Historically, states pursued nuclear weapons under the protective assumption that deterrence begins once a program reaches maturity; that is, when nuclear devices are assembled, tested, or deployed. To some extent all nine nuclear weapon states achieved that level of deterrent threshold during their proliferation stages. Iran had not achieved such maturity. Furthermore, when looking at the region historically the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and the 2007 strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar site both hinted at a willingness on the Israelis’ part to act preemptively to stop regional proliferators.

But the scale and coordination of this most recent strike go further. It sends a global message that enrichment facilities themselves, when capable of being targeted and penetrated by American GBU-57 bombs, inherently means that once you are closing in on enrichment, your facilities are fair game. This will be the truest when referring to adversaries of the US and its alliance network. It remains to be seen what would take place if an ally of the US were to proliferate nuclear weapons in this modern era without its consent.

This shift has profound implications for the future of proliferation. Any adversarial state aspiring to build nuclear weapons will now face a new strategic prerequisite: it must first develop the defensive capability to withstand a preemptive strike before it can even hope to proliferate successfully. That means constructing extensive, deeply buried underground facilities, tunnel networks, and hardened bunkers. They must be capable of surviving the US military’s most sophisticated bunker-busting munitions. It also means investing in robust air defenses, redundancy, deception, and a level of operational secrecy that rivals the most advanced intelligence agencies in the world.

Not every state can afford this. Proliferation is already an expensive and politically risky endeavor. The need to develop advanced passive defenses only compounds those challenges. Most would-be proliferators simply will not have the financial or technical wherewithal to defend their nuclear infrastructure at such a level, especially in the early, vulnerable stages of enrichment.

Iran, of course, will likely try again. The Islamic Republic has proven resilient, adaptive, and committed to achieving strategic parity with its adversaries. Unless it develops an indigenous system of defenses that can shield its critical infrastructure from aerial bombardment, future attempts will likely meet the same fate as the current one. Even if Iran builds bunkers and tunnel systems deep enough to shield its centrifuges, it will still face challenges of concealment, resource constraints, and foreign intelligence penetration.

The broader lesson here is stark; the window of opportunity for slow, open, or vulnerable proliferation may be closing. In the post Iran–strike era, nuclear aspirants will have to prepare for war before they prepare for the bomb. The cost of entry into the nuclear club has just gone up, not only in material terms but in strategic risk. Any state hoping to proliferate must now assume it will be struck before it succeeds.

This may serve to slow the pace of proliferation, but it could also make it more dangerous. Proliferators who internalize the lessons of the Iran strike may respond with greater urgency, opacity, and desperation. They may forgo the traditional step-by-step approach in favor of crash programs hidden deep underground or even move toward asymmetric hedging strategies that involve acquiring key technologies without crossing visible red lines. In such an environment, the risk of miscalculation on all sides grows.

The strike on Iran may therefore reduce the number of proliferators in the long run. But for those that do try, the game has certainly changed. As Stephen Cimbala recently argued, the precedent set by the Midnight Hammer strike on Iran should not be viewed in isolation. It marks a return to kinetic counter-proliferation under conditions of rising global instability, where deterrence is increasingly challenged by uncertainty and misperception.

In parallel, Peter Huessy emphasizes that restoring deterrence requires more than just missile defense or military strikes; it demands clarity of will and credible commitment to prevent nuclear breakout by adversaries.

Together, their analyses suggest that the US-Israel strike was not just about denying Iran the bomb, but it was also about reestablishing the normative firebreak against nuclear proliferation. The broader message is unambiguous: in an era where deterrence is fraying, those who wish to proliferate must now calculate not only how to build a bomb, but also how to survive the storm that will precede it.

If Iran is the test case, the future of proliferation will be shaped as much by preemption as by prevention, and only those with the means to withstand a midnight hammer will have any chance at joining the nuclear club. From now on, the path to the bomb runs through the rubble of facilities like Natanz and Fordow, and only the most prepared will make it out the other side.

Aaron Holland is a PhD Student at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed are the author’s own.

How US and Israeli Attacks on Iran Will Reshape the Future of Nuclear Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

An American submarine also fired thirty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against surface infrastructure targets at Isfahan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine described it, the entire operation was a complex timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.

