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		<title>Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-an-imminent-israeli-strike-on-iran/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 12:22:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31446</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Multiple converging factors point toward a high probability of a renewed and more expansive Israeli strike against Iran within the coming months, most likely between September and October 7, 2025, with residual probability extending into late November or early December. Israel’s strategic imperatives, Iran’s defensive mobilization, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political calculus reinforce the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-an-imminent-israeli-strike-on-iran/">Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Multiple converging factors point toward a high probability of a renewed and more expansive Israeli strike against Iran within the coming months, most likely between September and October 7, 2025, with residual probability extending into late November or early December. Israel’s strategic imperatives, Iran’s defensive mobilization, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political calculus reinforce the likelihood. This is not a singular scenario but rather the anticipated culmination of a phased campaign, already in motion, designed to disrupt its strategic weapons programs, impose lasting operational disadvantage, and neutralize Iran’s regional military network, including those in Lebanon and Yemen.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Drivers</strong></p>
<p>There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/netanyahu-faces-condemnation-over-plan-for-israel-to-take-full-military-control-of-gaza-13408401">Gaza</a> and its persistent pressure on <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-august-4/">disarming</a> Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable <a href="https://irannewsupdate.com/news/infightings/iran-regimes-leadership-split-over-war-or-negotiations-as-sanctions-threat-looms/">rifts</a> in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.</p>
<p>Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.</p>
<p><strong>Operational Indicators of Preparation</strong></p>
<p>Mossad has already <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/ckglkxl2d25o">intensified</a> intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/26/how-israel-launched-attacks-from-inside-iran-to-sow-chaos-during-the-war">within</a> Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.</p>
<p>Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-to-draw-down-reserve-deployments-by-nearly-a-third-amid-soaring-fatigue/">regeneration</a>, given the apparent contradiction between political <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250802-combat-will-continue-without-rest-in-gaza-unless-hostages-are-freed-says-israel-s-army-chief">calls</a> for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.</p>
<p>At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508054597">formation</a> of a National Defense Council under Ali <a href="https://wanaen.com/appointment-of-ali-larijani-as-secretary-of-irans-supreme-national-security-council/">Larijani</a> and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.</p>
<p><strong>Political Leverage and Timing</strong></p>
<p>US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.</p>
<p>Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77584">coordinating</a> with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.</p>
<p><strong>The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept</strong></p>
<p>Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.</p>
<p>However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/15/hezbollah-refuses-to-hand-over-its-weapons-to-lebanese-government">vowed</a> not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.</p>
<p><strong>International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment</strong></p>
<p>Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.</p>
<p>Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.</p>
<p><strong>Forecast and Likely Outcomes</strong></p>
<p>Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.</p>
<p>If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.</p>
<p>While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israels-davids-sling-air-defense-completes-new-upgrade-mc-080725">David’s</a> Sling, and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/israel-moves-to-significantly-accelerate-acquisition-of-more-arrow-interceptors/">Arrow</a> batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.</p>
<p>Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for </em>Global Security Review<em>.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Forecasting-an-Imminent-Israeli-Strike-on-Iran-Strategic-Drivers-and-Operational-Indicators.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-an-imminent-israeli-strike-on-iran/">Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/drawing-a-clear-red-line-bidens-imperative-response-to-iranian-aggression/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/drawing-a-clear-red-line-bidens-imperative-response-to-iranian-aggression/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Feb 2024 12:43:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27187</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the wake of the recent drone attack on January 28, where Iranian proxies killed three American soldiers and injured more than 30, President Joe Biden finds himself at a crucial crossroads in handling relations with Iran. This brazen act of aggression demands a resolute and swift response. The lack of a clear red line [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/drawing-a-clear-red-line-bidens-imperative-response-to-iranian-aggression/">Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the wake of the recent drone attack on January 28, where Iranian proxies <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">killed three American soldiers and injured more than 30</a>, President Joe Biden finds himself at a crucial crossroads in handling relations with Iran. This brazen act of aggression demands a resolute and swift response. The lack of a clear red line only exacerbates the volatility in the region and undermines American deterrence.</p>
