An inherently political phenomenon, terrorism is concerned with balances of power and the use of violence to achieve ideological and political aims. Though political goals influence the strategy of violent Islamic fundamentalists, the religious component remains the most important motivator for its agents and leaders. This makes that type of terrorism especially deadly and difficult to combat. Even seven years after the most recent wave of attacks from ISIS, Islamic terrorism is still the most prevalent type of terrorism threatening Europe, Africa, and Asia. In Latin America, Hezbollah is the only originally Islamist terrorist organization present.

Hezbollah was born during the Lebanese Civil War, which broke out in 1975 as a group of Shiite Muslims took up arms against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. Under the sponsorship of Iran, this militia would attack the barracks of the coalition forces in Beirut with more than three hundred causalities.

Hezbollah’s 1985 manifesto called for the destruction of the Israeli state, the expulsion of Western powers from Lebanon, and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader. By the late 1980s, Hezbollah established operations in Colombia, the tri-border area (between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), and, later, Venezuela. Hezbollah claims credit for attacks against an Israeli Embassy (1992) and a Jewish community center (1994) in Argentina.

Latin America’s recent history of violent revolutions and regime change shows why the region is particularly ripe for extremist movements. When Fidel Castro entered Havana, Cuba, on January 1, 1959, he imposed a type of repressive regime that was seen as a model by socialist movements on the continent. In the years that followed Castro’s victory and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba became the center of the “good” guerrilla fighter. Asymmetric warfare proliferated across Latin America. The Shining Path organization from Peru relied on terror tactics that included: bombings, targeted assassinations, and guerrilla raids.

In these environments, death became romanticized through public executions commonly seen in the cartels, enabling Hezbollah to find considerable sympathy in many Latin American countries. Today, the group uses the region as a breeding ground for illicit drug trafficking and money laundering. Weak border enforcement and flawed authorities create fertile soil for Lebanese traffickers to move goods northward and southward, from Colombia’s coca fields to Argentina and Brazil’s ports.

Hezbollah activity in Peru, where the Shining Path continues drug trafficking operations, proves that the group also relies on local means to spread its influence. The center of the connection between the Shining Path and Hezbollah is in the small rural town of Abancay, where large parts of the population are converted Muslims and declared members of the Peruvian Hezbollah Party. In October 2014, a Lebanese man was arrested in connection to a plot against Israelis and Jews in Lima. According to law enforcement, he received assistance from the Shining Path to enter the country for this plot.

The State Department designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization in 1997, but Latin America was slow to follow: Argentina in 2019, Paraguay in 2019, and Colombia in 2020. As of 2024, these three countries remain the only states in South America to designate Hezbollah a terrorist entity, though several Central American states also accept Hezbollah as a violent extremist group.

In April 2024, Argentina’s Court of Cassation declared Hezbollah and Iran responsible for the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center. Despite thirty years of setbacks from the court, the tide is turning against Iran and its proxies. However, Argentina still finds itself in tricky situations involving planes and passengers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) while Venezuela’s overt relationship with Iran deepens.

On July 12, 2024, Argentina took its recent progress even further and designated Hamas a terrorist organization, the first Latin American country to do so. In today’s era of intense globalization, conflicts can be both regional and global. If Argentina’s actions are anything to go by, the influence of Iran as one of the world’s leading sponsors of terrorism may be on the decline. The path to do so, however, is far from linear. As Iran continues to sit on the brink of becoming a nuclear-armed state, the country’s reign of terror will not end.

General John F. Kelly, former Commander of US Southern Command, expertly warned, “Iran’s involvement in the Western Hemisphere is a matter for concern.” Only naïveté would support a belief that unchecked terrorist operations in Latin America will never spread north, when the incentives to do so only grow. A unified continent may be the best counter to Iran and its proxies, but the complexities of this issue prevent any easy or immediate avenues for this goal. As with many of the world’s challenges, solutions must first begin with knowledge of the problem.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral student at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Alexis Schlotterback is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Terrorism in Latin America: We Should Be Paying Attention was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts to conventionally deter Iran failed with Iran-inspired fighting spreading from Gaza to the Red Sea, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Recently, three American soldiers were killed and 34 wounded in a drone attack by Iran-backed militants in northeastern Jordan, according to US Central Command. The Pentagon has reported more than 160 attacks by Iranian-linked militia groups on American bases and forces in the Middle East since Israel was attacked on October 7, 2023. These actions place immense pressure upon President Joe Biden to strike the sovereign territory of Iran, which Iranian leaders may view as an act of war.

