The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

• General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​
• Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​
• USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​

Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, & Deterrence ​

• Peter Huessy: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO’s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​
• Key Points:
  • Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​
  • Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.
  • The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​

Event of the Week ​

• Defense Conference: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​

Administration Developments ​

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​

The AF Chiefs Corner ​

• Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​

The Commanders Corner

• General Cotton: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​

Strategic Developments ​

• Taiwan: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​
• NATO Air Command: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​

Top Essays of the Week ​

• Essay #1: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​
• Essay #2: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​

Congressional Budget Developments ​

• Defense Spending Tips: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​

Economic Developments

• Stephen Moore: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​

Proliferation Concerns ​

• Colin Demarest: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​

Ukraine Corner ​

• Clifford May: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​

Media Error of the Week ​

• Wall Street Journal: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.

ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ISAB report was also issued by a bipartisan group, comprised of strategic policy experts from both professional and academic backgrounds. The ISAB report recommends a DoS-led response in several areas of nuclear deterrence strategy and is unsurprisingly heavily focused on diplomacy and arms control efforts. The ISAB report also unsurprisingly continues the DoS clarion call for lowering the overall American inventory of nuclear weapons while recognizing the increased nuclear threat created in a multipolar environment. The ISAB report contains little that would be unexpected in such reports, but a few problematic items emerge in the report.

The ISAB report notes that the nature of deterrence is unchanged by moving into a multipolar environment. The report concludes:

Fundamentally, deterrence is about convincing an actor not to take specific actions for fear of not achieving its planned objective, or of being forced to absorb unacceptable levels of punishment. Deterrence by both denial and punishment relies on the capability to deliver an effective response to an enemy action, the credibility of threats to follow through with that response, and effective communication of the promised response.  Extended deterrence threatens retaliation on behalf of allies and partners, and assurance signals US commitment to their security.

The argument offered is that deterrence is about convincing an actor not to act because they will fail or suffer unacceptable levels of punishment.

The DoS is the primary diplomacy arm of the US government. The DoS’ role is, therefore, to pass along the correct information regarding American policy, to assure both competitors and allies alike of American capability, and to take a leading role in developing foreign policy that forces our nuclear competitors to choose between costly arms build-ups and more peaceful paths to achieving international respect for their legitimate interests. A report that advocates only for arms control and ignores the role of assuring denial is problematic.

Assuring allies of American capabilities and intentions is good. Better is assuring them of American understanding of enduring mutual interests and how the United States can work with them to strengthen deterrence. The United States must convince its allies that working together makes the world safer. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report issued in May 2023 offers, as a conclusion, that the United States must commit to signaling a bipartisan commitment to alliances as this may “assuage concerns about abandonment.”

One key element of assurance and alliance management is showing that the US is a responsible nuclear actor committed to nuclear arms control. Commitment to alliances and nuclear arms control is an important element in alliance management. But this commitment also requires the US to show it will respond quickly to put pressure on adversaries and competitors who engage in irresponsible behaviors. Commitment to nuclear arms control is how the DoS operationalizes “taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy as wells as the risks of nuclear war, while also ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, and our extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible.”

The biggest role that the DoS should play is in assurance of allies. South Korea and Saudi Arabia are expressing interest in acquiring nuclear arms and uranium enrichment. The DoS must lead the way in assuring these key allies of American commitment to their security from opponents such as North Korea and Iran. The DoS will need not just to assure these governments of American support, but other populations as well. “Frequent polls show a strong majority of South Koreans—between 70 and 80 percent in some surveys—support their nation acquiring atomic weapons or urging Washington to bring back the tactical nuclear weapons it removed from the South in the early 1990s.”

The ISAB report states that making extended deterrence and assurance credible requires making allies understand the “indispensable nature of our co-dependencies.”  What are the economic and cultural dependencies of South Korea or Saudi Arabia and the US? Additionally, the ISAB report says that assurance strategies must be tailored to the allies’ situation and requires continuous efforts in coordinating and consultation. The report points to intelligence and information sharing with European allies before Russia invaded Ukraine as an example of how the US can effectively create assurance among key allies.

The ISAB report states, “It is also far from certain that the United States or our allies have a full and accurate picture of what PRC and Russian leaders value, and how to effectively influence their nuclear and strategic decision-making.” A major responsibility of the DoS is collecting information about other governments and their populations. In fact, the United States does understand Russian and Chinese leaders’ goals and objectives. Reports issued by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2022) and the Federation of American Scientists (2022) both outline Russian nuclear doctrine in detail. Reports such as “Understanding the Risks and Realities of China’s Nuclear Forces” also exist. A large volume of research exists concerning the very subjects that the ISAB says we do not know much about.

The DoS is the largest information-gathering agency in the US government, so how do they not know or understand Chinese and Russian nuclear doctrine or what Russian and Chinese leaders value? If the ISAB report wants to make the point that DoS reports come up short in the area of understanding foreign leaders’ goals and foreign governments’ nuclear postures, the ISAB report should advocate for increased information analysis and better sharing of information between US government agencies.

The DoS needs to perform their most fundamental duty of interpreting the actions and assessing the intentions of the most important American adversaries by clearly and succinctly stating the nation’s competitor’s broad expectations for the mid-term. For instance, the report misses the opportunity to urge the DOS to work on assuring allies in Asia that the United States understands the strategic goals of China and understands how these goals negatively impact allies. The DoS needs to assure allies that working together is the best way to prevent China from acting hegemonically and threatening their security.  The United States needs to make sure that allies in Europe know America understands their concerns about Russian aggression and engages with them in countering Putin’s behavior.

Both Russia and China are improving the quality and quantity of their nuclear forces to improve coercive nuclear threats. The DoS needs to take a leading role in assuring allies that the US understands this threat to their security. If the DoS is interested in arms control, it must figure out what pressures are needed to bring Russia and China to the arms control table.

Had the ISAB report spent more time focusing on denial of success and assurance strategies for the DoS, perhaps this report would not have been as overlooked. Instead, the report came up short. What the report really needed to offer was suggestions for ways to properly engage allies in joint efforts to deny success to nuclear challenges. The report also undermined effective assurance by intimating that the US government, represented by the DoS, does not understand the goals and strategies of nuclear competitors. In short, the ISAB report was largely a failure and will rightly find a home in the ash heap of history.

Sam Stanton, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies

The State Department Assessment of American Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.