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	<title>Topic:International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harsa Kakar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 13:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32239</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The year 2026 arrives with looming threats of nuclear weapon employment more than ever, as the world is faced with eroding arms control agreements and the global environment seems increasingly fragile. With several key treaties set to expire in 2026 and countries rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to growing international conflict 2026 will [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/">The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The year 2026 arrives with looming threats of nuclear weapon employment more than ever, as the world is faced with eroding arms control agreements and the global environment seems increasingly fragile. With several key treaties set to expire in 2026 and countries rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to growing international conflict 2026 will be a defining moment, particularly as countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia contemplate nuclear weapon development. As diplomats of non-proliferation continue to call for disarmament, reality dictates that such talk is fantasy rather than a clear roadmap forward, underscoring a need for a realistic assessment of the challenges that lie ahead.</p>
<p>Most the world’s approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">12,100</a> nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly <a href="https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/">87</a> percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">5,500</a> and the US holding approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">5,177,</a> declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">600</a> operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">50</a> nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.</p>
<p>These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.</p>
<p>The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.</p>
<p>Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.</p>
<p>Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel&#8217;s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran&#8217;s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.</p>
<p>Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a &#8220;<a href="https://www.apln.network/analysis/the-korea-times-column/2026-signals-critical-moment-to-preserve-nuclear-order">crucial year</a>&#8221; for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.</p>
<p>Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.</p>
<p>In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.</p>
<p><em>Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Dawn-of-2026-Challenges-to-Non-proliferation.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/">The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sidra Shaukat]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 13:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31779</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 28, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed previously lifted sanctions against Iran. The move occurred when the European powers triggered the “snapback” mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on August 28, 2025. This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/">Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 28, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed previously lifted sanctions against Iran. The move occurred when the European powers triggered the “snapback” mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on August 28, 2025.</p>
<p>This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.</p>
<p>The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/new-iaea-resolution/">2005</a> when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm">2006</a>, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc8980.doc.htm">2007</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/03/251122">2008</a> further tightened the restrictions. In <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm">2010</a>, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran">oil revenues and banking sector</a>, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.</p>
<p>These sanctions were lifted under the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf">JCPOA</a> in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/27/middleeast/iran-snapback-nuclear-sanctions-intl">snapback clause</a>; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10330/">August 28, 2025</a>, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.</p>
<p>The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran">2006–2010</a>. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.</p>
<p>Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39rpgpvwy1o">condemned</a> the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran <a href="https://en.mehrnews.com/news/237003/Iran-recalls-ambassadors-from-Germany-France-UK?utm_source=politico.eu&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=politico.eu&amp;utm_referrer=politico.eu">recalled</a> its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-president-says-no-plans-to-leave-non-proliferation-treaty-106cec44">clarified</a> it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.</p>
<p>The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-07/news/israel-and-us-strike-irans-nuclear-program">Coordinated attacks</a> by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165974">Russia and China</a> echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-joint-statement-on-iran-activation-of-the-snapback">maintained</a> that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/iran-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-to-delay-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions.php">emphasized</a> that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.</p>
<p>The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/stories/2025/june/inside-iran.html">internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure</a> would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2025-06/zero-enrichment-unnecessary-unrealistic-objective-prevent-iranian-bomb">zero enrichment</a> and even presented <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/19/iran-hits-out-ahead-of-un-vote-on-nuclear-sanctions">partial solutions</a> at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/irans-eastern-strategy/">Look East</a> strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.</p>
<p>The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.</p>
<p>The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/3/us-says-its-strikes-degraded-irans-nuclear-programme-by-one-to-two-years">two years</a>, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.</p>
<p>The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.</p>
<p>For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.</p>
<p>The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.</p>
<p><em>Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Snapback.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="223" height="62" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 223px) 100vw, 223px" /></a></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/">Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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