The renewed early September exchange of attacks between Iran and the US, including US strikes on three Iranian tankers after missiles targeted American warships, has not changed the conflict’s underlying equation. The US and Israel have inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s leadership, air defenses, naval forces, and military infrastructure. Yet Tehran has prevented those operational successes from yielding a stable political settlement. Its regime remains intact, its coercive capabilities have not been eliminated, and the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted.

Tehran has adopted a strategy designed to avoid a fast and decisive defeat. Iran’s principal objective is no longer to restore a favorable conventional balance. It is to survive, extend the conflict, and increase its opponents’ economic and political costs until Washington accepts a negotiated outcome less ambitious than the one military force was intended to initially deliver.

A Strategy of Political Denial

Iran’s approach rests on a distinction between battlefield performance and political effect. The US and Israel can destroy missile batteries, strike naval facilities, and decapitate command structures. But unless those actions compel Tehran to accept their terms, military success remains politically incomplete.

Iran has therefore treated time as a strategic resource. Every month that the regime survives allows it to argue that the campaign failed to force capitulation. Prolongation allows Tehran to expose differences among the US, Israel, European governments, and the Gulf states. At the same time, Gulf states also have powerful reasons to prevent their territories and infrastructure from becoming permanent fronts in a US-Iran conflict.

Hormuz as Coercive Leverage

The Strait of Hormuz is the central instrument of this strategy. Before the conflict, approximately twenty million barrels of oil and petroleum products crossed the Strait each day. The International Energy Agency estimates that available bypass capacity amounts to only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. Iran therefore does not need to close Hormuz completely to influence international decision-making. It is necessary to maintain sufficient risk to deter shipowners, crews, and insurers. Iran does not possess uncontested control of the Strait. American forces have cleared mines, attacked coastal launch systems, and facilitated some commercial transits. Recent traffic illustrates the effect. For one late August week, only twenty-four vessels reportedly passed through Hormuz, compared with roughly 130 per day before the war. Tehran nevertheless retains a potent, still-relevant sea-denial capability through missiles, drones, mines, and the threat of unpredictable attacks.

This leverage, however, is self-eroding. Prolonged disruption damages Iran’s own exports, antagonizes Gulf neighbors and imposes costs on China and other Asian customers whose diplomatic neutrality Tehran crucially needs. It also encourages investment in bypass routes, greater international naval coordination, and more aggressive action against Iranian coastal capabilities.

Iran’s Supporting Pillars Are Weakening

Iran’s remaining missiles, drones, and mines still impose operational costs, but stockpile levels and replacement rates will become increasingly important. The question is whether it can sustain enough regime survivability while its economy, oil exports, production sites (including drones and missiles production), and distribution networks (including regional proxies) remain under pressure.

The regional proxy network has also performed below Tehran’s original expectations. Hezbollah in Lebanon has suffered extensive attrition and lost much of its former strategic depth in Syria. Iraqi militias remain divided by local political calculations. The Houthis continue to threaten Red Sea shipping and Saudi-linked interests, but their autonomy means activity in Yemen cannot automatically be converted into coordinated Iranian escalation. The “axis of resistance” remains dangerous but degraded. It no longer functions as a reliable unified deterrent system unless the Houthis manage to disrupt Bab El Mandeb.

Economic endurance presents a deeper problem. Iran also retains experience in sanctions evasion, informal financial channels, and covert trade. China provides an important commercial and technological lifeline, while Russia and China offer varying degrees of diplomatic protection. Yet these relationships are designed to prevent Iran’s total isolation, not to assume the costs of rebuilding its military or rescuing its economy. Sanctions evasion can postpone financial suffocation; it cannot reverse cumulative wartime destruction, lost exports, and declining currency confidence.

Three Paths Over the Next Three to Six Months

The first option is a managed but deteriorating stalemate. Iran will preserve enough missile and maritime capacity to keep Hormuz contested, while the US alternates between limited strikes, mine-clearing, sanctions, and enforcement of its blockade. Negotiations will periodically resume without resolving the nuclear issue, maritime access, and sanctions relief. Iran will remain capable of resistance but progressively less capable of setting the terms of the conflict.

