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	<title>Topic:multi-alignment strategy &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-deep-strategic-culture-beyond-the-skies/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Areesha Manzoor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 12:45:06 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>From the 1957 Sputnik-1 satellite to more contemporary explorations such as NASA’s Artemis III program, space has become the high ground for state competition due to its multifaceted military and civilian applications. The behavior of states within the space domain mirrors the earthly quest for dominance to plant flags on the uncharted territories. Orbits have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-deep-strategic-culture-beyond-the-skies/">India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From the 1957 <a href="https://www.spacecentre.co.uk/news/space-now-blog/how-sputnik-changed-the-world/">Sputnik-1</a> satellite to more contemporary explorations such as <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission/artemis-iii/">NASA’s Artemis III program</a><strong>, </strong>space has become the high ground for state competition due to its multifaceted military and civilian applications. The behavior of states within the space domain mirrors the earthly quest for dominance to plant flags on the uncharted territories. Orbits have become the new playground for spacefaring nations. Now, states are developing a strategic culture beyond the skies and harnessing scientific curiosity to enhance sovereignty, power, and status.</p>
<p>In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (<a href="https://www.space.com/india-anti-satellite-test-significance.html">ASAT</a>) to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/indias-new-space-based-spy-network/">spy and surveillance satellites</a>—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003246626-8/indian-strategic-culture-rajesh-basrur">concept</a> of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.</p>
<p>Basrur identifies <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003246626-8/indian-strategic-culture-rajesh-basrur">two levels</a> of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.</p>
<p>India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/SatelliteNavigationServices.html#:~:text=NavIC%20was%20erstwhile%20known%20as,%2Dway%20ranging%20stations%2C%20etc.&amp;text=A%20new%20civilian%20signal%20is,Safety%2Dof%2Dlife%20alert%20dissemination">navigation satellites</a> (NavlC) and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140211041254/http:/isro.org/satellites/geostationary.aspx">communication satellites (GSAT).</a> India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/Launchers.html">development</a> of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.</p>
<p>The Mission Shakti ASAT <a href="https://www.space.com/india-anti-satellite-test-significance.html">Test</a> is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both <a href="https://space.commerce.gov/u-s-india-joint-statement-highlights-space-cooperation/">the US</a> and <a href="https://india.mid.ru/en/history/articles_and_documents/cooperation_in_space/">Russia</a> as per its strategic needs. This <a href="https://www.spykmancenter.org/india-multi-alignment-dilemma">multi-alignment strategy</a> aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.</p>
<p>Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/mission/chandrayaan-1/">Chandrayaan</a>, <a href="https://www.planetary.org/space-missions/mangalyaan">Mangalyaan</a>, and the upcoming <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/Gaganyaan.html">Gaganyaan</a> mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India&#8217;s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.</p>
<p>Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-welcomes-india-as-27th-artemis-accords-signatory/">Artemis Accords,</a> the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1587232">data</a> that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.</p>
<p>Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly <a href="https://icfs.org.uk/from-surveillance-to-strike-operation-sindoor-and-the-role-of-space-in-himalayan-regional-security/">offensive space uses</a>, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.</p>
<p>At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.</p>
<p>In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/shocking-rift-between-india-and-united-states">strategic rift</a> between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.</p>
<p><em>Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Indias-Deep-Strategic-Culture-Beyond-the-Skies.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-deep-strategic-culture-beyond-the-skies/">India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-central-asia-matters-to-the-united-states-again/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ziaulhaq Tanin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 13:29:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32000</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At first glance, President Donald Trump’s November meeting with the leaders of five Central Asian countries under the C5+1 framework appears to signal a revival of America’s expansionist economic diplomacy. In reality, however, it reflects a fundamental shift in the United States’ geopolitical calculus driven by three decisive factors: the stalemate over the war in [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-central-asia-matters-to-the-united-states-again/">Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At first glance, President Donald Trump’s November <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/us-central-asia-summit">meeting</a> with the leaders of five Central Asian countries under the <a href="https://kz.usembassy.gov/c51/">C5+1</a> framework appears to signal a revival of America’s expansionist economic diplomacy. In reality, however, it reflects a fundamental shift in the United States’ geopolitical calculus driven by three decisive factors: the stalemate over the war in Ukraine, the deepening Russia-China <a href="https://merics.org/en/comment/china-and-russia-are-using-shanghai-cooperation-organization-push-alternative-global-order">alignment</a> within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the growing concerns over Beijing’s technological and mineral dominance. After two decades of military focus on the Middle East, Washington is once again turning its attention to a region that could play a critical role in shaping the future of great-power competition: Central Asia.</p>
<p><strong>Washington’s Return to Central Asia</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.</p>
<p>This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.</p>
<p>Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors</strong></p>
<p>The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world&#8217;s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">BRI</a>).</p>
<p>However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, <a href="https://gazettengr.com/kazakhstan-president-abandons-vladimir-putin-says-wagner-forces-rebellion-internal-russian-affair/">blocked</a> the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and <a href="https://jamestown.org/the-future-of-the-eurasian-economic-union/">declined</a> to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment <a href="https://timesca.com/open-for-business-new-reforms-accelerate-investment-in-uzbek-companies/">reforms</a> designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.</p>
<p>Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/kazakhstan-joins-the-abraham-accords-and-redefines-the-geography-of-peace/">join</a> the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, <a href="https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/us-and-kazakhstan-strike-4-billion-locomotive-deal-lutnick-says-4249567?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Kazakhstan</a> recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/kazakhstan-could-lead-central-asia-in-mitigating-the-worlds-energy-and-food-shortages/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">reserves</a> of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.</p>
<p><strong>Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership</strong></p>
<p>Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.</p>
<p>Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.</p>
<p>Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.</p>
<p>By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.</p>
<p><em>Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><em> <a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Why-is-Central-Asia-Matters-to-the-United-State-again_ags.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-central-asia-matters-to-the-united-states-again/">Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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