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		<title>Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/diplomacy-in-great-power-competition-and-the-limits-of-economic-statecraft/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/diplomacy-in-great-power-competition-and-the-limits-of-economic-statecraft/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hafiz Ibrahim]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 13:10:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32289</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As contemporary rivals, the United States and China echo historical patterns of major competition between an established and a rising power, described within Graham Allison&#8217;s article, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” Allison warns of an apparent tendency towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/diplomacy-in-great-power-competition-and-the-limits-of-economic-statecraft/">Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As contemporary rivals, the United States and China echo historical patterns of major competition between an established and a rising power, <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thucydides-trap-are-us-and-china-headed-war">described</a> within Graham Allison&#8217;s article, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” Allison warns of an apparent tendency towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power like a regional or international hegemon.</p>
<p>The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word <em>diplōma</em>, <a href="https://kids.britannica.com/students/article/diplomacy/274012">meaning</a> “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is <a href="https://kids.britannica.com/students/article/diplomacy/274012">defined</a> as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/economic-statecraft">defined</a> as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.</p>
<p>In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.</p>
<p>China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China&#8217;s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.</p>
<p>The United States&#8217; current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.</p>
<p>Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in <em>International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues</em>, <a href="https://studylib.net/doc/26973335/international-politics-enduring-concepts-and-contemporary...">argue</a> that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”</p>
<p>Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. <a href="https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/japanese-military-aggression">sanctions</a> intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.</p>
<p>For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Book-Reviews/Display/Article/3052420/deterrence-by-denial-theory-and-practice/">deterrence by denial,</a> as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in <a href="https://gsas.harvard.edu/news/discussing-thucydides-trap">Thucydides’ Trap</a>, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.</p>
<p>Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia&#8217;s posture. As noted by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/three-years-war-ukraine-are-sanctions-against-russia-making-difference">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as <a href="https://www.globaltrademag.com/chinas-2025-economic-resilience-record-trade-surplus-amid-tariffs/">described</a> by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”</p>
<p>It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.</p>
<p>While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.</p>
<p><em>Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Role-of-Diplomacy-in-Great-Power-Competition-and-the-limit-of-economic-statecraft.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="259" height="72" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/diplomacy-in-great-power-competition-and-the-limits-of-economic-statecraft/">Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Chhimpa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31719</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, and non-aligned traditions.</p>
<p>That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.</p>
<p><strong>India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI</strong></p>
<p>India’s governance model integrates<a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2021-02/Responsible-AI-22022021.pdf"> civilian oversight</a> with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/national-strategy-for-ai"><em>National Strategy for AI</em></a> mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.</p>
<p>The<a href="https://visionias.in/current-affairs/"> Evaluating Trustworthy AI</a> (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.</p>
<p>India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10493592"> red-team exercises</a> involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.</p>
<p><strong>Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation</strong></p>
<p>US-India collaboration on <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-chart-an-ambitious-course-for-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology/">AI verification</a> can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/international-center-excellence-in-technology">iCET fact sheet</a> outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.</p>
<p>A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.</p>
<p>The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Lalwani%20-%20U.S.-India%20Divergence%20and%20Convergence%20.pdf">Quad framework,</a> pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.</p>
<p><strong>Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The<a href="https://unidir.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-and-its-implications-for-international-peace-and-security-an-evidence-based-road-map-for-future-policy-action/"> UNIDIR report</a> calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.</p>
<p>The UN General Assembly has established an <a href="https://dig.watch/updates/fourth-revision-of-draft-unga-resolution-for-scientific-panel-on-ai-and-dialogue-on-ai-governance">Independent AI Scientific Panel</a> and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Applications and Future Prospects</strong></p>
