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		<title>From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-bilateralism-to-multilateralism-washingtons-push-for-strategic-stability-through-the-p5/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nawal Nawaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 12:19:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32658</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 5, 2026 With the New START’s expiration on February 5, 2026, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-bilateralism-to-multilateralism-washingtons-push-for-strategic-stability-through-the-p5/">From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 5, 2026</em></p>
<p>With the New START’s expiration on <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/nuclear-arms-control-and-disarmament-after-new-start/">February 5, 2026</a>, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or those of its nuclear adversaries, highlighting Washington’s lack of appetite for a renewed bilateral arrangement. <a href="https://www.state.gov/biographies/christopher-yeaw">Dr. Christopher Yeaw</a>, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shared the U.S. perspective at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), shifting from exclusive U.S.-Russia strategic constraints toward a more inclusive yet complex multilateral framework that could shape the future of global nuclear stability. This transition shows a broader shift in arms control policy of the U.S., emphasizing the need for a new arms control arrangement that reflects a transition from a bilateral framework to a multilateral charter, holding all five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (P-5) equally responsible for making serious efforts toward nuclear disarmament.</p>
<p>While addressing the CD, Dr. Yeaw used the shortcomings of the New START to advance a broader strategic argument rather than merely listing Russian violations. By emphasizing Russia’s sizeable stockpile of non-strategic (theatre) nuclear weapons that are estimated to be around <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2025.2494386">2,000 warheads</a> and the production of novel systems like nuclear-armed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2025.2494386">Skyfall cruise missile</a> and the nuclear powered <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2025.2494386">Poseidon torpedo</a>, Washington aimed to highlight that New START was overly focused on deployed strategic warheads and completely overlooked the full range of modern nuclear risks.</p>
<p>Dr. Yeaw further linked these loopholes with China’s emergence as a <a href="https://www.state.gov/biographies/christopher-yeaw">major nuclear actor</a>, arguing that the New START bilateral structure left a structural gap by excluding Beijing at a time of unprecedented expansion in its nuclear arsenal. While projecting on China’s official defense white papers, he cautioned that Beijing could attain strategic parity in the next <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2026/02/24/us-china-nuclear-expansion/">four to five years</a> and may possess fissile material sufficient for more than <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202511/t20251127_11761653.html">1,000</a> warheads by <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202511/t20251127_11761653.html">2030</a>, which was roughly <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202511/t20251127_11761653.html">200</a> at the time the treaty was signed in 2010. Additionally, he highlighted concerns about Russian cooperation on China’s <a href="https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russia-helping-china-speed-its-nuclear-buildup-us-unprepared-counter-it">CFR-600 reactors</a>, framing this collaboration as further complicating U.S. threat perceptions. Through these arguments, Washington justifies a shift from a bilateral arms control framework with Russia toward a multilateral platform that includes additional nuclear stakeholders, reflecting a recalibration of the U.S. arms control policy in the contemporary multipolar nuclear landscape.</p>
<p>The U.S. believes that New START’s expiration arrived at the fortuitous time, urging all states, not just the nuclear-weapon states, to strive for a better arms control framework. Under the new proposal, Washington aims to transition from a bilateral arms control agreement with Russia to a multilateral platform as a necessary next step in ongoing arms control discussions. Such a multilateral format can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, restrain the build-up of nuclear arms, and address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons. In a multilateral format, the Trump administration says all options are on the table as it discusses the future of nuclear arms control in the current security environment. Washington wants to conduct negotiations on strategic stability and arms control on multiple avenues, including the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-03/features/potential-p5-process">P5 forum</a> where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states already meet to discuss issues of strategic importance. The Trump administration maintains that all five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are under <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-03/features/potential-p5-process">an obligation</a> to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith under <a href="https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt">Article 6</a> of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that disarmament efforts are not limited to those states with the largest arsenals. Under this new proposal, the U.S. wants nuclear weapon states like Russia and China to participate in a multilateral process for effective debate on the elements of arms control arrangements.</p>
<p>In the evolving multipolar nuclear order, bringing together all five <a href="https://geneva.usmission.gov/2026/02/23/statement-by-u-s-assistant-secretary-of-state-for-the-bureau-of-arms-control-and-nonproliferation/">nuclear-weapon states to the NPT</a> &#8211; Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. admits that today’s strategic stability extends beyond Russia-U.S. dynamics. This forum could prove effective in preserving normative commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and divergent threat perceptions limit the viability of such a multilateral forum. The U.S. and Russia still possess <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/nuclear-arms-control-and-disarmament-after-new-start/">80 percent</a> of the global nuclear arsenal, while Beijing would resist numerical limits without prior reductions by the U.S. and Russia. France may support such a multilateral dialogue with other P5 states, maintaining its independent nuclear deterrent. However, Paris would likely resist any binding multilateral commitments that could limit its small arsenal. The United Kingdom may support the U.S. initiative for expanding P5 engagement.</p>
