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		<title>Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arman Sidhu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 12:15:09 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 11, 2026 Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 11, 2026</em></p>
<p>Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs">overran</a> at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.</p>
<p>Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 <a href="https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/36158/us-africa-command-conducts-strike-against-isis-in-nigeria">U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes</a> on Nigerian soil and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/03/22/us-troops-in-nigeria-using-drones-to-detect-and-disrupt-terrorist-activity/">deployment</a> of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.</p>
<p><strong>The Mosul Parallel</strong></p>
<p>Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/12/11/how-iraqs-ghost-soldiers-helped-isil">50,000 ghost soldiers</a> on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/ghost-soldiers-britains-shadow-war-in-west-africa/">Leaked</a> UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. <a href="https://ti-defence.org/gdi/">Transparency International</a> gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.</p>
<p>The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/documentary-reveals-low-morale-in-nigerian-army">deployed</a> without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.</p>
<p><strong>ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor</strong></p>
<p>ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/iswap-assaults-target-military-bases-in-lake-chad-region/">destroyed</a> forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2025/11/17/nigerian-army-commander-brig-gen-uba-killed-iswap-after-terrorists-intercepted-his">intercepted</a> his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.</p>
<p>The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s <a href="https://www.military.africa/2025/03/niger-withdraws-from-mnjtf-counter-terror-coalition/">withdrawal</a> from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-6/">Lakurawa</a>, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/sahel-monitoring-may-2025">attack</a> on Nigerian soil in 2025.</p>
<p><strong>The Air Power Deficit</strong></p>
<p>The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians <a href="https://impactpolicies.org/news/483/zamfara-airstrike-tragedy-understanding-civilian-casualties-and-security-challenges-in-nigeria">killed</a> in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/africa/nigeria/massacre-kwara-state-heightens-nigerias-security-challenges">February 2026 Woro massacre</a> showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.</p>
<p><strong>External Partners and the Limits of Assistance</strong></p>
<p>The United States launched <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/25/politics/us-strikes-isis-nigeria">16 Tomahawk cruise missiles</a> against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-united-states-conduct-strikes-nigeria">CSIS assessed</a> that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/africa-report-n-237-nigeria-challenge-military-reform">International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint</a> called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.</p>
<p><strong>The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus</strong></p>
<p>Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.</p>
<p>A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/07/24/when-rebels-rule-iswap-formula-winning-support-nigeria-northeast-tax-control">estimated</a> $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-november-25/">$1.42 billion in ransom</a> in a single year.</p>
<p>Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.</p>
<p><strong>Outlook</strong></p>
<p>The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/president-tinubu-presents-%E2%82%A658-18-trillion-2026-appropriation-bill-vows-stronger-discipline-in-budget-execution/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThese%20outcomes%20are%20not%20accidental,revenue%20of%20%E2%82%A634.33%20trillion.">5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion)</a>. However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.</p>
<p>Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.</p>
<p><em>Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic &amp; Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Hollow-RanksGhost-Soldiers-Nigerias-Corruption-Fueled-Security-Collapse-.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2024 12:14:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29061</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Space Defense and Security Summit​, that took place in parallel to the September 2024 World Space Business Week conference in Paris, announced positive developments for European space defense. France has the second largest defense export industry in the world and is the fourth-largest military space spender—albeit far behind the US, China, and Russia. The country, emphasizing [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/">France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Space Defense and Security Summit​, that took place in parallel to the September 2024 World Space Business Week conference in Paris, announced positive developments for European space defense. France has the second largest defense export industry in the world and is the fourth-largest military space spender—albeit far behind the US, China, and Russia. The country, emphasizing space deterrence and surveillance, decided to double down on space defense tech. By leveraging improved cooperation with its commercial space sector, France’s space defense also joins in a <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/japans-ministry-of-defense-opening-space-security-to-the-commercial-sector/">global trend</a> that started with the US and Japan.</p>
<p>In planning to strengthen space defense capabilities, the French military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA) focuses on surveillance, security, and cooperation. France aims to have a full space defense capability by 2030, built on military space capabilities such as Earth observation, communications, positioning, and navigation. The country is also expanding its space situational awareness capability to monitor, classify, and better understand space activities and threats.</p>
