<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:mining &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/mining/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/mining/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 11:10:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0.2</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holden Johansen]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 12:10:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics & Trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alternative materials]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China–Japan Rare Earths dispute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cobalt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[copper]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[domestic production]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic coercion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electric vehicles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[export]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[export restrictions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[F-35 fighter jets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[graphite]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[industrial production]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investment planning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lithium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military aircraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mineral reserves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[price volatility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[processing dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radar systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rare Earth minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[recycling technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refining infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[semiconductors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[solar panels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stockpiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic vulnerability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[submarines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain diversification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tomahawk missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. dependency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unmanned aerial vehicles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32858</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: July 2, 2026 China&#8217;s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial inputs for products used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/">China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> July 2, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China&#8217;s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial </span><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-africa-critical-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">inputs for products</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over the supply chains of these critical minerals is becoming a key aspect of geopolitical rivalry.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Much of this competition is focused on Africa, which holds about </span><a href="https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa"><span data-contrast="none">30 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the world’s mineral reserves. China has already secured dominant positions in essential parts of these supply chains, recognizing the strategic importance of controlling access to these critical resources.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China produces nearly</span><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-africa-critical-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none"> 70 percent of the world&#8217;s rare earth minerals</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and has reinforced this position through deliberate efforts to </span><a href="https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/chinas-critical-minerals-footprint-in-africa-projects-strategy-and-impacts/"><span data-contrast="none">control every stage</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the critical mineral supply chain. This process begins long before extraction, with Chinese banks and engineering firms securing involvement. Beijing then extends that control to the project&#8217;s end, pairing ownership of mines with ownership of the railways, roads, and ports through which these materials move. The result is a supply system in which China extracts, refines, and exports minerals from Africa which ensures that, in many cases, raw materials move on Chinese terms.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China’s dominance in the rare earth mineral trade stems from its strategic approach to mineral supply chains, not just profit. This allows Beijing to maintain long-term control of mines during economic downturns. This is a luxury that profit-driven Western competitors do not have. Chinese firms enter the market fully prepared and offers financing, workforce, equipment, and logistics that often gain significant control over project execution from the start. This strategy has helped Beijing achieve “</span><a href="https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/chinas-critical-minerals-footprint-in-africa-projects-strategy-and-impacts/"><span data-contrast="none">processing dominance</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">,” meaning control over the refining system to the point that winning a mining contract in Africa does not ensure independence from Chinese supply chains. Although </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-executive-order-ties-us-critical-minerals-security-global-partnerships"><span data-contrast="none">China produces only about 10 percent of the world&#8217;s lithium, cobalt, and copper, it controls roughly 40-90 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the refining capacity for these materials. Therefore, a Western company extracting ore in sub-Saharan Africa has not truly succeeded if the ore must be processed through a Chinese refinery. For the United States, this distinction has far-reaching consequences beyond market competition.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The U.S. is highly exposed to supply chain disruption risks because critical minerals have uses that extend far beyond consumer products. They are key components of systems essential to national defense, including</span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions"><span data-contrast="none"> </span></a><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions"><span data-contrast="none">F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and more. The U.S. maintains </span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-critical-minerals-dilemma-what-know"><span data-contrast="none">only one domestic rare earth mine, possesses minimal refining infrastructure</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and </span><a href="https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/chairman-griffith-delivers-opening-statement-at-subcommittee-on-environment-hearing-on-the-beneficial-use-of-coal-ash-1"><span data-contrast="none">relies on China for 70% of rare earth imports</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. Expanding domestic mining and refining capacity </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/trade-critical-supply-chains"><span data-contrast="none">requires significant capital investment and highly specialized expertise</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, limiting the speed at which domestic production can realistically offset exposure risks. The result is a situation in which the U.S. defense industrial base is significantly dependent on a strategic adversary for materials it cannot easily replace, and which are essential to the production and sustainment of advanced military capabilities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The risks of relying on a strategic adversary like China for materials vital to American national security are clearly shown by the China–Japan Rare Earths </span><a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">dispute of 2010</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships in the East China Sea, leading to the arrest and detention of the boat’s captain. In reaction, the Chinese government stopped exporting critical minerals to Japan. Tokyo, which depended on Beijing for nearly 90 percent of its rare earth mineral imports, saw prices for these goods rise nearly 10-fold in the year after the incident. Although the United States and Japan are in different positions within global supply chains, Japan&#8217;s experience demonstrates the broader strategic dangers that arise when a country becomes heavily dependent on a geopolitical rival for key resources.