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	<title>Topic:Iran nuclear program &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed El Doh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 12:29:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32698</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 18, 2026 (Originally written in April 2026) The failure of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/">The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 18, 2026 (Originally written in April 2026)</em></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/12/jd-vance-says-no-deal-us-iran-pakistan-talks-islamabad">failure</a> of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive pressure, military signaling, and elevated risk of miscalculation. This risk is driven by the threat Iran continues to pose to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and by its remaining ballistic capabilities, which allow it to erratically target neighboring Arab states and regional U.S. allies.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the announcement of a U.S.-led maritime <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/us-blockade-iran-threatens-gulf-shutdown-ceasefire-on-brink-despite-trumps-war-nearly-over-claim-1.500508304">blockade</a> over Iranian ports fundamentally alters the operational and strategic landscape aimed at confining the Iranian threat. The main question now is no longer whether tensions will rise, they already have, but whether the current trajectory leads toward controlled escalation, negotiated recalibration, or systemic full-scale conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Structural Drivers of Escalation</strong></p>
<p>At the core of the U.S.-Iran negotiations lies a set of structural but irreconcilable objectives. The U.S. continues to frame its demands around three pillars: curtailment of Iran’s nuclear development program, limitations on ballistic missile capabilities development, and the rollback of Iran’s regional proxy networks. Iran, on the opposite side, views these elements as essential to regime survival and sovereign deterrence. Accordingly, this is not a negotiation gap; it is a strategic contradiction.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear posture has evolved from a bargaining chip into a core pillar of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) and the regime’s survival. Any perceived concession risks undermining internal legitimacy and external deterrence credibility. Accordingly, ongoing diplomatic negotiations are performative rather than transformative, thus aimed at managing escalation rather than resolving underlying disputes. Additionally, the U.S. decision to impose a maritime blockade represents a calibrated escalation designed to exert economic and psychological pressure without the need to immediately resort back to kinetic operations. However, the strategic implications are profound.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy relies mainly on maritime oil exports. A blockade directly targets this vulnerability, threatening <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAXGoXDQ19Q">revenue</a> streams, which then impacts the domestic stability, in addition to regional influence operations funded through such revenues. From Tehran’s perspective, failure to respond would signal weakness not only to the U.S. but also to its network of non-state groups across the region. This creates a classic escalation dilemma for Iran. On one hand, not responding risks strategic erosion of the IRGC and the current regime’s image. On the other hand, the response risks triggering military confrontation, which Iran cannot withstand. In such conditions, even any Iranian action such as harassment of commercial shipping, or proxy attacks carry a high probability of escalation.</p>
<p>Another key driver for the escalation is the pre-positioned military capabilities. Unlike previous crises, the current environment is characterized by pre-positioned military assets and operational readiness on both sides. U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in the Middle East are already <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/15/us-sending-10000-more-troops-to-middle-east-despite-iran-ceasefire">configured</a> for rapid response operations, while Iran’s IRGC maintains asymmetric capabilities are carefully tailored for maritime disruption, drone attacks, ballistic missile launches, and regional proxy warfare.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Spillover Risks</strong></p>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical geographic variable in this confrontational equation given that one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Iran has long signaled its capability and strategic <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/16/military-advisor-to-iran-s-supreme-leader-threatens-to-sink-us-ships-in-the-strait-of-hormuz_6752475_4.html">intent</a> to disrupt traffic through asymmetric means, including naval mines, drones, and anti-ship missiles. While full closure remains unlikely due to the overwhelming U.S. response it would provoke, disruption has already been taking place via targeted attacks on passing vessels, which is more than enough to deter commercial liners. Even limited interference could generate outsized economic and political effects, particularly for energy-dependent economies. All that said, the Houthis in Yemen remain on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/">standby</a> mode to disrupt the maritime flow via resumption of attacks on vessels passing via Bab-el Mandeb to and from the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Iran’s strategic depth lies not in conventional military parity but in its network of regional proxies. Groups aligned with Tehran, including those in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, provide Iran with operational flexibility. Given Israel’s successful campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah as well as the Iran-backed Iraqi militias preoccupied with the deterrence posed by the U.S. forces, the <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/">Houthis</a> in Yemen remain the final card for Tehran. Intensified maritime threats from Houthi forces in the Red Sea are likely to <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/04/14/amid-focus-on-strait-of-hormuz-experts-sound-warning-on-yemens-houthis-and-red-sea/">reemerge</a> at any moment. This allows Iran to impose costs on U.S. and allied interests without triggering immediate large-scale retaliation. However, the cumulative effect of a multi-chokepoint pressure strategy could compel a broader and internationally supported response.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Calculus: War vs. Controlled Escalation</strong></p>