<p>France unveiled <em>Toutatis</em>, a new space surveillance program to protect low-Earth orbit assets, focusing on satellite detection, characterization, and targeting. <em>Toutatis</em> works with two satellites. A “spotter” cubesat detects targets and a smaller target satellite—developed by French <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/u-space-nanosats/">start-up</a> U-space in partnership with defense industry major MBDA.</p>
<p>France also works on geosynchronous orbit surveillance through the <em>Yoda</em> program of small satellites with cameras to monitor space threats. The annual military space exercise, <em>AsterX</em>, highlights the need for enhanced situational awareness in low-Earth orbit. Within two years, the <em>Toutatis</em> program will test capabilities with planned launches of maneuverable satellites.</p>
<p>Rather than kinetic weapons against weaponized space assets, France deploys non-destructive measures like dazzling adversaries with lasers to neutralize threats—without creating debris. The country also seeks to balance autonomy with international cooperation. For example, an envoy from Ukraine recently discussed space defense in Paris. Pawan Kumar, Director of the Indian Defense Space Agency, recently provided the French space command with an update on military space cooperation between the two countries.</p>
<p>The French view is that enhanced situational awareness in space, through programs like <em>Toutatis</em>, is a cornerstone of its space defense strategies. Nations should prioritize investments in monitoring technology to observe potential threats and signal their deterrence capabilities.</p>
<p>France’s focus on space start-ups indicates a shift towards commercial and civilian involvement in space security. A timely joint-announcement made by two rising space ventures, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/cailabs/">Cailabs</a> and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/unseenlabs/">Unseenlabs</a>, revealed they successfully tested space <a href="https://www.c4isrnet.com/global/europe/2024/09/13/france-tests-space-lasers-for-secure-satellite-downlink-in-world-first/">laser</a> transmission for satellite downlink in a world first. While Cailabs supplied the optical ground station, Unseenlabs deployed a low-Earth orbit nano-satellite with a laser payload. The pair established a stable link for several minutes. France’s Ministry of Armed Forces called the successful test a world first. It was a first for the commercial sector, but a few other experiments remain confined to American government attempts.</p>
<p>The French Defense Innovation Agency funded the test with €5.5 million ($6.1 million). The Cailabs/Unseenlabs system will be integrated on France’s future military satellites. Laser technology is hard to intercept or hack, compared with radio antennas.</p>
<p>Such a capability would be useful for expanding battlefield data transmissions. France’s optical communications satellite project, dubbed <em>Keraunos </em>(thunderbolt in Greek), helps mitigate the effects of atmospheric turbulence, making space-Earth liaisons handy on mobile, land-based, naval, and airborne platforms.</p>
<p>The European Space Agency Director, General Josef Aschbacher, rightly noted that a gap in space spending between Europe and the United States (a ratio of 1 to 6) is complicated further by spending in Europe that is spread among a wider range of national space agencies. <a href="https://spacenews.com/esa-seeks-better-coordination-of-european-space-spending/">Streamlining</a> European defense and space governance is thornier than in the US since it <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congressional-haggling-jeopardizes-the-us-space-force-fy-2025-budget/">involves structural reforms</a> on technological gaps, fragmented capital markets, and strategic spending.</p>
<p>A rather disappointing report on European <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en">competitiveness</a> by Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and president of the European Central Bank, generated immediate push-back from Ludwig Moeller, director of the <a href="https://www.espi.or.at/perspectives/draghi-report/">European Space Policy Institute</a> (ESPI). ESPI methodically reviewed the Draghi Report’s <a href="https://www.espi.or.at/briefs/brief-70%20/">shortcomings</a> when it came to European Defense and Space. ESPI suggested the report lacked an impulse for the needed market reforms.</p>
<p>As stated by Eva Portier, space deputy in France&#8217;s military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA), &#8220;Access to space is an essential element of our national sovereignty, our capacity to use space to launch our satellites and conduct operations.&#8221; While greater Europe is struggling to fundamentally unite in its efforts to counter future malicious space efforts by China and Russia, France is stepping forward in a more limited way. It is not lost on observers that French satellite names harken to a past where France needed protection. For example, <em>Toutatis</em>, discussed above, was a divinity once worshipped in ancient Gaul and Britain, and was considered a protector of Gallic and Celtic tribes. The annual military space exercise, <em>AsterX</em>, led by the French Air and Space Force and involving 15 partners countries, is a wink to Asterix and Obelix, leading characters of a comic book series describing the adventures of a small village resisting the Roman invaders. Legend has it the Gauls feared only “that the sky would fall on their head.”</p>
<p>French efforts are moving in the right direction, but unless Europe reforms and consolidates space defense efforts across the continent, Europe will be unprepared when a crisis occurs. Major space reforms take time. Thus, it is important those reforms begin now. France simply cannot accomplish what is needed on its own.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/France-Doubles-Down-on-Space-Defense-Tech.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/">France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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