<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:Iron Dome &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/iron-dome/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/iron-dome/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 10:31:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tahir Mahmood Azad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 12:14:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air superiority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alliance management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asymmetric capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Attrition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ballistic missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cost-effective interception]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cost-exchange dilemma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cruise missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defensive inventories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[directed energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[directed energy weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extended deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Golden Dome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iron Dome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[non-state actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Patriot]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision strike]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resource allocation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[saturation attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic adaptation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic attrition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[THAAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unmanned aerial systems]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32585</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 16, 2026 The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/">Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 16, 2026</em></p>
<p>The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.</p>
<p><strong>The Cost-Exchange Problem</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>At the operational level, Iran&#8217;s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-defense-crossroads">noted</a>, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4086300/">development</a> of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.</p>
<p><strong>Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model</strong></p>
<p>The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran&#8217;s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.</p>
<p>The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran&#8217;s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.</p>
<p><strong>Implications for American Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.</p>
<p>The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News <a href="https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/#:~:text=Real%2Dtime%20video%20feeds%20from,NATO%20and%20the%20Strategic%20Imperative">reported</a>, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.</p>
<p>There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Iran&#8217;s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a</p>
<p>deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics &amp; International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Irans-Missile-Drone-Campaign-and-Its-Implications-for-the-United-States-Deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="194" height="54" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 194px) 100vw, 194px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/">Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:09:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arrow-2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arrow-3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ballistic missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bombing raid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[C4ISR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[David’s Sling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Friedrich Merz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IRGC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iron Beam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iron Dome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[maritime security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mission Delta 4]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear facilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Patriot]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regime change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shia hegemony]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SIGINT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[situational awareness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syrian leadership.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[THAAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Türkiye]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Space Force]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31265</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Since its inception, the Iranian regime (1979) has terrorized and subjugated the Middle East and killed far too many Americans. For nearly 50 years, Iran successfully used a combination of proxies and agents of influence within the US and Europe to deter the West. The regime also built a credible missile program with thousands of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/">Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution">inception</a>, the Iranian regime (1979) has terrorized and subjugated the Middle East <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/19/iranian-and-iranian-backed-attacks-against-americans-1979-present/">and killed far too many Americans</a>. For nearly 50 years, Iran successfully used a combination of proxies and agents of influence within the US and Europe to deter the West. The regime also built a credible missile program with thousands of ballistic missiles, useful for blackmail. Iran’s effort to deceive the West about its nuclear ambitions was not allowed to last indefinitely.</p>
<p>By mid-June 2025, after years of preparation, the Israelis, in one fell swoop, destroyed half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, destroyed some nuclear facilities, and assassinated Iran’s leading nuclear scientists and the leadership of the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-poised-for-more-power-7ed0ba63">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</a> (IRGC). Then on June 23, 2025, a pre-dawn bombing raid <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LSfs58cGx1U">ordered by US President Donald Trump</a> took out of commission the hard-to-crack nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.</p>
