Semiconductors: The Backbone of Cyber Power

Semiconductors enable the computing power that drives everything from commercial applications to military operations. Advanced chips are critical for AI, autonomous systems, and national security infrastructure. As nations race to secure technological dominance, control over semiconductor production becomes a central element of cyber deterrence.

The production of semiconductors is extraordinarily complex and relies on a global supply chain. No single country is self-sufficient in this domain. Manufacturing processes demand rare metals, precision tools, and expertise spanning Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Companies like TSMC (Taiwan), Intel (United States), and Samsung (South Korea) dominate the field, with TSMC leading in advanced chip production. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography (ASML), a Dutch company, monopolizes the production of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, critical for fabricating cutting-edge chips.

The Strategic Importance of Semiconductors

Semiconductors are more than just a commercial product—they are a strategic resource that nations leverage to project power in cyberspace. The United States has long recognized the importance of staying ahead in chip technology, aiming to maintain at least a two-generation lead over adversaries like China. This lead is not just about technological superiority but is also about cyber deterrence.

Cyber deterrence relies on the ability to defend, retaliate, or disrupt an adversary’s cyber capabilities. Advanced semiconductors provide the computational power necessary for AI-driven cybersecurity systems, intelligence gathering, and offensive cyber operations. For example, autonomous systems in modern warfare require sophisticated chips to function effectively. If a nation lacks access to such technology, its cyber capabilities are significantly weakened.

China’s Vulnerability and Response

China, despite being the second-largest economy and a global manufacturing powerhouse, has a surprising weakness in the semiconductor supply chain. It spends more on importing chips than oil and relies heavily on foreign suppliers, including its geopolitical rivals. This dependency creates a critical vulnerability in its cyber and AI ambitions.

Recognizing this weakness, China launched massive initiatives to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductor production. However, the barriers to entry are steep. Manufacturing cutting-edge chips requires material purity at a level of 99.99999 percent, and even a minor defect can render a chip unusable. The complexity of the global supply chain further complicates China’s efforts. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography machines, essential for advanced chip production, are legally restricted from being sold to China under export control agreements led by the United States.

China’s strategy focuses on targeting chokepoints in the supply chain while ramping up domestic production of less advanced chips. Success in this endeavor would significantly alter the balance of power in cyberspace, enabling China to compete more effectively in AI and cyber operations. However, for now, its reliance on foreign technology remains a significant deterrent.

US Strategy: Strengthening Deterrence Through Dominance

The United States took proactive steps to secure its dominance in semiconductor technology as part of its cyber deterrence strategy. Legislation like the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act provides billions in subsidies to bolster domestic chip production. The US also works to integrate government, industry, and academia to address challenges in manpower, education, and research and development.

The American approach to cyber deterrence is twofold. First, it seeks to maintain its technological edge by investing in leading-edge chips while ensuring a robust supply of legacy nodes for essential systems. Second, it actively restricts access to critical technologies for adversaries. For instance, since 2018, the export of EUV lithography machines to China has been prohibited, a move aimed at stalling China’s progress in advanced semiconductor manufacturing.

This strategy aligns with the broader geopolitical framework, where supply chain control becomes a tool for exerting influence. By leveraging its dominance in semiconductors, the US can deny adversaries the tools they need to compete in AI-driven cyber capabilities, thereby strengthening its cyber deterrence posture.

The Role of AI and Advanced Chips in Cyber Deterrence

AI is a cornerstone of cyber operations, from defensive systems that identify and mitigate threats to offensive tools that exploit vulnerabilities in adversarial networks. The power of AI is directly tied to the availability of advanced chips, which enable greater computational efficiency and data processing.

In the AI arms race, semiconductors are the critical enabler. Nations with access to advanced chips can train larger models, process more data, and deploy more sophisticated algorithms. Conversely, those lacking access are at a significant disadvantage. This dynamic emphasizes the importance of securing semiconductor supply chains as part of national cyber deterrence strategies.

Geopolitics and the Future of Cyber Deterrence

The geopolitical implications of semiconductor dominance extend beyond cyber operations. Control over the chip supply chain influences alliances, trade policies, and even the balance of power in global governance. Governments increasingly push nations and companies to choose sides, creating a polarized landscape.

The US and its allies currently hold a strong position, but the race is far from over. As China invests heavily in self-sufficiency, the stakes in the semiconductor arms race continue to rise. The future of cyber deterrence will depend on the ability of nations to secure their supply chains, innovate in chip technology, and adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of AI and cybersecurity.

