Historically, authoritarian regimes without succession plans often face power struggles when the leader eventually dies, retires, or is overthrown. The absence of a designated heir could lead to internal conflicts within the CCP when Xi is gone.

The only possible threat to his authority could emerge from within the security apparatus. Furthermore, his grip on power is not static; it is continuously reinforced through persistent anti-corruption efforts and CCP rectification campaigns. In other words, Xi Jinping’s entrenched control over China’s political system and the mechanisms he employs to maintain power was and remains prominent.

Political Variables

The lack of a clear successor suggests that Xi intends to rule indefinitely, breaking with the leadership norms established after Mao Zedong’s era. This raises concerns about political stability in the long term, as the absence of a transition plan increases the risk of a power struggle when he eventually leaves office.

Also, it means a weakness of political opposition that emphasizes that opposition within China has largely disappeared, with dissenters either forced into exile or silenced through political repression. This suggests a highly controlled political environment where resistance is ineffective. While this strengthens Xi’s immediate grip on power, it does not necessarily eliminate discontent. Rather, it forces opposition underground. If economic hardships or political scandals arise, suppressed grievances could resurface, potentially destabilizing the regime—meaning that discontent is potentially creating instability in the future.

Although Xi appears unchallenged, the security apparatus is a possible source of opposition. Security forces are crucial to maintaining authoritarian rule, and, if internal divisions emerge, they can pose a serious threat to his leadership. Thus, if divisions emerge within China’s security forces whether due to policy disagreements, economic struggles, or leadership disputes, Xi’s position could be at risk.

While there is no clear indication of this happening, it suggests that control over the military and intelligence agencies remains a key factor in his rule. To wit, in authoritarian regimes, the military and intelligence agencies are often the key enforcers of the leader’s rule, but they can also become sources of internal opposition. However, so far, he has maintained tight control over the military and state security agencies through purges and loyalty tests.

There is also a role of anti-corruption and party rectification campaigns in Xi’s bureaucracy and leadership. Rather than merely consolidating power in a passive way, Xi actively reinforces his authority through continuous anti-corruption drives and ideological campaigns to eliminate political rivals and maintain loyalty within the CCP. While these measures strengthen his rule, such campaigns may also create resentment among officials who fear they could become targets.

Aging Political Leadership

The top leadership is tilted in Xi Jinping’s favor. However, this top leadership is aging. An aging leadership also means that many of Xi’s key supporters may retire or pass away, potentially opening room for new political dynamics that he may not fully control.

In 2027, the current Politburo will have an average age above 68. Should they be renominated then, the average age of Politburo members would be above 73 on the eve of the next Party Congress and current Central Committee members are not far behind. Their time horizon will become shorter, and if no potential successor appears, their political position will become increasingly vulnerable. Again, a defining feature of Xi’s leadership is the lack of a designated successor, breaking from previous CCP norms that aimed to ensure stability through planned transitions. Without a clear heir, uncertainty will grow among the party elite, increasing the risk of political maneuvering or factional struggles as different groups seek to position themselves for leadership roles. This uncertainty could weaken Xi’s grip on power over time, especially as leaders begin to consider their own political futures beyond his rule.

As the current leadership ages and their career time horizons shrink, their incentives may shift. Rather than unwavering loyalty to Xi, some officials might begin looking for alternative paths to secure their personal or factional interests. If no successor emerges, competition among different factions could intensify, creating a fragile political environment. Additionally, older officials may become less effective in governance, potentially exacerbating policy stagnation or mismanagement, further weakening the regime’s overall stability.

Unless Xi Jinping changes his basic formula to ensure support and discourage any debate, his power will become brittle, and the likelihood of a succession crisis will increase. His leadership strategy requires grooming a successor or adjusting his approach to elite management. While his current control appears strong, the absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms makes a future power struggle more likely. Historically, power vacuums in authoritarian regimes often lead to internal conflicts, and China could face a similar scenario if Xi does not prepare a clear transition plan.

There are also nuanced views of Xi Jinping’s governance style, highlighting both his consolidation of power and the underlying complexities within China’s political and economic landscape. Despite Xi’s centralization of power and strong grip on influence, Chinese bureaucracies remain highly fragmented, with institutional silos, rival factions, and competition among individuals. This contradicts the idea of a fully unified authoritarian system, suggesting that power struggles still play a role in policy decisions.

Clearly, there is Xi’s ability to enforce policy shifts while maintaining ideological rigidity, as well as the role of elite competition in shaping China’s future. Additionally, the influence of princelings (descendants of revolutionary leaders) remains significant, particularly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial institutions. While the next leader may not necessarily be a princeling, elite clans could act as key power brokers, determining leadership transitions behind the scenes.