A second, plausible option is a coerced interim bargain. Mounting economic damage, Gulf pressure and concerns about military readiness could lead Washington to accept a phased arrangement involving verified commercial passage through Hormuz, limits on Iranian maritime activity and partial sanctions relief. It would be an armistice managing the confrontation rather than resolving it.

Lastly, is an accelerated Iranian breakdown accompanied by wider escalation. Serious fractures within the security elite, an inability to finance the coercive apparatus or a rapid decline in missile-launch capacity could convince Tehran that time is no longer on its side. Rather than surrender, the regime might expand attacks against neighboring states, undersea cables, shipping, or American regional facilities to force immediate intervention by outside powers. Iranian weakness could therefore make the conflict more dangerous before it makes Iran more conciliatory.

The indicators to watch are commercial traffic and insurance premiums in Hormuz, Iran’s missile and drone launch rate, evidence of renewed minelaying, Chinese purchases and technological transfers, cohesion within the Revolutionary Guard, and whether Gulf governments move from advocating restraint to supporting sustained maritime enforcement.

Iran has demonstrated that a regional actor can temporarily deny a superpower an inexpensive political victory. But denial is not victory, and endurance is not recovery. Unless Tehran converts disruption into a negotiated settlement, the same strategy that preserved the regime during the conflict’s first six months will surely consume the economic, diplomatic, and military foundations required to survive the next phase.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition was originally published on Global Security Review.

Pale hulls painted with “China Coast Guard” cut the waters around Taiwan, the Philippines, near Alaska, and across the deep blue of the Pacific. Such actions are not, however, common patrols so much as sublimated aggression to which the world has become habituated.  

Overt invasions, military aggression, and acts of war are unacceptable in today’s world order. Such actions undermine the legitimacy of foreign policy, leaving only the exercise of power. To preserve at least some international legitimacy, nations therefore pursue aggression in a more undeclared manner. China and Russia best exemplify this in their maritime operations. The coordination of these powers in this aggressive grey-zone policy reflects a larger shift in how the world applies legitimacy and force.  

The China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) function primarily as domestic forces, tasked with serving state security and sovereignty, while upholding legal precedents through their internal authority. Their actions, however, have been less about policing than about perpetration. In 2018, the CCG shifted its official status from the People’s Armed Police to the Central Military Commission, giving it authority to enforce laws in areas under Chinese jurisdiction that statutes do not clearly define. It is authorized to use all necessary means to prevent any infringements of sovereignty or jurisdiction. As a result, it acts like a military force in the region. Since 2023, it has expanded its operations, reaching as far as the Aleutian Islands and the waters around Alaska.  

The following year, Chinese Coast Guard Regulation No. 3 was implemented, allowing the detention of foreign nationals suspected of border violations and the detention of ships in Chinese territorial waters. The USINDOPACOM legal team assessed this development as the first document permitting CCG detention and emphasized the vagueness of the territory in question. In February 2026, CCG activity in the Taiwan Strait increased, underscoring, on the law’s fifth anniversary, “institutionalized control in sensitive maritime areas.” CCG deployments spiked, reaching 933 ship-days in the first six months of 2026. The following months were no less eventful, with CCG operations expanding east of the main Taiwan island and into outlying islands.  

Additionally, 2026 saw striking aggression in both diplomacy and physical action between China and the Philippines, as CCG cutters blockaded Philippine resupply ships to the grounded military outpost BRP Sierra Madre in September 2026. This followed high diplomatic tensions preceding Chinese claims to the Batanes and surrounding waters, increased military presence and operations, including an incident in which Chinese personnel struck a Filipino sailor with a baton, as well as the persistent harassment of fishing boats by the CCG. Japan Coast Guard data records Chinese vessel activity in the Senkakus’ region on 357 of 365 days in 2025, with a constant presence spanning 335 days, from November 2024 to October 2025, with over 1,300 vessels recorded in the region. Japan’s Naha Coast Guard director said Chinese vessels have grown increasingly aggressive, while Japan has not acted to deter them, given that China operates more than twice as many coast guard vessels as Japan and is more heavily armed. Such aggressive actions pose clear threats that require a response; however, the long, slow build-up of involvement has become habitual.  