Conclusion

Semiconductors are not just a technological marvel—they are a strategic weapon in the cyber domain. As nations compete for supremacy, control over chip production and supply chains will play a pivotal role in shaping cyber deterrence strategies. The US, with its technological edge and integrated approach, aims to maintain its dominance, while China’s efforts to overcome its vulnerabilities will redefine the global order. In this high-stakes competition, the invisible hand of the market is guided by the visible hand of governments, ensuring that semiconductors remain at the heart of cyber power.

Adam Harris, PhD, is a career cyber professional who both practices the profession and teaches at the university level. The views expressed are his own.    

Cyber Deterrence in the Age of Semiconductors was originally published on Global Security Review.

A comparison of recommendations for multilateral diplomacy and sanctions written in 2007 and 2023 offer no evidence of success. Experts now say Tehran is within a few months of several working atom bombs, and a year or two at most from having nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Israel and the European Union.

Israel’s bombings of plutonium-producing reactors under construction in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 are simpler examples of how to regain the initiative in civil defense—via prevention of nuclear attack to begin with. Iran’s underground nuclear weapon facilities at Natanz and Furdow should be neutralized with GBU57-A/B ground-penetrator ordnance, which are necessary to wreck their delicate centrifuges and cave in their adits (entrances).

Sanctions and diplomacy failed to stop North Korea from getting the bomb. Words and tighter sanctions will no longer work on Iran. Iran is a disruptive, warmongering, rogue state. Its repressive autocratic regime is entrenched.

Iran is controlled by a radical sect that believes killing perceived enemies is a sure route to Paradise. Iran’s leaders promise to “destroy Israel forever.”

The risk calculus, were Iran to field nuclear arms, would present the US, and Israel, especially, with something worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis. A nuclear-armed Iran is more intolerable than a nuclear-armed Cuba in 1962. The conditions favorable for a successful naval quarantine of Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the decks of cargo ships going to Cuba, do not apply to Iran.

It is unwise to look to nuclear deterrence against a nuclear-armed and radically hostile Iran to solve the problem, given their extremist ideology. Keeping nuclear weapons far away from bad actors is vital to effective nuclear counterterrorism.

Both Russia and China have separatist problems—including terrorists who might have or might develop Iran connections. Their best interests are aligned with the US and Israel in this instance. This is similar for Israel’s Arab neighbors. They should all want Tehran’s nuclear weapons program permanently terminated. Yet they stay on the sidelines, believing this is a Western problem.

North Korea shows that once a rogue state fields nuclear warheads on missiles, voluntary denuclearization becomes impossible. The US missed the opportunity to prevent the Kim regime from fielding a now-expanding nuclear arsenal.

As Iran’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei surely realizes, “Israel is a one-bomb country” because of its small size. This means that a single nuclear weapon could devastate any of Israel’s major cities.

The Kim regime played several American presidents while North Korea came to own dozens of nuclear missiles threatening South Korea, Japan, and, now, the continental United States. The ayatollahs are probably playing a similar game. Hamas’s attack could be Tehran’s premeditated sleight of hand to buy the little time they need to go nuclear.

Iran’s latest threats to attack Israel’s nuclear facilities and finish their own atom bomb, should Israel attack Iran’s nuclear assets, has unacceptable odds of being more Tehran double-talk while Iran’s covert weapons work presses forward. Intel that such worked ceased—like the nonexistent or ignored “intel” before September 11, 2001, and October 7, 2023—might be, quite literally, fatally flawed.

A clandestine approach to building fission weapons underground might be beyond already overstretched Mossad and CIA abilities to detect. Typical intel lapses, bureaucratic sluggishness, and political paralysis within and between concerned countries could get millions killed.

Barely 4 percent of the ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel got through the layered multinational defenses defending Israel on April 13. But with further attrition of interceptors and less help from the outside being possible over the next year, one atom bomb might reach Israeli soil. Missile defenses alone are not the answer. An Iranian bomb could instead be delivered covertly, by a ship or a truck…or a camel…or mule.

A nuclear attack is likely to take place without warning. The heat and overpressure from an air blast over Tel Aviv would prove devastating. A ground burst could blanket Israel’s cities and towns with fallout.

It would be better and wiser to fight a larger regional conventional war now than a limited nuclear war in the Middle East in the months or years ahead. Yet more “mowing the grass,” or reticent watchful waiting, are short-term non-answers.

As a Department of State spokesman recently said, “Iran has no credible civilian justification for enrichment up to sixty percent.” Iran has already crossed an unacceptable red line. As Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently said, “Israel will do whatever it needs to defend itself.”

Israel does not need more lectures about restraint. Israel needs to prevent nuclear annihilation at the hands of Islamic terrorists certain their religious obligation requires them to strike with whatever deadly weapons they possess.

Joe Buff is a senior fellow for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran Shall Not Have the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.