The relationship between the federal government and American universities is tense and often misunderstood. The gap between the purposes and priorities of government, on one side, and the missions and functions of universities, on the other, is alarming.

Historically, the United States has relied on its colleges and universities for several things critical to national defense. First, higher education produces a more educated work force for a globally competitive marketplace. Second, advanced learning fills federal, state, and local government positions that citizens rely on for necessary services. Third, the military and civilian defense establishments require leaders who understand the science and engineering behind modern weapons. Future defense and national security leaders must also understand the American military experience and the relationship between the armed forces and society.

The current and prospective international system is one that poses a wide variety of threats to world peace and international order. U.S. armed forces will be tasked for deterrence and war fighting missions across the entire spectrum of conflict,  from nuclear weapons spread and the possibility of war in space, to the nuances of urban terrorism and counterinsurgency. Officers who rise to senior command will need the perspective of innovators and adaptors, sometimes improvising in combat when exigent conditions override old rules of engagement.

As technology advances and the geostrategic environment grows more complicated, the United States will need a stronger educational establishment to compete with China and other rising powers. Nowhere in Europe or among major Asian military powers is national education under such crossfire as it is in the United States today. How did we get here, and what is to be done?

A primary cause of the war against American education is the perception among politicians, activists, and journalists that higher education has been colonized by radicals who hate America, misrepresent its history, and aim to produce dissidents who attack traditional culture and values, including patriotism and military service. This narrative has spread through misleading political campaigns, indifferent media coverage, and, unfortunately, some missteps by educators themselves.

At the center of this narrative is conflict between the Trump administration and Ivy League universities where demonstrations included violence and charges of antisemitism. Coverage of episodes at Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia has emphasized the behavior of a small percentage of students, sometimes supported by nonstudents and outside money, and overlooked the far larger share of students and faculty who avoid political violence and intimidation.

Admittedly, some leaders in higher education were slow to confront agitators who crossed the line between permissible speech and harassment. On July 24, 2025, Columbia University announced a settlement with the Trump administration: $220 million in fines in exchange for an end to attacks on Columbia’s federally funded research program. Some commentators and observers saw a dangerous precedent; others preferred Harvard’s decision to litigate. Acting Columbia President Claire Shipman argued the agreement was needed to prevent further disruption, and possible destruction, of the broader research enterprise. Whatever the outcome, we are far from the day President John F. Kennedy, at Yale’s 1962 commencement, joked that he enjoyed the best of both worlds: a Harvard education and a Yale degree.

Attacks on higher education also suggest that students, faculty, and administrators are elitists out of touch with Middle America. In fact, most students that attend public institutions come from middle class families, and do not learn their basic values from professors. Values are learned years before college through family and other primary groups. Professors rarely convert diehard conservatives into liberals, or vice versa. Radicals who break the law and violate campus codes are seldom motivated by instructors and more often they are encouraged and funded by activists who move from campus to campus. For example, antisemitism at some universities has been fueled by provocateurs exploiting student concern for non-terrorist Palestinians in Gaza while mischaracterizing Israel’s response to the October 7, 2023, attacks.

Administrators can also be faulted for negligence in defending First Amendment rights and for suppressing speech on spurious grounds. Unlike high school students, most college students are legal adults. They have the right to use confrontational rhetoric and provocative discourse protected by the First Amendment, however infuriating it may be. Too many universities have come to see themselves as providers of reassurance and guarantors of good feeling, backing that impulse with coercive training and sanctions against so-called offensive remarks inside and outside the classroom. The result is an atmosphere in which conversation is reduced to clichés and the celebration of the obvious instead of the clash of ideas from which great minds are molded.

It is an irony that more cut-and-thrust classroom testing of ideas can be found in some U.S. military war colleges and service academies than in many civilian institutions. Even there, however, trends toward government micro-management of curricula and textbook selection are troubling. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia since the February 2022 invasion is lesson to be learned in this debate: Ukraine turned a failed coup de main into a war of attrition through determination, drones, better intelligence, and a faster OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) than Russia.

Going forward, educators, politicians, warriors and voters will have to decide: do we want rigorous and results-oriented learning experiences for our future generations of leaders, or, instead, do we prefer ritualized feelgood rites of passage that will produce generations of intellectual bobbleheads majoring in conspicuous consumption?

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

The Halls of Ivy and National Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.