Published: April 2, 2026

On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual 2025 China Military Power Report to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, while Russia continues to brandish tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons to shield conventional aggression. Yet U.S. deterrence planning still assumes that sufficiency against one peer will scale to two.

Within the bomber community, personnel are trained to operate and make decisions amid uncertainty. Deterrence cannot rely on idealized scenarios. Washington, however, continues to plan and budget as if deterring one peer at a time is adequate to maintain peace. Since the Nixon administration elevated “strategic sufficiency,” the U.S. has preferred a survivable second-strike posture over matching adversary numbers, even as U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander Adm. Charles Richard testified in 2020, “We do not seek parity.”

That posture of sufficiency made sense when the U.S. faced one major nuclear superpower at a time. It makes less sense when the U.S. must deter two nuclear peers, potentially in overlapping crises while also accounting for a third in North Korea. The 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned the nation is “ill-prepared” for a future where China and Russia can coordinate, or opportunistically exploit dual crises.

The issue is not that U.S. modernization appears timid on paper. Instead, it is optimized for a single adversary. A survivable second strike against one major nuclear opponent is not enough as a credible deterrent against two, especially if one adversary believes the other will absorb U.S. attention. Deterrence developed for one enemy breaks down when facing multiple opponents.

Modernization is also colliding with the same budget dysfunction that has battered conventional readiness for years. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats do not just delay programs; they advertise doubt about U.S. resolve. In deterrence, doubt about political will can be just as harmful as uncertainty about capability.

Enter the logic of reciprocity. The White House’s February 2025 memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs argues that reciprocal measures are not punishment; they are a way to restore balance when competitors exploit unequal terms. Reciprocity is a framework for fairness, and fairness is what makes commitments believable.

Deterrence needs a similar framework. Strategic fairness demands a posture calibrated to the combined capabilities of the adversaries the U.S. must deter, not an accounting trick that treats them sequentially. Dynamic Parity offers that calibration: match the aggregate nuclear threat, go no further, and use that ceiling to avoid both arms racing and strategic vulnerability.

Dynamic Parity is “parity without superiority.” It rebuffs a race for numerical dominance, but it also rejects minimalist postures that assume an adversary will politely wait its turn. It restores equilibrium as the foundation of deterrence in a multipolar era.

Skeptics argue that “parity” invites an arms race or abandons arms control. Dynamic Parity does the opposite: it clearly separates what is required from what is excess, with the numerical arsenals determined by the adversary and then matched by America. This establishes a disciplined standard for force planning. That discipline also enhances the U.S. position in future risk-reduction negotiations by making the baseline requirements explicit instead of improvised during a crisis.

Strategy, however, is not self-executing. If Dynamic Parity is the strategic logic, Congress needs a budgeting structure that can deliver it. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund provided the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with authorities that support long-lead procurement and multiyear contracting.

Congress should implement that approach throughout the nuclear enterprise via a National Strategic Deterrence Fund. The goal is not to escape oversight; it is to safeguard the core of deterrence from annual budget brinkmanship and start-stop inefficiency. If the fund is protected as non-discretionary spending with multiyear authority, modernization timelines become actual plans rather than mere hopes.

Here is what that would look like in practice:

• Direct the next Nuclear Posture Review to adopt a concurrency standard and use Dynamic Parity as the force-planning logic.
• Create a National Strategic Deterrence Fund with multi-year and long-lead authorities across delivery systems, warheads, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications.
• Require annual execution reporting, i.e., schedule, industrial capacity, and funding stability, so Congress can measure delivery and not intent.

This is about credibility, not bookkeeping. The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board warned in 2023 that extended deterrence hinges on the perception of sustained capability and resolve. Allies and adversaries do not parse budget documents; they watch whether the U.S. executes what it promises.

Execution is the signal. Russia’s 2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence establishes clear redlines for potential nuclear use while deliberately preserving threshold ambiguity. China is building the force structure for nuclear coercion alongside conventional power projection. If Washington cannot modernize on schedule and at scale, because budgets lurch from continuing resolution to shutdown threat, adversaries will read that as strategic hesitation, not fiscal noise.

Reciprocity works only when it is enforced. In nuclear deterrence, enforcement means a posture designed for concurrency and a budget mechanism that delivers it. Dynamic Parity provides the standard; a National Strategic Deterrence Fund provides the spine. In a multipolar nuclear world, balance against combined nuclear threats is not a theory, it is the price of credibility.

Joseph H. Lyons is a career bomber aviator and a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, any other U.S. government agency, or Missouri State University.

Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whenever the United States resorts to military force, the same question echoes through Washington and beyond: Did President Trump act within the law? Recent controversies surrounding the War Powers Resolution—especially the requirement to notify Congress—have only intensified that debate. This article steps aside from that familiar battleground. Instead, it asks a more fundamental constitutional question: would an air campaign against Iran be lawful under the United States Constitution? A careful reading suggests that the answer may well be yes.

There are two sections in Article I of the Constitution that address the authority to declare war. Clause 11 of Section 8 grants Congress the power to declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning capture on land and water. It is not the only provision that discusses war-making authority.

Clause 3 of Section 10, which is rarely mentioned in war powers discussions, deprives the states of the authority to maintain a standing army or navy, or to engage in war. It is the federal government’s responsibility to provide for the nation’s common defense, with two exceptions. First, Congress may permit states to possess these powers. Second, states may go to war if they are “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

War Powers Act of 1973

Using general legislative authority, as well as power granted to it from Article I, Section 8, Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973. The Act came after frustration over the Korean War and the bombing campaign over Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

The Act creates several limitations on the President’s abilities to make war and requires: 1) a declaration of war, 2) specific statutory authorization, or 3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

“In every possible instance,” the President is required to consult with Congress prior to beginning hostilities and do so within 48 hours. Congressional approval is needed if hostilities are to continue beyond 60 days.

From a prescriptivist perspective, there are compelling arguments that certain provisions of the Act may be unconstitutional. While some argue that Congress cannot delegate its authority to make war, others argue that the Act infringes on the President’s duties as Commander in Chief. Article I, Section 10, creates exceptional circumstances for the exercise of war-making powers. Moreover, there is a strong textual argument that those powers expressly granted to the states inherently apply to the President.

Principles of Presidential War Powers

Using the two clauses of the Constitution referenced above, we can extract two principles regarding war-making authority: Consent of Congress and Imminent Danger.

1. Consent of Congress

Congress can consent in three ways. It can issue a formal declaration of war. It can also pass legislation to create conditions for the use of force. And it can give the Commander in Chief limited flexibility, as they did with the War Powers Act.

Alternatively, Congress can signal passive approval by not responding to the Presidential action at all. This last approach is controversial, but common sense and Supreme Court precedent suggest it is lawful. Moreover, Congress is the only body that can legally correct an unauthorized or undesired war. They can pass laws to restrict war-making authority, end a war, or use their impeachment power. When Congress chooses not to use these options, it is effectively granting passive consent.

2. Imminent Danger Exception

As stated in the preamble to the Constitution, the purpose of creating a constitution is to provide for the common defense of the people, among other goals. While Congress has the Article I power to declare war or legislate how the President can wage war, responsibilities are commingled. The President is the Commander in Chief per Article II, Section 2. One of the implied duties of heading the armed forces is directing them in a defensive attack or addressing imminent danger, which refers to an immediate threat that poses a risk of harm without prompt intervention. This is not a tangential power of the President, but a core constitutional power as well.

It would be ludicrous to suggest that the initial response to the War of 1812 was unauthorized because Congress could not meet to deliberate on a declaration. While it is clearly the primary duty of the federal government to repel invasion, it is also in the purview of the states to act when “actually invaded” or placed in “imminent danger.” The Founding Fathers clearly recognized the need for flexibility in responding to threats, especially in an era when communication delays were the norm. If the states are given such power in exceptional circumstances, certainly the Commander in Chief would have these powers.

What is peculiar is that the flexibility afforded to states is not restricted to times of invasion. An invasion is already an imminent danger. Neither is the exception in Section 10, Clause 3 restricted to actions on the sea for events such as intercepting a flotilla attempting to invade. It is easy to believe the Founders contemplated threats from their immediate borders with France, Britain, and Spain.

If a state had a border along a river, and an enemy nation started concentrating forces on the other bank of the river, one could argue the existence of imminent danger, especially in historic times where standing armies were statements in and of themselves.

How This Applies to Iran

There is clearly some lawful justification for offensive use of force when Congress does not provide express consent. Just War Theory and the preemption doctrine can be discussed all day long until we are blue in the face, without concluding whether the current use of force is theoretically justified. The answer is truly a matter of prudence and congressional will.

Using threats of imminent danger as justification seems to be a stretch in this scenario, particularly because many in positions of authority have hinted the imminence originates with Israel’s decision to carry out strikes and the retaliation that would bring upon American forces within the region.

One can argue that the intent of the imminent danger exception in the Constitution is limited to public defense. The War Powers Act considers imminent danger to military forces. Say that the military came across evidence of a nation trying to repeat a USS Cole-style bombing. Retaliating against that nation or striking first to reduce their capability would be the prudent thing to do, and it would be a lawful use of force under the Constitution alone, regardless of what acts of Congress say.

It is also important to consider the specific moment used to assess whether the actions are lawful. At the start of a conflict, one might not actually be in immediate danger or have given consent. Nevertheless, arguing imminent danger becomes easier in the chaos of war, especially after the first shot is fired.

It is unknown what the actual intelligence is behind the scenes, nor is it known the veracity of public comments by members of the Administration and Congress. Some say it is about nuclear weapon production, preempting retaliation that would stem from Israel’s strikes against Iran, retaliation for the alleged killings of thousands of Iranian civilians, or regime change. Others who are just as authoritative contradict these claims.

While there may be classified intelligence to the contrary, this is a rare instance in which the justification for the strikes has not been communicated to the public. Normally, the public is aware of escalating tensions and seeing the President or other officials give warnings or make demands before we see strikes. On the evening of March 3, 2026, many members of Congress took to social media to discuss their briefing on the conflict. Representatives Seth Magaziner and Stephen Lynch, Senator Richard Blumenthal, among others, indicated that the administration failed to articulate any justification, while most republicans stated support for the strikes.