<p>India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/mapping-the-prospect-of-arms-control-in-south-asia/">joint research on AI safety</a>, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.</p>
<p>Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bSpONUdcms">Mach 8</a> and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p>
<p>Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.</p>
<p>By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.</p>
<p><em>Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science &amp; Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AI-Arms-Race-South-Asia.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2025 12:09:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30673</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The advent of hypersonic weapons, with their unparalleled speed and maneuverability, ignited a global debate about the future of strategic security. Some argue these weapons unwittingly ushered in an era where traditional defenses are rendered obsolete, leaving nations exposed to swift and devastating attacks. The emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/">Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The advent of hypersonic weapons, with their unparalleled speed and maneuverability, ignited a global debate about the future of strategic security. Some argue these weapons unwittingly ushered in an era where traditional defenses are rendered obsolete, leaving nations exposed to swift and devastating attacks. The emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) prompts a fundamental reassessment of assumptions about deterrence and defense.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons, capable of exceeding Mach 5 with unpredictable flight paths, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjDyqS03ISMAxXdSDABHdn2BmUQ-NANegQIShAG&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.csis.org%2Fanalysis%2Fcomplex-air-defense-countering-hypersonic-missile-threat-0%23%3A~%3Atext%3DI%2520think%2520it%27s%2520a%2520number%2Cto%2520adequately%2520address%2520the%2520threat.&amp;usg=AOvVaw3XVxaqX_L8zs0rOiDfXyxI&amp;opi=89978449">shatter the bedrock principles</a> of conventional missile defense. Their ability to glide and maneuver within the atmosphere allows them to evade radar detection and interceptor systems, compressing warning times to mere minutes. This drastic reduction in reaction time amplifies the risk of miscalculations and accidental escalation, particularly in moments of crisis.</p>
<p>The global balance of power is being fundamentally altered, not merely adjusted, by the aggressive pursuit of maneuverable hypersonic weapon capabilities. China’s DF-17 hypersonic missile, coupled with its reported testing of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) with a hypersonic payload, demonstrates a clear intent to achieve <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjZvb7O3ISMAxVQM9AFHQYhEjgQFnoECCMQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.defense.gov%2F2023%2FOct%2F19%2F2003323409%2F-1%2F-1%2F1%2F2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF&amp;usg=AOvVaw071h0Fy5906vIE-xj7tnoR&amp;opi=89978449">global strike capabilities with minimal warning</a>. Russia’s deployment of the Avangard HGV on its SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the operational status of the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwimx7rg3ISMAxX3JNAFHdOhCP4QFnoECBYQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fjamestown.org%2Fprogram%2Fthe-role-of-hypersonic-weapons-in-russian-military-strategy%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw3n36uTFyvfkRCtN8vA3S-g&amp;opi=89978449">Zircon hypersonic</a> anti-ship missile further highlight the growing proliferation of these advanced weapons. North Korea’s claim of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjQ2_zs3ISMAxVm8MkDHV_GL5YQFnoECCAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2Ftag%2Fnorth-korea-hypersonic-missile%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw20bRg4HsjuR_uIgDgG7ptn&amp;opi=89978449">successful hypersonic missile tests</a>, while requiring verification, signal a potential integration of these weapons into its theater nuclear strategy, adding another layer of complexity to regional security.</p>
<p>The inherent capacity of maneuverable hypersonic weapons to render existing missile defense systems obsolete signifies not just a technological leap, but a deliberate dismantling of established strategic certainties. The unpredictability of their flight paths and the compression of warning times do not just complicate defense planning; they erode the very foundation of strategic stability, where deterrence relies on the certainty of retaliation. The potential for these weapons to carry both conventional and nuclear payloads does not just increase their versatility; it blurs the lines between conventional and nuclear conflict, creating a perilous ambiguity that heightens the risk of miscalculation.</p>
<p>The ability to strike targets with minimal warning does not just enhance offensive capabilities; it creates a coercive tool, enabling states to exert pressure and achieve strategic objectives without resorting to large-scale conventional warfare. The potential for hypersonic weapons to be deployed in a first-strike role does not just raise concerns about escalation; it fundamentally alters the calculus of deterrence, where the threat of retaliation may no longer be sufficient to prevent aggression.</p>