At a deeper level, there is a pattern in Xi’s governance. Initial inflexibility followed by strategic reversals or rigidity then with certain pragmatic adjustments. When policies face resistance or cause unintended consequences, this would be addressed through a “pullback pattern” or “rear-view mirror approach” that are evident in key crises, including: the 2015 stock market crisis, the COVID-19 lockdowns, the 2020 real estate crash, and the Sino-American trade war.

This suggests that Xi is a risk-taker but not reckless; meaning, he is willing to implement bold policies but is also pragmatic enough to change course when necessary. However, these reversals are often framed in a way that protects his authority, shifting blame onto subordinates or external factors.

Xi’s political capital plays in a “selective policy flexibility versus ideological rigidity.” While Xi shows pragmatism in adjusting economic policies, his core ideological agenda remains unchanged. His governance remains centered around: reinforcing ideology; promoting “struggle” (斗争); and maintaining a strong international posture. Even in areas where Xi has shown flexibility such as real estate bailouts or fiscal stimulus, shifts are constrained by his broader ideological commitments.

Xi is also deepening policies that predated his rule. He has an affinity for the self-strengthening movement of the Qing empire, summed up by the famous maxim, “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical use” (中学为体, 西学为用). Republican China sought help from Germany to modernize its arms industry and sent students on scholarships to the United States. The best-known case of this is rocket scientist Qian Xuesen who, after leaving the United States in 1955, led China’s ballistic development.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty was the basis for what is called the largest technology transfer in history. Much of this focused on industry and infrastructure, but it also involved education and the training of scientists, including in the nuclear field.

The Sino-Soviet rift inaugurated a period of closure, but Mao Zedong nonetheless launched several “big projects” during the Great Leap Forward. They are recalled today to justify the present large-scale policies.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai, followed by Deng Xiaoping, hailed the “four modernizations” (四个现代化) that put the accent on big science again. Since the early 1960s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never ceased from engaging in research and development on new weapons, serving as a harbor for scientists in times of political turmoil or during more recent anti-corruption campaigns.

A chief aim of China’s normalization with the United States was to acquire key technologies. From former US Presidents Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter’s presidency, which was the heyday of the US convergence with China against the Soviet Union, supercomputers (supposedly for climate predictions), nuclear knowledge, radar installations, and many other dual-use technologies were shared. Large contingents of Chinese students underwent education and training abroad, mainly in the United States.

Successively, we can observe that Xi’s foreign policy adaptations are evident with strategic pauses. There is a pattern of assertiveness followed by recalibration. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), once a cornerstone of China’s global strategy, has seen a decline in outward investments and loans, possibly due to economic slowdowns and concerns over debt sustainability. Additionally, in response to changing global dynamics, particularly under a potential Trump second presidency (2024–2028), China appears to be cautiously reassessing its relationships with key nations, including India, Japan, and the UK. This suggests that while Xi projects strength internationally, he is also willing to adjust diplomatic strategies to navigate shifting geopolitical realities.

Implication and Conclusion

Per its implication, while Xi’s control appears secure for now, the long-term consequences of his rule remain uncertain. The suppression of opposition, lack of a succession plan, and reliance on internal purges could make the political system more fragile over time. If economic challenges or elite divisions intensify, his grip on power may face unexpected tests.

Xi’s leadership is characterized by strong, centralized control, but his dominance is not necessarily permanent. His reliance on security forces, ideological campaigns, and repression keeps him in power, yet these same factors could generate internal tensions. Whether his rule remains stable or faces future challenges depends on how well he navigates potential economic, political, and internal security risks.

While Xi Jinping maintains firm control over the CCP, the aging leadership and the absence of a succession plan introduce long-term vulnerabilities. If these issues remain unaddressed, they could lead to political uncertainty, elite fragmentation, and a potential succession crisis. Xi’s ability to navigate these challenges will determine the long-term stability of his rule and the CCP’s future.

Xi Jinping’s leadership is characterized by a mix of ideological rigidity and strategic pragmatism. While he has consolidated power, elite competition, bureaucratic infighting, and security apparatus tensions remain underlying factors in China’s political landscape. His policy approach follows a recognizable pattern: firm initial positions, followed by controlled reversals, when necessary, which helps him maintain authority while adapting to challenges. However, as China faces economic pressures, elite power struggles, and an evolving international environment, the long-term sustainability of this governance model remains uncertain.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines.  The ideas are the author’s own.

Xi Jinping’s Bureaucracy in 2025: A Critique was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.

During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.

The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.

More Actors Are Getting Involved

The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.

However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.

They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.

This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.

In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.

Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.

The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.

Election Day Was Just the Beginning

Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”

First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”

What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.

In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.

A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.

As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.

It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.

Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science & Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not was originally published on Global Security Review.