<p>The imperative of arms control is encouraging, but given the evolving global nuclear order, where New START failed to achieve its objectives, it is difficult to see how the proposed multilateral, modernized approach might succeed soon. In this scenario, a multilateral forum like the P5 would remain a consultative platform rather than serve as a substitute for enforcing arms control agreements.</p>
<p>In conclusion, after New START’s expiration, the U.S. has moved from bilateral arms control with Russia to a broader multilateral strategy, encouraging all NPT nuclear-weapon states, through forums like the P5, to share responsibility for strategic stability. This favors a more flexible approach to multilateral engagements over the binding bilateral constraints of the past in a changing security environment.</p>
<p><em>Nawal Nawaz is a researcher at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad. She is pursuing her MPhil in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University in Islamabad, focusing on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and regional strategic stability.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/From-Bilateralism-to-Multilateralism-Washingtons-Push-for-Strategic-Stability-Through-the-P5.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="176" height="49" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 176px) 100vw, 176px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-bilateralism-to-multilateralism-washingtons-push-for-strategic-stability-through-the-p5/">From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2025 12:15:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30898</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Global arms control regimes are built on the pillars of trust, dialogue, transparency, mutual respect, restraint, verification, and, most critically, consensus among great powers. However, leadership in this domain risks deterioration at a time when the world urgently needs a renewed commitment to peace and stability. As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/">How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global arms control regimes are built on the pillars of trust, dialogue, transparency, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2023.2292812">mutual respect</a>, restraint, verification, and, most critically, consensus among great powers. However, leadership in this domain risks deterioration at a time when the world urgently needs a renewed commitment to peace and stability.</p>
<p>As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship">economic conflicts</a> erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.</p>
<p>Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/ending-the-china-paradox/">supply chain</a>. Moreover, it can weaken American <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship">global leadership</a> as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.</p>
<p>The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade-war.asp">strategic stability</a>. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.</p>
<p>American <a href="https://behorizon.org/china-u-s-tech-war-new-hegemony/">technological superiority</a>, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1drqeev36qo#:~:text=A%20US%20Geological%20report%20notes,%2C%20radar%2C%20and%20permanent%20magnets.">70 percent of the global supply</a> of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.</p>
<p>However, the American military is already in <a href="https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/americas-incredible-shrinking-navy/">decline</a> according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”</p>
<p>The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/03/21/osd-comptroller-says-u-s-shipyards-cant-build-3-destroyers-a-year">three destroyers annually</a>. By contrast, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/threat-chinas-shipbuilding-empire#:~:text=Today%2C%20Jiangnan%20Shipyard%20alone%20has,support%20China's%20military%20industrial%20complex.">China</a> possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.</p>
<p>The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/08/us/politics/jd-vance-peasants-china.html">zero-sum</a> strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20zd4k6d36o">provocative rhetoric</a> from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.</p>
<p>Traditionally, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/why-china-not-trust-america-nuclear-weapons-talks-1926809">China rejects</a> arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.</p>
<p>Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">great powers</a> declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">verification process</a>, and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">supply chain</a> supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.</p>
<p>Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.</p>
<p>In 2019, President Donald Trump <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-withdraw-united-states-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/">withdrew</a> the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-01/features/life-after-new-start-navigating-new-period-nuclear-arms-control">New START</a> remains uncertain and fragile.</p>
<p>At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.</p>
<p>Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-quest-for-nuclear-weapons">South Korea</a>, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.</p>
