This is the third trilateral meeting between these countries this year. The issue of terrorism in Pakistan was a top agenda in all three conferences. Apart from trade cooperation and CPEC, it matters most. The truth is that terrorism-related threats have their sources in Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus not only contended with internal insurgents but also with non-state actors based in Afghanistan. These players are aided by regional instability, ideological havens, and a rushed Western departure.

In the Global War on Terror, Pakistan was at the receiving end of a conflict it never initiated, yet it paid with blood and billions of dollars over the past two decades. This involvement led to the deaths of over 70,000 Pakistanis and resulted in losses exceeding $150 billion to Pakistan’s economy, post-9/11. The trauma is deep and the cost staggering, whether it was the school massacre in Peshawar, terror attacks on urban centers, or assaults on security forces. Even today, Pakistan continues to grapple with terrorism, a remnant of the Global War on Terror.

A 2024 report noted that more than 1,600 civilians and security personnel were killed in terror bombings and gun attacks. 2024 appeared to be the deadliest year, as more than 685 servicemen were killed in 444 terrorist incidents. In March of 2025, Pakistan ranked second in the Global Terrorism Index, as terrorist attacks rose by 45 percent.

A new phase in Pakistan’s war on terror began with the launch of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June 2024, a multi-faceted counterterrorism initiative aimed at breaking the chain of terrorism-related violence. A distinguishing feature of this operation is its full acknowledgment of cross-border terrorism, particularly that originating from Afghanistan. The operation focuses on improving intelligence capabilities, strengthening diplomatic ties with the Taliban government in Kabul, and aligning border management with broader security measures.

Operation Azm-e-Istehkam could potentially mark a systematic reform in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, built on a structure centered on intelligence-driven operations, regional cooperation, and social and economic reforms. However, for the operation to be implemented successfully, it must be accompanied by progress across the Durand Line. External sanctuaries in Afghanistan will continue to undermine the internal security gains achieved by Pakistan as long as the country remains a permissive environment for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.

As far as China is concerned, its interest in the Pak-Afghan rapprochement is twofold. One is that it aims to prevent any spillover of terror into Xinjiang province through radical networks. China wants to counter any strategic threat to CPEC, particularly since their officials have already been attacked by insurgents in Baluchistan. China also seeks to hamper the increasing influence of India in Kabul.

Furthermore, the economic presence of China can be used to influence the Taliban to tone down their attitude towards Pakistan. Beijing can contribute to creating integrated security architecture by offering aid, developing infrastructure, and offering trade incentives, especially the prospect of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. This might include collective management of the border and repatriation of Afghan refugees, as well as coordinating intelligence.

In July, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Tianjin, China, emphasized the need for Afghan stability and greater cooperation among regional states. Beijing’s message was more than mere diplomacy. It signaled a strategic recalibration. This stance was echoed by Pakistan Foreign Minister Dar and was followed by a series of high-level talks between Pakistan and the Taliban regime, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing.

Previously, in May 2025, a trilateral dialogue was held in China between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The meeting produced a symbolic willingness to reinstate diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Kabul at the ambassadorial level. More importantly, it opened an avenue for future regional security cooperation, not only against TTP terror but also against threats such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which have also drawn Beijing’s attention.

These trilateral engagements offer Pakistan two opportunities to internationalize its concerns over cross-border terrorism and the chance to tie those concerns to broader regional stability and economic growth.

China’s mediation introduces a new variable into the equation, shifting the dynamic from a binary of conflict and impunity to a triangle of pressure, cooperation, and mutual interest. Provided it is adequately utilized, the trilateral effort between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has the potential to evolve from a symbol into a solid plan—and out of weak diplomacy into stable security.

Qurat-UL-Ain Shabbir is a research officer at CISS.

Can Trilateral Diplomacy Secure Pakistan from Terrorism? was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, when looking deeper, combining field developments, the Taliban’s contradictory conduct, and shifting regional dynamics, reveals a more complex reality. This enmity may not be as absolute as it seems. Instead, it could present a multi-layered game in which the Taliban leverages the ISIS-K threat to justify internal repression, gain regional legitimacy, and position itself as the “lesser evil.” In this light, ISIS-K might serve both as a tactical threat and a strategic asset for the Taliban—a manufactured crisis that enables the group to tighten its grip on power at home and increase its geopolitical leverage abroad.

Open Hostility or Controlled Competition?

Since appearing in Afghanistan, ISIS-K launched brutal attacks on civilians, from deadly bombings against religious minorities to assaults on hotels housing Chinese and Russian citizens. These incidents were widely publicized, framing ISIS-K as a dangerous destabilizing force in the public mind.

