The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.

As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.

Table 1

Veterans Administration Budget 2018–2025

Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)

Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.

The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.

Further, in his autobiography, Hillbilly Elegy, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.

In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”

In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.

The Quest for Territory

Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.

In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.

Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.

In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.

The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.

Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Network of Powerful Allies

One of the strongest indicators of America’s continued leadership is its robust network of alliances. Over 50 nations are directly allied with the US, forming a global coalition that includes some of the world’s most powerful economies. Countries like Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia consistently align themselves with American leadership, not just in military terms but also economically and diplomatically. Even in regions like the Middle East, traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and emerging partnerships are fortifying the US’s global standing.

Contrast this with the coalition of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. While this quartet may represent a serious challenge, it pales in comparison to the extensive alliances that the US leads. Most crucially, while Russia and China may appear aligned in the short term, they are not close allies in any deep or historical sense. The two powers have a long and fraught history, marked by strategic rivalry and suspicion. Their partnership today is one of convenience rather than genuine alignment. In the end, history tells us that such partnerships are prone to fracture, especially when national interests clash.

The reality of America’s network of allies compared to the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is stark. This balancing coalition does not even come close to the strength of the band wagoning coalition the US possesses. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with its 31 member states, represents not only the most powerful military alliance in history but also an economic powerhouse, accounting for over 30 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).

In contrast, China and Russia are economic competitors more than collaborators, and their combined GDP does not come close to rivaling the economic output of the US and its allies. Furthermore, China’s partnerships with nations like Iran and North Korea are limited by geography, sanctions, and divergent interests. North Korea is a heavily sanctioned and isolated state with little economic or strategic leverage beyond its nuclear capabilities, while Iran is mired in regional conflicts that prevent it from playing a major global role.

In essence, while China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran may occasionally coordinate to challenge the West, their relationships lack the cohesion, shared values, and the long-term strategic alignment of the American-led alliance system. This coalition cannot hope to rival the strength, stability, and global reach of America’s network of alliances. For all the talk of a multipolar world, the US remains at the center of the most powerful and united coalition of nations in modern history, a fact that ensures its continued dominance on the global stage.

The Strategic Advantage of Geography

Another underappreciated advantage is geography. The United States enjoys a position of unmatched security, largely thanks to what scholars like John Mearsheimer call the “stopping power of water.” Unlike any other global power, the United States benefits from being bordered by two vast oceans. These natural barriers serve as formidable buffers against potential adversaries, significantly reducing the likelihood of direct invasion or immediate military threats to the mainland.

This geographic advantage has profound implications for national security and global influence. Unlike Russia, which shares extensive borders with Europe and Central Asia, and China, which borders several regional rivals including India, Japan, and Vietnam, the US is largely insulated from the chaos of regional disputes.

Moreover, this geographic separation means that the US can maintain a relatively smaller standing army compared to continental powers—focusing instead on advanced naval and air forces capable of projecting power far from its shores. American military bases, fleets, and alliances stretch across the world, but the mainland remains safely beyond the reach of conventional military threats.

This position gives the US a level of strategic flexibility that few nations can match. That is not to say the US Navy does not have issues facing its future, especially with shipyards and defense procurement. However, it is still considered the greatest Navy in the world as of 2024.

The Monroe Doctrine

Part of what makes the US so unique is its role as the uncontested regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine has long established the principle that no foreign power should interfere in the affairs of the Americas, solidifying U.S. dominance in its own region. No other nation on Earth holds this level of regional control.

This unrivaled regional hegemony allows the US to focus on maintaining global stability and leading from a position of strength. As long as the Western Hemisphere remains secure, the US can project power abroad with confidence, knowing that its backyard is free from external threats.

The Interconnected Economies of the U.S. and China

Finally, the specter of the so-called Thucydides Trap—the idea that a rising power (China) will inevitably clash with an established one (the US)—is not as likely as it may seem. While it is true that China’s economic and military rise is a concern, the interconnectedness of the two economies makes a full-blown conflict far less probable. The US and China are not just rivals; they are deeply intertwined economically. From trade to investment to the global supply chain, the economic fates of both nations are linked in ways that make large-scale conflict costly for either side.

This economic entanglement offers a powerful deterrent against conflict. Both nations have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability, knowing that any war would be mutually destructive. This interdependence, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing force, reducing the likelihood that the US and China will fall into the trap of inevitable conflict. However, it is worth noting that much of the same was said about the European powers just before World War I.

Conclusion: A Future of Optimism, Not Decline

Despite the challenges posed by emerging powers and the uncertainties of the global political landscape, the US remains in a position of unparalleled strength. Its vast network of powerful allies, its strategic geographic advantage, the stability of the Monroe Doctrine, and the economic interdependence with China all suggest that the US’s role as the world’s leading hegemon is secure for the foreseeable future.

Rather than succumbing to the doom and gloom of some political pundits, it is time to recognize the many reasons for optimism. The US has the tools, alliances, and strategic advantages to maintain its leadership and continue shaping a peaceful, prosperous global order.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed here are the author’s own.

The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures was originally published on Global Security Review.