Moreover, recent political decisions render the threatened use of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program impotent. In February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded President Trump’s United Nations (UN) sanctions restoration. This was followed by President Biden’s decision to release $6 billion “in exchange for the release of five Americans detained in Iran” and another $10 billion in a sanctions waiver that grants Iran access to money from Iraq in exchange for electricity purchases.

Recently, Maj Gen Hossein Salami, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, said the country is not seeking war with America, but is not afraid of it either. Iran’s aggressive behavior certainly lends credence to the statement. Iran is emboldened by its allies and empowered by its proxies. This, of course, is backstopped by an eerie sense of confidence that Iran may soon become a nuclear power. In May of 2022, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that “Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb,” with a uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent that had grown four times in just 90 days.

David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and founder of the US Institute for Science and International Security, said that if Iran continues producing enriched uranium at the same rate, the regime will have enough weapons grade material to make 12 nuclear bombs within five months. Meanwhile, Iran successfully launched three satellites into space using a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket. This achievement undoubtedly accelerates Iran’s ability to perfect and field a future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), likely the regime’s preferred nuclear weapon delivery system.

The United States is now experiencing coordinated aggression. The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review warns, “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”

Furthermore, the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board recently warned in their Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity that the United States must be concerned that adversary states could engage in opportunistic acts if or when the United States is engaged in other conflicts.

The bipartisan America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also advised that the possibility of opportunistic or simultaneous multi-state aggression should no longer be construed as improbable. According to the report, “The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future cooperative two-theater aggression.” Opportunistic aggression can translate to other hostile states like Iran and North Korea in league with Russia and China if they perceive American limitations in capability, capacity, or the will to fight with enough ferocity as to induce the fear to attack in the first place.

It appears that Iran is taking advantage of an already beleaguered United States that continues to support Israel in its war with Iranian-backed Hamas; exports arms, munitions, and intelligence to Ukraine; deters a hostile North Korea; and must endeavor to discourage Iran’s top oil importer (China) from invading Taiwan. All of these “fronts” are collectively testing American diplomacy, burdening the American taxpayer, challenging the American defense industrial base, negatively impacting military readiness, and now producing American casualties.

Killing Americans is a clear escalation and yet another indication that Iran remains undeterred by the current threat of American power. These acts are timed to take advantage of an overburdened America and are designed to frustrate American efforts within the region and ultimately convince the United States to abandon its Middle East interests and allies. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s untimely proclamation on September 29, 2023, that “[t]he Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades” was a complete misreading of the region.

Successful deterrence requires the consistent application of power. Deterrence messaging must not be muddled or muted. It must be clear, powerful, and credible. How is this done?

First, the Biden administration must immediately end sanctions relief of Iran. The United States can never fund its adversaries.

Second, the United States must take a systematic approach to eliminate the weapons, command and control, and supplies of Iranian proxies. They must not be allowed to threaten American and allied forces across the region.

Third, the United States must credibly communicate through strength by moving nuclear assets closer to the region. The United States seems content to use ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) to deter North Korea. An SSBN in the Arabian Sea would communicate a similar deterrence message.

Fourth, America must heed the warnings of opportunistic multi-state aggression and prepare a robust capability to address this very real and demonstrated threat. To do otherwise risks abandoning regional allies in conflict.

Fifth, America must not attack Iranian targets within sovereign Iranian territory unless President Biden and Congress are ready to declare war. What may be a regional conflict for the United States is a fight for survival for the Mullahs in Tehran.

Iran and its proxies are not deterred from attacking American forces, whether motivated by opportunistic aggression or existential circumstances. It is time to create a real sense of fear within the Iranian leadership. They must dread economic isolation, the destruction of proxies, and potential attack on what Iran holds most valuable—themselves and their nuclear facilities.

However, unless prepared to declare war, the United States must limit its retaliation to targets outside sovereign Iran. To attack Iranian soil would be a clear indication that deterrence has failed and could potentially lead to an all-out war. Restoring deterrence after such an event would come at a much higher cost.

Deterrence aims to make the adversary afraid to attack by creating a preferable condition of war avoidance. The goal is to convince the adversary that maintaining a peaceful status quo is the best option. Starting a war to prevent another war is a bad strategy, and it does not qualify as deterrence.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterrence Is Failing in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.