-performance multirole fighter combining stealth, sensor fusion, and extraordinary situational awareness, enhancing the lethality of NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability.

The venerable senior citizen B-52H Stratofortress, a workhorse of the bomber fleet, is also receiving a suite of vital upgrades. These enhancements include new engines, radar systems, and upgraded nuclear communications systems.  While progress is being made on these upgrades, they are encountering higher costs and longer timelines than initially projected. Nevertheless, the program is not “off the rails” and remains a critical effort to extend this enduring platform’s operational life and capabilities. When complete, the B-52J will be a more fuel-efficient, reliable, modern, and better-integrated platform going into the second half of the 21^st century. Should the B-52J modernization effort be overly delayed or cancelled, it will likely be replaced with additional B-21 bombers.

Finally, the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program represents a monumental undertaking. Beyond merely replacing the now 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, Sentinel involves a complete overhaul of the vast infrastructure spanning five missile fields. Following a Nunn-McCurdy recertification last year, all three stages of the missile, including the post-boost section, have undergone successful testing. The next crucial steps include laying some 7,000 miles of fiber optic cables across five states to establish robust command and control capabilities for the deployed weapons. A significant cost driver that contributed to the Nunn-McCurdy breach was the escalating cost of rebuilding the individual launch facilities. General Gebara reminded the audience that with 450 launch facilities (LF), any growth or cost increases in one LF can be multiplied by 450. Therefore, a $1 million increase in the design, construction, or reconditioning of one LF equates to adding half a billion dollars to the program, highlighting the scale and complexity of this vital modernization effort. General Bussiere, commander of the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, describes the Sentinel ICBM project as “the largest works project ever taken in fifty years [likely] since Eisenhower’s interstate program.”

The birth of the United States Air Force coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age and the rapid escalation of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence quickly became a central and defining mission, profoundly shaping USAF structure, development, and doctrine throughout the Cold War and beyond. In today’s complex era of great power competition, the USAF is, as it should be, deeply committed to modernizing and revitalizing its nuclear deterrent. While programs like the LRSO and B-21 demonstrate impressive progress, others, such as the B-52 upgrades and Sentinel ICBM, face inherent challenges. These efforts, though costly and complex, are essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrent in a dynamic global environment, ensuring national security for decades to come. This must be America’s number one priority!

As the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley once affirmed, as a believer in humanity, he deplored the use of the atomic bomb; however, as a soldier, he respected it. The United States should be prepared to utilize the full psychological and military impact of the bomb to prevent a war and, if attacked, to win the war. He was right in October 1949, and his sentiment remains valid today; the Air Force must ensure that its segment of the strategic nuclear triad is prepared to deter war well into the century.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

The Air Force’s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Podcast – Future-Proofing National Security: We Can’t Just Wish for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Christine and Natalie engage with Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, a nuclear historian, to discuss her book ‘Inheriting the Bomb’ and the complexities surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. They explore the historical context of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, the narratives surrounding its disarmament, and the implications of security assurances from major powers. Mariana shares her personal reflections on the ongoing war in Ukraine, the challenges faced by nuclear facilities under occupation, and the lessons learned for international security and cooperation.

Podcast: The Complexities of Ukraine’s Nuclear Legacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2020, President Donald Trump led a campaign to ban TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership and compromise of private data by the Chinese government. Four years later, Trump delayed the removal of TikTok from the American market as he looks to find an American buyer for the popular app. This apparent reversal raises the question, is this change motivated by legitimate considerations or political advantage?

The 2020 Ban: National Security or Politics?

During his first term, President Trump pushed to ban TikTok. This effort was framed as a national security measure. Concerns were raised that the app’s parent company, ByteDance, was sharing user data with the Chinese government, posing a threat to American citizens and government operations.

While these concerns were legitimate, critics argued the move was also a political maneuver. It allowed Trump to position himself as tough on China, appealing to his base and broader nationalistic sentiments during an election year. Few analysts considered that both can be true. Politics, particularly those surrounding a beloved video app, were too divisive.

2024: The Return of TikTok?

Fast forward to 2024, and the reported pivot to support TikTok’s return appears incongruous. The core issues cited in 2020—national security and data privacy—have not fundamentally changed. In fact, Americans better understand what it means to have sensitive personal data captured and potentially used for nefarious purposes by an adversary state. Highly contentious congressional testimony by the leaders of social media companies in 2024 only shined a further spotlight on how such firms do not work for the good of users.

Why then would President Trump seek to save the platform? One possible explanation is the platform’s immense popularity, particularly among younger demographics—a voting bloc Trump struggled to capture. Saving TikTok from the US Supreme Court’s ruling and ensuring its sale to an American firm could signal an attempt to appeal to these voters, making the move less about the app’s merits and more about electoral politics.

Is It about the Public Good?

President Trump’s changing perspective on TikTok may reveal a broader trend in modern politics—the prioritization of optics over substance. Leaders often take contradictory stances to align with prevailing public opinion or to cater to specific constituencies. In the case of TikTok, the narrative seems less about resolving genuine concerns and more about capitalizing on its cultural ubiquity. If national security was a pressing concern in 2020, the question remains why it would be any less urgent today.

Ironically, users fleeing from TikTok prior to its designated cutoff date did not flock to American social media platforms as some might expect, but other Chinese platforms similar to TikTok. It seems Americans are angrier and more concerned that Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat are manipulating them than anything the Chinese Communist Party may do. Whether this is the wisest choice is yet to be determined.

Political Rhetoric or Pragmatism?

Ultimately, the fluctuating stance on TikTok underscores the blurred line between political rhetoric and pragmatic governance. Decisions on complex issues like technology and national security require consistency and transparency, yet they are often reduced to tools for political gain. This is a bipartisan issue that was not invented by President Trump. It has a long tradition dating back to the early days of the Republic. In fact, it is endemic to democratic systems.

Whether Trump’s recent position reflects a genuine change of heart or strategic posturing, it highlights the broader issue of political inconsistency. Leaders across the political spectrum often adjust their positions based on electoral strategy rather than principle, yet accountability for these shifts is rare. For example, former Vice President Kamala Harris initially endorsed “Medicare for All” during the 2020 Democrat primary, only to later soften her stance to appeal to moderate voters. These shifts demonstrate how political beliefs are easily adjusted to maximize votes. Whether on healthcare, national security, or technology policy, such reversals can erode public trust if not clearly explained to the electorate.

The ultimate resolution of TikTok’s future will depend on whether the app is sold to an American firm, as President Trump has stipulated, or whether it continues operating without a sale. Given the heightened concerns over data security and foreign influence, a lack of clarity on this issue could further weaken public confidence. While political reversals are common, abrupt shifts without clear explanations can make leadership appear inconsistent or opportunistic. Greater transparency from President Trump regarding his rationale would not only provide insight into the decision-making process but could also help mitigate skepticism about his motivations. At a time when trust in government is already fragile, reinforcing accountability and open communication is critical to maintaining public confidence.

The TikTok saga serves as a reminder that political decisions, especially those framed as national security concerns, are often entangled with strategic interests. In an era where public trust in government is fragile, transparency and consistency are essential. Without them, shifting narratives risk further eroding confidence in leadership—not just on TikTok, but on the larger issues that shape democracy itself.

Offering further explanation into President Trump’s plan and thinking would give the American people a better understanding of the variables under consideration and could potentially assuage some of the speculation into his motivation. Democracies require open communication between the citizenry and their representatives. TikTok is an example of just that.

Justin Miller is Associate Professor of Practice in the School of Cyber Studies at the University of Tulsa.

TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, the president’s executive order directing the deployment of an active defense against missile and space-borne attacks is not the starting point for an arms race. The fact of the matter is, the Chinese and Russians started an arms race over a decade ago and recently accelerated it with their “breakout” in nuclear missiles deployments as well as the expansion and modernization of long-range strike platforms (to include fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

These expansions in offensive nuclear/space forces were not because America’s space and nuclear forces are too strong, but because they are too weak. The American nuclear enterprise is acknowledged to be “atrophied,” and the Space Force is not prepared to address such threats and incapable of addressing the threats posed by adversary space forces.

American vulnerability to homeland attack and, by extension, the nation’s critical space infrastructure, invites these threats. The US is delinquent in its duty to protect citizens by accepting a passive, hostage-style approach and labeling it “strategic stability.”

Second, detractors of homeland missile defense suggest that America is to blame for provoking China and Russia’s build-up. They are more concerned about space-based interceptors creating space debris than the impact of limited or mass attack upon the American homeland.

The US is the leader in advocating for the mitigation of debris generation, while China and Russia are the two biggest offenders. To think that these two adversary nations with kinetic ASAT capabilities and the political will to use them, despite debris generation, are only responding to US activity, shows a lack of understanding of these adversaries and their strategy. Lest Americans forget, both China and Russia see the United States as having more to lose from conflict in space than they do.

Third, opponents of Iron Dome for America believe that “real security” does not come from a credible hard power, but from “arms control, diplomacy and shared risk reduction.” While these are noble ideas, the historical record shows that arms control is often one-sided, with Russia cheating on every single arms control agreement it has ever signed and China showing no interest in anything other than American disarmament. UN votes on norms of behavior have not changed the situation one bit. China and Russia regularly exploit weakness. Iron Dome America seeks to remove this vulnerability from the equation. As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently stated correctly, “Diplomacy is important, talk is important, [and] negotiations are important,” Hegseth said. “But, ultimately, beans and bullets and tanks and helicopters and hard power still [matter].”

Finally, they argue that the system being pursued “won’t work.” This argument fails to understand that the reason American ballistic missile defenses are so limited is mainly due to policy restraints and less about technology. Missile defense technologies, such as those proposed in the Strategic Defense Initiative, were not mature in the 1980s, but four decades later, numerous technologies are more advanced.

Also, The high cost of launch, for example, is drastically lower today than it was four decades ago because of efforts of companies like SpaceX. This single company demonstrated the capacity to launch hundreds of satellites a year, if not thousands in the same number of launches it took thirty years for the Space Shuttle to fly.

Today, the idea of having “space-based interceptors” does not mean the United States must place missiles or laser cannons in space. There are many ways to pursue this effort in ways that were not conceivable when Ronald Reagan envisioned a space-based missile defense. Agencies like the Missile Defense Agency and Space Development Agency are pursuing numerous defensive layers as mentioned in the President’s Executive Order. All will collectively aid the system in protecting the homeland from boost to terminal phases of flight.

Iron Dome for America may not stop every missile launched at the United States, but fielding some measure of defense is better than simply ignoring the problem and hoping that good will prevail. History shows that idealism is all too often a key factor in the onset of war. Nuclear war is one Americans cannot afford to lose and should never be satisfied with leaving to chance.

Iron Dome for America is not just an idea, it is a requirement. The nation must get it right in order to ensure a more safe and secure home for Americans and the world.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Pentagon. The views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect those of his employer or the United States government.

Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Semiconductors: The Backbone of Cyber Power

Semiconductors enable the computing power that drives everything from commercial applications to military operations. Advanced chips are critical for AI, autonomous systems, and national security infrastructure. As nations race to secure technological dominance, control over semiconductor production becomes a central element of cyber deterrence.

The production of semiconductors is extraordinarily complex and relies on a global supply chain. No single country is self-sufficient in this domain. Manufacturing processes demand rare metals, precision tools, and expertise spanning Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Companies like TSMC (Taiwan), Intel (United States), and Samsung (South Korea) dominate the field, with TSMC leading in advanced chip production. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography (ASML), a Dutch company, monopolizes the production of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, critical for fabricating cutting-edge chips.

The Strategic Importance of Semiconductors

Semiconductors are more than just a commercial product—they are a strategic resource that nations leverage to project power in cyberspace. The United States has long recognized the importance of staying ahead in chip technology, aiming to maintain at least a two-generation lead over adversaries like China. This lead is not just about technological superiority but is also about cyber deterrence.

Cyber deterrence relies on the ability to defend, retaliate, or disrupt an adversary’s cyber capabilities. Advanced semiconductors provide the computational power necessary for AI-driven cybersecurity systems, intelligence gathering, and offensive cyber operations. For example, autonomous systems in modern warfare require sophisticated chips to function effectively. If a nation lacks access to such technology, its cyber capabilities are significantly weakened.

China’s Vulnerability and Response

China, despite being the second-largest economy and a global manufacturing powerhouse, has a surprising weakness in the semiconductor supply chain. It spends more on importing chips than oil and relies heavily on foreign suppliers, including its geopolitical rivals. This dependency creates a critical vulnerability in its cyber and AI ambitions.

Recognizing this weakness, China launched massive initiatives to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductor production. However, the barriers to entry are steep. Manufacturing cutting-edge chips requires material purity at a level of 99.99999 percent, and even a minor defect can render a chip unusable. The complexity of the global supply chain further complicates China’s efforts. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography machines, essential for advanced chip production, are legally restricted from being sold to China under export control agreements led by the United States.