<p>To counter this burgeoning vulnerability, the United States must not merely react, but fundamentally redefine its strategic posture, acknowledging that piecemeal technological solutions are insufficient to address the profound shift hypersonic weapons impose on the security landscape. The rapid development of the glide phase interceptor (GPI) and space-based tracking systems is not just about enhancing missile defense; it is about restoring a sense of strategic stability, reassuring allies and deterring potential adversaries. The expansion of conventional hypersonic programs, such as the AGM-183 ARRW, conventional prompt strike, and the long-range hypersonic weapon, is not just about developing counterforce capabilities; it is about demonstrating a commitment to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiMkcr93ISMAxXy78kDHb_0AS0QFnoECCIQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fproducts%2Fgao-24-106792&amp;usg=AOvVaw2jIDDvLxHHcvNklw37Y8Mg&amp;opi=89978449">maintaining a credible deterrent</a>, signaling to potential adversaries that aggression will be met with a swift and decisive response. The integration of hypersonic weapons into existing military doctrines does not just require tactical adjustments; it demands a fundamental reevaluation of strategic thinking, adapting to a new era of high-speed warfare.</p>
<p>The international community’s response to hypersonic weapons must not be limited to national defense initiatives; it must include a concerted effort to promote arms control and transparency. The absence of clear <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwigzbuP3YSMAxWsRTABHY1wDBgQ-NANegQIKxAC&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Funidir.org%2Fpublication%2Fthe-implications-of-hypersonic-weapons-for-international-stability-and-arms-control-report-on-a-unidir-unoda-turn-based-exercise%2F%23%3A~%3Atext%3DView%2520or%2520Download%26text%3DIn%2520September%25202019%252C%2520a%2520one%2C%252C%2520UNIDIR%252C%2520Geneva%252C%2520Switzerland.&amp;usg=AOvVaw0Dza55Gx-PQxOYY8KilYUi&amp;opi=89978449">international norms and regulations regarding hypersonic weapons</a> does not just create uncertainty; it fosters a climate of strategic competition, where states are incentivized to develop and deploy these weapons without restraint. The development of transparency and confidence-building measures is not just about reducing the risk of miscalculation; it is about building a foundation for strategic stability, where states can engage in dialogue and cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by these advanced weapons.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons represent a paradigm shift in military technology, fundamentally questioning if the world is entering a new era of vulnerability, undermining the foundations of traditional missile defense and reshaping the strategic landscape. Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive approach that combines technological innovation, strategic adaptation, and international cooperation. Only through a concerted effort can the international community hope to mitigate the risks posed by hypersonic weapons and ensure a more stable and secure future.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hypersonic-Weapons_-Are-We-Entering-a-New-Era-of-Vulnerability.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/">Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huma Rehman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 11:54:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30505</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p> The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming industries, economies, societies, and global politics. However, this artificial intelligence and technological revolution also exacerbates existing competitions, creating a stark divide between states that are AI haves and AI have-nots. This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/">AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong> </strong>The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming industries, economies, societies, and global politics. However, this artificial intelligence and technological revolution also exacerbates existing competitions, creating a stark divide between states that are AI haves and AI have-nots.</p>
<p>This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to harness AI’s potential for economic, social, and global political empowerment. The implications of the AI divide are leading to a tech race that impact geopolitical power dynamics, exacerbating competition major powers like the US, China, France, and India. Depending on how the race ends, it could swing the balance of power in a negative direction.</p>
<p><strong>AI Paris Summit</strong></p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia">AI Action Summit</a> held in Paris emerged as a pivotal event that highlights both the opportunities and challenges associated with this evolving AI tech race. This summit serves as a beacon of innovation, encouraging <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2527932/frances-macron-calls-for-equal-access-to-ai-for-all-nations">France</a> and India to collaborate more closely, while also exposing the complex interplay of international reactions, particularly from major powers like the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and China.</p>
<p>The summit focused on expanding AI’s boundaries while respecting environmental and ethical obligations. France’s President Emmanuel <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/statement-on-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligence-for-people-and-the-planet">Macron</a> reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to AI innovation, while maintaining high regulatory standards that draw parallels to Notre Dame Cathedral’s restoration. Such a strategy will likely accelerate AI ventures and foster innovation.</p>
<p>However, the regulation proposed was also a noose around the neck of the summit’s emphasis—deregulation. It is worth considering whether drastic deregulation will lead to genuine advances or the weakening of certain crucial safety nets as the world grapples with how to handle ever expanding data and the fragmentation that result from the intersection of geopolitical interests and the private ownership of data and capability. The US and China approach the issue differently than Europe, whose <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai">adoption of the AI Act</a> (2023) will see the first comprehensive AI regulation in the world.</p>
<p>Many wondered how agentic AI will impact the balance of power. Whether AI will have a net positive or negative effect is uncertain. The rate at which agentic AI is developed and adopted in the three main economic blocs of China, Europe, and the United States will determine much.</p>
<p><strong>India-France AI Alliance </strong></p>