Just as there is a fog of war, there is a fog of politics. Commentary is often on partisan lines; it is an election year, and members often vote against public statements, and to the chagrin of public opinion. It is also common for members to offer support privately and behind the scenes while publicly posturing against matters. What matters is what Congress does as a body. Congress has not yet revoked the President’s war-making ability. Until they do so, they are at least providing passive consent for the President to use force against Iran. While some may find the prudence of this conflict distasteful, until Congress votes otherwise, the war and that the President’s actions are lawful per the Constitution itself.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Is The Air Campaign Against Iran an Illegal Use of Force? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chris McInnes is Executive Director at the Air Power Institute. He is an air power and national security expert with 25 years of experience in the military, government, and industry and is also a frequent commentator and speaker at defence seminars here in Australia.

Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Australian Air Power and Deterrence with Chris McInnes was originally published on Global Security Review.

As a strategy, MAD was considered but jettisoned by the United States 65 years ago. For example, President John F. Kennedy noted, “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy, or of a collective death-wish for the world.” Kennedy succeeded in adopting a strategy short of all-out retaliation that came to be known as “flexible response,” which, in 1974, was fully developed by James Schlesinger and eventually codified in Presidential Defense Directive 59.

Whether the United States has 10,000 or 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons, American forces were designed to have a secure retaliatory capability at any level of conflict. The objective was to end any conflict as soon as possible and at the lowest level of destruction. The American objective was not to burn an adversary’s cities to the ground. American deterrence strategy was to hold at risk what the adversary valued most.

Critics of current deterrence strategy assume that no nuclear-armed adversary of the United States believes in “fighting” a nuclear war. So, the US should drop its long-held deterrence strategy and go back to MAD or something like it. At the same time, many of these critics join nuclear abolitionists to support nuclear weapons but only to deter, not engage, in warfighting. If conflict breaks out and these weapons will not be used in retaliation, then nuclear forces are off the table and reduced to a bluff.

The mistaken notion that the US has a MAD strategy plays into the hands of Russia and China. These two nations both seek to escalate or threaten to escalate in a crisis or conflict with the limited use of nuclear weapons. The objective is to get the United States to stand down and not come to the defense of her allies, a restraint to give Russia and China a strategic advantage.

Unfortunately, much of the current commentary on nuclear threats still assumes the US and its adversaries maintain a mutually assured destruction strategy as the best means to avoid any use of nuclear weapons. Annie Jacobson’s recent book, On Nuclear War: A Scenario, describes a mutually assured destruction strategy, which she assumes the US maintains, as simply MAD or crazy. She posits that any initial use of nuclear weapons would almost automatically result in the all-out use of such weapons, leading to nuclear winter and killing billions. As such, she calls for the entirety of American nuclear deterrence to be jettisoned.

Being in the deterrence business, it is important for Congress, the media, the executive decisionmakers in the military and Department of Defense to fully understand what deterrence, as practiced by the United States, entails and why it must be sustained.

To explain this requires a review of history and an understanding that adversaries of the United States and the West sought military advantage through enhanced nuclear weapons technology. Over time the challenge for the US to sustain deterrence changed. The Soviets sought to put nuclear weapons in space, then built a huge first-strike missile force, then deployed thousands of medium-range SS-20s to intimidate and split NATO, and, most recently, built a theater-strike capability to keep the United States and NATO from winning the war in Ukraine.

The US nuclear deterrent was never one size fits all and automatically fit for purpose. For example, the US and NATO faced a huge conventional military threat from the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Cold War on the plains of central Europe, a place called the Fulda Gap. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact tanks were not matched by American conventional forces. President Dwight D. Eisenhower did not wish to bankrupt the US treasury by building such a large and costly conventional military. The available alternative was to establish a nuclear umbrella over Europe, primarily aimed at Soviet tank armies. Thus, in the initial Cold War period, the US assumed a nuclear conflict would most probably grow out of an initial conventional war.

As technology improved, however, a threat emerged that could markedly change the correlation of forces between the United States and the USSR. The US still sought to deter a potential Soviet push into central Europe, but an additional threat was a potential Soviet pre-emptive first strike seeking to eliminate much of the American extended deterrent, followed up by a subsequent conventional invasion of Europe.

In 1963, the American strategic nuclear deterrent consisted of 6,000 nuclear warheads while the Russians had 600 warheads. As President Kennedy remarked, this strength, and particularly the newly deployed Minuteman missiles, were “my ace in the hole” that gave the United States the strategic advantage that peacefully ended the Cuban Missile Crisis.

However, by the time the next decade ended, the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) “arms control” treaty process was implemented and the USSR largely caught up, deploying 7,800 warheads compared to the US force of 8,700 warheads. Most worrisome was the new Soviet land-based missile force of 3,000 warheads on highly accurate SS-18s—with the overall Soviet nuclear force projected to grow to over 24,000 warheads by 1993.

As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told Congress in 1974, “the Soviets are going for a first strike force and there is no doubt about it.” The SS-18 eventually held at risk the entirety of the US land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. This was the only American deterrent force that was sufficiently accurate to target key Soviet leadership and military targets without requiring “city busting.”

The US stopped deploying land-based missiles at 1,050 and associated warheads at around 2,000—assuming the USSR would show equal restraint. But Moscow built a huge land-based ICBM force that could take out the nation’s Minuteman missiles, leaving the US without the ability to hold key Soviet assets at risk. This perceived imbalance was known as the “window of vulnerability” where the US faced the prospects of a Soviet-initiated first strike that would leave US leaders exactly where President Kennedy worried it would.

The US solved the strategic equation of the window of vulnerability, the Soviet empire collapsed, the US added the Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and Peacekeeper land-based ICBM, Soviet SS-20s were banned, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) arms control process brought Russian warheads down to under 2,000.

In April 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, economically unable to rebuild a Soviet-era nuclear force, decreed that Moscow develop highly accurate, small, low-yield, battlefield nuclear weapons, which his successor, Vladimir Putin, did in earnest. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned, these theater nuclear weapons were designed to “escalate to win” a conventional conflict or crisis between Moscow and Washington.

Putin thinks the US will not respond to the small-scale use of nuclear weapons because the US will not want to risk escalation and the possibility of strategic nuclear exchange. That is why Putin made exactly these threats over NATO’s intervention in the war against Ukraine.

Both Russia and China assume the relative weak theater nuclear forces the US maintains are now insufficient to match escalatory threats from Moscow and possibly Beijing. This point was emphasized by the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report in laying out the opening of a new window of vulnerability.

The US is indeed now developing a greater theater nuclear deterrent to close the technology gap. However, simply adding to America’s conventional deterrent is not sufficient. As military leadership has repeatedly emphasized, if adversarial nuclear forces are introduced into a conventional conflict, the American advantage ceases. In short, conventional military leverage disappears.

The central tenets of mutually assured destruction no longer apply. MAD was jettisoned long ago. More importantly, America’s adversaries employ credible threats with the nuclear forces. New technology and expanding adversary arsenals are undermining the limited deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal, a fact that must change if the United States seeks to ensure it does not find itself embroiled in a conflict where capitulation or Armageddon are the nation’s only options.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Mutually Assured Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military defines deterrence as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.” From this, readers can deduce that deterrence is a state of mind and a product of rational decision-making.

Basing security policy on either of these assumptions is foolhardy. It is challenging to calibrate deterrence. This requires distinguishing enough deterrence, where credible fear of counteraction keeps the peace, from too much deterrence, where credible fear of an opponent’s motives can lead to a preemptive attack.

First, some practical examples. Returning to October 7, 2023, it is possible to say Israeli deterrence failed. Since 1948 Israel has sought to maintain a level of strength and preparedness sufficient to prevent its enemies from planning and executing attacks, using the threat of overwhelmingly force to maintain deterrence against its enemies.

The first major sign of trouble with this approach came in 1968, months after Israel’s defeat of its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War, when Egypt began preparing a response. This came in October 1973 with Operation Badr, the attack which kicked off the Yom Kippur War. Similarly, Hamas began planning its 2023 attack immediately after a major defeat nine years before in the Gaza War of July–August 2014.

In both cases, deterrence failed years before the actual attacks. Israel’s overwhelming military superiority simply delayed the inevitable response to a situation its adversaries saw as absolutely unacceptable. Israel, overconfident in its deterrent capability, discounted the danger when intelligence assets began to report trouble. Thus, a single-minded reliance on deterrence actually led to future conflict.

So much for recent practice. On the theoretical side, scholars and practitioners alike have sought to chart the proximate triggers of war. The Athenian general Thucydides offered a multi-dimensional explanation in his History of the Peloponnesian War. He believed conflict resulted from three factors: Phobos (fear), kerdos (self-interest), and/or doxa (honor or reputation).

Deterrence, as we have seen, relies on threats of force which induce phobos, and therein lies a huge problem: it ignores the crucial elements of self-interest and honor or reputation. Thucydides named phobos as a principal trigger for conflict, even as definitions of deterrence, the current paradigm for conflict prevention, cite its reliance on instilling phobos. As the French might say, not only does deterrence fail in practice, but even worse, it does not work in theory.

Nuclear Deterrence and Global Devastation 

The shortcomings of conventional deterrence are well documented. Then there is its younger brother, nuclear deterrence. The story there is much simpler. Recent research on nuclear winter has lowered estimates of the megatonnage of nuclear detonations needed to trigger the phenomenon. Significant global effects leading to the starvation of over a billion people could be triggered by the use of as few as one hundred “small” Hiroshima-sized (total 1.5 megatons) explosions over urban targets.

This is extraordinarily bad news for the nuclear weapons priesthood, which has been chanting slogans of escalation dominance in government ears since the 1960s. The only rational nuclear deterrence that can be relied upon, it now seems, is self-deterrence, where a conflict which seems unwinnable by conventional means is now far more likely to appear unthinkable in nuclear terms.

Seeking a Realistic, Effective Alternative

Eliminating all nuclear weapons is clearly a necessary part of the journey towards lasting peace. But focusing on particular weapons is miscasting the problem and thus misunderstanding the nature of the solution. The world needs a transition away from the deterrence-based para bellum paradigm, the idea that achieving peace requires constant preparation for war, toward a new way of looking at conflict. This article proposes a radically different paradigm, Trinitarian Realism, which rests upon three principal assumptions.

First, in a concept borrowed from the Christian Trinity, one’s individual confession (peccavi) is important, but the collective and universal confession (peccavimus) is crucial in international peacebuilding. All need to recognize that each has sinned and fallen short, that no one comes to the table, any table, anywhere, with completely clean hands. Second, readers must truly grasp Carl von Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” in war, combining the irrational (war moves a citizenry to violence, hatred, and enmity); the non-rational (commanders face “the play of chance and probability”); and the über-rational (governments attempt to “subordinat[e war] as an instrument of policy”).