Yet, a closer look reveals an intriguing pattern: the majority of ISIS-K attacks occurred in provinces like Nangarhar and Kunduz, the very areas where the Taliban launched “anti-ISIS” operations to consolidate their own authority. The Taliban consistently portray their campaigns against ISIS-K as “heroic battles” against terrorism. Yet beneath this narrative lies a troubling question: could the Taliban be managing or even facilitating ISIS-K’s presence as a pretext to justify their own rule, gain international support, and ruthlessly crush opposition?

It appears ISIS-K never posed an existential threat to the Taliban. On the contrary, its existence allows the Taliban to brand themselves as “terrorism fighters” while targeting domestic opponents, civil society activists, former security personnel of the previous republic, and even ethnic groups like Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Nangarhar, for example, hundreds were detained on allegations of ties to ISIS-K, though many were once affiliated with the republican government.

For the Taliban, ISIS-K represents a “manageable threat,” dangerous enough to draw local and international backing, but not so strong as to undermine their own power. In fact, it provides an opportunity for the Taliban to further entrench themselves.

The Haqqani Network and Crisis Management

At the heart of this theory lies the Haqqani Network, a sophisticated and shadowy branch of the Taliban known for its long-standing ties with Pakistani intelligence services and transnational jihadist networks. Field patterns suggest that in eastern Afghanistan, there is a kind of covert coexistence between the Haqqanis and elements of ISIS-K. Major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul, including assaults on hotels frequented by Chinese and Russian diplomats, raise suspicions that these incidents may have occurred with either Haqqani facilitation or their tacit approval. There are also reports indicating that some mid-level ISIS-K leaders once cooperated with the Haqqanis.

This relationship can be analyzed through three possible scenarios. First, there is the direct management scenario. Here, the Haqqani Network actively directs parts of ISIS-K to operate within controlled limits.

Second, there is the limited influence scenario. In this scenario, the Taliban and the Haqqanis have some influence over ISIS-K and use it for political purposes.

Third, there is the independent ISIS scenario. In this case, ISIS-K acts independently, but the Taliban opportunistically exploit its existence for political gains.

Although there is no definitive evidence of full collusion between the Taliban and ISIS-K, the Taliban’s selective responses to ISIS-K’s activities suggest we are witnessing “crisis management” rather than an all-out war. Even if we dismiss the first scenario, there is sufficient evidence to support the second. While the Taliban may not entirely control ISIS-K, they at least seek to manage it, benefiting from its existence while preventing it from becoming a genuine threat to their dominance.

A Regional and International Bargaining Chip

For the Taliban, ISIS-K is not merely a domestic issue, it is also a key “bargaining card” in dealings with regional powers. By presenting themselves as the only effective barrier against ISIS-K, the Taliban have transformed from international pariahs into reluctant but necessary security partners for neighboring countries.

To China and Russia, they say, “Without us, ISIS-K will spread into Central Asia and Xinjiang.” To Iran, they warn, “Weakening the Taliban will empower ISIS-K on Afghanistan’s western borders.” To Pakistan, they remind, “Uncontained ISIS-K activity could jeopardize economic security and projects like CPEC.” By managing the ISIS-K threat, the Taliban position themselves as the lesser evil and draw financial and political support from regional actors.

Crisis Engineering: A Familiar Tactic

What the Taliban is doing today is not unlike Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s, when Islamabad exaggerated the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to extract financial and political concessions from the US and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban have now reproduced this model, creating and managing a more extreme enemy to bolster their own position. This tactic aligns with the theory of a “constructed crisis,” in which security actors inflate or even control threats to use them as tools for pressure and legitimacy.

It is likely, then, that the Taliban never intend to fully destroy ISIS-K. Its continued existence forms an essential part of their political and security survival strategy.

Targeted Attacks: Eliminating Opponents in Terror’s Shadow

In this geopolitical chess game, the Afghan people remain the primary victims. The Taliban’s “anti-ISIS” operations increasingly target civil activists, former security forces, and even ethnic minorities. Some ISIS-K attacks, like the one on the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry, fueled suspicions about the Taliban’s role, or at least their prior knowledge, of such incidents. Some reports even suggest that the Taliban warned their personnel in advance of certain attacks.

These operations may act as a tool for the “targeted elimination” of internal opponents, allowing the Taliban to avoid direct responsibility. Rather than weakening the group, this tactic reinforces the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan’s security equations.

Taliban and ISIS-K: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

At first glance, the Taliban and ISIS-K seem like sworn ideological enemies. But on closer inspection, field evidence and geopolitical logic suggest their relationship is far more complex than a simple rivalry. The Taliban leveraged ISIS-K’s presence to crack down on internal dissent, bolster their regional legitimacy, and present themselves as a defensive shield against terrorism and global threats emanating from Afghan soil.

As long as this intricate game continues, the Taliban can maintain their role as a “necessary but unpleasant” player in regional and global affairs, while Afghanistan remains trapped in a security quagmire with no easy way out.