<p>India and France are forming a partnership to leverage AI’s full potential globally, sharing knowledge, resources, and best practices to create a robust framework for AI initiatives and global dialogue. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/frances-ai-action-summit">During the summit</a>, leaders from both countries addressed how their alliance could facilitate joint ventures, research collaborations, and talent exchange programs. <a href="https://in.ambafrance.org/India-France-will-harness-AI-s-potential-for-global-good">Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Macron foresaw</a> great potential for future cooperation in 2019 when they endorsed the <em>Indo-French Roadmap on Cybersecurity and Digital Technology</em>. India and France, founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, aim to develop a safe, open, secure, and ethical AI for human development and global commons.</p>
<p><strong>Global Reactions</strong></p>
<p>As the world watches the developments in Paris, reactions from other global powers, notably <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/why-us-china-ai-competition-matters/">China and the United States</a>, added another layer of complexity to the conversation around AI regulation and collaboration. In recent years, both states have invested heavily in AI research and development, seeing it as critical to their national security and economic competitiveness.</p>
<p>China’s approach to AI governance contrasts significantly with that of France and India. While the <a href="http://fi.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/kxjs/201710/P020210628714286134479.pdf">Chinese government</a> prioritizes rapid innovation with minimal regulatory oversight, this led to concerns about privacy, surveillance, and ethical implications. The US, on the other hand, grapples with debates around data privacy, corporate responsibility, and the potential for AI misuse. As a result, the responses from these two states illustrate differing philosophies about how best to harness AI’s potential while safeguarding public interests.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/feb/11/us-uk-paris-ai-summit-artificial-intelligence-declaration">The US and UK declined</a> to sign a declaration on “inclusive and sustainable” artificial intelligence at the Paris summit, in a blow to hopes for a concerted approach to developing and regulating the technology. The document was backed by 60 other signatories on February 11, 2025, including France, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/china">China</a>, India, Japan, Australia, and Canada.</p>
<p>The reactions from the relevant stakeholders highlight the urgent need for international cooperation and dialogue. As AI transcends borders, creating harmonized standards and frameworks could mitigate risks associated with its deployment.</p>
<p><strong>Opportunities and Challenges Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The summit concluded by emphasizing the need for proactive state engagement in AI regulation, prioritizing innovation while protecting individual rights and societal values. This, participants believed, would allow the world to fully capitalize on AI’s benefits.</p>
<p>As the world grapples with the realities of increasingly AI-driven technology, <a href="https://www.innovationaus.com/is-the-paris-ai-declaration-as-vulnerable-as-the-climate-accord/">the voices of diverse stakeholders</a>, including technologists, ethicists, policymakers, and civil society must be heard in shaping the future of AI. Under the flag of the AI Paris Summit, the India-France AI alliance is entering into a new and more unpredictable phase. By defying red tape and cultivating a spirit of cooperation, states are setting the pace for unlocking unprecedented opportunities while highlighting the inherent challenges of this transformative technology.</p>
<p><em>Huma Rehman is a project consultant, consultant, and defense and foreign affairs analyst. She can be reached at X @HumaRehman1.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/AI-Paris-Summit-and-Emerging-Paradox-of-AI-Haves-and-Have-Nots.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29601" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="Download here." width="302" height="84" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 302px) 100vw, 302px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/">AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-2-0-unilateralism-and-the-future-of-arms-control/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Syed Ali Abbas]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 2025 13:16:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29803</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the world prepares for Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the implications for global arms control loom large. New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire in February 2026. Russian president Vladimir Putin suspended participation in the treaty a year ago due [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-2-0-unilateralism-and-the-future-of-arms-control/">Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the world prepares for Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the implications for global arms control loom large. New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire in February 2026. Russian president Vladimir Putin suspended participation in the treaty a year ago due to tensions resulting from the Ukraine war, which leaves the agreement or any like it in question.</p>
<p>This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Trump’s Arms Control Record</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.</p>
<p>Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.</p>
<p>These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>The Risks of Unilateralism</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.</p>
<p>If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.</p>
<p><strong>A Fragmented Global Landscape</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.</p>
<p>Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.</p>
<p><strong>Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability</strong></p>
<p>The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.</p>