China’s strategy focuses on targeting chokepoints in the supply chain while ramping up domestic production of less advanced chips. Success in this endeavor would significantly alter the balance of power in cyberspace, enabling China to compete more effectively in AI and cyber operations. However, for now, its reliance on foreign technology remains a significant deterrent.

US Strategy: Strengthening Deterrence Through Dominance

The United States took proactive steps to secure its dominance in semiconductor technology as part of its cyber deterrence strategy. Legislation like the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act provides billions in subsidies to bolster domestic chip production. The US also works to integrate government, industry, and academia to address challenges in manpower, education, and research and development.

The American approach to cyber deterrence is twofold. First, it seeks to maintain its technological edge by investing in leading-edge chips while ensuring a robust supply of legacy nodes for essential systems. Second, it actively restricts access to critical technologies for adversaries. For instance, since 2018, the export of EUV lithography machines to China has been prohibited, a move aimed at stalling China’s progress in advanced semiconductor manufacturing.

This strategy aligns with the broader geopolitical framework, where supply chain control becomes a tool for exerting influence. By leveraging its dominance in semiconductors, the US can deny adversaries the tools they need to compete in AI-driven cyber capabilities, thereby strengthening its cyber deterrence posture.

The Role of AI and Advanced Chips in Cyber Deterrence

AI is a cornerstone of cyber operations, from defensive systems that identify and mitigate threats to offensive tools that exploit vulnerabilities in adversarial networks. The power of AI is directly tied to the availability of advanced chips, which enable greater computational efficiency and data processing.

In the AI arms race, semiconductors are the critical enabler. Nations with access to advanced chips can train larger models, process more data, and deploy more sophisticated algorithms. Conversely, those lacking access are at a significant disadvantage. This dynamic emphasizes the importance of securing semiconductor supply chains as part of national cyber deterrence strategies.

Geopolitics and the Future of Cyber Deterrence

The geopolitical implications of semiconductor dominance extend beyond cyber operations. Control over the chip supply chain influences alliances, trade policies, and even the balance of power in global governance. Governments increasingly push nations and companies to choose sides, creating a polarized landscape.

The US and its allies currently hold a strong position, but the race is far from over. As China invests heavily in self-sufficiency, the stakes in the semiconductor arms race continue to rise. The future of cyber deterrence will depend on the ability of nations to secure their supply chains, innovate in chip technology, and adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of AI and cybersecurity.

Conclusion

Semiconductors are not just a technological marvel—they are a strategic weapon in the cyber domain. As nations compete for supremacy, control over chip production and supply chains will play a pivotal role in shaping cyber deterrence strategies. The US, with its technological edge and integrated approach, aims to maintain its dominance, while China’s efforts to overcome its vulnerabilities will redefine the global order. In this high-stakes competition, the invisible hand of the market is guided by the visible hand of governments, ensuring that semiconductors remain at the heart of cyber power.

Adam Harris, PhD, is a career cyber professional who both practices the profession and teaches at the university level. The views expressed are his own.    

Cyber Deterrence in the Age of Semiconductors was originally published on Global Security Review.

Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.

The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.

This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with Russia and China, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.

Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in Ukraine serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.

The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.

The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.

The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.

Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.

First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.

Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.

Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.

Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.

Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.

Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.

Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance
   Joe Buff discusses the critical role of escalation dominance in maintaining effective deterrence strategies. He emphasizes the need for modernized approaches to address evolving global threats.
2. The Geostrategic Mind of Iran
   Mohamed El Doh delves into Iran’s strategic thinking, exploring its geopolitical maneuvers and regional ambitions. The article comprehensively analyzes Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

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The Weekend Gouge was originally published on Global Security Review.

This week’s EAR Report brings critical updates on global security dynamics in a world fraught with geopolitical tensions and nuclear threats. ​ From the evolving nuclear doctrines of major powers to the strategic imperatives of missile defense, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of international security. ​ Understanding these developments is crucial for policymakers and the public as nations grapple with the complexities of deterrence and defense. ​

Strategic Developments: New Russian Nuclear Doctrine Summary ​

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ratified a revised nuclear doctrine, emphasizing nuclear deterrence against potential adversaries, including countries and military alliances that view Russia as an enemy. ​ The doctrine allows for nuclear responses to significant threats to Russia’s sovereignty, even from conventional weapons, and includes the possibility of nuclear retaliation if Belarus, as part of the Union State, is attacked. ​

Homeland Missile Defense ​

North Korea, Russia, and China continue to enhance their long-range missile capabilities, posing a threat to the U.S. homeland. ​ The next U.S. president must prioritize restoring credible missile defense. ​ Recommendations include developing space-based sensors for persistent missile tracking, advancing boost-phase intercept technologies, and creating a multi-layered defense framework incorporating land, sea, air, and space interceptors. ​ The goal is to counter both rogue state missile salvos and limited nuclear launches from major powers. ​

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: Foreign Affairs by Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller ​

The U.S. faces renewed nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. ​ The Biden administration has updated nuclear-targeting guidance to deter these adversaries simultaneously. ​ However, modernization efforts for the U.S. nuclear deterrent are hampered by industrial base limitations, material shortages, and funding gaps. ​ The next administration should expedite modernization without extensive policy reviews, focusing on replacing aging systems and enhancing the defense industrial base. ​

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasizes deterrence against adversaries and allows nuclear responses to significant threats, including conventional attacks. ​
2. Missile Defense: Urgent need for a comprehensive, layered missile defense system incorporating advanced technologies and space-based sensors. ​
3. U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: Updated guidance to deter multiple adversaries; modernization efforts must be accelerated to address current and future threats. ​
4. Industrial Base Challenges: Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hindered by industrial limitations and funding issues. ​
5. Strategic Imperatives: The U.S. must maintain a robust nuclear triad and enhance its defense capabilities to ensure national and allied security. ​

ICBM EAR Report – November 22 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Specifically, if the United States does not reduce government spending and reduce the national debt, the nation’s ability to modernize the nuclear arsenal and keep pace with rapid technological advancements is not possible. It is time for a “guns versus butter” debate that ultimately reigns in domestic spending.

The relationship between economic power and military strength is well-documented. As Paul Poast notes, “Money is power.” Paul Kennedy’s research empirically shows, from the Roman Empire to the Cold War, that economic decline often precedes the erosion of military dominance. In today’s context, the United States faces a growing national debt, projected to surpass $50 trillion by 2033, according to the Congressional Budget Office. While this staggering figure is often discussed in terms of domestic economic consequences, such as inflation and interest rates, its implications for national security are equally alarming. The costs of servicing this debt, combined with rising entitlement spending, will leave fewer resources available for defense.

Deterrence and the Need for Modernization

Deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, is the bedrock of American security strategy since the end of World War II. The ability to deter adversaries—whether through nuclear capabilities or advanced conventional forces—depends on maintaining a credible threat of retaliation. This requires not only a robust military infrastructure but also a commitment to modernization.

The American nuclear arsenal, a cornerstone of deterrence, is aging. The nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers—was largely developed during the Cold War. Many of these systems are nearing the end of their operational lives, and without significant investment, they will soon become less effective. The Sentinel ICBM program and the Columbia-class submarine are critical components of this modernization effort, but they come with hefty price tags. The Department of Defense estimates that modernizing the nuclear triad will cost over $1.5 trillion over the next 30 years.

This modernization is not optional. As adversaries like China and Russia expand their nuclear capabilities, failure to update our arsenal would undermine the credibility of American deterrence. In addition, North Korea’s continued nuclear development and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons only increase the need for a reliable deterrent. However, modernization is only possible with sustained investment. If the US continues its current fiscal trajectory, defense spending will only decline, as it already has, by the growing demands of interest payments on the national debt and mandatory spending on programs like Social Security and Medicare.

Technological Advancements: The New Frontier of Deterrence

Beyond nuclear modernization, the future of deterrence will be defined by emerging technologies. As Michael Horowitz notes in his 2020 article, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, autonomous drone warfare, cyber warfare, and hypersonic weapons are reshaping the nature of conflict. These technologies have the potential to transform military operations by providing advanced capabilities for precision strikes, autonomous systems, and cyber operations that can incapacitate an adversary’s critical infrastructure without the need for traditional warfare.

However, the integration of these technologies into the American defense apparatus requires substantial investment in research, development, and deployment. China is already making significant strides in AI and quantum technologies, while Russia continues to prioritize hypersonic weapons development. The US cannot afford to fall behind in this technology race, as the consequences for deterrence are dire. A nation that lacks cutting-edge capabilities risks becoming vulnerable to both traditional and non-traditional forms of warfare.

Yet, technological innovation is expensive. Maintaining a competitive edge in AI, cyber capabilities, and other advanced technologies requires not only a well-funded military but also a robust industrial and academic infrastructure. If government spending continues to spiral out of control, the funds necessary to develop and integrate these technologies will be diverted to service the national debt or shore up social welfare programs. This creates a vicious cycle in which the American military falls further behind while adversaries close the gap—or even surpass the United States—in critical areas.

The Economic Roots of Military Power

The decline in military readiness that results from unchecked government spending and rising debt is not hypothetical. Historical examples illustrate the dangers of economic mismanagement leading to military weakness. The Soviet Union, for instance, collapsed, in part, because it overextended itself militarily while failing to manage its economic challenges. While the US is far from Soviet-style economic collapse, the lesson is clear; no nation can maintain military dominance without a strong economic foundation.

Paul Poast, a leading scholar on the political economy of security, highlights the importance of economic capacity in sustaining military power. Military expenditures are only sustainable if the state has the economic resources to support them. Poast argues that focusing solely on military budgets without addressing the underlying economic conditions that make those budgets possible is a recipe for disaster.

In the American case, the growing national debt is directly threatening the economic foundation necessary for sustained military investment. Interest payments on the debt already consume $900 billion each year, and that figure is expected to rise significantly in the coming decade. As interest rates increase, so will the cost of servicing the debt, leaving fewer funds available for national defense. Without a course correction, this fiscal irresponsibility will leave the US incapable of maintaining its military superiority, much less modernizing its forces for the future.

The Path Forward: Fiscal Responsibility as a National Security Imperative

To avoid this grim future, the US must prioritize fiscal responsibility as part of its broader national security strategy. There are no historical examples of any nation borrowing its way to prosperity. This begins with reining in government spending and reducing the national debt. While this may require difficult political choices—such as reforming entitlement programs or scaling back certain discretionary spending—the alternative is far worse. A nation that cannot afford to invest in its defense is a nation that cannot defend itself.

Moreover, reducing the national debt would free up resources for the investments necessary to modernize the nuclear arsenal and integrate emerging technologies into the military. By putting the nation’s fiscal house in order, it is possible to ensure that the US remains a global leader in both traditional and technological forms of deterrence. Failure to do so risks not only economic consequences but also the erosion of America’s ability to defend its interests and allies in an increasingly volatile world.

The political economy of security is not just about guns and bombs—it is about dollars and cents. If the nation fails to address the growing national debt, the US will prove unable to modernize its nuclear arsenal or keep pace with the technological change that is defining the future of warfare. Fiscal responsibility is not just a domestic issue; it is a national security imperative. Only by controlling spending and reducing debt can deterrence remain credible.

By taking the necessary steps now, the nation can secure a future where America’s deterrent capabilities remain strong and its security unassailable. Failing risks a future where deterrence fails, and with it, the ability to protect the nation and its allies. The stakes could not be higher.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Political Economy of Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hezbollah, now attempting to fend off Israel’s September 30 ground operation, is simultaneously working to adapt its own approach to technology, and, if history is any indicator of the future, the terror group will likely continue as it has, answering Israel’s high-tech efforts with ironically harder to trace low-tech options. That Hezbollah was even using pagers was to avoid cellular detection. And as they adapt, their communications will likely go even more analog, perhaps communicating only through couriers, as Osama Bin Laden was known to do, or using physical handwritten notes and dead drops, as militant Italian anarchist groups did in the early 2000s.

While the idea of a terrorist group obtaining a more technologically advanced arsenal, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or instituting a mass cyberattack is daunting, it is not exactly uncommon due to expense and required expertise. What is far more likely is that Hezbollah and other terrorist groups will downgrade methods, opting for cheaper and easier to implement weapons and methods which are more than capable of lethal outcomes.

Time and time again, society has seen heavy damage wrought on person and property via methods that seem relatively primitive.

In 2021, the Gaza-based terrorist group Hamas increased their use of incendiary balloons when attacking Israel, causing more than 20 fires in southern Israel, straining civilian and IDF emergency service resources, and burning upward of 10,000 acres of farmland over the preceding three years. These “balloons are easily constructed and require little setup to launch compared to rockets, which are expensive and time-consuming to produce” but are still incredibly effective.

In 2013, a US power plant in California was victim of an as yet unsolved shooting attack, damaging multiple transformers. Surprisingly set up with little to no security, the plant’s perimeter was breached and approximately 100 rounds of high-powered rifle ammunition were fired into 17 transformers before police arrived. The damage was severe enough that to avoid blackouts across Silicon Valley power had to be diverted from other areas during the months-long repair.