This guarantees wholly unknowable results. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb points out, “What is surprising is not the magnitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it. This is all the more worrisome when engaging in deadly conflicts; wars are fundamentally unpredictable (and we do not know it).” Finally, that the July 16, 1945, Trinity event at White Sands, New Mexico, the first nuclear explosion, introduced a global catastrophic risk arising from the multiple and wide-ranging ecological effects of nuclear winter.

A transition away from deterrence can begin by not reflexively demonizing anyone with whom there is a serious disagreement. Softening morality projections and focusing judgment on a better understanding of complex collective emotions is also helpful. We can do this with far greater humility, including recognition that we will get our assessments wrong.

Writing of diplomatic historian and Christian apologist Herbert Butterfield, political scientist Paul Sharp provided the bare bones of a three-dimensional replacement for deterrence which we call strategic compassion: “Butterfield’s writings on Christianity and international relations suggest…the moral principles of self-restraint [as antidote for fear/phobos], empathy [honor/doxa] and charity [self-interest/kerdos] upon which an effective diplomacy should be based.”

Finally, we believe that nations must abandon their attachment to nuclear deterrence postures for the reasons outlined above and must accept the eradication of all nuclear weapons—before they eradicate all of us.

Paul Ingram is a Research Affiliate and former Academic Programme Manager with the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) at Cambridge University. Edmond E. (Ted) Seay III is a retired Foreign Service Officer with 26 years’ experience in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. His final assignment was as principal arms control advisor to US NATO Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council Ivo Daalder.

Deconstructing Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The immediate remedy is to provide, through NATO, the military capability Ukraine needs to restore its sovereignty and firmly demonstrate the resolve of the West to deter any further Russian escalation of the conflict. But to accurately answer why such a remedy is needed requires returning to the point at which American deterrence was undermined in the first place.

The Taliban’s swift defeat by December 2001 was brilliant. The defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003 was also brilliant. In both instances, the reaction of many allies and adversaries was to underscore the formidable capability of the US military. To that extent, deterrence was very much enhanced.

But the US and others assumed future wars would be very short duration and, consequently, the American industrial base need not be enhanced. Both assumptions turned out to be incorrect. As a result, much of the deterrent value of these two “successful” missions was lost after nearly two decades of nation building post 2003. The hasty 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan seriously undermined American deterrence. Despite American forces in Iraq, ISIS developed there, along with multiple Iranian-funded and -armed militias.

In 2008, well before the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US failed to forcibly respond to Russian incursions in Georgia and deterrence credibility was weakened. In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine and the US administration announced that Ukraine was not critical to the nation’s security. The issue was made worse when the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Ukraine, the victim of aggression. This was seen as peace at all costs, undermining deterrence.

With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US again lost deterrence credibility. America removed sanctions on Iran, released billions in escrowed funds, and then gave Iran a “right to enrich.” This allowed Iran to build an industrial-strength nuclear technology capability, which Israel described as a sanctioned pathway to a nuclear bomb.

In 2022, the US failed to prevent another Russian invasion of more Ukraine territory, further weakening American deterrence credibility. Over the next three years, the Biden administration publicly worried about possible escalation of the war in Ukraine, thus, refraining from providing Ukraine with advanced military technology as well as limiting the types of assets, especially on Russian territory, that could be used.

This took some conventional and nuclear deterrent capability off the table insofar as the United States could or could not use military capability to prevent the very Russian escalation the US most worried about. The US placed most of Russia’s key military and economic assets in sanctuary and signaled to allies and adversaries that the US was less than serious about deterring Russian escalation. In short, America ceded to Moscow the ability to pick and choose to implement the very escalating dangers feared.

Put another way, the US undertook a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence. To many in the US, and particularly in Congress, this again looked like a prescription for another endless and perhaps fruitless war.

Now the continued Russian threats to use nuclear weapons is what most worries many US policymakers. Ironically, these Russian threats are also thought by many others to be largely bluff, including many congressional supporters of enhanced assistance to Ukraine, which now numbers some 85 senators that support Chairman Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) Ukraine funding legislation.

Assuming nuclear threats are bluff might be understandable if the US had a robust as opposed to somewhat minimal theater nuclear capability to deter the Russian use of theater or regional nuclear forces.

But as the Strategic Posture Commission October 2023 report underscored, Putin’s repeatedly threatened to escalate to the nuclear level in order to “win” or force the US to stand down. These threats are coming from Putin because Moscow thinks its 2,000 to 4,000 such weapons are enough to intimidate the US with only a hundred gravity bombs on short-range jets in Europe.

Enhancing American theater nuclear systems through the deployment of nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) is now proceeding, but such enhancements may take years. Short- and medium-range cruise missiles aboard aircraft could also be used to close the gap between NATO and Moscow, and those deployments could be forthcoming in a shorter time.

But as Israeli ambassador Dori Gold warned a decade ago, the bad guy’s “clocks” are moving at a different speed than those of NATO, and there is no guarantee that Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the region will not materialize or be fully deterred by new and timely US conventional or nuclear technology.

However, if the United States is to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty, the US and NATO must have faith in the existing deterrent, emphasize determination to move forward, and provide Ukraine with the military capability necessary to achieve these objectives and, with all due speed, upgrade theater deterrent capability. After all, America did not work for decades to end the Soviet empire only to give it back to Moscow, one country at a time.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Ukraine Sovereignty Requires Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

So sure was Israel in its southern security that intelligence reports were downplayed; the military even redeployed troops from Gaza prior to the October 7. The brutality of the attack and horror at the hostage crisis left Israel so shocked that it delayed a ground invasion for 20 days.

Despite the delay, calls for ceasefire and accusations of genocide existed before Israel’s offensive began. All the same, every first-semester international relations student knew what would happen next: with Hamas no longer deterred, Israel’s only recourse was compellence.

Compellence theory is simply acting on the threat that keeps your adversary deterred. Israel needed to compel Hamas to surrender the hostages, disarm, and realize that attacking Israel is a bad idea—restoring deterrence. For nearly two years since, Israel has tested compellence theory; at best, with mixed results, not only with Hamas, but across the region.

The Lebanese terror group Hezbollah launched its own attack on October 8, 2023, which by the end saw the launch of approximately 10,000–15,000 rockets and 2,500 drone attacks that displaced at least 70,000 Israelis and killed 75 soldiers and 45 civilians. Israel’s effort to restore deterrence devastated Hezbollah, killing 2,500–3,000 fighters, eliminating the majority of its leadership, through an exploding beeper attack in advance of a ground invasion. Seeing their losses, the group agreed to partially disarm and stay out of further hostilities, being effectively compelled.

In Yemen, the Houthis likewise joined the attack on Israel with rocket and drone attacks, as well as targeting ships off its coast, causing significant supply-chain disruptions. The attacks prompted the United States (US) to designate them a terrorist group and launch an aerial campaign alongside the United Kingdom—on top of Israel’s responses.

The Houthis endured severe damage to its offensive infrastructure and lost hundreds of fighters but still managed to occasionally launch limited attacks. The Houthis are more weakened than compelled.

Iran, the financier of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, for the first time acted against Israel directly. Retaliating against Israeli strikes, Iran launched ballistic missile and drone salvos against Israel in April and October of 2024. The tit-for-tat came to a head over 12 days in June 2025, as the two exchanged strikes while Israel tried to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Though the damage Iran’s nuclear capability took is debated, what is known is Israel’s air superiority destroyed nearly all of Iran’s defense framework and eliminated several senior military staff.

Israel endured significant damage as Iran managed to breach its defenses on a few occasions, and the two have since agreed to a ceasefire, while simultaneously pledging readiness to attack in the future. So perhaps, they are mutually deterred for now.

Syria recently entered a new phase of its civil war following the downfall of Assad, an Israeli push to expand its buffer region, and the emergence of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction. HTS is led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, an Islamic State affiliate who recently began targeting members of Syria’s minority populations, largely the Druze.

Israel intervened to protect the Druze, striking HTS sites until Julani quickly agreed to withdraw his troops from the Druze-populated areas. Prior to that intervention, there were rumors of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. While compellence worked to protect the Druze in the short term, it may have derailed a long-term peace deal.

Hamas remains the outlier. Ceasefire talks are again looking to collapse. The message is that despite the devastation, loss of leadership, approximately 17,000 lost fighters, and thousands of civilians killed in the crossfire, it can endure more. Israel’s attempt at compellence was so intense, that it sparked worldwide protests and allegations of genocide. Yet, rather than agree to Israel’s terms, Hamas continues to hold out, giving a statement that they will continue to fight until a Palestinian state is established.

The US attempted to broker multiple ceasefires, with some success in November 2023 and January 2025, but a deal to end the conflict remains elusive. If the US wants real results, compellence should target Hamas’ hosts and financiers, Turkey and Qatar.

While publicly on good terms with the US, the argument that Turkey and Qatar are state sponsors of terrorism would not be difficult to make given the support and protection they have offered Hamas. President Trump could threaten to add Turkey and Qatar to the list of state sponsors of terror unless Hamas agrees to Israel’s terms of ending the war.

There are indications that this could work. At least publicly, the two countries recently joined with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a call on Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. This is a good first step, but the call has no “or else”–type clause that would actually pressure Hamas.

With that support gone, Hamas’ political leadership’s only choice would be deportation from its hosts which would likely jeopardize their finances and potentially put them within Mossad’s reach or accede to Israel’s conditions. Ever self-interested, the hope is they would be compelled to the latter. This type of diplomatic pressure directed at Hamas’ sponsors could trickle down to Hamas’ leadership and potentially be the last best hope for Gazan civilians as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signals plans for a renewed military offensive in the enclave.

Whether deterrence is restored by Israel is yet to be determined. For the sake of civilians on both sides, let us hope it is restored and soon.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Failed Deterrence and Misplaced Compellence in Gaza was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider his transformation since February’s Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump and Vice President JD Vance chastised Zelensky for being “disrespectful,” admonished Zelensky’s efforts to rally international support as “propaganda,” suggested it was Zelensky’s responsibility “to end the destruction of your country,” and described Zelensky as “buried.” Six months later, Trump is praising Ukraine’s “unbreakable spirit,” supports its “future as an independent nation,” and appears to realize that Zelensky is not to blame for Vladimir Putin’s war. It is clear that Putin is not entranced by “the art of the deal,” and that America must play a role in securing any postwar peace. The outlines of that peace are starting to come into focus.