<p>Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.</p>
<p><strong>Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.</p>
<p>To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.</p>
<p><em>Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Trump-2.0-Unilateralism-and-the-Future-of-Arms-Control.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-2-0-unilateralism-and-the-future-of-arms-control/">Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2024 12:14:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Deterrence & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AsterX]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[atmospheric turbulence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[battlefield data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cailabs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense innovation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[space governance]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29061</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Space Defense and Security Summit​, that took place in parallel to the September 2024 World Space Business Week conference in Paris, announced positive developments for European space defense. France has the second largest defense export industry in the world and is the fourth-largest military space spender—albeit far behind the US, China, and Russia. The country, emphasizing [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/">France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Space Defense and Security Summit​, that took place in parallel to the September 2024 World Space Business Week conference in Paris, announced positive developments for European space defense. France has the second largest defense export industry in the world and is the fourth-largest military space spender—albeit far behind the US, China, and Russia. The country, emphasizing space deterrence and surveillance, decided to double down on space defense tech. By leveraging improved cooperation with its commercial space sector, France’s space defense also joins in a <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/japans-ministry-of-defense-opening-space-security-to-the-commercial-sector/">global trend</a> that started with the US and Japan.</p>
<p>In planning to strengthen space defense capabilities, the French military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA) focuses on surveillance, security, and cooperation. France aims to have a full space defense capability by 2030, built on military space capabilities such as Earth observation, communications, positioning, and navigation. The country is also expanding its space situational awareness capability to monitor, classify, and better understand space activities and threats.</p>
<p>France unveiled <em>Toutatis</em>, a new space surveillance program to protect low-Earth orbit assets, focusing on satellite detection, characterization, and targeting. <em>Toutatis</em> works with two satellites. A “spotter” cubesat detects targets and a smaller target satellite—developed by French <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/u-space-nanosats/">start-up</a> U-space in partnership with defense industry major MBDA.</p>
<p>France also works on geosynchronous orbit surveillance through the <em>Yoda</em> program of small satellites with cameras to monitor space threats. The annual military space exercise, <em>AsterX</em>, highlights the need for enhanced situational awareness in low-Earth orbit. Within two years, the <em>Toutatis</em> program will test capabilities with planned launches of maneuverable satellites.</p>
<p>Rather than kinetic weapons against weaponized space assets, France deploys non-destructive measures like dazzling adversaries with lasers to neutralize threats—without creating debris. The country also seeks to balance autonomy with international cooperation. For example, an envoy from Ukraine recently discussed space defense in Paris. Pawan Kumar, Director of the Indian Defense Space Agency, recently provided the French space command with an update on military space cooperation between the two countries.</p>
<p>The French view is that enhanced situational awareness in space, through programs like <em>Toutatis</em>, is a cornerstone of its space defense strategies. Nations should prioritize investments in monitoring technology to observe potential threats and signal their deterrence capabilities.</p>
<p>France’s focus on space start-ups indicates a shift towards commercial and civilian involvement in space security. A timely joint-announcement made by two rising space ventures, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/cailabs/">Cailabs</a> and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/unseenlabs/">Unseenlabs</a>, revealed they successfully tested space <a href="https://www.c4isrnet.com/global/europe/2024/09/13/france-tests-space-lasers-for-secure-satellite-downlink-in-world-first/">laser</a> transmission for satellite downlink in a world first. While Cailabs supplied the optical ground station, Unseenlabs deployed a low-Earth orbit nano-satellite with a laser payload. The pair established a stable link for several minutes. France’s Ministry of Armed Forces called the successful test a world first. It was a first for the commercial sector, but a few other experiments remain confined to American government attempts.</p>
<p>The French Defense Innovation Agency funded the test with €5.5 million ($6.1 million). The Cailabs/Unseenlabs system will be integrated on France’s future military satellites. Laser technology is hard to intercept or hack, compared with radio antennas.</p>
<p>Such a capability would be useful for expanding battlefield data transmissions. France’s optical communications satellite project, dubbed <em>Keraunos </em>(thunderbolt in Greek), helps mitigate the effects of atmospheric turbulence, making space-Earth liaisons handy on mobile, land-based, naval, and airborne platforms.</p>