<p>Beyond adding to Israel’s capabilities with American B2 bombers loaded with GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o">bunkers busters</a>, the bombing cemented American leadership in dealing with the Iran problem. A review of joint Israel-US capabilities helps explain how deterrence in the region is returning and what to expect next.</p>
<p>Since the October 7, 2023, massacre of Israelis by Hamas, an Iranian proxy, Israeli intelligence and military units, all backed by superior defense technology, methodically destroyed Iranian capabilities and supporters. Iran’s “<a href="https://jiss.org.il/en/amidror-irans-ring-of-fire/">Ring of Fire</a>” utterly failed to achieve Iran’s strategic aims.</p>
<p>Israeli and American <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/us-should-leverage-middle-east-partners-to-boost-space-capabilities/">space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</a> enabled early warning, target verification, and battle damage assessment. Israel relied on a precision-strike doctrine that is supported by systems like the <a href="https://www.gov.il/en/pages/ofek-13-satellite-successfully-launched-into-space-29-mar-2023">Ofek</a>, <a href="https://ts2.tech/en/inside-israels-space-power-satellites-services-and-the-secret-strength-of-the-israel-space-agency/">AMOS</a>, and <a href="https://www.eoportal.org/satellite-missions/eros-b">Eros-B</a> space assets. Israel maintained surveillance for dominance above Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Iran merely <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-quest-for-middle-east-hegemony/">linked its space program</a> to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">IRGC</a>.</p>
<p>With multi-layer sensor fusion, Israel integrates <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/topic/eitan-uav/">Eitan unmanned aerial vehicles</a> (UAV), <a href="https://www.iai.co.il/p/elw-2090">ELW-2090 airborne warning and control systems</a>, and ground-based radars like the <a href="https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/radars/air-defense-radars/green-pine-elm-2080-elm-2080s">EL/M-2080 Green Pine</a> with satellite data into a national and regional situational awareness (SA) web, shaping strikes and missile defense prioritization. Space-derived situational awareness enables real-time assessment of missile launches, UAV swarm attacks, or asymmetric maritime threats by Iran and proxies operating from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.</p>
<p>Cyber intelligence, signal intelligence (<a href="https://www.elbitsystems.com/land/land-ew-sigint">SIGINT</a>), and electronic warfare form another layer. In the conflict, Israel <a href="https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/directorates/c4i-and-cyber-defense-directorate/c4i-and-cyber-defense-directorate/">command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems</a> pit <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-820689">Unit 8200</a> against <a href="https://ir.usembassy.gov/designating-iranian-cyber-officials/">IRGC</a> affiliated cyber units.</p>
<p>Israel’s missile shield includes <a href="https://www.rafael.co.il/system/iron-dome/">Iron Dome</a>, <a href="https://www.rafael.co.il/system/medium-long-range-defense-davids-sling/">David’s Sling</a>, and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-running-low-on-arrow-interceptors-us-burning-through-its-systems-too-wsj/">Arrow-2/Arrow-3</a>. They combine to create a web of coverage. Arrow’s high-altitude, long-range interceptors tackle <a href="https://news.usni.org/2025/06/18/report-to-congress-on-irans-ballistic-missile-programs">Iranian ballistic missiles</a> such as <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-launches-first-strike-isreal-mach-13-fattah-hypersonic">Fattah</a>, <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/">Shahab</a>, and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/20/new-missile-enters-israel-iran-conflict-what-we-know-about-tehrans-sejil">Sejil</a>. <a href="https://www.rafael.co.il/system/iron-beam/">Iron Beam</a> laser defense, under development, aims to address low-cost, high-volume threats like UAVs and small rockets.</p>
<p>Israeli capabilities for missile defense, early warning, C4, and interoperability are integrated with US <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/">Central Command</a> and the systems of the Gulf States. The US supports Arrow and David’s Sling. <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/aegis-combat-system.html">Aegis</a> ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area defense (<a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/thaad.html">THAAD</a>) systems in the region share radar feeds. <a href="https://www.spaceforce.mil/about-us/fact-sheets/article/2197746/space-based-infrared-system/">American space-based infra-red system satellites</a> provide missile-launch detection.</p>
<p><a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">Bahrain hosts the US Navy</a> and supports regional <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/insights/cards/c4isr-military-nervous-system/">C4ISR</a>, and has growing maritime security ties with Israel. The US expanded its Saudi Arabian basing in <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-exploring-new-bases-saudi-arabia-counter-iran">Tabuk</a> to feed into the regional missile defense picture. The United Arab Emirates <a href="https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/exclusive-united-arab-emirates-boosts-air-defense-capabilities-with-m-sam-ii-integrating-with-us-pac-3-and-thaad">enables THAAD, Patriot (PAC-3), radar integration, and air picture sharing</a> with the US and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates-israelpalestine/uae-israel">Israel</a>. Jordan, the United Kingdom, and France also contribute to defensive actions during missile and drone attacks.</p>
<p>Iranian targets and their proxies have nowhere to hide. The <a href="https://www.spoc.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/3878161/mission-delta-4-missile-warning">US Space Force’s Space Operations Command Mission Delta 4</a> identifies and tracks threats. It did so during the <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/space-force-guardians-missile-warning-iran-israel/">April 2024 </a>and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/space-force-guardians-second-iranian-missile-attack/">October 2024</a> Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to share intelligence, Mission Delta 4 ensures no missile launch ever catches America or her allies and partners by surprise.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/03/16/israel-super-capabilities-in-space/">A space-enabled Israel</a>, integrated with Gulf State operations, eliminated Iranian air defenses, triggered covert operations inside Iran, and launched targeted bombings and assassinations. The American bombing topped these other efforts. Israel, as the military strong horse, irreversibly altered the regional balance of power, possibly ushering in the demise of a threatening Iranian Shia hegemony—an objective shared by Sunni Arab Gulf States.</p>