Lurching

In early 2025, French military commanders floated the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” to send troops to Ukraine. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members expressed support for the idea. By summer, 10 European nations offered to contribute troops to a 30,000-man “reassurance force” in postwar Ukraine. However, the Europeans emphasized they would need the US to provide “backstop” capabilities.

That was a nonstarter for Trump—at least until the hastily-arranged summit that brought the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, NATO, and the EU to the White House on August 18. Whether they came out of panic over the unsettling Trump-Putin Alaska meeting or in solidarity with Zelensky, or both, the result of the White House summit was positive.

For example, while Trump emphasized that he would not deploy American ground forces and explained that “European nations are going to take a lot of the burden,” he added, “We’re going to help them…we’ll be involved” in any peacekeeping mission.

Toward that end, he ordered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine to work with allied militaries on the specifics of a European-led peacekeeping force. Perhaps with the US shouldering command-and-control responsibilities; offering American airpower and other enabling capabilities; and signaling support for a security guarantee for postwar Ukraine, peace may prevail. Predictably, administration officials then hedged on Trump’s promise to support the postwar peacekeeping mission in Ukraine—prompting a NATO diplomat to conclude, “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

What Trump’s transatlantic counterparts and those of us who are critical of Trump’s policies need to keep in mind is that this lurching, two-steps-forward-one-step-back approach to Ukraine’s security is better than what Ukraine endured between January and July. There was the Oval Office meeting, the suspension of military aid and intelligence-sharing, the mineral deal, the moral relativism, outright moral inversion, and the inexplicable deference to Putin. Trump now appears to be moving in the right direction.

Lessons

Zelensky made clear that Ukraine cannot sign a peace deal without concrete security guarantees—given Putin’s brazen violation of the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 and 2022. Eleven years of occupation and war have taught Ukrainians that words are not enough to ensure their security. A genuine security guarantee, bolstered by multinational peacekeepers and sustained military aid, is what Ukraine needs going forward—not to roll back Putin’s army to pre-2014 borders, but to deter it from another landgrab. The rest of Europe needs this too. A strong, stable, secure Ukraine will only enhance NATO’s ability to deter Moscow.

Such a guarantee will not be embodied by Ukraine’s accession to NATO—at least not anytime soon—but instead will be a thatch of bilateral commitments from individual NATO members and partners. “A group of now 30 countries, including Japan and Australia, are working on this concept of security guarantees,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently revealed.

To be sure, an American contingent on the ground in postwar Ukraine—working alongside partners that collaborated in other warzones under acronyms such as MFO, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF—would be preferable to what Trump is offering.

After all, American boots on the ground send an unmistakable message to aggressor nations. However, given where Trump was in February, it is important to look at the bright side; rather than taking an ambivalent or even antagonistic position towards Ukraine, Trump appears willing to support America’s closest allies as they secure a postwar peace. The Ukrainian people can then harden their territory against another Russian invasion. There are also two important historical realities.

First, American airpower has a proven track record of making a positive impact on the ground—whether in humanitarian, peacekeeping, deterrent, or combat-support missions. Consider the Berlin Airlift, which sustained a besieged city for 15 months and dealt Stalin a humbling blow. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, which protected Iraqi civilians from Saddam Hussein’s vengeance for 12 years and allowed Iraq’s Kurds to build an all-but-sovereign state is another. Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, which, in coordination with partners on the ground, brought Serb paramilitaries to heel in Bosnia, pushed Serb regulars out of Kosovo, and hastened the end of Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal rule. The toppling of the Taliban after 9/11, which saw the US use airpower as a force-multiplier for indigenous fighters on the ground is but one more example. Finally, Operation Inherent Resolve leveraged airpower to assist ground units in rolling back ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Of course, no one wants American warplanes directly engaging the Russian military. But it pays to recall that it is already happening on a routine basis—near Alaskan airspace, over the Baltic Sea, across Pacific Ocean, and in the Middle East. Moreover, given recent encounters between American and Russian forces—and American and Russian hardware—it seems unlikely Putin’s high command will want to challenge American airpower along or above a future Ukraine-Russia DMZ.

That brings to light a second set of historical lessons. Neither lingering territorial disputes nor simmering hostilities are dealbreakers when it comes to providing security guarantees to allies and partners in the crosshairs. Consider post–World War II Germany. After a period of disarmament and occupation, the country’s western half was rearmed and invited into NATO as a full member, despite massive Soviet bloc armies ringing West Berlin and despite West Germany facing an overwhelming military disadvantage across a heavily armed border.

In fact, the US did not formally recognize the post–World War II territorial-political settlement in Germany or across Europe until 1975. The people of West Germany never abandoned their hopes for German reunification. Those hopes were not realized until 1990.

Next, consider post–World War II Japan. The Red Army seized Japanese islands at the end of the war. To this day, Tokyo does not recognize Russian control over those islands. Despite this territorial dispute, the United States guaranteed Japan’s security in 1951 and entered into a full-fledged mutual-defense treaty in 1960. That treaty is still in force today.

Last, consider the Korean Peninsula. Despite territorial disagreements; despite the absence of a peace treaty; and despite, or perhaps because of, the threat posed by a massive hostile army north of the 38th Parallel, the US provided open-ended security guarantees to South Korea in the autumn of 1953. Those security guarantees are still in force. The people of South Korea still look forward to unification of the two Koreas under the banner of freedom. South Korea even has a cabinet-level government ministry focused on unification.

Predator

In none of these examples did the US or its allies agree to the permanent ceding of territory. Rather, they recognized the difficulty of liberating occupied territory and they envisioned the future prospect of the return of that territory. That is how Ukraine and its partners should view the imperfect peace that will emerge in the coming months—a peace that will leave some of Ukraine’s territory under Putin’s control.

It is also worth emphasizing that a European-led, US-supported peacekeeping force in Ukraine is necessary given Putin’s policies and plans: Moscow occupies swaths of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; threatens Poland; is conducting a campaign of sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint; has moved nuclear weapons into Belarus; is firing off intermediate-range missiles; and is diverting 35 percent of government spending into its war machine. As French President Emmanuel Macron concluded, Putin is “a predator…at our doorstep.” Putin will not stop until he is stopped. Securing Ukraine—while continuing the build-up of deterrent forces on NATO’s eastern flank—is key to stopping Putin.

Alan W. Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

Trump’s Path to an Imperfect Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic Drivers

There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in Gaza and its persistent pressure on disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.

Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable rifts in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.

Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.

Operational Indicators of Preparation

Mossad has already intensified intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from within Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.

Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force regeneration, given the apparent contradiction between political calls for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.

At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s formation of a National Defense Council under Ali Larijani and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.

Political Leverage and Timing

US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.

Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is coordinating with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.

The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept

Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.

However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah vowed not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.

International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment

Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.

Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.

Forecast and Likely Outcomes

Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.

If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.

While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.

Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.

Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for Global Security Review.

Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United Kingdom’s Defense Issues

The United Kingdom’s military spent several decades downsizing its military. Still, the UK took part in major conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, showing that Britain continues to have some force projection capability.

Nevertheless, British Ministry of Defence (MoD) data shows recruitment shortfalls over the past five years. Recent data published by the UK Defence Journal show the biggest recruitment shortfalls are found in the army, where manpower gaps in land forces are most pronounced.

A major factor in recruiting failure was a several-year attempt to draw down spending, that included the army’s closure of half of its recruiting offices, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A lack of recruiting offices only erodes the interaction between recruiters and the community. This lack of interaction dissuades civilians, who may not fully understand the benefits of military service, from joining.

Furthermore, an aging population, a rise in health risks, and an extremely long pipeline from recruitment to basic training can dissuade young men and women from choosing service. While Britain’s Air Force and elite Royal Marines remain formidable, further emphasis on naval power and regrowing the land forces is much needed.

Canada’s Rearmament Crisis

The Canadian Armed Forces are currently facing a readiness crisis. According to an internal overview by the Department of National Defence, only 58 percent of the military is ready to handle any situation. Canada’s lack of readiness is increasingly causing concern among the general public. War in Eastern Europe and Africa and brewing conflicts in Asia show the need for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states to bolster each region. Canada’s military is unready to face a crisis.

A major challenge is stagnation in the Air Force and Navy, where much equipment is neglected and degraded. Because logistics win wars, Canada needs to recruit and train support personnel such as technicians, maintenance, supply, and communications personnel.

Australia’s Defense Issues

Australia, a rising regional power in the Indo-Pacific, also faces challenges for the Australian Defence Forces. Being a member of the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS), Australia is currently awaiting the construction and transfer of three to five Virginia-class submarines from the United States, which may not come in time for Pillar II of the AUKUS agreement, due to stagnant American naval production rates.

Only 80 percent of the 69,000 recruits needed to enhance the Australian Defence Forces have either signed up or met recruiting requirements. Simultaneously, younger Australians feel they have better economic and social opportunities in the private sector than in the military, drawing potential recruits away.

Continuously growing defense spending over several decades will be critical in maintaining readiness. Decades of neglecting defense forced the Australian military into a position where it must catch up to other mid-sized powers like Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute noted, confidence in the military remains low. Thus, efforts to change this view are needed in the information sphere if public institutions are to effectively remilitarize, in lieu of rising threats.

Recommendations for Each Country

The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia face major recruitment and militarization woes. However, steps can be taken for all three countries to push towards modernization and expansion. This is particularly important if these Anglo nations are to remain a close alliance.

British recruitment woes correlate with the lack of recruitment offices. The British Ministry of Defence must grow and lobby for more offices and events where promising youth can learn and gather information about military service. Furthermore, efforts are needed in the more neglected Royal Navy and Army.

The British have an opportunity to take a leadership position on the continent. Growing the British military will also support defense exports and further enhance and expand the military—albeit with an effort to increase the MOD’s budget.

Canada’s efforts must include broader government support for the military as Canadians question the credibility of a government that drew down the military to ineffectiveness. The Canadian Defence Ministry can also take lessons from NATO partners, such as Poland, Romania, Finland, and others, who are modernizing successfully.

Australia’s expansion of the military must take a two-pronged approach. First, show potential recruits the benefits of military service. Second, the government must instill a sense of patriotism and respect for the Armed Forces. The government can focus on brewing threats in the Indo-Pacific, which will eventually reach Australia, while explaining the benefits of military service.