<p>The European Space Agency Director, General Josef Aschbacher, rightly noted that a gap in space spending between Europe and the United States (a ratio of 1 to 6) is complicated further by spending in Europe that is spread among a wider range of national space agencies. <a href="https://spacenews.com/esa-seeks-better-coordination-of-european-space-spending/">Streamlining</a> European defense and space governance is thornier than in the US since it <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congressional-haggling-jeopardizes-the-us-space-force-fy-2025-budget/">involves structural reforms</a> on technological gaps, fragmented capital markets, and strategic spending.</p>
<p>A rather disappointing report on European <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en">competitiveness</a> by Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and president of the European Central Bank, generated immediate push-back from Ludwig Moeller, director of the <a href="https://www.espi.or.at/perspectives/draghi-report/">European Space Policy Institute</a> (ESPI). ESPI methodically reviewed the Draghi Report’s <a href="https://www.espi.or.at/briefs/brief-70%20/">shortcomings</a> when it came to European Defense and Space. ESPI suggested the report lacked an impulse for the needed market reforms.</p>
<p>As stated by Eva Portier, space deputy in France&#8217;s military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA), &#8220;Access to space is an essential element of our national sovereignty, our capacity to use space to launch our satellites and conduct operations.&#8221; While greater Europe is struggling to fundamentally unite in its efforts to counter future malicious space efforts by China and Russia, France is stepping forward in a more limited way. It is not lost on observers that French satellite names harken to a past where France needed protection. For example, <em>Toutatis</em>, discussed above, was a divinity once worshipped in ancient Gaul and Britain, and was considered a protector of Gallic and Celtic tribes. The annual military space exercise, <em>AsterX</em>, led by the French Air and Space Force and involving 15 partners countries, is a wink to Asterix and Obelix, leading characters of a comic book series describing the adventures of a small village resisting the Roman invaders. Legend has it the Gauls feared only “that the sky would fall on their head.”</p>
<p>French efforts are moving in the right direction, but unless Europe reforms and consolidates space defense efforts across the continent, Europe will be unprepared when a crisis occurs. Major space reforms take time. Thus, it is important those reforms begin now. France simply cannot accomplish what is needed on its own.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/France-Doubles-Down-on-Space-Defense-Tech.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/">France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Paving the Ethical Route for AI</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/paving-the-ethical-route-for-ai/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/paving-the-ethical-route-for-ai/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huma Rehman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2024 11:52:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Disclosure Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Algorithmic Accountability Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence Data Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Council of Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital Services Oversight and Safety Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethical application]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Artificial Intelligence Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[explainability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fairness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Framework Convention]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global AI Governance Initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global governance]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resource allocation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rule of law]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[technology advancement. ​]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29041</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The complex landscape of artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly relevant across all fields and nations. Since AI affects every state, its benefits and drawbacks must be addressed collectively. The recent passage of the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence by the Council of Europe marks a significant turning point in the quest for effective and long-lasting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/paving-the-ethical-route-for-ai/">Paving the Ethical Route for AI</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The complex landscape of artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly relevant across all fields and nations. Since AI affects every state, its benefits and drawbacks must be addressed collectively.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-signed-council-europe-framework-convention-artificial-intelligence-and-human-rights">recent passage</a> of the <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/the-framework-convention-on-artificial-intelligence">Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence</a> by the Council of Europe marks a significant turning point in the quest for effective and long-lasting control of AI. The document is a statement about how European states will harness AI, a relatively new and powerful technology, to empower humanity while limiting its abuses.</p>
<p>The March 2024 adoption of a US-led United Nations General Assembly resolution on seizing the opportunities of safe, secure, and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems for sustainable development also highlights the common ground the United States shares with Europe and democracies around the world. While the US differs in some <a href="https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-the-signing-ceremony-for-the-council-of-europe-framework-convention-on-artificial-intelligence-and-human-rights/">important areas with Europe</a>, the significant agreement is valuable. This convention provides a foundation for others to build on.</p>