<p>Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Shahzad Akram </em><em>is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/How-Trade-war-Threatens-the-Future-of-Arms-Control.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/">How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 12:14:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30540</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The delicate architecture of international security, built upon decades of painstaking negotiations and agreements, faces unprecedented challenges. From the erosion of established agreements and treaties to the resurgence of nationalist agendas, the world grapples with a shifting landscape where the specter of unconstrained nuclear proliferation is increasingly possible. President Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda is [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/">Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The delicate architecture of international security, built upon decades of painstaking negotiations and agreements, faces unprecedented challenges. From the erosion of established agreements and treaties to the resurgence of nationalist agendas, the world grapples with a shifting landscape where the specter of unconstrained nuclear proliferation is increasingly possible. President Donald Trump’s “<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwii35Og24SMAxVKCjQIHXfCBRwQFnoECB4QAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fbriefings-statements%2F2025%2F01%2Fpresident-trumps-america-first-priorities%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw1t1_KU71lk_FuFmjqGQZn5&amp;opi=89978449">America First</a>” agenda is perceived by many within the United States and among allies as American withdrawal from long-standing defense agreements. Thus, it is prompting a critical examination of the trajectory of global arms control.</p>
<p>Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwid0r7O2oSMAxViFTQIHb8FCR4QFnoECBwQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fthebulletin.org%2F2019%2F11%2Fthe-death-of-the-inf-treaty-has-lessons-for-arms-control%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw1JBtuixiQjRar9xz0zi63f&amp;opi=89978449">strategic stability</a>. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjMppP424SMAxXXGDQIHW1hH9UQFnoECBkQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.state.gov%2Fnew-start-treaty%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2V0n26__cladV8fJsZ0Aph&amp;opi=89978449">New START</a>), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.</p>
<p>The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiBlK2C3ISMAxVROTQIHWLpLuwQFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2F2009-2017.state.gov%2Fe%2Feb%2Ftfs%2Fspi%2Firan%2Fjcpoa%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw0f9a2v8qnxyuCz_3kV5wIQ&amp;opi=89978449">JCPOA</a>), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwihubni2oSMAxUSIjQIHahjJJQQFnoECBoQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iiss.org%2Fsv%2Fonline-analysis%2Fonline-analysis%2F2018%2F05%2Fus-abandons-iran-nuclear-deal%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2HyGD3I2zYWEAGPB4UPaoG&amp;opi=89978449">regional proliferation</a>.</p>
<p>Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwi26aL22oSMAxWTFjQIHYBML_EQFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F356235152_Chinese_nuclear_weapons_2021&amp;usg=AOvVaw0g1V4EaC5HHy79g2p92zE4&amp;opi=89978449">existing arms control</a> framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.</p>
<p>The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.</p>
<p>Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwisqd2L24SMAxWOFzQIHSAvJP4QFnoECBkQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdirect.mit.edu%2Fisec%2Farticle%2F43%2F1%2F56%2F12199%2FEscalation-through-Entanglement-How-the&amp;usg=AOvVaw3j3L7FuGX_Fn-TN7AJwT-g&amp;opi=89978449">climate of uncertainty</a>. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.</p>
<p>President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwj7ie2v24SMAxW8HjQIHQDzIFYQFnoECCcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreignaffairs.com%2Funited-states%2Ftrumps-troubling-nuclear-plan&amp;usg=AOvVaw07yDXz55JiX0xro7azFNXX&amp;opi=89978449">This approach</a> stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.</p>
<p>The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjV3t3o24SMAxXEAjQIHbB3ERkQFnoECBgQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdisarmament.unoda.org%2Fwmd%2Fnuclear%2Fnpt%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw3z9W6saHMke4MxzRPAaks0&amp;opi=89978449">unconstrained proliferation</a> and ensure a more stable and secure future.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Arms-Control-in-an-Age-of-Isolation_A-Fading-Hope.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29601" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="Download here." width="302" height="84" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 302px) 100vw, 302px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/">Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-2-0-unilateralism-and-the-future-of-arms-control/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Syed Ali Abbas]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 2025 13:16:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29803</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the world prepares for Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the implications for global arms control loom large. New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire in February 2026. Russian president Vladimir Putin suspended participation in the treaty a year ago due [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-2-0-unilateralism-and-the-future-of-arms-control/">Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the world prepares for Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the implications for global arms control loom large. New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire in February 2026. Russian president Vladimir Putin suspended participation in the treaty a year ago due to tensions resulting from the Ukraine war, which leaves the agreement or any like it in question.</p>
<p>This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Trump’s Arms Control Record</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.</p>
<p>Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.</p>
<p>These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>The Risks of Unilateralism</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.</p>
<p>If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.</p>
<p><strong>A Fragmented Global Landscape</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.</p>
<p>Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.</p>
<p><strong>Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability</strong></p>
<p>The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.</p>
<p>Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.</p>
<p><strong>Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.</p>
<p>To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.</p>
<p><em>Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Trump-2.0-Unilateralism-and-the-Future-of-Arms-Control.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-2-0-unilateralism-and-the-future-of-arms-control/">Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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