While these incidents are high profile, given the critical infrastructure connections, they did not result in any fatalities. However, that is not always the goal of terrorists and is hardly the reality for other common low-tech methods. Shootings, bombings, and melee attacks continue to make up the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks. Research from the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that from 2015 to 2020,  85 percent of terror attacks employed one of these methods, with 12 percent being unrealized threats, 2 percent other, and 1 percent vehicle ramming.

The numbers are remarkably similar for lethal attacks in 2023 according to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index published by Vision of Humanity. Out of the 50 most lethal terrorist attacks, only one, an incident in the Homs Province of Syria, featuring an explosive-laden unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) targeting a military graduation ceremony which killed 89 people, could be thought of as a high-tech weapon. The other 49 were made up of 43 armed assaults, five bombings, and one explosive projectile.

As terrorist groups get backed into a corner by high-tech counter methods like the Israeli pager attack, it is increasingly likely they will rely on time-proven simple methods. The world may even see them adapting and learning from accidents such as the September 2024 car crash into a gas pipeline in Texas which caused an explosion or the 2017 Hamburg, Germany, airport evacuation which resulted from the accidental discharge of a simple, lipstick-sized can of pepper spray. While these were both accidents, one can imagine the economic and fear-induced impact if a terrorist group were to try to replicate the outcomes.

There are, of course, outliers to the terrorist use of low-tech methods. There is the terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo’s launch of the notorious Tokyo Sarin gas attack in 1995 or drone attacks along the lines of  2023’s drone attack in Syria, as well as other groups’ potential use of commercial drones. But today’s would-be terrorist is likely not resorting to high-tech weapon or communication devices, and more often than not, going for something easy and/or available. To borrow from Chistopher Nolan’s Joker in the Dark Knight, items like “dynamite, and gunpowder, and gasoline [are] cheap” and are going to comprise the bulk of the future threats from terrorist groups.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Counter Terror’s High-tech to Low-tech Backfire was originally published on Global Security Review.

Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 trillion. As Russia grows increasingly assertive, many on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering how NATO member-states will step up and contribute to the continent’s defense.

To withstand a Russian attack, NATO must plan for between 35 and 50 extra brigades of 3,000–7,000 troops each—adding 105,000–350,000 soldiers. Germany must contribute 3–5 extra brigades or 20,000–30,000 combat troops.

Protection from air attacks is a major German and Eastern European vulnerability. Former German Defense Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula van der Leyen recently emphasized the need for Germany, under its new defense plans, to quadruple its air defenses. That includes Patriot missile batteries and shorter-range systems to protect bases, ports, and railway transportation systems.

Should Russia attack NATO, hundreds of thousands of troops, together with tanks, equipment, and ammunitions, will have to make their way to the eastern front through Germany. Preparations for war with Russia indicate that Poland, the Baltics, and other Eastern NATO allies are primary targets, but so is Germany. During the Cold War, Germany had 36 Patriot missile air defense units. The count is down to nine—after donating three to Ukraine. Berlin just ordered four Patriot missile units at a cost of 1.35 billion euros.

The United States spends about 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, but the Congressional Budget Office projects that will fall to 2.5 percent by 2034. NATO member-states recently issued a joint communique that said, “We reaffirm that, in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.”

The Baltic states are adamant about the need for increased defense spending. Tuuli Duneton, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defense Policy, praised the 23 NATO member-states who now meet the 2 percent spending target. She suggested raising the spending goal to 2.5 to 3 percent.

Pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps,” Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūna stated, “We’ll start to talk at least about 2.5 percent as a floor,” pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps.” He added, “When we analyze what the countries need to develop soon, for a decade maybe, it’s not even 2.5 percent. It’s not even 3 percent. It should be more if you want more air defense systems, if you want more long-range strike capabilities.”

NATO plans focus on logistics, troop movement, and cyber defenses in preparation for conflict with Russia. After NATO’s plans for the biggest defense upgrade in three decades were agreed upon last year, now is the moment of truth: the minimum defense requirements to meet these plans were sent to national governments, highlighting significant shortfalls in air defenses, long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistics, and secure digital communications.

Fixing these shortfalls requires billions of euros in investment. By autumn 2025, NATO aims to set binding targets for members to ensure Europe’s defense. Achieving these targets may be difficult due to budgetary constraints and differing views on NATO’s stance towards Russia.

NATO’s effort to navigate a moment of clear and present danger is made more difficult by the Herculean task of rearming. Deep industrial reconstitution and technological evolution are both needed and taking place across all value chains in all defense tech investments, including space, cyber, drones, and the role of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. Despite its current state of political uncertainty, change-adverse politicians and populations must be convinced of the need for refocusing on defense.

Europe must face a Kulturkampf in which Europeans overcome the three decades of cognitive denial about war in Europe. The biggest obstacle to the above efforts is likely to come from populations that are accustomed to generous welfare programs at the expense of defense preparations. Europe cannot tax its way out of its current problem. European taxes are already the highest in the world.

Compelling communication strategies are essential to justify the increased defense budgets. Officials need to emphasize the pan-European necessity for national and regional security. The twin brother of blood and treasure returned from a long hiatus. Making the argument to citizens becomes an even tougher sell if conscription across Europe is required to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to fight.

Asking ordinary citizens in Western or Southern Europe whether they are willing to die for Ukraine or Lithuania or even Poland will likely draw a negative response. Not all European populations seem willing, able, and ready to fight as nation-states united under the concept of pan-European patriotic defense. Those now leading the effort de guerre are found among Poles, Balts, and, in no small part, the newly energized Nordic countries.

In short, if Europe wishes to survive, it must adapt, deter, and defend itself now. Waiting will only add more blood and treasure to the bill that must be paid.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump said, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.

Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which highlighted the need to revitalize the nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.

Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term

Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian violations, and signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.

Under Trump, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead, which was deployed on Ohio-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the Sentinel ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.

However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “fire and fury” rhetoric toward North Korea and his famous twitter threat that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.

While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.

 The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors

Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a contest for top national security positions, with figures like Richard Grenell and Elbridge Colby emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for focusing military efforts on countering China, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.

The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.

What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?

If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the Columbia-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.

A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.

At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.

 Conclusion

 A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.

Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, modernization efforts are underway among all nuclear weapons states (NWS), who must acknowledge how their nuclear-based actions and rhetoric impacts global security through incentivizing proliferation for non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). Moreover, the world must not forget the effects of actual nuclear use or the potential for catastrophic escalation to follow. Hiroshima and Nagasaki may represent victory achieved by nuclear use to some, but there is no direct analogy to the present day.

On the Horizon?

The potential for nuclear war began in August 1949, when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb. After the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), bilateral and multilateral treaties focused on nuclear arms control. Such efforts served a vital role then, as they do today, for strategic stability and mutual security.

The cornerstones of nuclear arms control include 2011’s New START, plus the original nuclear agreement, and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Russia suspended participation in New START in August 2022, ultimately exacerbating tensions amidst the war in Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats are also increasing nuclear tensions. While the NPT remains active with 191 signatory states, its intention to prevent the further spread of nuclear proliferation is threatened by increasingly aggressive nuclear rhetoric surrounding nuclear strikes and first use. Such concerns stem from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as its, China’s, and North Korea’s vertical proliferation.

Japan is one of many states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons and is experiencing increasing incentives to do so. The cost-benefit analysis of nuclear proliferation is a frequent focus amongst theorists, with the commonality being credible existential threat(s) to a state. Japan experiences this regionally from China and North Korea and more broadly from Russia. Though the United States provides a nuclear umbrella to its Pacific allies, which it continuously reaffirms, discussion in South Korea and Japan suggests growing support for independent nuclear arsenals. This adds to the concern that Japan, for example, might develop its own nuclear weapons.

The Japanese Perspective

Even with existential threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries, most Japanese citizens are opposed to nuclear proliferation and nuclear use. According to public opinion polls, 75 percent of Japanese citizens support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). They believe so strongly in the nuclear taboo that 58 percent denounce nuclear use, even in retaliation to a nuclear attack.

This sentiment is strong in no small part because of their very direct experience through Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Survivors of the Hiroshima bombing—alongside Nagasaki—advocate for peace. They see warfare and the employment of nuclear weapons as unavoidably devastating to civil society. Survivor Toshiko Tanaka advocates for peace through nuclear disarmament, arguing that the world must remain consciously aware of nuclear war’s aftermath. The city of Hiroshima also holds annual commemorations on the bombing’s anniversary—along with housing museums and memorials intended to be a stark reminder of the consequences of war.

“The Only Winning Move is [Still] Not to Play”

Japanese surrender in 1945 stemmed from several factors that cannot be replicated in the age of multiple nuclear-armed states. Imperial Japan started the war in the Pacific with invasions of China and other Asian nations before eventually launching a surprise attack on the United States. By the time Japan surrendered, it took the emperor imposing his will on a military that sought to fight to the bitter end. For some of the military leadership, the physical effects of the atomic bombs were comparable to the firebombing long underway.

Today, however, nuclear weapons are far larger and more numerous, making the effects far greater for any society that may experience nuclear employment. Thus, avoiding highly destructive conventional wars with the potential for uncontrolled nuclear escalation is important.

The threat posed by nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states may be much higher than previously believed. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Ukraine are worrisome. Expanding Chinese and North Korean nuclear arsenals and Iran’s likely nuclear breakout are also worrisome. Moreover, some US political thinking combines with its ballistic missile defenses to lean into isolationist tendencies that stress extended deterrence credibility.

Any nuclear use is likely to receive strong condemnation from the international community. The consequences of international condemnation and the uncertain consequences for use may be enough to prevent the employment of nuclear weapons, but there is no guarantee. Whether limited or large scale, the use of nuclear weapons will likely end efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, including 79 years of historical precedent prioritizing diplomacy, reduction, and verification. This would be a world that neither NWS nor NNWS should wish to see. And to its survivors, remembering the Hiroshima of 1945 serves as a stark reminder of the cost of nuclear employment.

Deterring the use of nuclear weapons must remain a priority for the United States. The optimism for disarmament that won former President Barack Obama the Nobel Prize in 2009 has mostly eroded, and nuclear-armed adversaries show little interest in resuming talks much less action. Therefore, the United States must accomplish its nonproliferation objectives through the strength found in its nuclear modernization and commitments to allied defense.

Amanda Hart is a recent graduate from Virginia Tech, currently working in the field of C-WMD planning and support. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Proliferation Motivations and Modern Japan: Lessons Since Hiroshima was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the B-21 bomber enters the Air Force inventory the number of nuclear-capable bomber bases sees very little change. With the nation preparing for the geopolitical era ahead, it is time to discuss the re-commissioning of Cold War–era United States Air Force (USAF) bases, whose geographic positions can once again play an important role in deterring the axis of autocracy that is forming in opposition to American and Western leadership.

The changing strategic landscape and re-emergence of great-power competition should prompt discussion of renewing a committed focus towards strategic deterrence and the nuclear capabilities needed to deter China, North Korea, and Russia. Many Cold War–era bases were strategically located to project power and respond to threats. Re-commissioning these bases could provide needed dispersal for a bomber force that is located at only three bases. While upgrades and modernization are necessary, existing infrastructure at bases that remain in use by National Guard units, for example, or other organizations could significantly reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Tankers and other supporting components to the bomber mission would also benefit.

Utilizing existing bases could minimize environmental impacts, construction costs, and impact on local communities. While the Base Realignment and Closure effort that followed the Cold War’s end allowed the United States to reduce defense spending through dramatic cuts to infrastructure, the three-decade hiatus from great-power competition is over and the consolidation impacted deployability and introduced strategic force vulnerabilities. Today’s accelerating threat requires the urgent re-establishment of a ready network of dispersal and forward bases.

In tandem with re-commissioning Cold War–era Air Force bases, the strategic value of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) must also be considered. As a critical asset in ensuring energy security, the SPR provides a buffer against potential disruptions in oil supply that could arise from geopolitical tensions or conflicts. Ensuring that military operations are not hampered by fuel shortages is paramount, especially when considering the logistical demands of dispersed air bases. By maintaining and potentially expanding the SPR, the US can safeguard its military readiness and resilience, ensuring that energy constraints do not undermine strategic deterrence and defense capabilities.

The expansion of the American strategic nuclear arsenal—including increasing the number of SSBNs, making Sentinel road-mobile, and acquiring more than the planned 100 B-21 stealth bombers, which are all required in the current strategic environment—underscores the need for re-commissioned bases. Not only are these bases useful for dispersal of bombers, but they have the potential to offer areas from which road-mobile ICBMs can disperse.

Admittedly, significant investment is required to modernize shuddered bases, including upgrades to runways, hangars, communication systems, and security. Environmental assessments and remediation efforts may also be necessary to address potential contamination from previous operations, adding to the cost and timeline. Re-commissioning could also disrupt local communities and raise concerns about noise pollution, safety, and environmental impacts, necessitating careful planning and community engagement. However, many towns devastated by the closure of bases would gladly welcome their return.

Significant resources are required to refurbish or rebuild facilities, integrate new aircraft and technology with existing infrastructure, coordinate with local authorities, and establish new supply chains and support networks. Legacy infrastructure at Air National Guard bases, for example, can reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient force structure while reducing costs. ICBMs, tankers, and other support elements would also benefit.