<p>Although new technologies often appear benign at first glance, there are many ways AI, in particular, can negatively impact the values held dear by so many around the world. From facial recognition systems interfering with privacy to machine learning that amplifies injustice, the potential cost of AI’s misuse is high.</p>
<p>Until now, there was not an effort at global governance of AI. This fostered a string of national laws that lack the capacity to address the transnational nature of AI adequately. A system of fractured development silos creates a wide gap wherein technological advancement is prioritized over ethics.</p>
<p>There are a few <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/featured/special-editorial/the-ai-governance-challenge">AI regulatory developments</a>  around the world for AI management worthy of note. First, the US House of Representatives debated the Digital Services Oversight and Safety Act of 2022 (H.R.6796) and the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2023 (<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-118hr5628ih/pdf/BILLS-118hr5628ih.pdf">H.R. 5628</a>). The AI Disclosure Act of 2023 (<a href="https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr3831/BILLS-118hr3831ih.pdf">H.R. 3831</a>) was also introduced before the House of Representatives.</p>
<p>Canada saw the introduction of the Artificial Intelligence Data Act (<a href="https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-27/first-reading">AIDA</a>). The European Parliament began discussing the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence">EU Artificial Intelligence Act</a> in 2023, which represents a shift toward “hard law.” China is also addressing the issue and undertook the Interim Administrative <a href="https://www.pwccn.com/en/industries/telecommunications-media-and-technology/publications/interim-measures-for-generative-ai-services-implemented-aug2023.html">Measures</a> for the Management of Generative AI Services, which was enacted in 2023.</p>
<p>Recently, the United States <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3618367/congress-passes-fiscal-2024-defense-spending-bill-pay-raise-for-service-members/">passed</a> the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which <a href="https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7776/BILLS-117hr7776enr.pdf">include</a>d a five-year implementation plan to adopt AI applications to accelerate decision advantage for both business efficacy as well as warfighting capability.</p>
<p>China also released <a href="http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/dbtxwx/202311/t20231121_11184852.htm">the Global AI Governance Initiative</a>, “calling for all countries under the <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202310/t20231020_11164834.html">principles</a> of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits to enhance exchanges and cooperation, work together to prevent risks, and develop an AI governance framework based on broad consensus, to make AI technologies more secure, reliable, controllable, and equitable.”</p>
<p>The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention, discussed above, provides a comprehensive legal structure to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, besides promoting innovation. This strikes a balance where the use of technology should not be limited but society must ensure that development is in the right direction—with most of the technologies promoting ethical usage.</p>
<p>The Convention <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/us-britain-eu-sign-agreement-ai-standards-ft-reports-2024-09-05/">offers a set of guidelines</a> for the advancement of AI that include respecting human dignity and upholding the idea that one should not infringe upon the rights and liberties of others. There is a significant urge to pursue explainability, which requires an explanation for each decision an AI makes and highlights how these systems have the power to significantly impact people’s lives in fields like criminal justice and healthcare. Additionally, the Convention calls for fairness in the creation of AI by considering prejudice in learning systems.</p>
<p>The Convention clearly aspires to international cooperation, which is important because it is a central element of the liberal international order. Numerous states agreed to the treaty, realizing that artificial intelligence is not a local problem. Such collaboration is required since <a href="https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Brief-ResponsibleAI-Final.pdf">artificial intelligence affects all states</a>, and its advantages and disadvantages can only be addressed jointly. The agreement’s openness to other parties is crucial because it enables people from different backgrounds and cultures to voice their thoughts, enhancing and leveling the playing field.</p>
<p>As AI advances, concerns will grow about the agreement’s direction, applicability, and resource allocation. It implies that ethically right deeds now might turn unethical as technology develops, highlighting the necessity of a progressive framework for a code of ethics.</p>
<p>Since the development of AI must be accompanied by its ethical application, the Convention on Artificial Intelligence represents an important accomplishment in European regulation of the technology. Therefore, this treaty serves as a guide for how human rights, accountability, and openness should be upheld when integrating AI into society. The journey has only just begun. However, the political will and spirit to act, observe, and adopt the proper approach to governance can serve to achieve the benefits of AI.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, it will probably be difficult to put these rules and policies into foolproof practice. It will certainly be a work in progress. The European Council is certainly providing a road map for managing global mutual technology advancement concerns.</p>
<p><em>Huma Rehman is Director of Research at the Islamabad Policy Institute (IPI) and a Defense &amp; Foreign Affairs Analyst. The views expressed are her own.   </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Paving-the-Ethical-Route-for-AI-Amid-Challenges.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/paving-the-ethical-route-for-ai/">Paving the Ethical Route for AI</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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