The digital public square has transformed how Americans encounter information, debate ideas, and form political identities. Social media platforms promise open dialogue, but their algorithms often reward emotionally charged content, amplifying voices that confirm what users already believe. In this environment, misinformation spreads quickly, and communities increasingly cluster around shared narratives rather than shared facts. Foreign actors have recognized the strategic value of this fragmented information ecosystem. Among them, Russian influence operations—often described as “Kremlinbot” networks—have drawn particular attention for their efforts to inflame existing social and political tensions within the United States.

Kremlinbots, Russian state-sponsored bots and trolls, manipulate public opinion through fake accounts to skew social media comments and manufacture a false sense of consensus. While inauthentic, bombarding the comments section of social media threads is an effective tactic to manipulate public opinion. This tactic can lead to two outcomes: supporters of the narrative are more likely to follow aligned pages, creating an echo chamber; while dissenters are often intimidated or discouraged from posting, fearing online conflict. Even if users recognize the commenters as bots, false consensus bias discourages them from joining public debates.

False Consensus Bias

False consensus bias and manufactured consensus bias are similar but differ in how they develop and their purpose. False consensus bias happens when people favor information that seems supported by the majority. This information can be true, false, or misleading. Regardless, if it looks widely accepted, it is considered accurate. Simply put, people believe something because it appears that everyone else does. This is like in-group thinking. On the other hand, manufactured consensus bias involves intentionally manipulating social media to create the illusion of broad agreement. When Kremlinbots succeed in manufacturing consensus, they also generate a false consensus bias, making people think their views are in line with the mainstream.

The Battleground

Manufactured consensus often forms in the comments sections of major news outlets, government officials, institutions, celebrities, universities, world leaders, CEOs, and athletes on social media. Whenever any of these entities, organizations, or high-profile individuals post an article, statement, or video, the comments thread beneath the post becomes the battleground for Russian state-sponsored bots and trolls to create biased perceptions.

Additionally, Kremlinbot-manufactured consensus bias is often seen on threads where the entire article post is fake. False information from a single fake account or multiple fake accounts pretending to be real people or organizations has become quite common. For example, a Russian state-sponsored troll farm based in St. Petersburg, Russia, called the Internet Research Agency (IRA), created the Twitter account EN_GOP named “Tennessee GOP” during its attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election, gaining over one hundred thousand followers.

The IRA was founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former Russian oligarch who led the Wagner Group and was a close ally of Vladimir Putin with direct ties to Russian intelligence. The agency created fake accounts on major social networks to promote Kremlin interests in domestic and foreign policy, especially concerning Ukraine and the Middle East. More than 1,000 employees worked in a single agency building in 2015. The reach and impact of the IRA were enormous. By 2019, the IRA’s troll farm influence operation caused unprecedented divisions and discord within Western democracies. For perspective, if 500 people each manage at least 30 fake profiles in a troll farm, which totals 15,000 state-sponsored troll accounts, all targeting comment threads on various social media pages.

The comments thread is a clear example of manipulation, deceit, and illusion. Russian Kremlin bots and trolls function as illusionists, working overtime to make followers believe they are part of the club if they agree, and outside if they do not accept the false consensus. This constitutes a social media psychological operation, or psyops campaign. Benjamin A. Valentino, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, explains in his analysis co-authored by computer scientist Soroush Vosoughi, “Bias arises not from who is on a platform, but from who among them are active, vocal participants on that platform. This varies based on the topics being discussed. Even if you have everyone on Twitter, they may only participate in topics they find interesting or feel comfortable discussing in public, says Vosoughi. So, when a small group is very vocal about a particular issue, their opinions get over-represented in the data.”

Conclusion

Kremlinbot-manufactured consensus is not the only reason Americans live in two conflicting realities. Still, consensus bias is a key cause of division among Americans, many of whom now only inhabit isolated echo chambers of alternate worlds. Within their echo chambers, cognitive biases are often reinforced, especially on social media platforms that are manipulated to bolster pre-existing beliefs. These tactics turn social media into breeding grounds for hatred and tools for foreign adversaries. Russian security agencies have perfected methods to exploit these divisions, which now pose a serious threat to U.S. national security.

Sean G. McKelvey is a Doctoral Candidate at The Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., conducting research on Russian Foreign Malign Influence Operations. Sean has published an article in the Sentinel Journal, A Journal of Strategic Statecraft and Counterintelligence Volume 1, Issue 1, Winter 2025, an Article titled: “Russia is winning the Disinformation War with Ukraine.” Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

State-Sponsored Trolls as An Emerging Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.

During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.

The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.

More Actors Are Getting Involved

The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.

However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.

They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.

This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.

In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.

Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.

The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.