The Commonwealth countries of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada all have capable yet stagnant militaries. Addressing problems with recruitment, logistics, and maintenance can reduce stagnation and help restore these nations’ military strength. As close allies of the United States, their success matters.

Julian McBride is a former US Marine. He is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist.

Commonwealth Defense and Recruitment Hurdles was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since January 20, Trump administration officials have announced an end to US participation in NATO military exercises; floated plans to relinquish NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander post (held by an American since NATO’s founding); proposed withdrawing 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe; threatened the sovereignty of NATO ally Canada; raised the prospect of using force to seize Greenland (a territory of NATO ally Denmark); derided “freeloading” Europeans; said of Vladimir Putin that America “should take him at his word”; torpedoed NATO’s unanimous declaration to “never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea”; and suggested America’s NATO allies would not “come and protect us” in a time of crisis. This follows Trump’s 2024 invitation to Putin’s henchmen to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies failing to meet NATO’s defense-spending requirements; 2018 threat to withdraw from NATO; and a 2016 declaration that he would defend NATO members under attack only if they had “fulfilled their obligations to us.” Add it all up, and Trump’s view of NATO diverges dramatically from that of what was once known as the “Grand Old Party.”

For instance, as he took the reins as NATO’s first military commander, General Dwight Eisenhower—a future Republican president—called NATO “the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.” President Richard Nixon viewed NATO as “a moral force.” President Gerald Ford believed NATO “protected the free world from the threat of aggression.”

President George H. W. Bush called NATO “an insurance policy.” Indeed, for America, NATO insures against the worst scenario: another European conflict triggering another global war. For the rest of NATO, the alliance is a security guarantee backed by the United States. Without that guarantee, there is no security in Europe, as history has a way of reminding those on the outside looking in, from Cold War Hungary to post–Cold War Ukraine.

President George W. Bush called NATO “the essential foundation of transatlantic security.” This essay did not forget President Ronald Reagan. However, many of those who claim Reagan’s mantle forget that he was an unwavering NATO advocate—during and after the Cold War. Rather than dismissing NATO as “obsolete,” Reagan called NATO “the core of America’s foreign policy and of America’s own security.” Rather than alarming NATO allies, Reagan reassured them by echoing the words of the North Atlantic Treaty: “If you are threatened, we’re threatened…. An attack on you is an attack on us.”

Rather than distorting NATO into a transactional protection racket, Reagan championed NATO as a “community of democratic states” and “a bond which has served us so well.”

Reagan never questioned NATO’s relevance, never browbeat NATO laggards, never threatened withdrawing from NATO, and never raised doubts about America’s commitment to NATO. Instead, Reagan championed NATO as “an antidote to chaos,” “a living commitment of the nations of the West to the defense of democracy and individual liberty.”

Importantly, Reagan did not think NATO’s mission was over when the Berlin Wall fell. In fact, he endorsed NATO’s continued growth. “Room must be made in NATO for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” he declared after the Cold War thawed. And even after Moscow began walking the path of reform, Reagan cautioned, “We cannot afford to forget that we are dealing with a political system, a political culture and a political history going back many decades, even centuries…. We must stick with the strategy of strength.” In short, Reagan shrewdly saw NATO as a hedge against a Russia that might revert to revanchism—which is exactly what has happened.

Putin’s Russia violated nuclear treaties, conventional-weapons treaties, and its own pledge to “respect the independence…sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine”; warned NATO member Poland that its western territories were “a gift from Stalin”; dismembered NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine; countenanced and/or conducted cyberattacks against American energy infrastructure; interfered in elections throughout NATO’s membership roster; conducted sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint (including American targets); threatened use of nuclear weapons; aided and funded attacks against American forces; provided targeting data to support Houthi attacks against allied ships; and made “massive investments in its defense sector” (according to Trump’s own intelligence officials). In light of all of that—and the Kremlin’s long history of deceit—Reagan would never “take Putin at his word.”

GOP presidents, and their democrat counterparts, supported NATO because they recognized that NATO serves America’s interests. For 40 years, NATO helped deter Moscow and prevent the Cold War from turning hot. But that is just a fraction of how NATO has served America’s interests.

Thirteen current NATO allies deployed troops to assist America in defending South Korea. NATO militaries, infrastructure, and decades of interoperability served as the nucleus for the coalition that ejected Iraq from Kuwait, with NATO allies deploying thousands of troops to assist America.

The only time NATO’s all-for-one collective-defense clause was invoked was after September 11, 2001, when NATO allies rushed aircraft and personnel to this side of the Atlantic to guard America’s skies. NATO then bled with America in the Sisyphean campaign that followed, with 455 Brits, 158 Canadians, 86 French, 54 Germans, 48 Italians, 43 Danes, and 40 Poles dying in Afghanistan. When America withdrew from Afghanistan—20 years after the attacks on America’s capital, America’s military headquarters, America’s largest city—74 percent of the foreign troops deployed in the country that spawned 9/11 were not Americans. The vast majority were NATO allies. Trump is apparently unaware of this history.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 16 NATO allies sent troops when America asked for help. Hundreds of NATO troops—Brits, Italians, Poles, Bulgarians, Latvians, Danes, Dutch, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs—died in Iraq, as did 18 soldiers from Ukraine, a country that is not a NATO ally but certainly acts like one.

In the post Iraqi freedom years, seven NATO members conducted airstrikes against the ISIS caliphate. Again, NATO was there.

Far from “freeloading,” NATO allies Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain are supporting operations in the Red Sea. Likewise, British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Canadian assets are promoting freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

European nations sent more aid to Ukraine than the US. Britain and France are organizing a peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine.

NATO has eight battlegroups defending its most at-risk members along the eastern flank. Only one is American-led.

Britain leads the battlegroup in Estonia, supported by Denmark, France, and Iceland. Britain is committing resources to defend NATO’s northern flank. And the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales just commenced a globe-spanning mission—the largest deployment of British naval airpower in a quarter-century.

Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania, backed by Belgium, Czechia, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Germany is building permanent bases in Lithuania for 4,800 German troops. Germany is spearheading a continentwide missile shield. And Germany’s parliament recently approved a massive defense-infrastructure fund.

Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia, supported by 10 other NATO allies. France leads NATO’s battlegroup in Romania. Pouring almost 5 percent of GDP into defense, Poland fields NATO’s third-largest military. Sweden is quadrupling production of anti-tank weapons.

What NATO is doing and deterring underscores something General James Mattis observed almost a decade ago, “If we did not have NATO today, we would need to create it.”

This begs the questions: what if we did not have NATO? What if these first hundred days mark the last days of history’s greatest alliance for peace?

NATO is designed not to wage war, but to deter war. If there is any doubt about NATO’s collective-defense guarantee—and these first hundred days have created enormous doubts—Putin could be tempted to do in the Baltics what he has done in Ukraine. That would force NATO to blink or fire back. And that would lead to terrible outcomes. The former means the collapse of NATO—and with it, the entire US-led alliance system. The latter means great power war.

The best way to prevent such dire outcomes is through deterrent military strength, clarity of intent, and certainty of cause and effect. Trump’s words and actions have undermined all of these.

What the transactional Trump administration fails to recognize is that by undermining NATO, it is undermining America’s security. If a cyberattack or EMP blast or bioweapon paralyzes America; if ISIS or al Qaeda or some other terror group unleashes something worse than 9/11 or 10/7; if Moscow blinds America’s constellation of satellites; if Beijing moves against Taiwan; or if Pyongyang restarts the long-paused Korean War, America will call for help.

A post-NATO Europe may be unable or unwilling to answer.

Alan Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

FYI to the GOP on NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

Informed by the works of Lieutenant General Tom D. Miller, particularly “The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base” and “Capability, Capacity, and Risk in Sustainment of Air Force Weapon Systems,” it is clear that the challenges and strategies surrounding maintenance of Air Force weapon systems are multifaceted. The first article highlights the foundational elements necessary for a robust defense sustainment industrial base, emphasizing the need for a resilient infrastructure. The second publication further develops this analysis, delving into the evolving landscape of capability, capacity, and risk management in the context of sustaining advanced weapon systems. Collectively, these works offer critical insights and recommendations on optimizing the sustainment process, ensuring readiness and effectiveness in a changing security landscape.

This passage highlights a significant juxtaposition of key themes present in the Secretary of Defense’s goals and Gen. Miller’s examination of Air Force sustainment challenges. To navigate these challenges effectively, specific focus must be placed on three pivotal areas: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and reestablishing deterrence.

In the effort to restore the warrior ethos, the military needs skilled personnel, modern facilities, and a sustainable defense industrial base. Workforce retention and a shortage of technical expertise undeniably impact operational readiness. According to the Secretary of Defense’s mandate, there is a pressing need to “revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military.”

Miller’s analysis reveals that the sustainment workforce is facing severe challenges such as an aging workforce, a lack of recruitment, and significant technical expertise gaps. The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) is currently experiencing a 30 percent shortage in experienced depot maintenance personnel. This shortfall adversely affects the maintenance and throughput of mission-critical aircraft. A 2022 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that workforce shortages at Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs) contribute to an average delay of 20 percent in aircraft depot maintenance cycles, diminishing operational readiness.

Transitioning from a counterterrorism focus to one that emphasizes great power competition necessitates a sustainment workforce capable of advanced manufacturing and software maintenance, but current training pipelines struggle to produce such expertise. The implications are stark; a degraded sustainment workforce directly undermines operational readiness, particularly in maintaining high-end platforms like the F-35, which are essential for effective deterrence.

In relation to rebuilding the military, the defense industrial base faces significant hurdles due to aging infrastructure, inefficient procurement processes, and inconsistent funding. Secretary Hegseth emphasizes the importance of this rebuilding process, stating the need to match threats with capabilities. Gen. Miller’s assessments indicate that the Air Force’s sustainment infrastructure is outdated and that funding for depot modernization is inconsistent. The average age of Air Force maintenance depots exceeds 60 years, with several facilities dating back to World War II. Supply-chain vulnerabilities also arise. Significant dependence on a sole supplier for 67 percent of critical spare parts for legacy aircraft creates potential crises during conflicts. Moreover, extended procurement cycles often delay readiness enhancements, averaging 8 to 10 years from requirement to fielding for sustainment modernization projects.

Thus, without rapid modernization of sustainment infrastructure and necessary acquisition reform, the Air Force will struggle to maintain aging fleets while simultaneously integrating essential next-generation capabilities for initiatives like joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and agile combat employment (ACE).