<p>Regime change was never a stated war aim but was an anticipated consequence if it occurred. It did not. The surviving Shia Islamist leadership and IRGC are now engaged in repression and remain capable of inflicting much suffering on both the region and Iranians.</p>
<p>It is unclear to which extent proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias can still attack Israel and American assets in the region. Military outcomes, though, are not the sole factors defining the Iranian endgame. The Iranian <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/us-iran-talks-unlikely-to-succeed-absent-a-military-strike/">taqiyya-driven regime</a> and its Shia hegemony ideology are down, but not out. Their nefarious ideological influence can persist <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geostrategic-mind-of-iran/">around the Gulf, as far as Yemen and Africa, and beyond</a>.</p>
<p>Considering the cost of inaction and a failure to reinstate deterrence, eradicating a threat to the homeland, Middle East bases, and Gulf allies means the effort was worth it. If the conflict drags on, the costs will rise. Disruption of maritime traffic and oil markets could bring its predictable cohort of economic disruptions. Terrorism around the globe is <em>déjà vu</em>.</p>
<p>In the words of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/germanys-merz-says-israel-is-doing-the-dirty-work-for-all-of-us-by-countering-iran/">Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us</a>.” Depending on the roles the new Syrian leadership and a resurgent Türkiye play, <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">the Iranian endgame</a> may take different forms.</p>
<p>Yes, President Trump decisively <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/">played the hand he was dealt</a>. But there are many more moves left in this game. The best moves may be still to come.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/DETERRING_IRAN_ChrisB_2025_0621_.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="248" height="69" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/">Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:23:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EAR Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms control agreements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biden administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Budapest Memorandum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CBM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christian Science Monitor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cold war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional-nuclear integration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elbridge Colby]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Estonia intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethical dilemmas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extended deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical shifts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[INF Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iron Dome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military buildup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minuteman III]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missileers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mutual assured destruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New START]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear arms control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear arms race]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear command and control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear deterrence credibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear deterrence system]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear escalation ladder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear force execution policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear triad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear umbrella]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear warfighting force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear weapons development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear winter]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear winter propaganda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Posture Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reagan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian threat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SDI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SecDef Hegseth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[self-reliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Senator McConnell]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sentinel program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Development Agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tax legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ted Postol]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US security policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-ROK deterrent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30161</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats. Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats. The House and Senate have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="answer_copyable_21811e0e-71c9-41c9-9188-3b92cf83bbe7" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The House and Senate have added $100-150 billion over ten years to defense, focusing on expanding the Navy, strengthening the defense industrial base, and modernizing strategic nuclear forces.</div>
<p>​<br />
SecDef Hegseth seeks an additional $50 billion for top priorities, excluding nuclear deterrence from budget cuts.</p>