During the Cold War, the U.S. military employed a dispersal strategy to mitigate the risk of concentrated attacks on its airbases, scattering aircraft across multiple locations to enhance survivability and ensure retaliatory capabilities. This approach was vital in countering the Soviet threat—reducing the vulnerability of strategic assets. In today’s context of renewed great-power competition, with rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, adjusting the current strategy is essential.

Ultimately, the decision to expand the basing footprint should be built on a comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits and a thorough understanding of strategic implications. By carefully weighing these factors, policymakers can make informed decisions that enhance national security while minimizing negative impacts on communities and the environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise. His background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. Views express are his own.  

Reviving Cold War Air Bases: A Strategic Move for Modern Deterrence? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The book is fast-paced and covers Nitze’s career in and around government in just 268 pages. James Graham Wilson, an historian at the US State Department, draws on voluminous archived notes of White House meetings and State Department documents to build his description of Nitze’s influence. This allowed the author to clearly and confidently identify what and how Nitze’s ideas were injected into treaties and American policy. Wilson also does not shy away from criticizing Nitze’s policy or personal shortcomings where warranted. This makes for a complete yet consumable treatment of Paul Nitze’s work.

Whether working in the Department of State or Defense, where Nitze served, aspiring national security professionals should be reading this book. Following Paul Nitze’s career path might be impossible today, but tracing it offers many useful insights.

Nitze made a personal fortune investing during the volatile years of the market crash and depression. He married into political connections and with his comfort secured, could have lived a life of leisure, but chose a life “in the arena” instead. Nitze first applied his exceptional analytical skills to a pressing national security issue—assessing the value of strategic bombing in World War II. It was here, with the US Strategic Bombing Survey, that the Nitze way came to prominence. As Wilson tells it, this “way” is to find the facts, use them to craft executable plans for securing American “predominance,” and then fight aggressively but patiently to get that plan implemented.

The Bombing Survey demonstrated that strategic bombing did not achieve the goals its advocates claimed, earning Nitze no friends in the Pentagon. His analytical accuracy, candor in presentation, and independence of thought earned him the respect of President Truman, Eisenhower, and most presidents that followed.

Paul Nitze has a particular policy related to nuclear weapons. His influence did not depend on his holding a position in government but transcended political partisanship. He saw himself as a “man of action” who fused his mathematical mind with the social sciences and balanced theory with his practical experiences to provide realistic policy. Wilson’s Nitze changed his views rarely and did not shy away from bullying when the tactic appeared useful.

Nitze’s laser focus on America first policies put the country on the path for peace through strength well before those were popular slogans. His loyalty to national interest over personal gain was showcased in a scathing op-ed he helped write that attempted to scuttle the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, once he came to see it as counter-productive to defense.

United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68) was Paul Nitze’s first, and perhaps most important policy document. Wilson dedicates a chapter to this product, but it permeates the entire book. Wilson shows how this document was so much more than simply a plan to deal with Soviet nuclear weapons. It was close in impact to Kennan’s Long Telegram. While sensitive to the value of public debate on defense policy, Wilson demonstrates that Paul Nitze was self-conscious about publishing. However, Wilson credits Nitze with an impressive writing feat in NSC-68, functionally creating the first national security strategy. This document certainly echoes across the decades from its initial presentation to Truman in 1950 well past the Cold War.

Later in his career, Nitze led President Ronald Reagan’s negotiation team for the anti-ballistic missile and intermediate nuclear forces treaties. Nitze consistently pushed for a strong US nuclear posture to enable effective negotiations. This is reflected in deterrence theory today in books like Matt Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters.

Advocacy for high defense budgets did not restrict Nitze from calling for complete nuclear disarmament later in life. He believed that the 1991 Gulf War showed that this could be achieved because of the strategic effects of precision-guided weapons and what the Biden administration calls integrated deterrence.

Some of today’s up and coming defense policy and strategy practitioners may have a hard time relating to Paul Nitze’s privileged upbringing or his self-made independent wealth. Wilson’s assertion that it is unlikely that anyone today could move back and forth across the political aisle like Nitze did is probably true. But there are many useful nuggets of Nitze wisdom and experience in this book that are useful for new and well-practiced policymakers. Wilson’s Nitze is a persistent yet practical advisor at the nexus of defense and diplomacy whose work covered most of the last century but whose impact will likely reach into the next. Paul Nitze’s professional life is worth your time and this book is a great introduction to his work.

James McCue is a retired USAF aviator and nuclear security professional. He is an expert on nuclear strategy and national defense policy. He is a fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Associate Editor for Global Security Review. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior was originally published on Global Security Review.

Its author, James Wilson, is a supervisory historian at the State Department. Wilson oversees the compilation and editing of declassified documents for publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States. His focus is Cold War national security policy and interactions with the Soviets. He previously wrote a book about the end of the Cold War with a focus on Mikhail Gorbachev. Wilson also writes for War on the Rocks.

His latest effort focuses on Paul Nitze, his life, and his role in American national security policy throughout the Cold War.

Paul Nitze is not a household name when it comes to 20th-century US history or even Cold War history. There are only a handful of books about him; four books were published from 1969 to 2006 mentioning him, usually in passing. Keep in mind, he authored NSC-68, which is arguably the most important national security document in the nation’s history. His relative obscurity is not surprising, though, as his opinion of political scientists was mostly negative.

One can see from James Wilson’s resume that he understands the influential events of history and works with official material on these matters every day, which means Paul Nitze is important beyond just authoring NSC-68. Nitze was not just an advisor, but someone known by all post–World War II presidents, and too important to be promoted to a cabinet-level position.

Paul Nitze was and is important for reasons other than just a historic memo and the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was a man who helped write the Selective Service Act, helped procure resources for the Cold War fight against communism, wrote the final reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, and authored the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). His conclusions on the turning and end points for the Axis Powers during the war informed his beliefs throughout the Cold War.

Some of today’s challenges would be familiar to Nitze. He warned of expanding NATO and was highly critical of the State Department’s lack of imagination and ability to adapt. He understood what was required to win a war and a nation’s vulnerabilities during war. If he were alive today, he would most likely find the US to be as provocatively weak as it was on December 7, 1941.

As a man who believed in peace through strength, he would be discussing the nation’s weak economy and supply-chain challenges and advocate for technological innovation across the Department of Defense. He would also oppose consolidating military and private-sector logistics.

One of his worst fears was that an attack on American military forces would push the president into choosing between a retaliatory nuclear strike or surrender. This is still a concern today.

Wilson offers readers a great read and tells untold stories that those interested in World War II and the Cold War will enjoy. The later chapters set up the major policy decisions and events that bring readers to the present day.

This work reminds us that we have been here before, and that achieving strategic superiority is not easy. It took advocates like Paul Nitze, with grit and determination over decades, to make it happen. The threats to the nation continue to evolve. Thus, a new generation of advocates for technological and strategic superiority are needed. American leaders need to look past credentialism and embrace the competent, from wherever they may come. Hopefully the story of Paul Nitze will be an inspiration to them.

One of the highlights of the book is the tale of the overnight negotiations that took place in Reykjavik, Iceland, on the weekend of October 11–12, 1986, when President Ronald Reagan sought to bring General Secretary Gorbachev around to his previously outlined positions regarding START. After an all-night haggling session, and some shuttle diplomacy with their respective bosses, came the morning after. Paul Nitze and Soviet delegation head, Sergei Akhromeyev, agreed that, under the terms of START, they would count gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles on heavy bombers as one warhead.

Nitze was never constrained by academic tenure or any other hindrances. He thrived as an investment manager in private equity, fund management, and foreign direct investment when not in government. That gave Nitze the financial autonomy that shielded him from employers’ and pressure groups’ retaliation. It provided him with the freedom and ability to perform his political activism at the highest level.

Nitze was a man of action who shaped the clockwork of history’s small and big wheels. That does not mean he despised thinkers who kept their fingers on the pulse of things. But what Nitze really loathed was ineffective theorists with no impact on real decision-making.

James Wilson’s biography of Paul Nitze, who experienced the Cold War’s “tension between opposites,” reminds us of the words of Sir William Francis Butler who wrote, “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find it’s fighting done by fools and it’s thinking done by cowards.”

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a practicing attorney.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

America’s Cold Warrior: A Review was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though data on the breakdown of aerospace engineers employed in space-related projects versus solely terrestrial-based aircraft is not readily available, the above statistic represents a worrying trend for a field (space) that is heavily reliant on aerospace engineers and at the center of American preeminence. More concerning, it is important to also ask if these known unemployment numbers are a deterrent for graduates entering into a dedicated space-focused workforce. Space is a critical part of national security and without a comprehensive understanding of how to entice applicants into priority positions, the new space race with China may not be so easily won.

On the surface, the situation does not appear dire. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated aerospace engineering jobs should grow by 6 percent between 2021 and 2031. However, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that the number of space private-sector jobs is down 12,000 from a decade prior. Additionally, an article from major consultant McKinsey & Company noted an 8 percent decline in aerospace, aeronautical, and astronautical engineering hires over the past five years within the broader aerospace and defense sector. It characterized the situation as an “intense competition for talent,” with younger graduates more interested in pursuing the highly lucrative computer and software engineering careers.

“Right now, we have a STEM crisis,” Mel Stricklan of the Space Workforce 2030 initiative spoke in an interview at the 39th Space Symposium. Further exacerbating the space employment challenge is how the overall number of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) graduates decreased despite the number of job openings increasing. As the purpose of her organization’s mission is to develop the next base of qualified professionals, Stricklan was passionate in suggesting, “The next generation needs to understand that they have a place in space.” In the same interview, Mike French, formerly Vice President of Space Systems for the Aerospace Industries Association, warns companies need to pay attention to their retention rates, the impact of retirements on workforce demographics, and security clearance requirements dissuading applicants.

According to Pew Research, a majority of Americans believe the US needs to be a leader in space, including from within the private sector. Though analysts predict a space market valuation of over $1 trillion in under a decade, it is not yet clear if the path to reach this estimate is through increasing the number of professionals and therefore varied projects in the industry or by simply increasing the price to fund space projects already in existence.

For a recent parallel example, the collapse of cryptocurrency bank FTX was in part due to customers discovering sister-company Alameda Research artificially propped up the value of FTX by inflating the value of FTX’s nascent exchange coin rather than providing liquidity backed by fiat or already proven cryptocurrencies. Looking at the current trends in the space market, the Space Launch System rocket produced by Boeing keeps increasing in cost for the Artemis lunar exploration mission despite NASA’s goal to switch contracting methods. Young graduates may be paying attention to these trends and hedging their bets elsewhere.

As Americans wait for the space tourism industry to flourish, traditional aerospace companies are generally limited to selling only to governments and major commercial companies. When a project cancellation hits the industry, such as the OSAM-1 satellite mission, the engineering specialists and mission support staff find themselves in a precarious position of not knowing if they will remain employed. Following this development came whispers of more contractor layoffs hitting the Goddard Space Flight Center after previous cuts in 2023, although NASA committed to funding the 450 personnel working on the program through fiscal year 2024. The recent news of cuts at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which saw 8 percent reductions of the workforce following budget cuts to the Mars Sample Return program, also adds to the uncertainty of job stability for the space industry. Without a new project to immediately switch to, the unemployment rate of aerospace engineers may be partially explained by this phenomenon.

A lack of understanding of why engineers are moving away from space-related careers displays an incongruity within a space strategy that calls for the integration of commercial and military space capabilities. Paid training and a guaranteed job after completion will be necessary to persuade the upcoming Generation Z to choose a space career. Regardless of the numerous factors contributing to a decreasing space workforce, companies and government agencies must first recognize the extent of the problem before an adequate solution can be developed. Whatever solution industry and government leaders may choose, it is important it comes soon.

Alexis Schlotterback is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Is the United States Losing Aerospace Engineers? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Evaluating these effects is part of actuarial science, applied macroeconomics, and geostrategic analyses. There is nothing simple about the implications for the United States’ nuclear posture.

It is true that demographic effects may give the United States an advantage over adversaries on the economic and conventional military fronts through such things as maintaining a stable population, particularly in working- and military-age males. When demographic trends are unfavorable, the importance of nuclear weapons for the United States or an adversary grows as a smaller population of military-age males forces a nation to rely more heavily on a nuclear arsenal.

Conflicting Demographic Trends

Russia and China are suffering significant declines in their total fertility rate (TFR), that is, the average number of live births over the lifetime of each woman in their population. Ignoring the effects of immigration, so is the United States.

For a country to avoid a population gradually shrinking, it must maintain a TFR of at least 2.1. The fertility rate of the US is currently 1.6, China 1.1, and Russia 1.4. China and Russia are lower than America’s by enough to create a more serious problem for Russia, and especially for China, than for the United States. It can take decades for a state’s TFR to effectively reverse a downward trend.