Election Day Was Just the Beginning

Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”

First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”

What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.

In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.

A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.

As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.

It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.

Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science & Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not was originally published on Global Security Review.

Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and decide to launch a retaliatory strike on warning.

In Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani military officer contacts Pakistan’s prime minister to tell him India has initiated a nuclear strike, and an immediate response is required. The prime minister immediately orders a counterstrike. Pakistan proceeds to counterstrike protocols.

Missiles begin crossing borders between India and Pakistan as the world hurtles towards a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The world’s worst fears are realized. It is only later realized that the high-ranking Indian military officer’s message to an Indian commander was made by a nuclear command-and-control system embedded with generative artificial intelligence (AI).

The Role of Generative AI in Modern Warfare

The use of generative AI, which is best exemplified by ChatGPT, by an adversary, or third party, can impact deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. In a worst-case scenario, it could trigger a nuclear war, like the scene mentioned above. Should generative AI be embedded in nuclear command-and-control systems, it is theoretically possible that hyper-personalized messages, like the one described above, could be generated in a system that was not originally designed to allow such an outcome. The potential for a tailored message, for specific individuals, is possible.

Traditionally, content and information generation were based on human creativity. However, at present, generative artificial intelligence is being considered as a tool for digital transformation. Generative AI is a deep learning model which has the capability to generate synthetic media including text, video, and audio—dependent on training.

Perception Building and the Escalation of Crises

Generative AI can also play a distinctly different role in leading to nuclear crisis. In a deterrence framework, the development of a narrative and perception are crucial. Similarly, communication of deterrence threats is also achieved through perception-building of an adversary—concerning a state’s capabilities and credibility. In the specific case of India and Pakistan, India is creating misperceptions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Recently, Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate, stated that India is actively pursuing a state-led disinformation campaign to malign Pakistan.

He was referring to recent EU Disinfolab’s reports on how India is using fake nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and international organizations to malign Pakistan. Similarly, it is possible that India may use Generative AI to manipulate public opinion, thereby, creating misperceptions among Pakistan’s public. This could make the citizenry, as well as the government of both India and Pakistan, susceptible to separate facts from fiction—especially in a crisis situation. Hence, AI-driven narratives could push both countries to a crisis leading to warfighting.

Misinformation and Crisis Management Challenges in South Asia

Misinformation through generative AI can make crisis management and escalation dominance between India and Pakistan much more difficult. According to Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder has transformed into a web across domains with multiple actors and alliances, especially in the age of social media. In South Asia, due to mated warheads and cannasterization of missiles by India, coupled with geographical contiguity with Pakistan, nuclear use may become ultimate escalation within minutes—without a ladder or a web. Social media could be a threat multiplier and can become lethal with the use of generative AI. Although, tweets are unlikely to independently start a crisis, tweets from government officials of India and Pakistan could be fabricated through utilizing hacking and generative AI to escalate an ongoing crisis.

Risks of Generative AI in Command-and-Control Systems

While Indian nuclear weapons may have an effective command and control where nuclear weapons have nuclear safety and security mechanisms, there was a “Brahmos missile crisis” in 2022. Inadvertent or accidental, the launch of a missile could trigger a reactionary strike by Pakistan as the missile is dual-capable. Furthermore, this fog of war could undermine strategic stability. As a Group Captain was blamed for the launch, many commanders like him, who may be capable of launching nuclear missiles, even on Indian nuclear submarines, could be manipulated via high-level orders created through generative AI.

False Flag Operations and Strategic Escalation

India has also opted for adventurism against Pakistan through its false flag operations and surgical strikes. Pakistan has adopted a conventional strategy of quid-pro-quo plus as a conventional response to such Indian limited strike. However, malicious false flag operations through disinformation and fake news by India to garner public support for electoral gains and domestic politics can result in crisis escalation in such a competitive strategic environment. It is due to mistrust within the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan.

The Need for Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in AI

There is a dire need for risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan in the domain of AI. However, the appetite for CBMs and dialogue on the Indian side is non-existent. India and Pakistan could establish bilateral AI incident reporting and mitigation centers to counter the use of AI as a tool for inducing false alarms and other escalatory actions. Furthermore, there is a need for India and Pakistan to further opt for unilateral AI security and regulation measures, especially for inter-organizational and inter-state strategic communications. If leading states like the United States, China, and Russia opt for an AI arms control agreement, less powerful states, including India and Pakistan, may be persuaded to follow suit. This will help establish a universal AI arms control regime regarding the use of AI for military purposes.

Generative AI and Deterrence Stability: A Scenario for De-escalation

It is the night of May 28, 2028, at India’s military command center. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.