<p>The report highlights the importance of concurrent modernization work at the three ICBM bases, which could save billions.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>It also discusses the U.S. Air Force missileers&#8217; critical role in nuclear deterrence, the ethical and psychological aspects of their job, and the challenges of retaining diverse personnel.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The Christian Science Monitor provides an in-depth look at the missileers&#8217; responsibilities and the evolving nuclear landscape.</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Regarding North Korea, USAF General Jason Armagost emphasized that the U.S. can respond overwhelmingly to a North Korean ICBM attack, underscoring the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrence system.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>The report also touches on the potential for arms control negotiations with Russia and China, with President Trump expressing a desire for &#8220;denuclearization.&#8221;</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>However, the feasibility of such agreements remains uncertain, given the geopolitical complexities and the need for the U.S. to maintain a competitive edge in military capabilities.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p><strong>MUST READ: </strong> The most awe-inspiring piece of the report is about  &#8220;RESPONSIBILITY&#8221; from the Christian Science Monitor, dated February 14, 2025, which provides an in-depth look at the lives and duties of U.S. Air Force missileers stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div id="answer_copyable_ba69641a-49fa-483c-9f2d-eeba74404026" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-30165" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png" alt="" width="341" height="228" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png 470w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-300x200.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-360x240.png 360w" sizes="(max-width: 341px) 100vw, 341px" /></p>
<ul>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It highlights their critical role in nuclear deterrence, the gravity of their mission, and the personal and ethical complexities they face.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article follows missileers during their 24-hour shifts, emphasizing their readiness and strict operational protocols.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It also explores the mental burden and moral dilemmas they encounter, particularly in the context of faith.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The piece touches on the historical context of missileers, their continued relevance, and the growing nuclear threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">Additionally, it discusses the challenges of attracting and retaining personnel, especially women and minorities, within this demanding career field.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article underscores the human element of nuclear deterrence, the operational challenges of aging systems, and the evolving nuclear landscape.</li>
</ul>
<p>Overall, the report underscores the need for robust defense investments, the challenges of modernizing nuclear forces, and the geopolitical threats posed by adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="answer_copyable_21811e0e-71c9-41c9-9188-3b92cf83bbe7" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<div></div>
</div>
</div>
<div><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-of-Week-of-2-17^^.Prepared-by-Peter-Huessy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="346" height="96" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 346px) 100vw, 346px" /></a></div>
<div></div>
<div id="answer_copyable_21811e0e-71c9-41c9-9188-3b92cf83bbe7" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p>​</p>
</div>
</div>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christopher Stone]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2025 13:04:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Deterrence & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Race]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASAT weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christopher Stone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hard power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[homeland security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iron Dome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Missile Defense Agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Institute for Deterrence Studies. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pentagon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space debris]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Development Agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space-borne attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpaceX]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Defense Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic stability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30080</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, opponents of missile defenses published editorials in several outlets accusing the Trump administration of “conjuring” up an “arms race” that will severely damage “strategic stability by proposing an Iron Dome for America. This view is ill informed at best and severely dangerous at worst. There are several reasons this is true in the great [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/">Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, opponents of missile defenses published editorials in several outlets accusing the Trump administration of “<a href="https://spacenews.com/hubble-bubble-toil-and-trouble-stirring-up-an-arms-race-in-space/">conjuring” up an “arms race” that will severely damage “strategic stability</a> by proposing an Iron Dome for America. This view is ill informed at best and severely dangerous at worst. There are several reasons this is true in the great power competition era we find ourselves in.</p>
<p>First, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/the-iron-dome-for-america/">president’s executive order</a> directing the deployment of an active defense against missile and space-borne attacks is not the starting point for an arms race. The fact of the matter is, the Chinese and Russians started an arms race over a decade ago and recently accelerated it with <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/10/24/china-leading-rapid-expansion-of-nuclear-arsenal-pentagon-says/">their “breakout” in nuclear missiles deployments</a> as well as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-95-russias-nuclear-forces-have-been-modernised-2024-02-23/">expansion and modernization of long-range strike platforms</a> (to include fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.</p>
<p>These expansions in offensive nuclear/space forces were not because America’s space and nuclear forces are too strong, but because they are too weak. The American <a href="https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile">nuclear enterprise is acknowledged to be “atrophied,”</a> and the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/16/us-space-force-needs-more-to-effectively-deter-win-wars/">Space Force is not prepared to address such threats</a> and incapable of addressing the threats posed by adversary space forces.</p>
<p>American vulnerability to homeland attack and, by extension, the nation’s critical space infrastructure, invites these threats. The US is delinquent in its duty to protect citizens by accepting a passive, hostage-style approach and labeling it “strategic stability.”</p>