The United States’ 1.6 TFR would, by itself, make the US average age increase, while also shrinking the total population. But, America has one problem which is also an opportunity, while China and Russia have only the problem—immigration. Millions of young people are trying to get into the US, legally or illegally. Very few people of any age are trying to get into Russia and China, while many people in those authoritarian regimes are leaving.

Macroeconomic and Geostrategic Effects

As a country’s population ages, the size of its working-age population declines, and so will government tax revenues. The number of young people available for military service also declines. This has negative consequences. An aging population, when not offset by youthful immigration, leads to increases in the medical and pension costs for the elderly. These costs can grow into an increasingly divisive burden on a state’s economy and citizens—reducing resources available for military expenditures.

An aging population, if not offset by immigration, also leads to a decrease in available military manpower. This can weaken conventional armed forces.

Nuclear Risks

The negative impacts of an aging population can have an unfortunate two-fold effect. They can nudge an expansionist regime to rely more on its nuclear arsenal for coercion and deterrence. In the extreme, nuclear employment “escalate to win” may occur when a smaller and less capable conventional force cannot win outright.

One reason population decline can lead to greater reliance on nuclear weapons is the economic necessity that a small conventional military creates. Nuclear weapons are a cost-effective deterrent and useful for coercion. It should come as no surprise that Russia is substituting nuclear capability for its conventional weakness.

Conclusion

The declining populations of Russia and China are a reality that is unlikely to change. Such decline has widespread impact on the economy and military. It can lead their leaders to feel pressed to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons and take aggressive action before the decline takes its full effect. The timing of the current war in Ukraine may, in part, be a result of such considerations. It appears the reliance on nuclear weapons is underway. For Russia and China, nuclear weapons are the offset to American power.

While the demographic trends mentioned can give the United States a relative advantage in the economic and conventional military spheres, it is critical the nation does not become complacent. Properly understanding these trends can emphasize how vital it is the US modernizes and right sizes its nuclear arsenal for effective deterrence.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). He is an experienced actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed are his own.

Adversary Demographic Trends Are Eroding American Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton, labels this issue the three body problem. As nuclear strategy experts suggest, American deterrence capabilities and overall numbers both matter.

Patrick McKenna and Dylan Land’s “Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates,” details four essential variables for right-sizing the arsenal: risk management, deterrence and assurance goals, force use guidelines, and operational constraints. This article will unpack the matter of risk management.

Risk management issues permeate virtually every decision about nuclear posture and arsenal right-sizing. The perspectives of tolerable nuclear risks held by America, this country’s adversaries, and this country’s allies all matter to effective global nuclear peacekeeping.

Deterrence theorists rightly argue that the US should start by understanding exactly what each adversary values most and their goals. This information is useful in determining what to hold at risk—the high value assets to target. The total number of those targets is an essential input to arsenal right-sizing.

Political and fiscal compromises have a major impact on arsenal size as well. For the United States, the finite capacity of the defense industrial base is a major current constraint. The less money available to sustain America’s triad, the greater the risk that the force structure is not adequate to deter adversaries and assure allies. The weaker the political will to resist coercion, and to retaliate in kind to any nuclear attacks, large or small, the less successful is deterrence and assurance.

Similarly, the less the production capacity of the defense industrial base, the less the US is able to implement on a timely basis whatever types and numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads are the chosen arsenal size and force structure.

Since nuclear deterrence has never failed, analysis is necessarily prospective and does not rely on large quantities of data or past experience. Instead, there is a reliance on inferences from military and political history, combined with playing out, on paper, the aftermath of a nuclear war.

The United States is now dealing with the unpleasant reality that any significant expansion in the nuclear arsenal is accomplished much less rapidly than adversaries can grow and strengthen their own arsenals. Actuarial science suggests that guarding against catastrophic failures calls for worst-case planning. Given the catastrophic results of nuclear warfare, right-sizing the nuclear triad must deter all adversaries simultaneously. This includes accounting for the instance in which China, North Korea, and Russia collaborate to coerce or attack the United States. Should they ever take the gamble to launch a nuclear attack, American deterrence has utterly failed.

An upper bound on American deployed warheads is the sum of what is needed to deter each adversary in isolation. This is because should US Strategic Command deploy enough nuclear weapons to simultaneously hold Chinese, North Korean, and Russian targets at risk, deterrence is likely to hold. Keep in mind, there is no historical example to suggest that all weapons will strike designated targets.

Thus, the fewer weapons there are to strike targets, the greater the risk of deterrence failure. This leaves the old pejorative, “We will make the rubble bounce,” important when considering that probability of target destruction is certainly much lower than many believe.

As with other inputs to triad right-sizing, wherein less of an important resource increases the risk of deterrence failure, the more the total number of deployed nuclear warheads falls short of the upper bound mentioned above, and the greater the risk becomes that one or another scenario of adversary coercion or attack will occur and possibly succeed.

But assuming the US fields a large enough and modernized arsenal, there is a disincentive for any single attacker to strike the United States and for a second adversary to wait, assess the damage, and perhaps complete what the initial attacker did not. There is also a disincentive for all adversaries to collaborate in a unified attack. Absent a large American arsenal, such considerations become more viable.

Risk is relative. There is seldom one right answer when many limited resources are being competed for, while the nation must also address other priorities besides the all-important national defense. But to go very far below the upper bound of the total number of high-value targets risks deterrence failure. Any resource savings are short-term and illusory. The costs of deterrence failure vastly eclipse any imagined benefits to a too-small arsenal.

Only further research and development, strategic planning, intelligence analysis, and open debate can lead to a sound consensus on exactly how big the nuclear arsenal needs to be during the risk-laden years that lie ahead. There is no time to waste.

Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with four decades of experience. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Right-sizing was originally published on Global Security Review.

The US does not seek a full-scale nuclear exchange. Yet it is critically important that the civilian and military leadership consider all possible scenarios. It is imperative to impress upon warfighters and their political leaders that, while unwanted, nuclear exchange may be a reality the United States faces.

The expanding arsenals of China and Russia deploy advanced and varied delivery vehicles and warheads and are a direct challenge to the American-led international order. The move from a bi-polar to a tri-polar world is driving instability and creating new challenges that the US military is not prepared to face.

If military commanders fail to understand the critical role of nuclear weapons or lack a willingness to use them, when necessary, national security objectives will not be met. China and Russia see their nuclear weapons as an extension of their warfighting capabilities and are prepared to use them.

American leaders cannot wish away events unfolding around them. The Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) report on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified the contradiction in direction and understanding of American warfighters. According to the report, “The NPR reiterates a January 2022 statement by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdon and the United States stipulating that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,’ and that ‘nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.’”

Later the report explains, “The NPR lists three roles for nuclear weapons: deter strategic attacks, assure allies and partners, and achieve US objectives if deterrence fails.” This is indeed the cornerstone of national policy and ensures the United States effectively operates under a non-first-strike policy.

However, the military seems to interpret this message to mean that the United States will never fight a nuclear conflict and does not need to plan to fight one. A clear example of this is the fact that no American president has participated in a US Strategic Command national nuclear exercise since President George W. Bush. Warfighters and planners from Air Force Global Strike Command and US Strategic Command who do, in fact, plan and think about possible nuclear options every day, may disagree because they do think about nuclear conflict. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely discussed or examined by leaders within the major commands or combatant commands that are primarily tasked with a conventional mission.

The focus on conventional warfare pushes aside any discussion of conventional-nuclear integration in a future fight. Too often, a response becomes focused on a comparable conventional response instead of all available options for the president to choose from. This becomes self-limiting even after nuclear attacks on the United States or its forces abroad. Limiting the response to adversary’s nuclear attack to conventional options very likely has the opposite of the desired effect.

It is time to refocus attention on how to fight and win a conflict where nuclear weapons are employed and teach warfighters that deterrence holds when Russia and China understand the United States can and will fight and win a nuclear conflict. The military, unfortunately, has experienced a precipitous decline in nuclear expertise and strategic thought.

The future focus should be to increase the level of understanding across all levels within the total force. This is critical as the nation presses into uncharted waters in a new nuclear world. Recent developments and growth among the Russian, Chinese, and even North Korean nuclear arsenals create serious concern because none of these adversaries are only building strategic nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of strategic deterrence. They are building low-yield, shorter range, tactical nuclear weapons that serve no purpose other than battlefield use.

Time for a New Deterrence Theory?

 Three significant deterrence thinkers play an outsized role in shaping theory and policy. Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and, in the post–Cold War era, Keith Payne were, and remain, influential in driving national policy. Deterrence theory served the nation for many years and ensured that the Soviet Union understood the ultimate risk of nuclear conflict with the United States.

The tri-polar world emerging may change the probability for limited nuclear exchange—increasing the threat by emboldening Russia and China to challenge the United States. The smaller nuclear-armed states, when added to the mix, create additional volatility. Understanding that an adversary may believe they can overcome an overmatch of their conventional forces with the use of low-yield weapons is a new factor in the deterrence equation. While keeping any fight conventional is clearly the United States’ preference, Russia and China are demonstrating that they intend to use nuclear weapons to backstop conventional forces.

It is worth keeping in mind that any fight between the United States and Russia or China will take place in their backyard. This means the asymmetry of interests at stake may leave either adversary to see nuclear weapons as a logical option to ensure victory.

This change should drive new thought and deeper understanding of nuclear strategy and deterrence. Political and military leaders will have to rethink the time-tested deterrence methods of the past and see how they may or may not apply with this new and challenging nuclear world. Increasing nuclear expertise and strategic exploration will open new and varied thoughts on how to apply an updated and possibly more flexible nuclear strategy.

Conclusion

Political and military leaders must understand the dynamics discussed and ensure warfighters understand the battlefield on which they may fight. They must articulate the difference between nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting and mentor leaders on its critical importance.

Warfighters need to organize, train, and equip to fight and win in conflicts that include nuclear weapons use. Future leaders cannot fear nuclear weapons and must understand how to fight after their employment by either side. This may very well be the difference between American victory or defeat.

Raymundo M. Vann Jr. is a 2024 Department of the Air Force Fellow and author of The Joint Force’s Unwinnable War? The views expressed are his alone.

The US Military’s Unwinnable War was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Problem

In a population of 336 million, the potential death of 270 million Americans is 80 percent of the citizenry. Yet, fentanyl remains undesignated as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). A 1961 analysis suggested that a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States, consisting of 553 nuclear weapons with a total yield of over 2,000 megatons, would kill 50-60 million Americans out of a population of 179 million—30 percent of the American population.

According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the highly lethal China-Mexico fentanyl nexus is a sophisticated enterprise of illicit trafficking of precursor ingredients and refined product, as well as money laundering designed to evade authorities at all levels of government. Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator Anne Milgram stated, “Today, drug cartels in Mexico are mass-producing fentanyl and methamphetamine largely sourced from chemicals in China, and they’re distributing these substances throughout the United States. We are finding these deadly drugs in every state; in cities, suburbs, rural areas, and local communities spanning the country.”

As recently as December 2022, the DEA announced it seized “more than 379 million potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.” This is enough to kill the entire population of the United States and Canada.

The Director of National Intelligence’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment notes that “Mexico-based TCOs (transnational criminal organizations) are the dominant producers of illicit fentanyl for the US market and that China remains the primary source for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing equipment.” However, the report offers no explanation for the 76,725 fentanyl deaths in 2023.

This is more than just transactional narco-crime. It is a complex and deliberate example of gray zone warfare. Twenty-five years ago, two Chinese People’s Liberation Army colonels penned Unrestricted Warfare, which proposed asymmetric tactics for China to “fight a non-military war.”

The book describes a potential attack vector as “drug warfare,” which is “obtaining sudden and huge illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries.” In other words, the trafficking of lethal fentanyl allows China to weaken the fabric of American society, burden the United States with $1.5 trillion in annual costs, and potentially kill catastrophic numbers of American citizens. This is done without firing a single shot. Colonel Qiao Liang wrote, “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.”

China and the US have different approaches to counternarcotics cooperation. While the US tries to keep it separate and distinct from the overall bilateral geostrategic relationship, China views its counternarcotics cooperation as subordinate to its quid pro quo geostrategic relations. As the rapport between the two countries worsens, China’s willingness to cooperate with or acquiesce to the US on counternarcotics efforts decreases. This was demonstrated when China “formally suspended bilateral counternarcotics cooperation in August 2022, in response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.”

A Solution 

It is time to address the fentanyl scourge with a new approach. First, the American government must acknowledge the China-Mexico fentanyl crisis for what it is—gray zone warfare. The 2022 National Defense Strategy describes gray zone methods as “coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for US military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US government.”

Gray zone actions are performed by actors seeking to challenge or violate international customs, norms, and laws in pursuit of their national security interests without provoking a direct military response. Moreover, gray zone attacks from foreign powers can challenge national stability by exploiting societal divides and domestic vulnerabilities to destabilize or undermine societal harmony or confidence.

This risk is not limited to cyber-attacks upon critical infrastructure or terrorist attacks in American cities. Simply viewing the fentanyl crisis strictly from a criminal point of view limits responses to the law enforcement tool. Acknowledging the fentanyl crisis as a form of warfare will allow the integrated responses of the military to proactively engage the threat and begin to execute a real deterrence strategy for the future.