Flight time between India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and need to decide quickly whether to launch a retaliatory strike. He calls the command center to verify the message received.

India’s prime minister is contacted immediately concerning the message received by one of his commanders. He picks up the hotline to Pakistan’s prime minister and asks, “Have you launched nuclear weapons?”

Pakistan’s prime minister responds, “Not at all. This is fake!”

India’s prime minister informs the military command center. The crisis is averted, and nuclear weapons are not used.

Confidence-building measures, which were present in the second scenario, have the opportunity to change the outcome of a conflict. Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in nefarious ways, it is time to take action to avert such a crisis.

Ms. Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also currently a Research Fellow at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project led by Prof. Andrew Futter.

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

While this is a welcome comment from the former president, it is not a new argument to have a Space National Guard. This argument, however, was much maligned, mocked, and ignored for years. Lately, much reporting on the topic is misinformation that confuses both the American people and Congress.

Many who oppose the Space National Guard wrongly believe that space defense is a strictly federal mission. They believe the Guard’s deployable space operations, a function since the 1990s, and the nearly 300 years of the Guard’s legal and constitutional role does not justify a Guard element for Space Force. They argue that bypassing the constitutional framework and the law of the land, which requires a governor’s consent on decisions regarding their state guard forces, is a “one off.”

If the federal government is allowed to eliminate the role of governors, this would set a dangerous precedent. During congressional testimony, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendell discussed a legislative proposal that would do just that and suggested that going around the law “is not a big deal” and that National Guard is “an artifact of history.” Legislation requiring the support and inclusion of governors is not supported by Kendell.

The opponents of the Space National Guard repeat questionable arguments to confuse and distract the American people and Congress. The false arguments are many.

First, they claim a Space National Guard will result in increased and unsustainable costs and bureaucracy that are not supported by the Space Force and Air Force. This is false as documented by no less than six studies by the Department of the Air Force that supported a Space National Guard.

Five of these studies were deliberately withheld from Congress by actors external to the Pentagon. Importantly, these studies proved that the costs of establishing a space guard are insignificant because the existing budget will transfer from one line of accounting to another. They also dispute the findings of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study (2020) that did not use actual Air Force and National Guard budget data points to project the cost of establishing a Space National Guard.

Shockingly, the CBO did not interview anyone from the National Guard Bureau, the individual state guard components, or the Department of the Air Force’s working groups when it conducted the study. In truth, no additional bureaucracy is needed to establish the Space Guard because the staff support and operational squadrons already exist in the Air National Guard and would transfer into the Space National Guard.

Second, detractors argue that states do not need a Space Guard for the limited protection of individual states. This is a mistaken perspective because the National Guard is the nation’s primary combat-reserve force—regardless of operating domain—and has been since 1636. It delivers strategic and operational depth to the nation. It is a lower cost alternative to the larger and more expensive federal force. For example, most of the nation’s air sovereignty mission is owned by the Air National Guard because the threat to American air space is not constant.

It is also important to remember that the states are dependent upon space systems for their domestic emergency operations and the capabilities of the National Guard are leveraged for events like wildfires, earthquakes, floods, and others. Space systems are linked to critical infrastructure and therefore fall into the state roles and missions for homeland security. Those who want to use the opportunity to consolidate military space power at the federal level ignore these realities.

Third, the military must have the support of the American people when it is time to go to war. The National Guard, by design, provides a clear and deep connection with the American citizenry. Support for a robust Space National Guard is vital if the nation is to field the force required to win in a time of war. Connecting main streets across the nation with space defense cannot occur through a single component service and the absorption of what is rightfully National Guard capability into the federal military.

The talking points used by Space National Guard opponents are fundamentally misleading and fail to acknowledge the immediate readiness costs associated with taking Air National Guard space units away from their respective states and governors. Keep in mind, about 80 percent of Guard personnel surveyed suggested that they will not transfer to the US Space Force unless there is a Space National Guard. All 50 governors oppose the removal of the space missions from the National Guard.

If opponents of a Space National Guard succeed, units and capabilities will become ineffective. Enormous experience will be lost from the loss of personnel. The Department of Defense will then have to fund recruiting and training efforts for the Space Force to rebuild that capability. Those who oppose the Space National Guard leave out that this would cost taxpayers at least $1 billion. Former President Trump, NGAUS, and all 50 state governors are correct; the Space National Guard should exist as the “primary combat reserve of the US Space Force.”

National Defense Authorization Act language should not ignore the states and their governors. It is time to establish a Space National Guard.

Christopher Stone is senior fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The thoughts, opinions, and statements are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Department of Defense.

