An Exclusive Economic Zone does not grant absolute territorial sovereignty to a coastal state. However, it secures the exclusive rights of a coastal state to explore and exploit vital economic resources within the water column and the seabed. In an era of intense geopolitical competition, Türkiye introduced the Blue Homeland doctrine as a comprehensive maritime strategy. This visionary strategic framework protects these rights and safeguards Ankara’s long-term interests in its surrounding seas. The implementation of this doctrine represents a fundamental shift in regional maritime geopolitics. 

The Aegean Sea and the Territorial Waters Status Quo 

Greece has long-standing ambitions to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea. This proposed move would severely threaten regional stability and the delicate balance established over decades. Historically, Türkiye has declared that such an extension is an indisputable cause of war. 

Currently, Türkiye is not a signatory to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This abstention stems from the unique geographical structure of the Aegean Sea. Historically referred to as the Sea of Islands, the Aegean defies standard nautical mile limitations designed for open oceans. Applying these standard rules would severely restrict international airspace and maritime navigation. 

While Athens maintains a six-mile limit for now, it has militarized numerous Aegean islands despite Turkish claims that such deployments violate the demilitarization provisions of the Lausanne and Paris treaties. These historical agreements explicitly conditioned Greek sovereignty over these islands on their strict demilitarization. Consequently, the current militarization efforts undermine the foundational legal texts governing the region. 

Fault Lines in the Eastern Mediterranean 

In the Eastern Mediterranean, shifting geopolitical fault lines have given Türkiye a significant strategic advantage. In 2019, Ankara signed a Maritime Delimitation Memorandum of Understanding with Libya. This pivotal agreement completely dismantled the maritime containment strategy devised by Greece, Egypt, and the Greek Cypriot Administration. 

Simultaneously, lucrative natural gas discoveries have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a focal point of global energy competition. Initial efforts by opposing blocs attempted to exclude Türkiye from regional energy infrastructure, notably through the unviable EastMed pipeline project. However, the subsequent failure of these exclusionary projects proved that no regional energy equation can succeed without Türkiye’s participation. 

Today, Türkiye systematically codifies its maritime jurisdiction zones to consolidate these strategic gains. By defining legal boundaries for disputes dating back to 1982, Ankara actively redraws the Eastern Mediterranean energy map. Domestically, the Blue Homeland doctrine enjoys a robust bipartisan consensus across the political spectrum. The Turkish parliament is expected to legalize these maritime boundaries soon. Moving forward, Greece must face this newly established strategic reality. Athens must factor in both the regional energy resources and the renewed Libyan geopolitical equation. Rejecting diplomatic negotiations in favor of maximalist policies will not yield favorable outcomes for Athens. 

The Legalization of the Blue Homeland 

Declaring an exclusive economic zone establishes a definitive and recognized legal framework. It places all living and non-living resources within the water column and the seabed under the strict jurisdiction of a single state. The upcoming legislative steps of Türkiye will reinforce its sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. This definitive legal action preempts Greek claims to these contested waters. 

Crucially, this legal framework encompasses one hundred and seventy-six islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty remains disputed. Historical treaties never explicitly ceded the sovereignty of these specific geographic formations to Greece. Thus, this upcoming legislation solidifies both the legal and practical reality of the Blue Homeland doctrine. 

Under the current Territorial Waters Law of Türkiye, the Aegean boundary remains at six nautical miles strictly out of geographical necessity. In contrast, Türkiye applies the standard 12-mile limit smoothly in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Despite this delicate equilibrium, Greece recently announced plans to create large national marine parks slated for 2025. This environmental initiative reveals a clear intent to establish unilateral control over disputed waters. Consequently, it poses a direct and unacceptable challenge to Türkiye’s maritime rights. 

Growing Concern in Athens 

Unsurprisingly, these structural moves trigger profound anxiety within political circles in Athens. The Greek government publicly expresses fears that codifying Türkiye’s maritime claims could be an immediate cause of war, as the Turkish parliament declared in 1995. Meanwhile, the Greek domestic press frequently accuses its administration of underestimating these significant developments. 

Greek media openly acknowledges that Türkiye’s growing geopolitical influence fundamentally shifts the regional balance of power. Greek outlets often mischaracterize this growing influence as Turkish revisionism. This rhetoric serves to mask that Ankara seeks to secure its rights under international law. 

Toward a New Regional Security Architecture 

The international system of today faces profound crises of global hegemony and a turbulent transition of power. Leaving maritime boundaries ambiguous in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean creates a massive and dangerous security vacuum. The recent initiative of Türkiye anchors its Blue Homeland vision upon a solid, unshakeable legal foundation. 

This codification is a proactive measure carefully designed to close the existing security gap. The international community and regional actors should not view Ankara’s actions as aggressive revisionism. Instead, they represent the foundational building blocks of a new regional security architecture. This new system is firmly grounded in legal clarity, effective deterrence, and geopolitical realism. 

Nazım Fatsa is a public sector professional and independent researcher based in Türkiye, currently completing his master’s studies in International Relations at Kütahya Dumlupınar University. His primary research focuses on regional security dynamics, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and maritime strategies such as the Mavi Vatan doctrine. He also serves as a Language Editor for several peer-reviewed publications, including the ASSAM International Refereed Journal and the Academic Thought Journal. The views of the author are his own. 

Redrawn Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye’s New Legal Moves was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.