Reestablishing deterrence requires a comprehensive assessment of readiness to ensure that sustainment capacity effectively aligns with the threats posed by nations such as China and Russia. As stated in the SECDEF mandates, deterrence must be reestablished through defense of the homeland and collaboration with allies. However, Miller’s 2022 assessment points out a disconnect between current sustainment funding models and the operational requirements of deterrence in contested environments. For instance, from 2012 to 2022, the readiness rates for the USAF fighter fleet plummeted from 75 to 57 percent, with sustainment backlogs contributing significantly to non-mission-capable status. Only 40 percent of American sustainment infrastructure is currently forward-positioned in the Indo-Pacific, which is crucial for countering aggressive actions from adversaries.

To counter these challenges and bolster national defense strategy, courses of action should be implemented. First, revitalizing the sustainment workforce through expanded training and technological improvements is essential. According to projected outcomes, this could reduce depot maintenance delays by 15 to 20 percent within five years while raising mission-capable rates for advanced platforms.

Second, prioritizing infrastructure and acquisition reform will require streamlining procurement processes and integrating industry best practices. This reform could lead to a reduction in aircraft downtime and enhance rapid repair capabilities essential for operating within geographic regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Finally, adopting a risk-based resource-allocation strategy aligned with high-threat mission areas can significantly strengthen deterrence, ultimately raising mission-capable rates of critical platforms.

By aligning sustainment actions with the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force can demonstrate improved deterrence capabilities, build enduring advantages, and modernize its force. An immediate investment in revitalizing the sustainment workforce, modernizing depot infrastructure, and aligning resources with operational needs is imperative. A reformative approach to sustainment is not merely an operational necessity; it constitutes a vital aspect of maintaining peace through strength. Without these necessary adjustments, the Air Force risks facing severe mission degradation in high-threat scenarios, ultimately jeopardizing national defense.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative was originally published on Global Security Review.

Historically, authoritarian regimes without succession plans often face power struggles when the leader eventually dies, retires, or is overthrown. The absence of a designated heir could lead to internal conflicts within the CCP when Xi is gone.

The only possible threat to his authority could emerge from within the security apparatus. Furthermore, his grip on power is not static; it is continuously reinforced through persistent anti-corruption efforts and CCP rectification campaigns. In other words, Xi Jinping’s entrenched control over China’s political system and the mechanisms he employs to maintain power was and remains prominent.

Political Variables

The lack of a clear successor suggests that Xi intends to rule indefinitely, breaking with the leadership norms established after Mao Zedong’s era. This raises concerns about political stability in the long term, as the absence of a transition plan increases the risk of a power struggle when he eventually leaves office.

Also, it means a weakness of political opposition that emphasizes that opposition within China has largely disappeared, with dissenters either forced into exile or silenced through political repression. This suggests a highly controlled political environment where resistance is ineffective. While this strengthens Xi’s immediate grip on power, it does not necessarily eliminate discontent. Rather, it forces opposition underground. If economic hardships or political scandals arise, suppressed grievances could resurface, potentially destabilizing the regime—meaning that discontent is potentially creating instability in the future.

Although Xi appears unchallenged, the security apparatus is a possible source of opposition. Security forces are crucial to maintaining authoritarian rule, and, if internal divisions emerge, they can pose a serious threat to his leadership. Thus, if divisions emerge within China’s security forces whether due to policy disagreements, economic struggles, or leadership disputes, Xi’s position could be at risk.

While there is no clear indication of this happening, it suggests that control over the military and intelligence agencies remains a key factor in his rule. To wit, in authoritarian regimes, the military and intelligence agencies are often the key enforcers of the leader’s rule, but they can also become sources of internal opposition. However, so far, he has maintained tight control over the military and state security agencies through purges and loyalty tests.

There is also a role of anti-corruption and party rectification campaigns in Xi’s bureaucracy and leadership. Rather than merely consolidating power in a passive way, Xi actively reinforces his authority through continuous anti-corruption drives and ideological campaigns to eliminate political rivals and maintain loyalty within the CCP. While these measures strengthen his rule, such campaigns may also create resentment among officials who fear they could become targets.

Aging Political Leadership

The top leadership is tilted in Xi Jinping’s favor. However, this top leadership is aging. An aging leadership also means that many of Xi’s key supporters may retire or pass away, potentially opening room for new political dynamics that he may not fully control.

In 2027, the current Politburo will have an average age above 68. Should they be renominated then, the average age of Politburo members would be above 73 on the eve of the next Party Congress and current Central Committee members are not far behind. Their time horizon will become shorter, and if no potential successor appears, their political position will become increasingly vulnerable. Again, a defining feature of Xi’s leadership is the lack of a designated successor, breaking from previous CCP norms that aimed to ensure stability through planned transitions. Without a clear heir, uncertainty will grow among the party elite, increasing the risk of political maneuvering or factional struggles as different groups seek to position themselves for leadership roles. This uncertainty could weaken Xi’s grip on power over time, especially as leaders begin to consider their own political futures beyond his rule.

As the current leadership ages and their career time horizons shrink, their incentives may shift. Rather than unwavering loyalty to Xi, some officials might begin looking for alternative paths to secure their personal or factional interests. If no successor emerges, competition among different factions could intensify, creating a fragile political environment. Additionally, older officials may become less effective in governance, potentially exacerbating policy stagnation or mismanagement, further weakening the regime’s overall stability.

Unless Xi Jinping changes his basic formula to ensure support and discourage any debate, his power will become brittle, and the likelihood of a succession crisis will increase. His leadership strategy requires grooming a successor or adjusting his approach to elite management. While his current control appears strong, the absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms makes a future power struggle more likely. Historically, power vacuums in authoritarian regimes often lead to internal conflicts, and China could face a similar scenario if Xi does not prepare a clear transition plan.

There are also nuanced views of Xi Jinping’s governance style, highlighting both his consolidation of power and the underlying complexities within China’s political and economic landscape. Despite Xi’s centralization of power and strong grip on influence, Chinese bureaucracies remain highly fragmented, with institutional silos, rival factions, and competition among individuals. This contradicts the idea of a fully unified authoritarian system, suggesting that power struggles still play a role in policy decisions.

Clearly, there is Xi’s ability to enforce policy shifts while maintaining ideological rigidity, as well as the role of elite competition in shaping China’s future. Additionally, the influence of princelings (descendants of revolutionary leaders) remains significant, particularly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial institutions. While the next leader may not necessarily be a princeling, elite clans could act as key power brokers, determining leadership transitions behind the scenes.

At a deeper level, there is a pattern in Xi’s governance. Initial inflexibility followed by strategic reversals or rigidity then with certain pragmatic adjustments. When policies face resistance or cause unintended consequences, this would be addressed through a “pullback pattern” or “rear-view mirror approach” that are evident in key crises, including: the 2015 stock market crisis, the COVID-19 lockdowns, the 2020 real estate crash, and the Sino-American trade war.

This suggests that Xi is a risk-taker but not reckless; meaning, he is willing to implement bold policies but is also pragmatic enough to change course when necessary. However, these reversals are often framed in a way that protects his authority, shifting blame onto subordinates or external factors.

Xi’s political capital plays in a “selective policy flexibility versus ideological rigidity.” While Xi shows pragmatism in adjusting economic policies, his core ideological agenda remains unchanged. His governance remains centered around: reinforcing ideology; promoting “struggle” (斗争); and maintaining a strong international posture. Even in areas where Xi has shown flexibility such as real estate bailouts or fiscal stimulus, shifts are constrained by his broader ideological commitments.

Xi is also deepening policies that predated his rule. He has an affinity for the self-strengthening movement of the Qing empire, summed up by the famous maxim, “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical use” (中学为体, 西学为用). Republican China sought help from Germany to modernize its arms industry and sent students on scholarships to the United States. The best-known case of this is rocket scientist Qian Xuesen who, after leaving the United States in 1955, led China’s ballistic development.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty was the basis for what is called the largest technology transfer in history. Much of this focused on industry and infrastructure, but it also involved education and the training of scientists, including in the nuclear field.

The Sino-Soviet rift inaugurated a period of closure, but Mao Zedong nonetheless launched several “big projects” during the Great Leap Forward. They are recalled today to justify the present large-scale policies.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai, followed by Deng Xiaoping, hailed the “four modernizations” (四个现代化) that put the accent on big science again. Since the early 1960s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never ceased from engaging in research and development on new weapons, serving as a harbor for scientists in times of political turmoil or during more recent anti-corruption campaigns.

A chief aim of China’s normalization with the United States was to acquire key technologies. From former US Presidents Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter’s presidency, which was the heyday of the US convergence with China against the Soviet Union, supercomputers (supposedly for climate predictions), nuclear knowledge, radar installations, and many other dual-use technologies were shared. Large contingents of Chinese students underwent education and training abroad, mainly in the United States.

Successively, we can observe that Xi’s foreign policy adaptations are evident with strategic pauses. There is a pattern of assertiveness followed by recalibration. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), once a cornerstone of China’s global strategy, has seen a decline in outward investments and loans, possibly due to economic slowdowns and concerns over debt sustainability. Additionally, in response to changing global dynamics, particularly under a potential Trump second presidency (2024–2028), China appears to be cautiously reassessing its relationships with key nations, including India, Japan, and the UK. This suggests that while Xi projects strength internationally, he is also willing to adjust diplomatic strategies to navigate shifting geopolitical realities.

Implication and Conclusion

Per its implication, while Xi’s control appears secure for now, the long-term consequences of his rule remain uncertain. The suppression of opposition, lack of a succession plan, and reliance on internal purges could make the political system more fragile over time. If economic challenges or elite divisions intensify, his grip on power may face unexpected tests.

Xi’s leadership is characterized by strong, centralized control, but his dominance is not necessarily permanent. His reliance on security forces, ideological campaigns, and repression keeps him in power, yet these same factors could generate internal tensions. Whether his rule remains stable or faces future challenges depends on how well he navigates potential economic, political, and internal security risks.

While Xi Jinping maintains firm control over the CCP, the aging leadership and the absence of a succession plan introduce long-term vulnerabilities. If these issues remain unaddressed, they could lead to political uncertainty, elite fragmentation, and a potential succession crisis. Xi’s ability to navigate these challenges will determine the long-term stability of his rule and the CCP’s future.