<p>Some believe that neither the U.S. nor Iran appears to seek full-scale war given that the costs (military, economic, and political) would be immense and unpredictable. For the U.S., a major conflict with Iran would disrupt global energy markets, divert resources from strategic competition with China, and risk regional destabilization affecting key allies in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). For Iran, a continuation of a direct war would expose critical infrastructure to sustained strikes and threaten regime survivability.</p>
<p>The most probable scenario over the next 2–3 weeks is a phase of controlled escalation characterized by maritime harassment incidents in the Gulf, limited proxy attacks, and intensified rhetoric and signaling. This scenario allows both sides to demonstrate resolve while avoiding irreversible steps toward war. However, it is susceptible to disruption by unforeseen incidents at any moment.</p>
<p>An increasingly possible scenario would be one that involves targeted military actions, such as U.S. strikes on IRGC assets or critical infrastructure vs. Iranian retaliatory indiscriminate strikes on U.S. regional allies. Such exchanges would likely be calibrated to avoid full-scale war but could easily escalate if casualties or strategic assets are impacted.</p>
<p>Lastly, a less likely but still possible scenario is the return to productive negotiations, driven by economic pressures including oil market volatility, as well as diplomatic intervention by third parties, including the Gulf states, China, or European actors.</p>
<p>The highest-impact and most consequential scenarios involve a rapid escalation into full-scale conflict, potentially triggered by Iran’s full refusal to give up on its nuclear program or ballistic missile development program. Other triggers for a full-scale conflict would include any major incident in the Strait of Hormuz, high-casualty attacks on U.S. forces, or a direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military assets. Such a conflict would likely expand beyond bilateral engagement, drawing in regional actors and severely disrupting global economic systems.</p>
<p><strong>Key Indicators to Watch</strong></p>
<p>Several indicators are going to be crucial in assessing the trajectory of the ongoing conflict. This includes maritime activity where increased Iranian harassment of shipping continues to take place. Proxy operations are also a critical indicator where the frequency and intensity of proxy attacks, and the Red Sea specifically start to rise. Finally, force posture changes remain one of the key indicators, as they are mostly based on advanced intelligence assessments, which are not available to the public or markets. That said, deployment of additional U.S. and allied assets to the region remains the clearest indicator of how the situation will move forward and provides early signs of shifts from controlled escalation to broader conflict.</p>
<p>For defense strategists, the imperative is clear: preparing for escalation, planning for contingencies across multiple theaters, and achieving consensus that in the current environment, the most dangerous outcomes are not those that are intended but those unintended.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management &#8211; France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/The-Escalation-Trajectory-of-US-Iran-Tensions-After-the-Collapse-of-the-Negotiations.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="205" height="57" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 205px) 100vw, 205px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-escalation-trajectory-of-u-s-iran-tensions-after-the-collapse-of-the-negotiations/">The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harsa Kakar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 13:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32239</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The year 2026 arrives with looming threats of nuclear weapon employment more than ever, as the world is faced with eroding arms control agreements and the global environment seems increasingly fragile. With several key treaties set to expire in 2026 and countries rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to growing international conflict 2026 will [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/">The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The year 2026 arrives with looming threats of nuclear weapon employment more than ever, as the world is faced with eroding arms control agreements and the global environment seems increasingly fragile. With several key treaties set to expire in 2026 and countries rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to growing international conflict 2026 will be a defining moment, particularly as countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia contemplate nuclear weapon development. As diplomats of non-proliferation continue to call for disarmament, reality dictates that such talk is fantasy rather than a clear roadmap forward, underscoring a need for a realistic assessment of the challenges that lie ahead.</p>
<p>Most the world’s approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">12,100</a> nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly <a href="https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/">87</a> percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">5,500</a> and the US holding approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">5,177,</a> declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">600</a> operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">50</a> nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.</p>
<p>These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.</p>
<p>The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.</p>
<p>Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.</p>
<p>Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel&#8217;s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran&#8217;s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.</p>
<p>Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a &#8220;<a href="https://www.apln.network/analysis/the-korea-times-column/2026-signals-critical-moment-to-preserve-nuclear-order">crucial year</a>&#8221; for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.</p>
<p>Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.</p>
<p>In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.</p>
<p><em>Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Dawn-of-2026-Challenges-to-Non-proliferation.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/">The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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