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		<title>The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed El Doh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 12:29:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32698</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 18, 2026 (Originally written in April 2026) The failure of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/">The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 18, 2026 (Originally written in April 2026)</em></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/12/jd-vance-says-no-deal-us-iran-pakistan-talks-islamabad">failure</a> of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive pressure, military signaling, and elevated risk of miscalculation. This risk is driven by the threat Iran continues to pose to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and by its remaining ballistic capabilities, which allow it to erratically target neighboring Arab states and regional U.S. allies.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the announcement of a U.S.-led maritime <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/us-blockade-iran-threatens-gulf-shutdown-ceasefire-on-brink-despite-trumps-war-nearly-over-claim-1.500508304">blockade</a> over Iranian ports fundamentally alters the operational and strategic landscape aimed at confining the Iranian threat. The main question now is no longer whether tensions will rise, they already have, but whether the current trajectory leads toward controlled escalation, negotiated recalibration, or systemic full-scale conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Structural Drivers of Escalation</strong></p>
<p>At the core of the U.S.-Iran negotiations lies a set of structural but irreconcilable objectives. The U.S. continues to frame its demands around three pillars: curtailment of Iran’s nuclear development program, limitations on ballistic missile capabilities development, and the rollback of Iran’s regional proxy networks. Iran, on the opposite side, views these elements as essential to regime survival and sovereign deterrence. Accordingly, this is not a negotiation gap; it is a strategic contradiction.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear posture has evolved from a bargaining chip into a core pillar of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) and the regime’s survival. Any perceived concession risks undermining internal legitimacy and external deterrence credibility. Accordingly, ongoing diplomatic negotiations are performative rather than transformative, thus aimed at managing escalation rather than resolving underlying disputes. Additionally, the U.S. decision to impose a maritime blockade represents a calibrated escalation designed to exert economic and psychological pressure without the need to immediately resort back to kinetic operations. However, the strategic implications are profound.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy relies mainly on maritime oil exports. A blockade directly targets this vulnerability, threatening <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAXGoXDQ19Q">revenue</a> streams, which then impacts the domestic stability, in addition to regional influence operations funded through such revenues. From Tehran’s perspective, failure to respond would signal weakness not only to the U.S. but also to its network of non-state groups across the region. This creates a classic escalation dilemma for Iran. On one hand, not responding risks strategic erosion of the IRGC and the current regime’s image. On the other hand, the response risks triggering military confrontation, which Iran cannot withstand. In such conditions, even any Iranian action such as harassment of commercial shipping, or proxy attacks carry a high probability of escalation.</p>
<p>Another key driver for the escalation is the pre-positioned military capabilities. Unlike previous crises, the current environment is characterized by pre-positioned military assets and operational readiness on both sides. U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in the Middle East are already <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/15/us-sending-10000-more-troops-to-middle-east-despite-iran-ceasefire">configured</a> for rapid response operations, while Iran’s IRGC maintains asymmetric capabilities are carefully tailored for maritime disruption, drone attacks, ballistic missile launches, and regional proxy warfare.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Spillover Risks</strong></p>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical geographic variable in this confrontational equation given that one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Iran has long signaled its capability and strategic <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/16/military-advisor-to-iran-s-supreme-leader-threatens-to-sink-us-ships-in-the-strait-of-hormuz_6752475_4.html">intent</a> to disrupt traffic through asymmetric means, including naval mines, drones, and anti-ship missiles. While full closure remains unlikely due to the overwhelming U.S. response it would provoke, disruption has already been taking place via targeted attacks on passing vessels, which is more than enough to deter commercial liners. Even limited interference could generate outsized economic and political effects, particularly for energy-dependent economies. All that said, the Houthis in Yemen remain on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/">standby</a> mode to disrupt the maritime flow via resumption of attacks on vessels passing via Bab-el Mandeb to and from the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Iran’s strategic depth lies not in conventional military parity but in its network of regional proxies. Groups aligned with Tehran, including those in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, provide Iran with operational flexibility. Given Israel’s successful campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah as well as the Iran-backed Iraqi militias preoccupied with the deterrence posed by the U.S. forces, the <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/">Houthis</a> in Yemen remain the final card for Tehran. Intensified maritime threats from Houthi forces in the Red Sea are likely to <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/04/14/amid-focus-on-strait-of-hormuz-experts-sound-warning-on-yemens-houthis-and-red-sea/">reemerge</a> at any moment. This allows Iran to impose costs on U.S. and allied interests without triggering immediate large-scale retaliation. However, the cumulative effect of a multi-chokepoint pressure strategy could compel a broader and internationally supported response.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Calculus: War vs. Controlled Escalation</strong></p>