Russia’s gray-zone aggression tactics parallel those of China, particularly around the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland, as well as in the Pacific. Japan Coast Guard figures from 2006 cite Japanese boats and crews seized near Hokkaido, 30 of which occurred between 1994 and 2005, including a fisherman injured by Russian Coast Guard fire. The legal frameworks established in the case of China are reflected in Russia as well, as the 2024 Defense Ministry decree proposed revising baselines that bind Russia’s territorial limits in the Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad. Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania objected. Days later, Russian border guards removed nearly half of the navigation buoys established by Estonia, an act the EU deemed a hybrid action by Moscow. In May 2026, the head of the FSB Border Service accused Estonia of shifting away from agreements regarding Lake Peipus and the Narva River, a framing used to justify Russian actions as defensive rather than aggressive. When Estonia tried to halt the shadow-fleet tanker Jaguar, Russia responded with a fighter jet. Russia then detained ships, such as the Greek Green Admire, as it left the Estonian Sillamäe port.  

On land and on the river, the border service role is clearer. A Russian coast guard cutter flew a Wagner banner on the Narva in early November 2025, and on December 17, 2025, three Russian border guards entered Estonian territory near the breakwater where the Narva meets Lake Peipus for about 20 minutes; Estonia’s interior minister said it was unclear whether the incursion was intentional. This year, the FSB also imposed temporary restrictions on movement, hunting, and river access along a five-kilometer strip on its side of the border, citing frontier security, through September 2026.  

Overall, Russia and China have acted in gray-zone regions using aggressive tactics that skirt overt aggression, while projecting power in international waters. They have justified these maritime actions under legal, albeit deliberately vague, frameworks, ultimately expanding not only Russia’s and China’s reach but also their justification for force. 

Jack Lindstrom is a Junior Researcher at the Mackinder Forum, conducting research on geopolitics and security in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. He also founded Arctic Ledger and is a member of the San Diego World Affairs Council Writer Corps. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

White Hulls, Gray Zones: China, Russia, and a Habituated World was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly taking place in the “gray zone”—the space between routine state competition and open warfare. Rather than relying solely on conventional military confrontation, states are employing hybrid tactics such as economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and limited military provocations to gradually shift the strategic balance in their favour.

China, North Korea, and Russia are among the most active practitioners of gray zone strategy. Their activities are deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger a large-scale military response, allowing a to challenge the rules-based order while avoiding outright conflict.

For policymakers and military planners, this presents a difficult dilemma. Traditional deterrence models were designed to prevent major wars, not persistent low-level coercion. As gray-zone competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, regional states must consider how to deter and respond to these activities without inadvertently escalating the situation.

Understanding the actors involved, and the tactics they employ, is therefore essential. The following sections outline how China, North Korea, and Russia conduct gray zone campaigns across the Indo-Pacific and how these activities collectively challenge regional stability.

China: Gradual Strategic Expansion

China arguably conducts the most sophisticated and comprehensive gray zone campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s approach combines military presence, maritime coercion, economic pressure, and legal strategies to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation.

In the maritime domain, China frequently uses coast guard vessels and maritime militia to harass foreign ships in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. These forces operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, allowing Beijing to apply pressure while maintaining plausible deniability.