Xi Jinping’s leadership is characterized by a mix of ideological rigidity and strategic pragmatism. While he has consolidated power, elite competition, bureaucratic infighting, and security apparatus tensions remain underlying factors in China’s political landscape. His policy approach follows a recognizable pattern: firm initial positions, followed by controlled reversals, when necessary, which helps him maintain authority while adapting to challenges. However, as China faces economic pressures, elite power struggles, and an evolving international environment, the long-term sustainability of this governance model remains uncertain.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines.  The ideas are the author’s own.

Xi Jinping’s Bureaucracy in 2025: A Critique was originally published on Global Security Review.

Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.

It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”

Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.

While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.

This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.

China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.

China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.

Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.

NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.

Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.

Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.

An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.

Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.

Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The collapse of the regime created a tremendous power vacuum, with various actors vying for control over Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape along with the main aim of shaping the country’s trajectory. Iran remains deeply entrenched in Syria through its network of allied militias and its strategic interests in the region. Tehran’s ability to sustain its presence and influence will depend on its capacity to mobilize resources and navigate mounting international and regional opposition.

In a post-Assad context, Iran may seek to carve out autonomous zones of influence, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as southern Syria and the corridor connecting Damascus to Lebanon. However, with the Assad regime no longer in power, the United States and Israel are likely to intensify their efforts to prevent Iran from filling the power vacuum. This could include targeted military actions, support for opposition groups, and diplomatic pressure on Iran and its allies. These countermeasures will play a very important role in shaping the balance of power in Syria and limiting Tehran’s ability to consolidate its position.

In the same vein, ISIS is likely to re-emerge again in the Syrian scene, which has already prompted US Central Command forces to conduct a series of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria. The existing fragmentation among opposition forces over the past years is likely to continue and despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the absence of a centralized authority has exacerbated divisions among Syria’s opposition groups, including factions with divergent political and ideological agendas.

External support for these groups will be a decisive factor in determining whether they can coalesce into a viable political and military force or remain fragmented, thereby prolonging instability. In this respect, the role of international and regional powers in supporting different opposition groups in Syria will be detrimental about how the tense situation in Syria unfolds.

Regional actors including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Gulf Arab states are poised to play a more prominent role in Syria’s post-Assad future. Turkey has already expanded its influence in northern Syria, while Gulf states may seek to assert their presence by supporting moderate factions. However, Turkish involvement is more complicated, given that Turkey aims to take control of influencing Syria. The ongoing armed conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish controlled Syrian cities in the North is likely to intensify.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Kurdish forces in Syria were originally supported by the US and considered one of the main local allies in the fight against ISIS. The interplay among these powers will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory and the broader regional order.

Russia’s evolving strategy for Syria is still worthy of consideration. Russia’s role in Syria has become more precarious following the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow already faces many challenges of recalibrating its strategy to safeguard its regional interests, which include maintaining access to its naval bases in the Mediterranean, countering Western influence, and preserving its role as an influential actor in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s ability to adapt to the new reality will determine its long-term relevance in Syria. Despite speculations that Russia is likely to negotiate maintaining naval bases with the controlling opposition force led by Al-Jolani, it can be also assumed that Turkey will be the main negotiator with Russia with regard to allowing Russian forces access to Syrian soil.

Overall, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Russia, which had invested heavily in propping up the Syrian government as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy over the past decade. Accordingly, Moscow now faces a host of strategic challenges.

With the Assad regime gone, Russia has lost a key partner that provided it with a foothold in the Middle East. This development undermines Moscow’s ability to project power in the region and challenges its status as a dominant player in the Syrian conflict. Russia must now contend with the risk of its influence being marginalized by other actors, including Turkey, and the US.

Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim and its naval facility in Tartus are critical to its military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime has exposed these facilities to heightened security risks, including potential attacks by opposition forces or Islamist groups. Protecting these assets will require significant resources and a re-evaluation of Russia’s military posture in Syria, which can be challenging for Russia given its existing war with Ukraine.

The collapse of the Assad regime diminished Russia’s ability to dictate the terms of international engagement in Syria. Without a stable Syrian government to anchor its strategy, Moscow will struggle to assert its influence in negotiations over Syria’s future. This loss of leverage could weaken Russia’s position not only in Syria but also in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Scenarios for Syria’s Post-Assad Future

The fall of the Assad regime presents a range of possible outcomes, each with distinct implications for regional and international actors. These scenarios may include the following.

Continued Fragmentation

The most likely short-term scenario is the persistence of fragmentation, with various factions and militias controlling different parts of the country. This will lead to prolonged instability and create opportunities for external actors to widen their influence.

For Russia, this scenario presents both challenges and opportunities, as it seeks to secure its interests while navigating a highly complex landscape. The same applies to Turkey. Turkey is, however, well-positioned to expand its influence, particularly in northern Syria, where it already established a significant military presence. This scenario could lead to increased friction with Russia, as Ankara’s ambitions conflict with Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria. Furthermore, armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish controlled areas, which are supported by the US, are likely to escalate.

Accordingly, the situation in Syria represents a new challenge to the Trump administration regarding its Middle East engagement policy. On one hand, President Donald Trump has indicated that Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future. On the other hand, the US already fears that the ongoing military build-up by Turkey, along the Syrian border, signals that Turkey is preparing for a large-scale invasion to areas held by the American-backed Syrian Kurds.

Iranian Consolidation

Despite the recent Israeli strikes on Iran and its proxies in the region, including Lebanon and Syria, Iran may still seek to fill the power vacuum by strengthening its alliances with local militias, establishing a dominant presence in key areas. Such a scenario would be of a key concern for other regional and international powers and lead to increased military confrontations.

For decades, Syria was under the influence of Iran. Syrian ground routes were among the main routes of supply of armaments by Iran to Hezbollah. Regardless of Iran’s current weak state, Iran is unlikely to give up on its influence in Syria. However, it is very likely that Iran-back militias will continue to take a central role in countering any stabilization endeavours in Syria.

Emergence of a New Central Authority VS Escalation of Proxy Conflicts

While very unlikely in the short term, the emergence of a new central authority that can unify the country would fundamentally reshape Syria’s future. Such an outcome will depend on significant international support and political compromise.

On the other hand, and more likely, the power vacuum in Syria will increase the likelihood of Syria becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts among regional and international powers. Regardless of the opposition forces’ success in overthrowing the Assad regime, still many member of these opposition forces emerged from extremist groups, which prompted Israel to strike most of Syria’s military assets following the country’s take over by Al-Jolani.

The rise of ISIS bases in Syria also presents an imminent threat to the region, prompting US CENTCOM to conduct precision airstrikes targeting ISIS camps and operatives in the region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder stated that the US military presence and primary focus remains on “supporting the defeat of ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.”

The post-Assad era in Syria is defined by uncertainty, with a host of internal and external factors shaping the country’s trajectory. For Russia and Iran, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major strategic challenge, forcing it to rethink its approach and adapt to a rapidly changing landscape in Syria and the Middle East.

As regional and global actors vie for influence in Syria, the country’s fate will remain a key barometer of broader geopolitical trends. The decisions made by international actors in the coming months and years will not only shape Syria’s future but also redefine the balance of power in the region.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard it can be for some once they leave the service. That same research will also help you to eliminate the politicization that left the military hurting for recruits.

This understanding and experience will be helpful in correcting the course of the Department of Defense. Prioritizing warfighting capabilities and lethality over supporting the mission creep of bureaucracy is critical but antithetical to everything that is Washington, DC. The Pentagon was focused on budgets and bureaucratic infighting long before you arrived. The five-sided puzzle palace will fight back and has a long institutional memory.

Just remember, of all services and the department itself, only the US Air Force Airmen gave more money to Republicans than Democrats. There is at least one ray of hope.

For decades the military has had its combat forces slashed, bases closed or consolidated, and weapon systems and platforms reduced or retired—all while the Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, and Russians expanded their military capabilities and plotted the destruction of the international order Americans built. While the war on terror was lost by the very people who hate the fact that you are Secretary of Defense, you have an opportunity to right the ship before it is too late.

No doubt, you will receive more input on what you should do than you can possibly digest. Let me offer a quick list.

First, a sovereign state, by definition, controls its borders. That is a military function. Help President Trump secure the border. There is no such thing as acceptable illegal immigration.

Second, adopt the Weinberger Doctrine as your overriding strategy for the use of military force. You will never go wrong if you do.

Third, the military may be the best socialist system in the world, but it is time to overhaul the personnel system and bring it into the twenty-first century. The military is unique, but do not let that be an excuse.

Fourth, modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal must be your top spending priority. A bigger Army, conventional Navy, or conventional Air Force will not deter China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia; only a robust strategic and theater nuclear arsenal can achieve that objective.

Fifth, service members, particularly junior enlisted, have lived in toxic base housing for far too long. This problem should not make this list, but after two decades it has yet to be solved.

Sixth, remove the cancerous social and political activism that inundates the military. Nothing harms unity more than pitting servicemembers against one another because of their race, gender, or some other contrived distinction. Based on your initial actions, your efforts are already moving ahead.

Seventh, there is simply too much duplication across the services and within the services. Ensuring command opportunities should not lead to the creation of unneeded commands. The services are too small to be inefficient.

Eighth, expand the number of combatant ships, missile defense systems, and the combat air force. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force has the capability to wage a sustained campaign against a peer. Not only does the nation lack the delivery platforms, but it will go Winchester in a matter of days. Thus, every kind of weapon is also needed.

Ninth, take the time to reset the baseline and see what the military really needs to defeat the Axis of Autocracy. Is it drone swarms, missile technology, robots? Whatever the answer may be, it is unlikely exactly what we already have.

Finally, get very good at telling the American people why it is more important to spend tax dollars on the military than the entitlements they know and love. This is perhaps your biggest task. In 2024, the federal government took in $4.4 trillion and spent $4.6 trillion on entitlement programs alone. That is unsustainable. The federal government was never meant to take care of the health, retirement, and education of Americans. It was specifically tasked to defend the nation.

You have a big job ahead of you. Good luck. Americans want nothing more than your success. The safety of the country depends on it.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 led to the restructuring of the Wagner Group into several new entities. At least four new groups reorganized thousands of former Wagner fighters, with a significant portion now operating under the Russian Defense Ministry and other intelligence services.

The entity operating as Africa Corps continues Wagner’s operations across Africa, including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Libya. Estimates suggest that these reconstituted paramilitary groups have around 5,000 members stationed across Africa. These forces are a mix of former Wagner operatives, new recruits, and other mercenaries. They are involved in a variety of roles such as providing security, training, combat operations, support to local regimes, and support to specific factions—like the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar forces in Libya. Generally, they have contracts to provide security to unstable regimes in the region.