<p>Some believe that neither the U.S. nor Iran appears to seek full-scale war given that the costs (military, economic, and political) would be immense and unpredictable. For the U.S., a major conflict with Iran would disrupt global energy markets, divert resources from strategic competition with China, and risk regional destabilization affecting key allies in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). For Iran, a continuation of a direct war would expose critical infrastructure to sustained strikes and threaten regime survivability.</p>
<p>The most probable scenario over the next 2–3 weeks is a phase of controlled escalation characterized by maritime harassment incidents in the Gulf, limited proxy attacks, and intensified rhetoric and signaling. This scenario allows both sides to demonstrate resolve while avoiding irreversible steps toward war. However, it is susceptible to disruption by unforeseen incidents at any moment.</p>
<p>An increasingly possible scenario would be one that involves targeted military actions, such as U.S. strikes on IRGC assets or critical infrastructure vs. Iranian retaliatory indiscriminate strikes on U.S. regional allies. Such exchanges would likely be calibrated to avoid full-scale war but could easily escalate if casualties or strategic assets are impacted.</p>
<p>Lastly, a less likely but still possible scenario is the return to productive negotiations, driven by economic pressures including oil market volatility, as well as diplomatic intervention by third parties, including the Gulf states, China, or European actors.</p>
<p>The highest-impact and most consequential scenarios involve a rapid escalation into full-scale conflict, potentially triggered by Iran’s full refusal to give up on its nuclear program or ballistic missile development program. Other triggers for a full-scale conflict would include any major incident in the Strait of Hormuz, high-casualty attacks on U.S. forces, or a direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military assets. Such a conflict would likely expand beyond bilateral engagement, drawing in regional actors and severely disrupting global economic systems.</p>
<p><strong>Key Indicators to Watch</strong></p>
<p>Several indicators are going to be crucial in assessing the trajectory of the ongoing conflict. This includes maritime activity where increased Iranian harassment of shipping continues to take place. Proxy operations are also a critical indicator where the frequency and intensity of proxy attacks, and the Red Sea specifically start to rise. Finally, force posture changes remain one of the key indicators, as they are mostly based on advanced intelligence assessments, which are not available to the public or markets. That said, deployment of additional U.S. and allied assets to the region remains the clearest indicator of how the situation will move forward and provides early signs of shifts from controlled escalation to broader conflict.</p>
<p>For defense strategists, the imperative is clear: preparing for escalation, planning for contingencies across multiple theaters, and achieving consensus that in the current environment, the most dangerous outcomes are not those that are intended but those unintended.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management &#8211; France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/The-Escalation-Trajectory-of-US-Iran-Tensions-After-the-Collapse-of-the-Negotiations.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="205" height="57" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 205px) 100vw, 205px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/">The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jan 2025 13:38:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29859</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an estimated 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza. The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in <a href="https://www.state.gov/anniversary-of-october-7th-attack/#:~:text=Today%2C%20we%20mark%20a%20devastating,of%20Jews%20since%20the%20Holocaust.">approximately</a> 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158206">estimated</a> 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza.</p>
<p>The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-war-ceasefire-tyre-ae002af23c7ec9e19a0cea08fecc9f62">uncertain</a>, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.</p>
<p>In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.</p>
<p>Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/operation-days-of-repentance-how-israels-strike-on-iran-unfolded-13243562">launched</a> Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.</p>
<p>This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/world/middleeast/israel-raid-syria-hezbollah.html">raided</a> an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjynx00hb1g">captured</a> Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.</p>
<p>Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-mideast-wars-israel-7450481f9e42ea5b786c5d672ec382a1">continues</a> to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-11-29/iran-nuclear-proliferation-critical-threat-in-coming-months-french-spy-chief-says">stated</a> that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.</p>
<p>However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.</p>
<p><strong>Degraded Proxy Capabilities</strong></p>
<p>In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.</p>
<p>Israeli operations significantly <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-showed-power-of-f-35s-iran-strikes-uk-admiral-2024-12">degraded</a> Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipJ80yH2BfI">S-300</a>s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.</p>
<p>Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411173173">economic</a> situation of the country as well as the increasing <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147681">repression</a> by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.</p>
<p>Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, <a href="https://manaramagazine.org/2024/11/the-challenges-of-gas-and-electricity-imbalance-in-iran/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20country%20grapples%20with,energy%20deficit%20by%20next%20summer.">energy</a> shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.</p>
<p>That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/29/iran-plans-to-install-6000-centrifuges-to-enrich-uranium-iaea-says">installation</a> of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.</p>
<p>Iran’s foreign minister recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/28/iran-says-it-could-end-ban-on-possessing-nuclear-weapons-if-sanctions-reimposed">stated</a> that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.</p>
<p>The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.</p>
<p>Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411296711">minimal</a> progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-plan-nuclear-weapons-def26f1d">options</a> in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.</p>
<p>Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.</p>
<p>While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.</p>
<p>Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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