Second, it’s time to declare fentanyl a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The federal government defines a WMD as “any weapon that is designed, intended, or has the capability to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of persons through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors.” We can all agree that the potential death of 80 percent of America’s population meets these criteria.

In 2019, the Trump administration considered but declined to declare fentanyl a WMD, instead declaring the opioid crisis a public health emergency. In 2021, the Biden administration issued an executive order declaring a national emergency with respect to international trafficking of illicit narcotics, including fentanyl.

Congress recently introduced HR 7190 “to require the Assistant Secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office of the Department of Homeland Security to treat illicit fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction and for other purposes.” Designating fentanyl as a WMD would elevate the threat of fentanyl to the American people from criminal behavior to a national security threat status and from a narco-trafficking burden to a class of gray zone warfare.

Third, the United States, a member of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), must designate fentanyl as a chemical weapon. To do this, the CWC definition of chemical weapon, which includes toxic chemicals that “can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans,” including their precursors, must be updated to include — intent.

Many CWC and WMD thinkers remain focused on traditional weaponized chemical munitions rather than the weaponization of synthetic opioids, like fentanyl, for the intentional exploitation or purpose of attacking a person or group or for spreading discord. Whether the attack vector is a 105-millimeter mustard gas munition or sold on the streets of America through the Chinese-sponsored fentanyl pipeline, the intent is the same: to kill.

Congressman David Trone (D-MD) declared in 2022 that China was “critically involved in the 64,000 deaths we had because they are pretty much the lone supplier of [fentanyl] precursor chemicals, which they are shipping to Mexico.” This is corroborated by the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment and the FBI director’s testimony.

Of the over 107,000 deaths-by-overdose in 2022, 68 percent were attributed to synthetic opioids like fentanyl. This is almost double the number of traffic fatalities for the same year. Since dead customers are not repeat customers, the motive is not profit but death and societal destruction through the calculated use of gray zone warfare.

America embarked on a twenty-year war on terror after 2,977 people were killed by a single terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Fentanyl “has killed more Americans than the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam Wars combined” and one kilogram of fentanyl is enough to kill 500,000 people.

Despite recent sanctioning of 25 China-based companies and individuals allegedly involved in the production of chemicals used to make fentanyl, China appears disinclined to actually stop precursor exports. As Attorney General Merrick Garland stated, “We know that this global fentanyl supply chain, which ends with the deaths of Americans, often starts with chemical companies in China.”

Treating fentanyl as a national security threat would allow a truly integrated approach to first combating and then deterring the drug with a Department of Defense response. It is time to hold China accountable for an activity emanating from within its borders. After all, the United States has gone to war for far fewer deaths.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

It’s Time to Declare Fentanyl a National Security Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

The newspaper cited U.S. officials, who described the incidents as potential forms of espionage.

Last year, the U.S. Department of Defense, FBI, and other agencies held a review to try to curb the frequency of these breaches, which involved unauthorized entries into US military bases and other federal sites, the newspaper reported.

READ MORE

Chinese Nationals Posing as Tourists Have Accessed US Military Bases and Other Sensitive Sites: Report was originally published on Global Security Review.

Central to the concept of inhibition is the idea that the US is willing to go to great lengths to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even at the expense of strained diplomatic relations or the imposition of sanctions. This commitment was evident in American interactions with both adversaries and allies, as seen in its efforts to dissuade countries like Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. Inhibition failed in the latter case and may soon fail in the former, but the lack of proliferation by American allies are cases of success.

The Pragmatic Approach of Inhibition

Historically, the United States was always willing to engage with other nuclear powers, even adversaries such as the Soviet Union, to advance shared inhibition goals. The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty discussed by both the United States and Soviet Union before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was understood as an inhibition tool. As Marc Trachtenberg notes,

A test ban, the Soviets would be told, would mean that “there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp.” The Russians, for their part, would prevent allies from building nuclear forces. And these commitments would be linked: the United States would “take responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated.”

This pragmatic approach, characterized by a mix of cooperation and competition, highlights the adaptability of the inhibition strategy in the face of evolving geopolitical dynamics. Ultimately, the US is willing to work with either friend or foe, to pressure, coerce, and threaten nascent nuclear states, to include both allies and adversaries, to keep them non-nuclear.

The Role of Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Extended nuclear deterrence, a key component of American grand strategy, refers to the United States’ commitment to defend its allies with nuclear weapons, if necessary. This commitment serves as a crucial aspect of the security assurances provided by the US to its allies under the nuclear umbrella, reinforcing the broader framework of alliances that underpin global security. However, the credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence is under scrutiny, particularly in light of doubts about the United States’ willingness to prioritize the defense of its allies over its own interests.

The United States’ willingness to trade Los Angeles for Seoul, for example, raises concerns about the reliability of American security assurances and the potential impact on its inhibition efforts. Such doubts not only affect the perception of American commitment to its allies but also raise concerns about the effectiveness of extended deterrence in supporting the broader strategy of inhibition. As such, ensuring the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence is crucial for maintaining global stability and preventing nuclear proliferation.

Reevaluating Kenneth Waltz’s Proposition

Kenneth Waltz’s proposition that more nuclear states can lead to a safer world raises profound questions about the nature of nuclear deterrence and international security. In a world where South Korea is concerned about American security commitments, they may consider proliferating nuclear weapons to ensure they have a credible deterrent against North Korea. They may come to the belief that more is better and develop their own nuclear arsenal in hopes of obtaining more security. However, the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the risks associated with additional nuclear-armed states suggests that Waltz’s argument may not hold true. The proliferation of nuclear weapons introduces uncertainties and escalatory risks that could destabilize regions and increase the risk of nuclear conflict rather than decrease the risk.

A scenario in which South Korea acquires nuclear weapons could potentially strengthen North Korea’s resolve to consider early nuclear weapons use in conflict, compensating for weaknesses in its conventional military capability. This is precisely the kind of hypothetical situation that prompted the United States to adopt a policy of extended deterrence alongside the grand strategy of inhibition. There is a concern that when the US (or any nuclear state) faces an adversary lacking parity in escalation capabilities, that adversary might resort to early nuclear weapons use to compensate for strategic shortcomings. However, testing an American response to nuclear attack is a risky endeavor fraught with the possibility of further escalation.

Sustaining the Strategy of Inhibition

Instead of advocating for a proliferation-friendly approach, it is imperative for the United States and the international community to continue their efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation. This includes diplomatic engagement, economic incentives, and, when necessary, coercive measures to dissuade states from acquiring nuclear weapons. The risks of nuclear proliferation far outweigh any potential benefits, and concerted efforts to prevent it remain essential for global security and stability.

Despite these challenges, the sustainability of the inhibition strategy remains feasible. The key lies in reaffirming American commitment to its allies and maintaining a credible deterrence posture. This requires not only a clear and consistent articulation of American security guarantees but also investments in conventional military capabilities and diplomatic efforts to address the underlying security concerns of allies. The US must continue to craft convincing strategic narratives regarding its commitment to allied security via maintaining escalation dominance, nuclear superiority, and narrative control.

Furthermore, the US can leverage its alliances and partnerships to reinforce norms against nuclear proliferation. By working closely with its allies and engaging with potential nuclear aspirants through dialogue and diplomacy, the US can continue to promote the goals of inhibition while ensuring the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrence.

Conclusion: Upholding the Principles of Inhibition

The United States’ grand strategy of inhibition is a linchpin of American foreign policy and is rooted in the belief that preventing nuclear proliferation is crucial for global security. While recent debates on the credibility of American extended deterrence raise valid concerns, the strategy of inhibition remains not only relevant but imperative in today’s world.

The risks posed by nuclear proliferation far outweigh any perceived benefits, making it essential for the US and the international community to continue their efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation. By reaffirming its commitment to allies, maintaining credible deterrence, and engaging diplomatically with potential proliferators, the US can uphold the principles of inhibition and mitigate the risks associated with nuclear proliferation. In doing so, the US will not only safeguard its own security but also contribute to a safer and more stable world.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Challenges: Inhibition and Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to separate this terrorist organization from the innocent Palestinian population that is dying as sacrificial lambs to Hamas’ ideological goals. Hamas is arguably using the self-made shield of dead and starving Palestinian civilians to gain appeal with Western observers. Civilian casualties, whether child or adult, male or female, devout or secular, are collateral damage in the terrorist organization’s quest to remain hidden and effective in their fight for narrative supremacy.

Yet upon further examination of Hamas’ covenant, “The Day of Judgment will not come about until [Muslims] fight Jews and kill them.” History has demonstrated that the groups and individuals who choose violent and radical means to achieve ideological goals often disregard the unintended consequences of their ambitions.

It seems that Hamas rejects any long-term peace talks. According to the Hamas covenant, “So-called peaceful solutions and international conferences are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement…Those conferences are no more than a means to appoint the infidels as arbitrators in the lands of Islam.” To take it a step further, Hamas believes, “There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. Initiatives, proposals, and international conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.”

Hamas does not care about the thousands of dead Palestinians, or the families displaced and starving. One must ask, is Hamas an organization supporting Palestinian liberation or a cancer on long-term peace and security in the Palestinian-Israeli question?

From a strategic perspective, Iran is the actor behind the scenes supporting Hamas, which many experts suggest is a subordinate organization in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. A further examination suggests Hamas’ ideological blindness brought the current hell on Gazans. In November 2023, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly told Hamas leader, Ismail Haniya, “You gave us no warning of your October 7 attack on Israel and we will not enter the war on your behalf.”

Analysts can choose to believe this or not. But Tehran struggles to keep up with heavy inflation, faces angry and restless youth and minority groups, a possible invasion by Azerbaijan into Armenia, which would cut trade and electricity imports. This is all while Iran undertakes a multifaceted campaign to remove the US from the middle east.

Hezbollah has largely remained out of the Gaza conflict, limiting engagement with Israel to small skirmishes on the Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah’s ideological and militaristic zealots do not appear willing to sacrifice their manpower and treasure for a group that is not comprised of co-religionists. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria was not going to join Hamas either because of its never-ending civil war and depleted resources. The Houthis are a different story, but as one al- Jazeera columnist wrote, the group’s real goal is permanent deterrence against the Saudis.

Hamas failed to understand that Israel would “rally around the flag” in an effort to exterminate the organization once and for all. Although Hamas sought to invoke a severe reaction from Israel to generate Gazan casualties, which then generates international support and aid, the Hamas leadership did not expect Israel to pursue a fight to the death.

Globally, Hamas is experiencing significant support in the information war, which can prove equally important to battles on the ground. While fighting rages in Gaza, the terror group’s strategic ambitions remain unchanged. The confounding reality is that the war is producing distorted Western perceptions of Hamas which are winning sympathy for Hamas (a designated terror group since 1997). Uninformed views of Hamas in the West confuse some younger generations, leaving them thinking the extremist group is fighting for freedoms similar to those found in the West.

Sadly, social media algorithms seem to ignore the hostage situation. Hamas took roughly 240 Israeli hostages during the attacks that killed over 1,200 people. The hostages were taken to underground “tunnels of the resistance”. Recent efforts to negotiate the trade of Hamas prisoners for Israeli hostages has failed. Though many Gazans celebrated in the streets after the October 7 attacks, Gazans recently criticized the harm caused by Israel’s response and are calling for an end to Hamas’ reign of terror. Tragically, the Israeli response and the refusal of Egypt or any other neighboring nations to accept Palestinian refugees has created a humanitarian crisis that is often viewed from very skewed sources that create echo chambers of disinformation.

This content amplification may arguably be convincing actors to commit more acts of terror. National law enforcement agencies report seven arrests made in connection with planned terror attacks related to efforts to support Hamas. Three of them were planning an attack on behalf of Hamas in Denmark and four in Germany and the Netherlands were members of the organization. They were detained due to suspicion of planning attacks against Jewish institutions in Europe.

European countries are notorious for knife attacks related to terror groups. Americans are susceptible to the same danger due to the Biden administration’s open-border policy. A US Customs and Border Protection internal intelligence notice warned that “individuals inspired by, or reacting to, the current Israel-Hamas conflict may attempt to travel to or from the Middle East via circuitous transit across the Southwest border.” Hamas’ ideology is indeed a cancer that will spread to the West if left uncontested. Amplified media content indirectly can support Hamas, as the justification and expansion of terrorism is copycatted.

Hamas is far from an Enlightenment-minded organization advocating for personal freedom and the preservation of human life. Americans can help end this war, but only with the defeat of Hamas.

Lora Karch Dulgarian is an independent analyst focusing on national security, social, political, and economic issues in the Middle East and Europe. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Israel-Hamas Conflict Has Spread the Fog of War Across the Western World was originally published on Global Security Review.

The risk of extremism and consistent alienation of citizens in European countries have both expanded and diversified. Some European Union member states in the EU require security sector reforms and the replacement of old communist security and intelligence infrastructure to tackle the hydra of radicalization and extremism.