For reasons of personal safety, the author has used a pseudonym.

The Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan: A Real Rivalry or a Strategic Game to Engineer Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The brainwashing of youths, monopoly over illicit drug production, sheltering and supporting global terrorist groups, weaponization of poverty, and recruitment of refugees has brought Afghanistan to the verge of an imminent explosion, with consequences that may prove more consequential than those of September 11, 2001. Understanding what the Taliban is doing deserves further explanation.

Brainwashing the Youth

The Taliban’s focus on educating Afghan youth in religious schools (madrasa), which serve as training centers for militants and suicide bombers, poses an immediate and long-term threat to the region and the West. Through relentless brainwashing, these madrasas create a generation of children and teenagers steeped in radicalism. Young recruits are taught that martyrdom and suicide attacks are not only honorable but also necessary.

What makes this particularly worrisome is the sheer scale. Tens of thousands of young minds are being primed for violence, and this army of youths will be deployed somewhere. The consequences for neighboring countries and the West, which are already struggling with radicalization, could be catastrophic. As Roza Otenbayeva, head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), said to the UN Security Council, “The Taliban do not allow any monitoring of these schools and we don’t know what they teach there.”

According to the Taliban Ministry of Education, at least 17,300 madrasas are officially active across Afghanistan. Meanwhile, according to an order issued by the Taliban on June 20, 2022, three to 10 jihadi schools, with a capacity of 500–1,000 students each, are being built in every district of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has 408 districts, and the construction of three to 10 new jihadi schools per district could quickly turn the country into the center of global terrorism.

Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is once again a haven for international terrorist groups. The Taliban’s victory emboldened and empowered extremist groups, providing them with the space to reorganize, train, and plan. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now operate freely inside Afghanistan. Taliban ties with these terrorist groups are not superficial. They are rooted in common ideology, long-term political interests, and, most importantly, many Taliban leaders have long-standing family ties with the leaders of these groups.

According to a report in Hasht-e-Subh, the Taliban are building well-equipped bases with residential houses for the Al-Qaeda network and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan in Ghazni province. Likewise, UN reports, especially the July 2024 report, are proof of this claim. The United Nations says Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is a “safe haven” for groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This network of relationships ensures that the Taliban will continue to cooperate with these groups in their collective efforts to destabilize the region, expand influence, and export terror globally, creating a security disaster with devastating global consequences.

Drug Monopoly

Although the Taliban officially banned the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, it has monopolized the industry. By limiting the supply, the Taliban is driving up the price of drugs, making the trade more profitable for themselves and their affiliates. As noted in the July 2024 UN Security Council report, it is still too early to assess the full impact of the poppy cultivation ban. However, senior Taliban officials oppose the ban. Poppy farmers lose while the Taliban profits. The report states, “Due to poppy stockpiles, the drug trade in Afghanistan remains significant.”

The world’s lack of attention to this development risks creating an underground drug economy, further empowering the Taliban and their allied terrorist groups—undermining security and stability in Afghanistan and the region. As the Taliban’s drug empire expands, terrorist groups will increasingly benefit.

Weaponization of Poverty

One of the most dangerous strategies used by the Taliban is the deliberate impoverishment of the Afghan people. By doing this, they pursue two goals.

First, they plunge a large portion of the population into extreme poverty and eliminate opportunities for education, employment, and basic survival. This makes it easier to recruit people into their ranks and allied terrorist groups.

Second, the Taliban’s control over local resources and their monopoly on illicit trade provides ample financial incentives for those willing to fight for them. In this way, poverty becomes a weapon and fuels rebellion and radicalism.

Recruitment of Deported Asylum Seekers

The Taliban encourages the deportation of Afghan refugees by secretly cooperating with some countries, particularly those in the region. This is a policy that is of strategic importance to the regime.

Many deported Afghans, returning to the land where they find no means of survival, are easily recruited by the Taliban and allied terrorist groups. Deportation is vital for the Taliban, as it ensures a steady stream of disillusioned and frustrated individuals who become pawns in their larger scheme.

Many countries fail to grasp the significance of this issue and view it superficially. Deporting immigrants, especially from Western countries, fuels anti-Western sentiments among the population, making them susceptible to serving terrorist groups.

Time Is Running Out

If the world continues to ignore the dire situation in Afghanistan, the consequences will soon prove irreparable. The brainwashing of the nation’s youth, Taliban drug running, safe havens for terrorists, the weaponization of poverty, and the recruitment of refugees will soon impact Afghanistan’s neighbors and the West. Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and India, will suffer the most, but the impact will not be limited to the region. Countries far beyond, especially in the West, will be in the crosshairs of these repercussions.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a serious miscalculation. The Biden administration, particularly Jake Sullivan, believes that drones and aerial surveillance can control the situation. This reflects a strategic mistake reminiscent of America’s approach during the Cold War. Ultimately, that mistaken view contributed to the rise of international terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Abandoning the Afghan people once again will prove catastrophic, especially the West.