<p>Second, detractors of homeland missile defense suggest that America is to blame for provoking China and Russia’s build-up. They are more concerned about space-based interceptors creating space debris than the impact of limited or mass attack upon the American homeland.</p>
<p>The US is the leader in advocating for the mitigation of debris generation, while <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/11/29/russia-produces-more-space-debris-than-any-other-country-a30053">China and Russia are the two biggest offenders</a>. To think that these two adversary nations with <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/saltzman-chinas-asat-test-was-pivot-point-in-space-operations/">kinetic ASAT capabilities and the political will to use</a> them, despite debris generation, are only responding to US activity, shows a lack of understanding of these adversaries and their strategy. Lest Americans forget, both China and Russia see the United States as having more to lose from conflict in space than they do.</p>
<p>Third, opponents of Iron Dome for America believe that “real security” does not come from a credible hard power, but from “arms control, diplomacy and shared risk reduction.” While these are noble ideas, the historical record shows that arms control is often one-sided, with Russia cheating on every single arms control agreement it has ever signed and China showing no interest in anything other than American disarmament. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-un-resolution-space-nuclear-weapons-satellites/">UN votes on norms of behavior have not changed the situation one bit</a>. China and Russia regularly exploit <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4443781-history-shows-that-no-ceasefire-or-treaty-with-russia-can-be-trusted/">weakness</a>. Iron Dome America seeks to remove this vulnerability from the equation. As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently stated correctly, “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4068503/hegseth-lauds-us-poland-alliance-reemphasizes-call-for-nato-countries-to-increa/">Diplomacy is important, talk is important, [and] negotiations are important,” Hegseth said. “But, ultimately, beans and bullets and tanks and helicopters and hard power still [matter].”</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Finally, they argue that the system being pursued “won’t work.” This argument fails to understand that the reason American ballistic missile defenses are so limited is mainly due to policy restraints and less about technology. Missile defense technologies, such as those proposed in the Strategic Defense Initiative, were not mature in the 1980s, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3743501/defense-officials-say-continued-investments-in-missile-defense-are-critical-ami/">but four decades later, numerous technologies are more advanced</a>.</p>
<p>Also, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-spacex-lowered-costs-and-reduced-barriers-to-space-112586">The high cost of launch, for example, is drastically lower today than it was four decades ago because of efforts of companies like SpaceX</a>. This single company demonstrated the capacity to launch hundreds of satellites a year, if not thousands in the <a href="https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/spacexs-big-year-heres-every-new-record-and-feat-elon-musks-space-company-achieved-in-2024">same number of launches it took thirty years for the Space Shuttle to fly</a>.</p>
<p>Today, the idea of having “space-based interceptors” does not mean the United States must place missiles or laser cannons in space. There are many ways to pursue this effort in ways that were not conceivable when Ronald Reagan envisioned a space-based missile defense. Agencies like the Missile Defense Agency and Space Development Agency are pursuing numerous defensive layers as mentioned in the President’s Executive Order. All will collectively aid the system in protecting the homeland from boost to terminal phases of flight.</p>
<p>Iron Dome for America may not stop every missile launched at the United States, but fielding some measure of defense is better than simply ignoring the problem and hoping that good will prevail. History shows that idealism is all too often a key factor in the onset of war. Nuclear war is one Americans cannot afford to lose and should never be satisfied with leaving to chance.</p>
<p>Iron Dome for America is not just an idea, it is a requirement. The nation must get it right in order to ensure a more safe and secure home for Americans and the world.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Pentagon. The views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect those of his employer or the United States government. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Iron-Dome-America-is-Not-the-Threat-to-Peace-Chinese-and-Russian-Nuclear-and-Space-Force-Build-Up-Is.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="320" height="89" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 320px) 100vw, 320px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/">Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/iron-dome-america-is-not-a-threat-to-peace/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2025 12:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EAR Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Administration Developments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Force Secretary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[B-21 raider]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chris Yeaw.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congressional Developments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elbridge Colby]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy independence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extended deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[flexible response]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Frank Kendall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[General Kevin Chilton]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gennady Gatilov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geostrategic Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Zero Proposals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[House Budget Committee]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICBM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iranian security threat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iron Dome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jill Hruby]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kevin Chilton]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kim Jong Un]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marco Rubio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mark Rutte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mark