The British state has abruptly clattered down to “earth with a very hefty collision, thanks to the Brexit hydra.”¹ The country is in a profound social and financial crisis—its machinery and security infrastructure are operating on a long-established streak. Security sector reforms are needed to make the system professionalize and competent. Mr. Tom Winsor’s police reform paper and the inquiry report into the Justice system both stressed the need for professionalization of police and law enforcement agencies, but no practical implementation has occurred.

The British state is in trouble and is sliding into the unholy-mess of Brexit, and its future is going to become gloomy outside Europe due to its economic and political confrontation with the EU.² The culture of racism, hatred, social, and political discrimination intensified after the 2016 Brexit referendum.³ Second, the Brexit crisis has become a permanent headache of government and civil society, which is going to damage the special relationship between the U.K. and the United States. The 2019 leak of a U.K. National Security Council meeting, in which cooperation on 5G infrastructure with Huawei—a Chinese technology company that is alleged to have close ties with the Chinese Communist Party’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army—was viewed by security experts as a matter of grave concern. If the company is permitted to operate with free-reign in the U.K., the country’s relationship and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. will be deeply affected.⁴

British civil society and the country’s intelligentsia are, in large part, opposed to Brexit, citing Britain’s century-long relationship with the continent. On February 13, 2019, the Guardian newspaper reported the concerns of more than forty former Ambassadors and High Commissioners about the entanglement of Brexit and its ramifications. In a written letter to the Prime Minister May, they warned that “British influence in the world will wane if the country leaves Europe’s trading and foreign policy bloc”.⁵

These all-embracing developments forced British Intelligence Chiefs to explain the importance of Britain’s intelligence sharing and security cooperation with the EU. On 20 June 2018, in a speech in Brussels, GCHQ Chief Jeremy Fleming’s statement was evident from his irritation about the dilapidating security crisis. He firmly demanded intelligence cooperation with the EU allies. In his speech, Fleming said; “After Brexit, the UK will continue to work with the EU. Fleming stated.⁶ On 14 May 2018, Chief of MI5, Mr. Andrew Parker consistently demanded cooperation with the EU intelligence agencies: “In today’s world, we need that shared strength more than ever. I can say confidently that the way we work together has prevented loss of life in the EU.”⁷ These statements were clear signs of irritation.⁸ 

The Prime Minister did not bring to bear the concerns of intelligence Chiefs about the consequences of Brexit. In the aftermath of these critiques, the government introduced the National Security Capability Review (2018),⁹ to tackle national security challenges, but the growing influence of extremist forces across the country¹⁰, cast doubt on the credibility and highlighted the weak approach of the May government to national security. The first major strategic failure of the review is that it did not elucidate the security road-map: “This lack of strategic clarity has been highlighted by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), the main parliamentary body scrutinizing its implementation.”¹¹ The country’s National Security Strategy also missed the boat to keep momentum with emerging threats and didn’t adequately respond to the exponentially growing threat of radicalization.¹² 

In its 04 June 2018 version, the U.K. Counter-Terrorism Strategy highlighted many vulnerabilities, citing the proliferation of jihadism, and a growing number of terror networks across the country, which prompted negative perceptions about its operational effectiveness, and popularity.¹³, However, several new amendments were added to the National Security Strategy, Strategic Defense and Security Review, and Cyber Security Strategy, to make effective law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure against radicalized forces, lone wolves and foreign espionage, but these amendments are not a proper panacea to the looming security crisis—more work is needed to make police and security agencies effective.¹⁴ 

From January to June 2019, more than 100 people in England were killed, and 100 more were injured in different incidents, but the police and law enforcement agencies have no security plan to address the concerns of communities. Interestingly, no single Muslim was found behind these attacks, while British Home Secretary Sajid Javed shamelessly linked terrorism to Islam. His recent verboseness against Islam appeared in a recent report of Christian Today newspaper: “Islam has been responsible for terrorist attacks in Britain…….“it is ‘lazy’ and ‘wrong’ to suggest terror has nothing to do with Islam. But I think it is absolutely fair to say that there is a special burden on Muslim Communities because whether we like or not these terrorists call themselves Muslims, the newspaper reported.¹⁵ The Home Secretary acted irresponsibly and did not take into account the concerns of Muslim communities.

Adding insult to injury is the country’s Snoopers Charter Surveillance (SCS) and the government’s war on civilian privacy. Liberty, a British human rights organization recently highlighted the powers of the Snoopers Charter Surveillance and data collection methods that were causing communities irksomeness: “When the U.K. government passed a law allowing the mass collection of data from all U.K. citizens…..The Investigatory Power Act, more popularly known as the ‘Snoopers’ Charter,’ allow for the indiscriminate collection of data”.¹⁶ The police has now practically started using the Snooper Charter Surveillance on a borough-level to monitor communities and their activities day-by-day.  

Recently, Liberty and Privacy International called on local communities to report the negative impacts of this consternating and offensive surveillance of local policing authorities, to the Police and Crime Commissioner. The way local police stations using modern surveillance technologies in streets and markets have put our privacy at risk. From car surveillance to mobile phone and drone technologies, the police forces have an unparalleled view into the lives of ordinary British citizens.

Individual liberty and human rights groups recently warned that excessive and offensive use of surveillance tools by the police might alienate communities from the state and government: “From facial recognition in streets to monitoring social media and mobile phones, the police are not open and honest about what tech they use, where they use it, who they use it against and what laws allow them to do so. However, surveillance tech is being used without the public knowledge or consent, on the ground that 95% percent civilians know nothing about the evolving and changing operational mechanism of police surveillance in cities, towns, and streets”.¹⁷

More worrisome is the unauthorized surveillance in which South Asian intelligence agencies are using their spies against their political opponents. They are cruising in cities and towns with impunity, and receive their salaries through a third person, or from their embassies.

This author has personally experienced eaves-dropping many times in high streets and shopping plazas in London.¹⁸ Foreign terrorist fighters present a significant threat to the national security and critical infrastructure of the country. Since 2014, we have seen large numbers of radicalized individuals traveling to Iraq and Syria, while Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), and Intelligence and Security Committee are showing their performance on papers in their annual reports. In reality, the state’s response has been feeble since the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.¹⁹ Intelligence wars between foreign entities on British soil is making thing worse. The security relationship with the EU community remains in flux, while internal political disagreement and deteriorating law and order are prompting a brain drain within civil society and intellectual forums.²⁰ 

EU resentment towards the U.K. raises several concerns—particularly the attitudes of France and Germany. In a knee-jerk reaction to U.K. electronic surveillance operations on its soil, Germany immediately canceled a Cold-War era agreement with U.K.²¹ In 2013, Germany, France, and Spain summoned U.K. Ambassadors to explain the country’s motive behind its intelligence collection practices. To distract from this and in an effort to disguise its own weaknesses, the British government published a security document, underlining the threat of 20 foreign intelligence agencies to the U.K.²² This was to prove that Germany and France were also spying on Britain.²³ 

British counter-extremism and counter-intelligence capabilities are broken. British law enforcement agencies face a multifaceted crisis, including the lack of a common operational mechanism, and a lackluster technical approach to domestic security.²⁴ The U.K. National Security Council also lacks the professional capacity to implement policy properly. Since the U.K. voted to leave the EU in 2016; huge questions surrounding its place in the international community were left unanswered. Prime Minister Theresa May sacked her Defense Minister, Gavin Williamson over the leaks of security secrets of the discussion of National Security Council about the Chinese Huawei crisis. This act of the Prime Minister proved that many things were not going in the right direction within her government.²⁵ Iinar research paper underlining crucial aspects of the NSC and its significance to national security, Institute for Government research associates Dr. Joe Devanny and Josh Harris assert that:

“The NSC is a relatively new committee, but it is only the latest iteration of over a century of Prime-Ministerial efforts to coordinate national security issues from the center. To date, there have been few sustained attempts to examine the NSC and its performance. Four and a half years on different Prime Ministers choose to approach the issue, structure, and appointment of senior advisors in different ways. It is important that the center of government can accommodate each Prime Minister’s preferred way of working. Few Prime Ministers now take office with much experience of National Security issues, and National Security coordination is rarely a key them in general election campaign. But no Prime Minister needs to reinvent the wheel once in office; their predecessors have grappled with similar problems of coordination for over a century.”²⁶

There are a number of national security and law enforcement agencies performing different stabilization roles in the country. However, if one examines their cycle of information, analysis, and operational mechanism, one can conclude that, without the introduction of meaningful security sector reforms, they will be unable to respond to looming national security challenges.²⁷

[1] Britain’s Brexit Armageddon, Tyler Durden, 15 May 2019

[2] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai, introduction pages 

[3] Whether it’s Brexit or Bremain, the UK is in long-term economic decline, David Brown, South China Morning Post, 28 May 2018 https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3012428/uk-leadership-race-can-hong-kong-born-rory-stewart-beat-us-born 

[4] The decline and fall of Britain, Brian Cloughley, 09 December 2016 https://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/09/the-decline-and-fall-of-britain/, and also, Brexit Is Killing the Special Relationship: Britain’s partnership with the United States always depended on its usefulness—and that’s starting to fall off a cliff. BY STEPHEN PADUANO, Foreign Policy MAY 2, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/brexit-is-killing-the-special-relationship/

[5] National Security Capability Review another missed opportunity? Celia Mckeon Open Democracy 23 March 2018    

[6] National Security Capability Review: A changing security environment: Government response to the committee’s first report, 2017-19

[7] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai, introduction pages

[8] Brexit, BBC News, 20 June 2018. 

[9] Sajid Javed: What has the new home secretary said about faith? Harry Farley, Christian Today, 30 April 2018

[10] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai.

[11] Guardian newspaper, 13 May 2018

[12] BBC 24 June 2016

[13] National Security Capability Review, March 2018

[14] The Guardian newspaper 04 November 2015

[15] Fixing the EU intelligence Crisis, Musa Khan Jalalzai, New York, 2017

[16] Stand up to police spying, Liberty and Human Organization, https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/stand-police-spying

[17] Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2017-18, January 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/776111/Intelligence_and_Security_Committee_Annual_Report

[18] The National Security Council: National Security at the center of government, Dr. Joe Devanny, Josh Harris, Institute for Government report.

[19] The Guardian Newspaper, 11 October 2017

[20] BBC, 28 April 2018

[21] Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), BBC, 05 November 2015

[22] Intelligence in Vex. Musa Khan Jalalzai, VIJ Publishing, India, 2018

[23] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai.

[24] Ibid

[25] Ibid

[26] BBC, 01 May 2019

[27] The National Security Council: National Security at the center of government, Dr. Joe Devanny, Josh Harris, Institute for Government report. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/NSC%20final_0.pdf

The Shifting Dynamics of Britain’s National Security Threats was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a lesson to be learned from recent events in Macedonia—and it must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identity and foreign policy in the Balkans. Any foreign policy decision that is seen as a threat to the continuity of the national identity is perceived as a security threat, and therefore, it is rejected as ontologically unacceptable. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans (still recovering from the traumatic experience of ethnic conflicts) require a different approach than what is advocated by the European Union.

President George Ivanov of the Republic of Macedonia, during his second inaugural speech in 2014, stated that he “will not accept ideas or proposals that would threaten the Macedonian identity, distinctiveness of the Macedonian nation, the Macedonian language and the Macedonian model of coexistence.” Ivanov added that “the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian citizens are a benefit for the Union only if we enter as equal in the mosaic of diversity of the European Union, with our own identity and dignity.” 

In his speech, Ivanov makes a clear distinction between Macedonia’s pursuit of its foreign policy interests and the need to ensure the continuity of the country’s national identity and explicitly states his reluctance to endorse any policy that would pose a threat to Macedonian’s self-image in the international arena. Taking this into consideration, one could legitimately expect that the recent political developments in Macedonia can shed new light into the complex relationship between a state’s national identity and its foreign policy. 

The Referendum in Macedonia

The referendum held at the end of September 2018 in Macedonia—in contrast to Ivanov’s 2014 speech—conflates of the concept of national identity with foreign policy into a single question: “Are you in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” 

The “Prespa” agreement between Macedonia and Greece includes specific clauses about changes to Macedonia’s official name, in addition to modifications to an already-established historical narrative of its national identity. The text of the Agreement arguably indicates a degree of political control over the planned reconstruction of the historical elements of the Macedonian national identity: “The Parties shall establish […] a Joint Inter-Disciplinary Committee of Experts on historic, archeological and educational matters, to consider the objective, scientific interpretation of historical events based on authentic, evidence-based and scientifically sound historical sources and archeological findings. The Committee’s work shall be supervised by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Parties […].” As such, established historical narratives that contribute to the Macedonian national identity would be revised based on a politically supervised “objective, scientific interpretation of historical events.”

Also, the wording of the referendum question implicitly points out the conditional relationship between the national identity and foreign policy objectives. In other words, the Macedonian voters were reminded that the full implementation of the “Prespa” agreement (and the subsequent amendments to historical elements of the national identity) is a crucial precondition for the realization of the country’s foreign policy goal—joining the E.U. and NATO. 

