This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.

The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to 2005 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in 2007 and 2008 further tightened the restrictions. In 2010, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s oil revenues and banking sector, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.

These sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a snapback clause; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On August 28, 2025, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.

The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed 2006–2010. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran recalled its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but clarified it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.

The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.

Coordinated attacks by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.

While Russia and China echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 maintained that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also emphasized that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.

The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for zero enrichment and even presented partial solutions at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.

Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its Look East strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.

The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.

The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly two years, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.

The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.

For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.

The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.