Correcting the Record on the Space National Guard was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider the following scenario: a nuclear-armed state faces a significant threat to its security but refrains from resorting to nuclear weapons use out of concern for reputational damage and the global perception that the country is no longer a responsible nuclear stakeholder. While this decision may seem prudent from a moral and ethical standpoint, it inadvertently undermines the credibility of the state’s nuclear force. Its adversaries may perceive this reluctance to employ nuclear weapons as a sign of weakness, emboldening them to act with impunity—disregarding the state’s nuclear deterrent.

The Crucial Role of Narrative Control

The crux of the matter lies in narrative control. In a world where perception is often more potent than reality, the ability to shape public opinion and control the narrative surrounding nuclear capabilities is of paramount importance. Leaders must project strength, resolve, and a willingness to employ nuclear weapons. This is necessary for instilling fear and uncertainty in the minds of adversaries.

Achieving narrative control is no easy feat. In the age of social media and instantaneous communication, information warfare is the new battleground for shaping public opinion. States contend with an onslaught of propaganda, misinformation, and alternative narratives, making it increasingly challenging to maintain a coherent and convincing message. 

Israel’s Narrative Struggles 

The case of Israel’s war with Hamas serves as a poignant example of the perils posed by losing the narrative war. Israel is being painted as the oppressor by large swaths of the international community, even though Hamas initiated the war with their October 7, 2023, attack. Despite possessing a formidable nuclear arsenal and clear escalation dominance in the region, Israel was utterly incapable of deterring conflict with Hamas. In fact, Hamas never believed Israel will use [its?] nuclear arsenal in a Gaza conflict. The Israelis have also failed to deter further escalation of aggression from Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.

Admittedly, nuclear weapons were never intended to deter all forms of aggression. It is possible that past Israeli strikes on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities are serving as a deterrent to Iran going nuclear because they fear an actual Israeli nuclear strike. This is speculation but serves to highlight the challenge of deterrence.

Israel has struggled to gain international acceptance and legitimacy for its action in Gaza with the United Nations condemning Israel, calling for a cease-fire, and even lending legitimacy to claims of genocide. This is a claim that prominent political scientists John Mearsheimer and Norman Finkelstein supported in the past weeks. The prominent commentator and former judge, Andrew Napolitano, also asserts that Israel has lost the public relations war.

Ultimately, the psychological impact of narrative victory empowers non-nuclear entities to resist traditional deterrence strategies. Adversaries, fueled by a sense of righteousness and global support, become more resilient to the deterrent effect of escalation dominance and nuclear superiority.

This resilience poses a significant challenge to the US and Israel, who find themselves contending with adversaries undeterred by their joint military superiority in the region. Even irrational decisions, in a quantitative sense, do not strike fear in adversaries that believe they dominate public support and will obtain divine vindication and retribution in their cause.

Reclaiming the Narrative Initiative

As a result, Israel finds itself caught in a precarious position, where its nuclear deterrent is weakened by perceptions of ambiguity, mistrust, and self-deterrence. Its adversaries are emboldened by this perceived weakness coupled with global support for their struggles. They may be more inclined to continue challenging Israel’s security interests, knowing that the costs of nuclear escalation are mitigated by doubts surrounding Israel’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons in conflict. This is a challenge with maintaining a nuclear posture of opacity.

To regain the narrative initiative, Israel must invest in strategic narrative crafting. Emphasizing shared values with allies, just causes, and a commitment to peace can reshape perceptions and counteract the narrative of oppression. Israel wants to be seen as a liberator and defender, not as the oppressor or the extension of an American empire. Israel has much work to do to change their current international reputation and reclaim the moral high ground. Strengthening international alliances and engaging in diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are essential and a good place to start. This is not to say Israel is not engaging in such efforts. They certainly are, but to little effect.

By influencing global narratives, Israel can garner support for their actions and create a more balanced perception of the current conflict. Launching targeted public diplomacy campaigns can bridge the gap between military actions and public understanding. Providing transparent and compelling narratives about strategic objectives can counter misinformation and build domestic and international support. Additionally, recognizing the power of cultural and ideological narratives is crucial. Israel should continue to tap into historical narratives that showcase their commitment to democracy, freedom, and human rights, countering portrayals that paint them as aggressors and oppressors.

Conclusion

The nexus of self-deterrence, narrative control, and nuclear deterrence is of utmost importance in the contemporary strategic environment. As states grapple with the complexities of nuclear strategy, the ability to shape public perception and maintain credibility is essential for maintaining peace and stability. Failure to do so risks undermining the very foundations of global security, with potentially catastrophic consequences for all nations involved. Only by mastering the art of narrative control can states hope to navigate the treacherous waters of nuclear politics and ensure the continued survival of the international order.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Self-Deterrence, Narrative Control, and Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Israel was originally published on Global Security Review.