However, a majority of Macedonians decided to boycott the referendum, illustrating a reluctance to answer a question in which they were asked to affirm the mutually exclusive nature of the relationship between Macedonia’s national identity and its foreign policy priorities. Voter turnout was low at 37 percent, thus failing to secure the 50 percent threshold required to make the vote legitimate. The concept of ontological security must be taken into account to understand why the Macedonian government was unsuccessful in legitimizing the referendum.

The Referendum in the Context of Ontological Security

The concept of ontological security, when applied to international relations, is defined as the unconscious and conscious possession of a fundamental national identity that justifies a country’s existence. It is argued that states pursue ontological security to ensure the continuity of the state’s identity. States must provide for their ontological security in addition to pursuing physical security objectives, such as ensuring the territorial integrity of the state. 

Ontological security of the state is especially important when the national ‘self’ interacts with the significant ‘other’ in the international arena. The harmony between the already established narratives and discourses that comprise the state’s identity of the state and foreign policy objectives is something governments take into consideration when conducting international relations.

In some cases, however, foreign policy is not conducted by the established narratives of the national identity. Thus, these foreign policy decisions are arguably ontologically unacceptable. To overcome this obstacle, policymakers selectively use specific narratives and discourses to emphasize certain parts of the national identity that could justify the new foreign policy. This strategic manipulation of narratives is done to bridge the cognitive gap between national identity and a foreign policy that is perceived as controversial or disruptive.

The referendum in Macedonia and the events preceding present an ideal case study for analyzing the importance of ontological security in foreign policymaking. Consistent reminders from both E.U. and NATO officials that an agreement on the name issue between Macedonia and Greece is a crucial precondition for Macedonia’s integration both entities made both of these foreign policy objectives ontologically unacceptable for many voters in Macedonia.

After years of difficult negotiations between Greece and Macedonia, an agreement was reached. Voters were faced with a referendum where they were asked whether they would accept the “Prespa” name-change agreement for the sake of Macedonia’s integration into the E.U. and NATO. Undoubtedly aware of the substantial cognitive dissonance between the already established ontological narratives and the requirements set by foreign policy objectives, the government initiated a strategic and selective reshaping of narratives to improve the controversial perception of these conflated policies—thus reducing the perceived threat to Macedonia’s ontological security.

The Macedonian Government’s Failed Strategy

A major theme of the government’s pre-referendum strategy was portraying the referendum as an opportunity to affirm the ‘European’ nature of Macedonia. The media and political elites in Macedonia told voters that they had the historic chance to vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia. The Prime Minister of Macedonia Zoran Zaev said that “September 30 is a day to write history, for European Macedonia.” For months before the vote, the European dimension of the Macedonian national identity was emphasized through political rhetoric. In contrast, the country’s new name—the Republic of North Macedonia—decided in the agreement between Macedonia and Greece, was hardly mentioned. 

This selective application of specific narratives and withdrawal of others to formulate a revised national identity represents a discursive manipulation aimed at bridging the cognitive gap between the national identity and the foreign policy goal. In other words, the Macedonian national identity was repeatedly ‘europeanized’ in political statements to portray the pro-European foreign policy as ontologically acceptable and compatible with the national identity—thus posing no threat to the continuity of the identity of the state. 

However, low voter turnout for the referendum indicates the government’s pre-referendum campaign was not sufficient. Voters were not convinced of two crucial things: that if they vote ‘yes’ they vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia, and that the continuity of the national identity – the ontological security of the state – will be maintained if the referendum was successful. Put in other words, the government’s strategy of selective usage and strategic manipulation with different narratives did not succeed in its aim to bridge the gap between national identity and foreign policy priorities. 

The events in Macedonia must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identities and foreign policymaking, especially in the Balkans. A volatile security context such as that of Balkan states leaves relatively less space for political differentiation between the physical and ontological security of the state. The region’s historical and geopolitical context gives the historical element of the national identity a central place in the politics of the Balkan countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the continuity of the national identity has been considered as a crucial component of the security and sovereignty of the states in the Balkans. 

Unfortunately, a crucial, yet oft-neglected, issue is that the E.U. conditional framework for states in the Balkans doesn’t entirely account for the importance of national identity in the region. On the contrary, E.U. conditionality criteria include clauses requiring that aspiring members enter into negotiations over their national identities. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans, which continue to recover from the trauma of multiple ethnic conflicts—mandate a different approach on the part of European institutions. The 2018 referendum in Macedonia should serve as a reminder that the geopolitical interests are not always the first choice in the Balkans, especially if they come at the cost of losing the ontological security of the state. 

Ontological Security in the Balkans: Lessons from Macedonia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Domestically, these problems include decreased public trust in institutions, “fake news” proliferating on social media, a growing wealth gap, and technological disruption to financial and labor markets.

On the global stage, there is considerable anxiety about the role the U.S. will play in what seems to be an increasingly multi-polar world order.

The international community will scrutinize the United States’ every move over the next decade.

They will be watching for signs of internal dissent, cooperation, contradiction, and isolationism. Economic policy, ethnic tensions and identity politics, tax policy, and workplace regulations will be areas of focus.

Lack of progress in these areas could signal a broader decline for the United States. This would mean a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, decreased federal authority, and diminished U.S. influence in global affairs. Nevertheless, the United States’ possesses undeniably massive levels of human and security capital. It is deeply entrenched in international political and economic systems, while a clear separation of powers within U.S. government institutions ensures that abrupt withdrawal from foreign engagements remains unlikely.

U.S. influence is likely to remain stagnant or constrained in the short term.

Contradictory rhetoric from the executive branch will impede U.S. credibility abroad and harm American interests. Persistent contradictions from within the administration heighten the risk of U.S. engagement in a significant conflict.While the short-term outlook for the United States’ role as the global leader remains uncertain, in the long-term, the U.S. will continue uniquely positioned to stay at the forefront of the worldwide order.

The United States has weathered hard times before.

The 1970s were a period of high national anxiety but were followed by a robust economic recovery and a greater sense of global leadership. Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

The U.S. Must Manage Domestic & Foreign Challenges in Order to Wield Credible Global Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on President Trump’s stated policy of unpredictability and instability, it’s difficult to say what his end-goals may be—or if he even has them. The administration seems to favor a realpolitik approach to global affairs—with an increasingly transactional form of diplomacy.

Trump himself is certainly no ideologue, nor is he a micromanager. The president prides himself on being a delegator—details aren’t his forte. Based on the fact that he frequently contradicts himself, changing his stance on a given policy from one week to the next, the President appears to be a communications channel for which the various spheres of influence within West Wing compete for access.

Strategic Irrationality

The defining feature of Trump’s self-professed success in negotiating is unpredictability. To put it in his words: “I don’t want to broadcast my intentions…You want to have a little bit of guess work for the enemy.”

Many have compared his behavior to Richard Nixon’s, particularly during talks with the North Vietnamese, and in his manipulation of tensions between China and the U.S.S.R. to the benefit of American commercial and national security interests.

The concept of ruthless perseverance in the pursuit of political objectives has been discussed and debated for over a half a millennia. In Discourses on Livy, Niccolò Machiavelli dedicated an entire chapter to the benefits of irrationality in politics, labeling it, “How at times it is a very wise thing to stimulate madness.” Centuries later, Richard Nixon put this theory into practice.

Richard’s Nixon’s Madman Theory

Nixon based his foreign and military policy on what he called “madman theory.” To show the North Vietnamese that there was no end to his hostility, he ordered the indiscriminate carpet-bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia.

“I want [the North Vietnamese] to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip word to them that ‘Nixon is obsessed about communism…and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’”

These tactics, along with unpredictable changes to U.S. foreign policy initiated by Nixon led to a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union, then led by Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev, like Nixon, was a proponent of brinkmanship—employing posturing and political doctrine to support a policy of mutually assured destruction when it came to relations between the two superpowers.

Both men believed that peace rested on an elaborate system of triggers that would guarantee nuclear holocaust in the event of any first strike. It was a combination of the absolute nature of this destruction with the instability of the peace that prevented it, it was argued, which guaranteed that no power would dare carry out a first-strike attack.

Nevertheless, some continue to argue that these negotiation tactics led to the development of a joint space exploration program, increased commercial ties, and, most importantly, nuclear détente.

Madman Theory 2.0: The Trump Doctrine

Trump, however, is not the prolific reader of foreign policy and political science that Nixon was. There are, however, some senior advisors, like National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who are heavily informed on matters of military history and theory and have significant experience at the strategic level. Mattis’ Defense Department, more importantly, has been given near-complete autonomy with regards military authority.

In any case, an attempt at forming a Moscow-Washington axis could have unintended consequences. Many of the president-elect’s cabinet and advisor appointees are virulently anti-Iran, which doesn’t exactly align with Russia’s long-standing relationship with the Islamic Republic.

Given Trump’s prior statements on the matter, his seeming attraction to nuclear weapons also underscores the notion of his employing some form of madman theory, be it intentionally or otherwise.

One could even perceive Trump’s rhetoric as condoning—even encouraging—the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Syria. When asked by MSNBC‘s Chris Matthews whether he would support the use of nuclear weapons against ISIS, he answered:

“I would never take any of my cards off the table.”

Madman Theory 2.0: The Trump Administration Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Jared Kushner reportedly discussed the possibility of setting up back-channel communications with Russian Intelligence Officials to facilitate secret and secure communications between the top levels of government in Washington and Moscow.

In December, Kushner reportedly asked Sergey Kislyak, Russia’s ambassador to the United States, about the possibility of the Trump administration utilizing Russian diplomatic communication lines or facilities in order to circumvent the United States national security and intelligence bureaucracies.

Kushner’s lack of prior experience in national security and foreign policy was hopelessly apparent. In national security and diplomatic circles, it’s common knowledge that the FBI makes a practice of intercepting the communications of Russian officials within the U.S., while the National Security Agency (NSA) continuously monitors the communications and SIGINT of Russian government officials overseas.

American officials told the Washington Post that Ambassador Kislyak subsequently informed Russian officials in Moscow of the request Kushner made. Reportedly, Kislyak was surprised at the suggestion—the proposed backchannel would have carried obvious security risks for the soon-to-be-installed Trump administration, and for Russian national interests.

“Kislyak…was taken aback by the suggestion of allowing an American to use Russian communications gear at its embassy—a proposal that would have carried security risks for Moscow as well as the Trump team.”

What was going through Kushner’s mind when he presented this proposal? Objectively, one can determine that Kushner’s naiveté got the best of him; he was either unaware of the security risks associated with such an arrangement, or he assumed that his contacts in Moscow trusted him to the same degree that he trusted them. Regardless, it’s increasingly obvious that—for all his reported brilliance as a political tactician—Kushner remains ignorant—almost pathetically so—to the nuances and details of foreign policy and national security strategy.

Vnesheconombank Chairman Sergey Gorkov Met With Kushner—at Kislyak’s Request

“The idea of using Russian facilities to skirt Russian surveillance would either be a serious attempt to hide something or the actions of a young amateur,” said former FBI special agent Clint Watts to The Atlantic. Former CIA acting-Director John McLaughlan provided that “I can’t keep out of my mind the thought that, if an American intelligence officer had done anything like this, we’d consider it espionage.”

This meeting is one of several that took place between senior Trump campaign officials or Trump surrogates and Russian diplomatic or intelligence officials that are of investigative interest to the FBI’s ongoing counterintelligence and criminal investigations into Trump’s campaign and subsequent administration.

Kushner is also reportedly involved in a number of other, high-profile, and clandestine meetings with Russian and other foreign officials.  Just days after making the backchannel inquiry to Kislyak, Kushner met with Sergey Gorkov—at Kislyak’s request. Gorkov is a former Russian intelligence officer and chairman of Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB). He maintains close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Putin effectively runs VEB as his private slush fund. If Putin wants to throw money at something like a bailout, or [the Winter Olympics in] Sochi, or Ukrainian industrial manufacturing, he uses VEB,” according to Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Aslund added, “VEB does not do any ordinary banking business. Therefore it is so remarkable that Jared Kushner met with the head of VEB.”

Vnesheconombank’s board is made up largely of Kremlin ministers; its chairman is Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and  Bank chairman Gorkov was trained at an FSB academy and has strong ties to both the KGB and its successor organization, the FSB. VEB frequently collaborates with Russian security services, providing agents with cover identities and institutional affiliations. VEB acts as the funding vehicle for Russian operations in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Syria, and the Caucasus—effectively providing an entirely off-the-books budget for the Putin regime.

Initially founded as a traditional development bank along the lines of the World Bank, Vnesheconombank’s initial purpose was to deliver long-term funding for projects private sector banks would likely avoid, according to a Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit analyst.

However, as time passed VEB was systematically converted into a “special purpose agency to finance politically important projects.” For instance, VEB has been heavily involved in efforts to forge inextricable economic links between Ukraine’s industrial and energy sectors and Russia—which would then give the Russian government enormous influence over the domestic politics of Ukraine.

Photo credit: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via Visual Hunt / CC BY

Jared Kushner Wanted Secret Back-Channel with Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.