China also conducts frequent aircraft incursions and large-scale military exercises near Taiwan, while maintaining persistent patrols around the Senkaku Islands. These operations serve multiple purposes: demonstrating military capability, testing regional responses, and normalizing Chinese presence in contested areas. Moreover, Beijing employs cyber espionage, economic coercion, and diplomatic strategies sometimes described as “lawfare,” often passing domestic laws that extend jurisdiction into contested spaces to codify expansive claims, selectively invoking international law, and using legal ambiguity to its advantage. These efforts allow China to reinforce its territorial claims and political narratives while staying below the threshold of open conflict. Over time, such actions gradually reshape the strategic environment in China’s favour.

North Korea: Coercion Through Provocation

North Korea relies heavily on gray zone tactics to pressure its opponents while avoiding the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.

Cyber operations are one of Pyongyang’s most important tools. Groups such as the Lazarus Group have conducted large-scale hacking campaigns targeting financial institutions, governments, and cryptocurrency exchanges. These cyber activities not only generate revenue for the regime but also demonstrate North Korea’s growing technological capabilities.

In addition to cyber operations, North Korea regularly conducts missile launches, artillery exchanges near disputed maritime boundaries, and military demonstrations aimed at raising tensions in the region. These examples are limited military provocations designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict.

North Korea also operates extensive sanctions-evasion networks. Through covert maritime trade, smuggling operations, and cyber-enabled financial crime, the regime generates revenue while circumventing international restrictions. These activities allow Pyongyang to sustain its economy and military programs despite heavy sanctions pressure.

Taken together, North Korea’s gray zone strategy enables the regime to coerce its adversaries, generate financial resources, and maintain strategic relevance without crossing the threshold of major war.

Russia: Information Warfare and Strategic Signalling

Although Russia’s primary strategic focus lies in Europe, Moscow also conducts gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific that challenge regional stability and Western influence.

Cyber operations remain a central element of Russia’s approach. Moscow-linked actors have been associated with intrusions targeting government systems and critical infrastructure in countries such as Japan and Australia. These operations are often accompanied by online disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust and influencing domestic political debates.

Russia also engages in strategic military signalling across the region. Long-range bomber patrols and naval deployments near areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea demonstrate Russia’s military reach and reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific. In some cases, these activities occur alongside Chinese forces, highlighting increasing coordination between Moscow and Beijing. Such cooperation amplifies the strategic message that Russia and China are capable of jointly contesting Western and allied presence in the region.

Russia also maintains sanctions-evasion networks that facilitate illicit maritime trade, including ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea. These networks allow Moscow to sustain economic ties while bypassing international restrictions.

The Strategic Challenge of Gray Zone Competition

Gray-zone campaigns pose a growing strategic challenge for Indo-Pacific states. Because these activities remain below the threshold of armed conflict, they are difficult to deter using traditional military tools. Yet over time, they can gradually erode regional stability and shift the balance of power. This raises an important question for policymakers: how should states respond to persistent gray zone coercion without escalating into major conflict?

One approach is to use limited, proportionate conventional responses to push back against gray-zone activities. However, such responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended escalation. This is where broader strategic deterrence may play an important role.

A stronger Indo-Pacific security framework—potentially including deeper military integration among regional allies and partners—could provide the stability needed to manage escalation risks. In particular, a future Indo-Pacific nuclear security architecture could serve as a strategic backstop. As much as nuclear deterrence underpins NATO’s conventional defence posture in Europe, a similar framework in the Indo-Pacific could help ensure that responses to gray zone provocations remain limited rather than spiralling into major war.

Preparing for Persistent Competition

Gray zone competition is likely to remain a defining feature of Indo-Pacific security in the coming decades. China, North Korea, and Russia are already using these tactics to challenge the existing strategic order while avoiding direct confrontation.

For regional states, the challenge is not simply responding to individual incidents. It is developing a deterrence framework capable of managing persistent, low-level coercion across multiple domains. Without such a framework, gray zone activities will continue to stress the limits of allied resolve and gradually reshape the strategic landscape. Strengthening regional cooperation, improving resilience against hybrid tactics, and reinforcing strategic deterrence will therefore be essential steps in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 2: Gray zone campaigns and activities conducted by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.