As an Afghan, I urge the West to pay attention and ensure that the Afghanistan that led to 9/11 does not become the same Afghanistan of the near future. It may be a landlocked country in Central Asia, but Afghanistan has already proved that it can cause great harm when left to its own devises.

The author is an Afghan who, for reasons of safety, is unnamed.

The Coming Disaster in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

A comparison of recommendations for multilateral diplomacy and sanctions written in 2007 and 2023 offer no evidence of success. Experts now say Tehran is within a few months of several working atom bombs, and a year or two at most from having nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Israel and the European Union.

Israel’s bombings of plutonium-producing reactors under construction in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 are simpler examples of how to regain the initiative in civil defense—via prevention of nuclear attack to begin with. Iran’s underground nuclear weapon facilities at Natanz and Furdow should be neutralized with GBU57-A/B ground-penetrator ordnance, which are necessary to wreck their delicate centrifuges and cave in their adits (entrances).

Sanctions and diplomacy failed to stop North Korea from getting the bomb. Words and tighter sanctions will no longer work on Iran. Iran is a disruptive, warmongering, rogue state. Its repressive autocratic regime is entrenched.

Iran is controlled by a radical sect that believes killing perceived enemies is a sure route to Paradise. Iran’s leaders promise to “destroy Israel forever.”

The risk calculus, were Iran to field nuclear arms, would present the US, and Israel, especially, with something worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis. A nuclear-armed Iran is more intolerable than a nuclear-armed Cuba in 1962. The conditions favorable for a successful naval quarantine of Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the decks of cargo ships going to Cuba, do not apply to Iran.

It is unwise to look to nuclear deterrence against a nuclear-armed and radically hostile Iran to solve the problem, given their extremist ideology. Keeping nuclear weapons far away from bad actors is vital to effective nuclear counterterrorism.

Both Russia and China have separatist problems—including terrorists who might have or might develop Iran connections. Their best interests are aligned with the US and Israel in this instance. This is similar for Israel’s Arab neighbors. They should all want Tehran’s nuclear weapons program permanently terminated. Yet they stay on the sidelines, believing this is a Western problem.

North Korea shows that once a rogue state fields nuclear warheads on missiles, voluntary denuclearization becomes impossible. The US missed the opportunity to prevent the Kim regime from fielding a now-expanding nuclear arsenal.

As Iran’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei surely realizes, “Israel is a one-bomb country” because of its small size. This means that a single nuclear weapon could devastate any of Israel’s major cities.

The Kim regime played several American presidents while North Korea came to own dozens of nuclear missiles threatening South Korea, Japan, and, now, the continental United States. The ayatollahs are probably playing a similar game. Hamas’s attack could be Tehran’s premeditated sleight of hand to buy the little time they need to go nuclear.

Iran’s latest threats to attack Israel’s nuclear facilities and finish their own atom bomb, should Israel attack Iran’s nuclear assets, has unacceptable odds of being more Tehran double-talk while Iran’s covert weapons work presses forward. Intel that such worked ceased—like the nonexistent or ignored “intel” before September 11, 2001, and October 7, 2023—might be, quite literally, fatally flawed.

A clandestine approach to building fission weapons underground might be beyond already overstretched Mossad and CIA abilities to detect. Typical intel lapses, bureaucratic sluggishness, and political paralysis within and between concerned countries could get millions killed.

Barely 4 percent of the ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel got through the layered multinational defenses defending Israel on April 13. But with further attrition of interceptors and less help from the outside being possible over the next year, one atom bomb might reach Israeli soil. Missile defenses alone are not the answer. An Iranian bomb could instead be delivered covertly, by a ship or a truck…or a camel…or mule.

A nuclear attack is likely to take place without warning. The heat and overpressure from an air blast over Tel Aviv would prove devastating. A ground burst could blanket Israel’s cities and towns with fallout.

It would be better and wiser to fight a larger regional conventional war now than a limited nuclear war in the Middle East in the months or years ahead. Yet more “mowing the grass,” or reticent watchful waiting, are short-term non-answers.

As a Department of State spokesman recently said, “Iran has no credible civilian justification for enrichment up to sixty percent.” Iran has already crossed an unacceptable red line. As Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently said, “Israel will do whatever it needs to defend itself.”

Israel does not need more lectures about restraint. Israel needs to prevent nuclear annihilation at the hands of Islamic terrorists certain their religious obligation requires them to strike with whatever deadly weapons they possess.

Joe Buff is a senior fellow for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran Shall Not Have the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.