<p>The escalating tensions with Iran present a serious problem that cannot be ignored. The <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2024/01/28/deadly-attack-us-troops-middle-east/72388580007/">continued attacks</a> on American troops by Iranian proxies underscores the urgent need for the Biden administration to define and communicate <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/twq/v37i3/f_0032946_26815.pdf">clear red line</a>s to prevent further acts of aggression and protect the lives of American military personnel in the region.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>The Need for Red Lines</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Firstly, the absence of a defined red lines allows Iran to push the boundaries of acceptable behavior without facing substantial consequences. Currently the Biden administration is “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-29/iran-distances-itself-from-us-base-attack-as-biden-urged-to-act?embedded-checkout=true">weighing responses</a>” to the attack. However, red lines were required once the administration entered office. Iran needed a clear picture of aggression’s consequences, especially aggression causing American casualties. This continued lack of clarity from the administration not only undermines the safety of American soldiers but also weakens the credibility of the United States on the international stage. Without a clear stance, there is a risk of further attacks and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/12/us/politics/mideast-war-israel-yemen.html">wider regional conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Secondly, defined red lines serve as a deterrent, signaling to Iran that the United States will not tolerate attacks on its military personnel. Establishing such boundaries is essential to maintaining stability in the region and preventing an escalation that can have <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/12/01/middle-east-conflict-risks-reshaping-the-regions-economies">far-reaching consequences</a>. This sends a powerful message that acts of violence will not go unanswered, fostering a more secure and predictable relationship.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/02/strategic-ambiguity-is-no-longer-prudent-us-policy-taiwan/">ambiguity</a> surrounding American responses can embolden other hostile actors in the region and elsewhere to test the waters. Clear red lines are not only about dealing with Iran but also about deterring other potential aggressors and ensuring that the United States is perceived as steadfast and resolute in defending its interests. The Biden administration must follow through on any violations of red lines to solidify credibility.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>The American Response</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>To address this critical issue, the Biden administration must take decisive action. First, it is imperative to communicate clear and non-negotiable red lines to Iran, making it unequivocally clear that attacks on American soldiers will <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-three-us-servicemembers-were-killed-in-jordan-will-the-us-strike-back-at-iran/#cooper-jordan-drone">trigger severe consequences</a>. Simultaneously, diplomatic engagement with Iran is needed to convey the seriousness of the American position, emphasizing the importance of de-escalation and constructive dialogue—but always backed by the threat of overwhelming violence.</p>
<p>However, to fortify its position and respond effectively to the heightened tensions with Iran, the United States must go beyond diplomatic initiatives and reinforce its military capabilities in the region. The US should <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4269282-us-to-further-increase-military-presence-to-bolster-deterrence-in-middle-east/">bolster its military presence</a>, which serves as both a deterrent and a tangible demonstration of the nation’s commitment to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety of its troops and allies. A visible and formidable American military presence sends a powerful signal, not only to Iran but to the entire region. The United States is prepared to defend its interests and respond decisively to any acts of aggression.</p>
<p>Additionally, the US must respond forcibly to the recent attack. As <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-three-us-servicemembers-were-killed-in-jordan-will-the-us-strike-back-at-iran/#wechsler-jordan-drone">William Wechsler</a> recently argued, it should be done in ways to avoid a wider regional war from occurring. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-three-us-servicemembers-were-killed-in-jordan-will-the-us-strike-back-at-iran/#kroenig-jordan-drone">Matthew Kroenig</a>, however, suggests the United States can incapacitate the Iranian navy. It could conduct strikes on Iranian naval bases or even emulate former President Donald Trump’s approach by targeting Iranian leadership, as demonstrated in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">killing of General Qassem Soleimani</a> in Iraq. Additionally, the Biden administration should consider the option of striking and dismantling Iran’s ability to proliferate nuclear weapons, especially considering American officials believe Iran can build a bomb in roughly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-can-make-fissile-material-bomb-in-about-12-days-us-official-2023-02-28/">twelve days</a>.</p>
<p>Lastly, strengthening alliances with regional partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, etc.) is another pivotal aspect of a comprehensive strategy that the Biden administration should pursue. Solidifying a unified front with its allies and friends in the Middle East fosters a collaborative approach to regional security. Collective efforts enable the sharing of intelligence, joint military exercises, and coordinated responses to potential threats. Such partnerships not only enhance the effectiveness of American actions but also contribute to regional stability by creating a cohesive and united response to aggression from Iran and its proxies.</p>
<p>Ultimately, well-defined red lines, coupled with a robust response to aggression, is essential for safeguarding American lives and maintaining stability in the Middle East. President Biden must seize the opportunity to demonstrate strength, resilience, and a commitment to protecting American interests in the face of escalating threats. If he fails to do so, deterrence will continue to falter, and attacks on American troops will continue to escalate. The stakes are high and clear red lines coupled with strict enforcement is the first step toward ensuring the US protects its interests within the region and enhances the credibility to deter further aggression.</p>
<p><em> </em><em>Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Drawing-a-Clear-Red-Line-Bidens-Imperative-Response-to-Iranian-Aggression.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/drawing-a-clear-red-line-bidens-imperative-response-to-iranian-aggression/">Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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