Schneider]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[massive retaliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michaela Dodge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minuteman III]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile shield]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multipolar nuclear powers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Institute for Deterrent Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Navy Secretary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIDS seminar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NPT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear balance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear C3BM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear deterrence mythologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear force reductions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear implications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear mythologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear warheads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peter Hegseth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[POTUS Authority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Presidential Nuclear Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia Defense Budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian aggression]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian military spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SALT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[secretary of defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Secretary of State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sentinel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[slcm-n]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[START]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[theater nuclear weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Triad Symposium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US economic policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Nuclear Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USAF]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29937</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025 Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies Key Takeaways Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies</strong></p>
<p><strong><u>Key Takeaways</u></strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia:</strong> Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Defense Leadership Changes:</strong> Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.</li>
<li><strong>Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments:</strong> Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.</li>
<li><strong>Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities:</strong> Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran&#8217;s growing missile capability.</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission:</strong> NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance&#8217;s credibility.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates:</strong> Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>International Developments</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Russia&#8217;s military spending will increase to <strong>13.5 trillion rubles</strong>, estimated at <strong>7-8% of GDP</strong>, its highest post-Soviet military budget.</li>
<li>Significant investments in <strong>modernized nuclear and conventional forces</strong> to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.</li>
<li>Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Intelligence sources indicate <strong>Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China</strong>, raising alarms among Western security analysts.</li>
<li>Iran continues <strong>uranium enrichment</strong>, prompting <strong>warnings from the UN</strong> about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>China &amp; Russia’s Nuclear Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Reports predict that by <strong>2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads</strong>, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.</li>
<li>Concerns grow over <strong>China’s accelerated nuclear development</strong> and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Escalation Risks in Space Warfare</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>RAND Corporation study</strong> warns that <strong>Russia may escalate conflicts in space</strong> early due to its <strong>heightened fears of a U.S. first strike</strong>.</li>
<li>The study underscores Moscow’s <strong>increasing risk tolerance</strong> and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte</strong> warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.</li>
<li>U.S. extended deterrence remains <strong>under scrutiny</strong>, with debates over whether the <strong>Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The <strong>U.S. Air Force confirms</strong> that the <strong>Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider</strong> will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.</li>
<li>Discussions continue over potential <strong>mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft</strong> to ensure nuclear survivability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>President <strong>Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system</strong>—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.</li>
<li>Critics call it <strong>overly ambitious</strong>, but proponents argue that it is essential to <strong>counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Events</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Speakers:</strong> Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) &amp; Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).</li>
<li><strong>Topic:</strong> Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>4-star USAF officer</strong> will serve as the featured speaker.</li>
<li>Expected discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Conclusion</u></strong></p>
<p>The <strong>ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025</strong>, highlights key developments in <strong>U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues</strong>. With <strong>Russia&#8217;s increasing military budget, Iran&#8217;s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion</strong>, the U.S. faces <strong>a growing multipolar nuclear environment</strong>. Discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities</strong> will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming <strong>TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events</strong> will provide further insights into these critical security matters.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-Ear-for-the-week-of-January-23.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