The presence of Russian troops in certain African nations is a cause for concern. As an illustration, it is worth noting that Russia recently bolstered its military presence in Libya. This includes the deployment of significant military equipment and personnel to provide support for General Khalifa Haftar with towed artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and rocket launchers. Russia is very clearly attempting to bolster its strategic position in the region as it supports aspirations for a naval base in Libya.

This move will amplify Russian influence in North Africa and pose a potential threat to Europe from the southern Mediterranean. In eastern Libya, there are air bases, such as al-Jufra, that serve as refuelling stations for Russian military flights before continuing to other African countries.

There are reports suggesting that Russia is close to setting up a naval base in Sudan, specifically in the vicinity of Port Sudan. In Sahel countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Russian forces, including those from the Africa Corps, are helping military juntas. They also participate in operations against insurgencies and safeguard governments. The Russian presence in the Sahel significantly increased after French forces departed from the area. In the CAR, for example, there is a significant paramilitary presence from Russia, and there are plans to establish a formal Russian military base in Berengo. It is anticipated that this base will accommodate a maximum of 10,000 Russian soldiers, bolstering its influence in the region.

The increasing involvement of Russia in Africa has numerous adverse consequences on a global level. In the case of the European Union (EU), the exploitation of migration routes by Russian-backed forces intensifies the issue of irregular migration to Europe, resulting in political and social tensions within EU countries. In addition, the control that Russia can potentially exercise over the oil and gas resources in Libya, for example, gives it the ability to manipulate energy supplies, which undermines the efforts of the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian energy.

For the United States, there are concerns about Russia’s strategic relationship with African regimes, which have the potential to undermine American influence and complicate its counterterrorism and military operations in the region, especially in the Sahel, where extremist groups are growing more active. The US has already taken steps to address security concerns in the Sahel and Maghreb by implementing initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

These efforts aim to strengthen the ability of countries in the region to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Nevertheless, the current initiatives fall short in addressing the magnitude and intricacy of the violence and governance shortcomings. The involvement of the Russian military in countries like Sudan and Libya has far-reaching consequences for the overall security situation in the Middle East. It has the potential to disrupt neighbouring regions and shape geopolitical decisions. Furthermore, the presence of Russian influence on African resources brings about fresh contenders for control and export of gold, oil, and gas.

To counter the growing presence of Russian forces and influence in Africa, the US and the EU, in coordination with key regional African and Arab partners, must adopt a multi-faceted strategy focusing on military, economic, diplomatic, and soft power measures. Strengthening military cooperation with a selected set of African nations, namely those who share borders with those who experienced a coup over the past three years. Joint exercises, training programs, and the provision of military aid and equipment are crucial, particularly in light of the noticeable decline in Western influence in most Sahel states and the eastern states of Sudan.

In Niger, for example, following the coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, the military junta rejected all US and regional diplomatic initiatives. As a result, we are emphasizing the importance of increasing Western cooperation with countries bordering Niger. Every year, the US conducts Flintlock, the largest annual special operations forces exercise by US Africa Command, with the aim of enhancing combined partner force collaboration in Africa alongside international and NATO special operations forces.

Exercise Africa Lion is also a large-scale US-led annual exercise that involves multiple African and allied nations, focusing on enhancing military readiness and interoperability. However, given the unprecedented level of political instability in Africa over the past few years, as well as the growing influence of Russian groups, it is now a critical time to intensify the West’s security cooperation with regional African partners.

It is essential for the West to strengthen its economic ties with Africa as a means of countering Russian influence in the short term as well as that of the Chinese in the long term. By prioritizing investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other development projects, the West can tackle the underlying issues that contribute to instability. This approach will not only bring tangible benefits to local populations, but also foster domestic goodwill. In doing so, it can diminish the appeal of external support from countries like China and Russia, which have been making significant infrastructure investments in Africa. Providing targeted expertise in mining, agriculture, and energy sectors to strategic African countries will contribute to sustainable development and reduce dependency on foreign entities.

Regardless of its declining effectiveness, diplomatic efforts continue to play a crucial role in countering Russian influence in Africa. Strengthening partnerships with important African nations and regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, along with specific political groups in unstable African countries, can support the diplomatic efforts of the West and influence the overall narrative. Efforts in the realm of diplomacy should prioritize the promotion of positive governance, human rights, and democratic institutions. This will also enable the implementation of targeted sanctions against entities and individuals engaged in destabilizing activities in Africa with support from Russian groups.

Addressing the challenge of countering Russian influence in Africa requires recognizing the significance of soft power and cultural diplomacy. These aspects play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of disinformation campaigns that aim to manipulate African information systems. It is worth noting that such campaigns have seen a significant rise, nearly quadrupling since 2022.

It is crucial to counter Russian disinformation by supporting independent media and promoting accurate information about the benefits of partnerships with the US and EU. This encompasses a range of initiatives, such as providing financial support for media literacy programs, bolstering the skills of local journalists, and backing civil society organizations and grassroots movements dedicated to promoting democratic reforms in Africa.

It is also crucial to prioritize the expansion of educational and cultural exchange programs. These initiatives aim to foster lasting connections with African youth and future leaders, ultimately contributing to the development of strong relationships. This becomes particularly significant in the context of a changing world, where younger generations are increasingly influenced by Western cultures. Educational scholarships, academic partnerships, and cultural initiatives can contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Engaging in a clear dialogue with African leaders to gain insight into their viewpoints and consistently addressing the geopolitical concerns of African countries will help ensure that their interests are considered in international policies. Thus, this approach should help foster a relationship that aligns more closely with Western values and principles. To address the issue of Russian influence in Africa, it is crucial to establish a collaborative international effort.

This would involve the cooperation of various international partners, including the US and EU, as well as key regional African and Arab nations. Collaborative efforts can greatly enhance the effectiveness and present a united front. Emphasizing regional security initiatives and frameworks that foster stability and cooperation among African countries, including capacity-building programs, will continue to be crucial in addressing the increasing presence and influence of Russian forces on the continent.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed are his own. 

Countering Russia’s Influence in Africa: Strategy and Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Why it matters: The hacking campaign laid out in the report marks a sharp escalation in China’s willingness to seize U.S. infrastructure — going beyond the typical effort to steal state secrets.

• The advisory provides the fullest picture to-date of how a key China hacking group has gained and maintained access to some U.S. critical infrastructure.

Details: The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation released an advisory Wednesday to warn critical infrastructure operators about China’s ongoing hacking interests.

• According to the advisory, China-backed hacking group Volt Typhoon has been exploiting vulnerabilities in routers, firewalls and VPNs to target water, transportation, energy and communications systems across the country.
• The group has relied heavily on stolen administrator credentials to maintain access to the systems — and in some cases it has maintained access for “at least five years,” per the advisory.
• Volt Typhoon has been seen controlling some victims’ surveillance camera systems, and its access could have allowed the group to disrupt critical energy and water controls.

Of note: Volt Typhoon uses so-called “living off the land” techniques that limit any trace of their activities on a network — making the actors more difficult to detect.

READ MORE

China had “persistent” access to U.S. critical infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

Mom and Dad were leased to the United States, as is true of all pandas. Back in 1984, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began leasing its unique national treasure to zoos around the world for $1 million per panda per year, with any cubs born abroad belonging to China.

The National Zoo in Washington, DC, is not the only American zoo where Chinese pandas are disappearing. Atlanta, San Diego, and Memphis already have or will soon lose their pandas. By January 2024, the United States will be panda-free for the first time in over 50 years. Americans are witnessing the end of five decades of Sino-American “panda diplomacy” that initially began in 1972 when first lady Pat Nixon was gifted two pandas on her state visit to China as President Richard Nixon sought to open relations between the United States and the PRC.

When President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger visited China in February 1972, the visit was met with a great deal of fanfare. However, China’s rise and clear desire to topple the American-led international order is leaving the two countries increasingly at odds and facing increased incompatibility among their national interests. China’s required return of pandas from American zoos is but one example of a relationship that is deeply fractured.

The Chinese cherish their pandas as a national symbol, which makes them a good gauge of the relationship between China and the United States. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used the perception that Yaya, a panda in the Memphis Zoo, was being neglected to generate public pressure within China to call for Yaya’s return to China, which happened in April 2023. This response took place after public polling of Americans supported the idea that China is the greatest threat to the United States. The PRC panda diplomacy response is a not-so-subtle effort to signal discontent.

However, the United States is not alone in facing the negative effects of panda diplomacy. China began repatriating pandas from G12 member-states in 2023 without renewing any agreements.

In addition to the United States, all giant pandas in Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and a few other democratic states were returned or will return to China by early 2024. As the overall panda population in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries drops, Russia’s panda population increased, all while the number of McDonald’s restaurants decreased.

Thomas Friedman posited the Golden Arches theory of democratic peace. Could there be a “Panda Index” that correlates to Beijing and Washington’s spheres of influence? This may be an apples and oranges comparison, or more literally a pandas and patties comparison, but it may be one more useful tool to gauge the ongoing distancing between the US and its allies and an emerging Sino-centric domain such as the Belt and Road Initiative forum.

Interests can certainly diverge over time, but the significance of this divergence between China and the United States has only recently become a major focus within the Beltway’s think tanks and federal agencies. Pandas are tangible symbols of the direction China’s friendship is moving, with countries given the honor of hosting these living Chinese national treasures clearly proving they are no threat to CCP interests.

2022 marked the 50th anniversary of formal relations between the United States and People’s Republic of China. That relationship is now at its lowest point over the past five decades and faces an uncertain future as the CCP ratchets up efforts to dislodge the United States from its position as global leader. What form that takes—economic, diplomatic, military, or all of the above plus more—is yet to be determined.

What appears certain is that the PRC is gathering autocratic regimes together in an effort to offer a clear alternative to Western-style democracy and capitalism. Whatever direction China may take, it is certainly wise to keep an eye on the pandas. They are a predicter of who China views as friend or foe.

Author: Alexis Littlefield, PhD, spent two decades in Taiwan and China before returning to the United States as a COVID-19 refugee. He currently lives in Washington, DC, and taught at the University of Nottingham’s School of International Studies in Ningbo, China.

The Value of Panda Diplomacy was originally published on Global Security Review.