American deception tactics contributed to surprise as neither Iraqi fighters nor their surface-to-air missile defenses attempted to interdict the American bombers and their supporting fighter aircraft, all of which returned safely.

According to General Caine, Operation Midnight Hammer involved more than 125 aircraft, including the seven B2 stealth bombers, numerous fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and dozens of refueling tankers. Some 75 precision-guided munitions were used in Midnight Hammer, including fourteen GBU-57 MOPs, which were used for the first time in combat.

The operational excellence of Midnight Hammer doubtless constituted a setback to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs, although exactly how much of a setback remains to be determined.  Battle damage assessment is dependent on overhead photography unless and until further information is obtained from intelligence sources near or at the affected sites.

There also remained unsettled issues relative to American and allied strategy going forward. The Trump administration’s declaratory policy wants to draw a line between going to war with Iran, on one hand, and neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and potential, on the other.  This is a fine line to draw and Iran response, and follow-on condemnations, suggest they see the American position as a distinction without a difference.

Ater the strikes, President Trump indicated that Iran should come to the diplomatic table and negotiate the status of its nuclear future. Iran rejected further negotiations. This left the American and Israeli defense communities to await whatever diplomatic or military response the Iranians offered, including possible military attacks against American forces deployed in the Middle East.

Based on experience, Iran would likely respond with continuing missile strikes against Israel and asymmetrical warfare against the United States. With regard to the latter, Iran’s options included: (1) disrupting the flow of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz; (2) committing cyberattacks against American military or societal targets; (3) committing missile or insurgent attacks against American military personnel in Iraq or elsewhere in the region; (4) supporting protest demonstrations or terrorism in the American homeland, perhaps making use of prepositioned cells made up of illegal aliens; and/or (5) encouraging Iranian proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to further harass American, Israeli, and allied interests.

Thus far, Iran limited its response to employing a small number of missiles against Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, even giving the Americans advance warning of the strike. For the Trump administration, this is the best possible outcome. Already, imagery intelligence suggests Iran is digging out its capabilities at Fordow and Esfahan. What the future may hold is uncertain. Whether Iran is simply buying time and learning lessons for future success or whether the regime truly desires peace is up in the air.

Future options for Iran have their positives and negatives. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economy, which needs the infusion of cash from oil sales to China.

Cyberattacks are a low-risk, low-cost option that may appeal to Iran in the near term, but they present a more serious potential threat to civilian targets compared to more heavily defended military ones. They will also draw severe reprisals from very competent American and Israeli cyber forces.

Additional attacks against American military personnel and facilities in Iraq are an option, as are missile or unconventional warfare against other regional states hosting American military bases. However, this path was not successful the first time.

Support for antiwar demonstrations or outright terrorism in the American homeland, including “lone wolf” terrorists recruited online, are still a possibility. New stories of Iranian illegal aliens arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are almost a daily occurrence.

As for Iranian proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah are on the ropes, momentarily, due to prior engagements with Israel, but the Houthis declared their intention to plus-up their disruptions of commerce in the Red Sea in the wake of Midnight Hammer. Whether this is possible is yet to be seen.

With respect to Iran’s future nuclear options and American responses, they may proceed in one of three ways: (1) a continuing “whack-a-mole” competition in which Iran continues surreptitious enrichment and the US and Israel continue to monitor its progress and, if necessary, repeat Midnight Hammer, or worse; (2) Iran undergoes a change of regime due to domestic opposition, leaving uncertain for a time exactly who is in charge and who controls the supplies of enriched uranium and nuclear infrastructure, never mind the armed forces and security police; or (3) Iran agrees to negotiate with the US and representatives of the international community another deal to limit its stockpiles of fissile material and its levels of enrichment.

These are possible options, but by no means the only options. Iran may pursue an unexpected path in an effort to outthink the United States and Israel. Whatever the future holds, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must keep a close eye on a regime that is built on destroying both countries. Hope is critical to human perseverance, but it is not a strategy.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State university, Brandywine. He is currently a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Midnight Hammer and After was originally published on Global Security Review.