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The coercive value of rare earth dominance lies not only in China&#8217;s ability to deny access but also in the threat of disruption. Even the possibility of export restrictions can drive price volatility, delay industrial production, complicate defense procurement, and undermine long-term investment planning. Japan’s response to the 2010 dispute reveals that dependency on rare earth elements is not unavoidable. Japan’s proactive approach included investing in recycling technologies, developing alternative materials, diversifying supply chains through overseas mining projects in Australia and other countries, and building stockpiles to secure reserves. As a result, Tokyo reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths by </span><a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">about 30 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, demonstrating that policy actions can yield tangible results. More broadly, Japan’s experience underscores a key truth of modern strategic competition: dependence on an adversary for vital materials can create vulnerabilities that go beyond economics. Washington and its partners should take notice.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Holden Johansen is an independent researcher focused on geopolitical security risks. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Miami University and completed coursework in European Politics and Security at the Danish Institute for Study Abroad in Copenhagen. The views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Critical-Mineral-Strategy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/">China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/seizing-the-high-ground-the-case-for-u-s-leadership-in-space-mining/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/seizing-the-high-ground-the-case-for-u-s-leadership-in-space-mining/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rachel Butler]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 13:30:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics & Trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Deterrence & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artemis Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asteroid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extraction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[framework ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intellectual property]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Leadership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lunar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NASA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[outer space treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[R&D]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32356</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Since the Cold War, space has served as a powerful symbol of American identity. It is an arena where national pride, technological daring, and the spirit of exploration converge. It has embodied the same frontier ethos that once drove the settling of the West, while simultaneously showcasing the unity and resolve that defined U.S. competition [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/seizing-the-high-ground-the-case-for-u-s-leadership-in-space-mining/">Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since the Cold War, space has served as a powerful symbol of American identity. It is an arena where national pride, technological daring, and the spirit of exploration converge. It has embodied the same frontier ethos that once drove the settling of the West, while simultaneously showcasing the unity and resolve that defined U.S. competition against rival powers. Yet as space becomes increasingly contested, that legacy of exploration and resolve must now address a new challenge: the rise of space mining.</p>
<p>Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.</p>
<p>To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&amp;D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.</p>
<p><strong>Formative Policy Action in Space Mining</strong></p>
<p>In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html">Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967</a>. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.</p>
<p>Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2024/space-technology-trends-2025.html.">satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms</a>. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/overview-in-situ-resource-utilization/">in-situ resource utilization</a> (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/economics-of-the-stars/">NASA’s Asterank database</a>, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262">U.S.</a> and <a href="https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal-framework/law_space_resources_english_translation.html.">Luxembourg</a> were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html">“province of all mankind”</a> as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “<a href="https://theweek.com/106954/russia-accuses-us-of-moon-invasion">invasion</a>” of the Moon, likening it to “<a href="https://theweek.com/106954/russia-accuses-us-of-moon-invasion">another Afghanistan or Iraq</a>.” Russia&#8217;s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/russia-wants-to-join-luxembourg-in-space-mining-idUSKCN1QN1OQ/">agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019</a>.</p>
<p>Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262">U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015</a> reflects <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf">Article II</a> of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/National-Space-Policy.pdf">2020 National Space Policy</a> aligns with the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf?emrc=695ad3f569640">Artemis Accords</a> by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.</p>
<p>Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.</p>
<p><strong>Protective R&amp;D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities </strong></p>
<p>As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore <a href="https://www.space.com/the-universe/moon/chinas-change-6-lunar-samples-suggest-our-moon-is-debris-from-an-ancient-giant-earth-impact">China&#8217;s growing space capabilities</a> and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.</p>
<p>China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ10/PLAW-112publ10.htm">Wolf Amendment</a>, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state <a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/news/nasa-investigators-safeguard-scientific-integrity-by-exposing-university-grant-fraud/">University for violations of the Wolf Amendment</a> and announced in December that the University <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-de/pr/university-delaware-failed-disclose-professors-foreign-government-ties">agreed to pay $715,580</a> to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to <a href="https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/Appendix%20B.pdf">a report</a> published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/texas-university-pays-resolve-claims-it-defrauded-grant-program">the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties</a> after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.</p>
<p><a href="https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/how-chinas-political-system-discourages-innovation-and-encourages-ip-theft/">China’s sustained intellectual property theft </a>is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&amp;D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&amp;D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion </strong></p>
<p>Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&amp;D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.</p>
<p><em>Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Seizing-the-High-Ground-The-Case-for-U.S.-Leadership-in-Space-Mining2.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="212" height="59" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/seizing-the-high-ground-the-case-for-u-s-leadership-in-space-mining/">Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/seizing-the-high-ground-the-case-for-u-s-leadership-in-space-mining/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
