One might think nuclear energy and quantum technology as unrelated. One concerns power plants, uranium, and electrical grids. The other revolves around next-generation computers, ultra-precise sensors, and advanced encryption. However, both are built on the same scientific foundations: quantum physics, or the study of how matter and energy behave at the smallest scales. A nuclear reactor and a quantum computer are governed by the same physical laws. Increasingly, tools developed in one field are becoming useful to the other.

The connection already works in both directions. Nuclear science has quietly contributed to quantum computing for years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has highlighted how ion beams — streams of charged particles — produced by accelerators used in nuclear research are now used to manufacture quantum devices. A well-established process known as ion implantation allows scientists to place individual atoms inside materials such as silicon and diamond with extraordinary precision. Those atoms make up qubits, which are the basic units of information inside quantum processors, many times smaller and faster than traditional computer information bits. The infrastructure built for atomic research is now the basis for creating machines capable of simulating atomic behavior more accurately than ever before.

Once that connection becomes clear, the next question is obvious: what can quantum technology do for the nuclear energy industry? The answer is substantial.

Quantum Computing Can Dramatically Speed Up Nuclear Simulations

Operating a nuclear reactor safely requires understanding the behavior of neutrons inside a reactor core. Those particles collide, scatter, and are absorbed by fuel, continuously changing the temperature and pressure of the surrounding system. Since these interactions are driven by statistical processes, quality information can only be obtained through large number sampling, often around a quadrillion (or a million billions) of interactions. Suffice it to say that designing safer reactors or testing new fuels requires simulations of enormous complexity.

The primary computational method used to track neutrons is the Monte Carlo method, which tracks particles as they move through materials and interact with reactor components. The method is essential for reactor physics and the transport of radioactive materials, but it is computationally expensive. Complex simulations can take days or weeks on classical computers and still rely on approximations because no conventional machine can model the entire system directly.

Quantum computers offer a different approach to the computer application. Because they operate according to quantum principles, they can model nuclear interactions more naturally. A UK research project led by ANSWERS Software Service, part of Amentum, alongside Oxford Quantum Circuits, the National Nuclear Laboratory, Sellafield, and the University of Cambridge, has already demonstrated that quantum algorithms can accelerate Monte Carlo simulations beyond the capabilities of classical systems. Algorithms complete in thousands of steps that calculations on conventional hardware would require millions. For an industry where regulatory approval can take years, reducing simulation times from weeks to hours could significantly alter reactor development timelines.

Both the nuclear and quantum computing fields, however, face the same obstacle: instability. Quantum computers are sensitive to environmental interference, a problem known as quantum noise. The Amentum ANSWERS project has evaluated methods for reducing interferences on working hardware. The more stable quantum computers become, the more dependable they are for the complex calculations that reactor design demands.

Quantum Computing Can Find Better Reactor Materials

Faster simulation is only one positive aspect of quantum computing. Quantum computing may also address one of nuclear energy’s most persistent challenges: materials degradation. The inside of a reactor is one of the harshest environments on Earth: extreme heat, intense radiation, and corrosive chemicals slowly degrade every component. Developing better materials traditionally requires years of testing as damage occurs at the atomic level. Engineers create samples, expose them to reactor conditions, measure the damage, and repeat the process. The cost and duration of that cycle contribute heavily to the slow development of advanced reactors, including Small Modular Reactor projects.

Quantum algorithms could shorten that process dramatically. By modelling atomic interactions under radiation and heat, quantum computers may predict how metal alloys and ceramics will behave before they are physically produced. That capability could reduce development costs and accelerate the deployment of advanced reactor designs.

Quantum Computing Can Make Nuclear Facilities Safer and More Secure

Quantum technology also has practical applications for reactor safety and security. Inside nuclear facilities, early detection is critical. Minor changes in neutron levels, temperature, or structural integrity can determine whether a problem remains in routine maintenance or indicates a larger concern. Quantum sensors, based upon quantum computing components and which can measure radiation, magnetic fields, and temperature with great precision, may provide details that aid in safety analysis.

Security is another concern. The IAEA safeguards system — the international network of inspectors, cameras, seals, and radiation detectors designed to prevent nuclear diversion — depends on securely transmitting sensitive information. Existing encryption methods may eventually become vulnerable to sufficiently advanced quantum computers. Quantum key distribution offers a potential solution. By using quantum-based systems to transmit encryption keys, the method makes interception immediately detectable. Applying it to safeguards communications would help protect nuclear security systems against future quantum-enabled threats.

Quantum Computing Makes Fusion Possible

The most consequential application of quantum technology may involve fusion power. Fusion reactors produce no long-lived radioactive waste, do not suffer from latent core overheating accidents, and rely on hydrogen fuel. Yet fusion remains elusive because plasma behavior is extraordinarily difficult to predict and control. Scientists must contain superheated plasma using complex magnetic fields while optimizing reactor conditions in real time. These are precisely the kinds of optimization problems quantum computers are expected to manage most effectively. Projects such as Commonwealth Fusion Systems and the international ITER project are pursuing fusion on timelines measured in decades. More capable quantum simulations could shorten those timelines and help solve fusion’s remaining engineering challenges.

The evidence linking nuclear and quantum technologies is already substantial. Research projects, work at U.S. national laboratories, and IAEA initiatives on ion-beam technology all point toward deeper integration. What remains limited is institutional coordination.

What Remains to be Done?

Nuclear engineering and quantum computing laboratories still operate in isolation. Governments and funding agencies need programs that bridge the two disciplines. The IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency should also formally evaluate how quantum technologies can improve reactor safety, materials research, and safeguards systems.

Nuclear energy and quantum technology have been treated as separate fields for too long. They share the same scientific foundations, increasingly rely on the same tools, and confront the same technical problems. A future built on nuclear power will depend on quantum computing to design reactors, quantum sensors to monitor them, and quantum encryption to protect them. The institutions responsible for both technologies are only beginning to recognize how connected they already are.

Hira Bashir is an Associate Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Her research focuses on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. She can be reached on X at @HiraBK5090 and on LinkedIn Hira Bashir. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Interconnection of Nuclear Energy and Quantum Technology was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most the world’s approximately 12,100 nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly 87 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately 5,500 and the US holding approximately 5,177, declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated 600 operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated 50 nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.

These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.

Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.

Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel’s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.

Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a “crucial year” for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.

Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.

In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own.

The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.

The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to 2005 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in 2007 and 2008 further tightened the restrictions. In 2010, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s oil revenues and banking sector, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.

These sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a snapback clause; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On August 28, 2025, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.

The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed 2006–2010. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran recalled its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but clarified it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.

The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.

Coordinated attacks by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.

While Russia and China echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 maintained that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also emphasized that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.

The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for zero enrichment and even presented partial solutions at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.

Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its Look East strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.

The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.

The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly two years, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.

The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.

For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.

The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.